sociological self essay

How to Write a Sociological Essay: Explained with Examples

This article will discuss “How to Write a Sociological Essay” with insider pro tips and give you a map that is tried and tested. An essay writing is done in three phases: a) preparing for the essay, b) writing the essay, and c) editing the essay. We will take it step-by-step so that nothing is left behind because the devil, as well as good grades and presentation, lies in the details.

Writing is a skill that we learn throughout the courses of our lives. Learning how to write is a process that we begin as soon as we turn 4, and the learning process never stops. But the question is, “is all writing the same?”. The answer is NO. Do you remember your initial lessons of English when you were in school, and how the teacher taught various formats of writing such as formal, informal, essay, letter, and much more? Therefore, writing is never that simple. Different occasions demand different styles and commands over the writing style. Thus, the art of writing improves with time and experience. 

Those who belong to the world of academia know that writing is something that they cannot escape. No writing is the same when it comes to different disciplines of academia. Similarly, the discipline of sociology demands a particular style of formal academic writing. If you’re a new student of sociology, it can be an overwhelming subject, and writing assignments don’t make the course easier. Having some tips handy can surely help you write and articulate your thoughts better. 

[Let us take a running example throughout the article so that every point becomes crystal clear. Let us assume that the topic we have with us is to “Explore Culinary Discourse among the Indian Diasporic Communities” .]

Phase I: Preparing for the Essay  

Step 1: make an outline.

So you have to write a sociological essay, which means that you already either received or have a topic in mind. The first thing for you to do is PLAN how you will attempt to write this essay. To plan, the best way is to make an outline. The topic you have, certainly string some thread in your mind. They can be instances you heard or read, some assumptions you hold, something you studied in the past, or based on your own experience, etc. Make a rough outline where you note down all the themes you would like to talk about in your essay. The easiest way to make an outline is to make bullet points. List all the thoughts and examples that you have in find and create a flow for your essay. Remember that this is only a rough outline so you can always make changes and reshuffle your points. 

[Explanation through example, assumed topic: “Explore Culinary Discourse among the Indian Diasporic Communities” . Your outline will look something like this:

• Importance of food
• Definition of Diaspora 
• Relationship between food and culture
• Relationship between food and nation
• Relationship between food and media 
• Relationship between food and nostalgia 
• How food travels with people 
• Is food practices different for different sections of society, such as caste, class, gender ]

Step 2: Start Reading 

Once you have prepared an outline for your essay, the next step is to start your RESEARCH . You cannot write a sociological essay out of thin air. The essay needs to be thoroughly researched and based on facts. Sociology is the subject of social science that is based on facts and evidence. Therefore, start reading as soon as you have your outline determined. The more you read, the more factual data you will collect. But the question which now emerges is “what to read” . You cannot do a basic Google search to write an academic essay. Your research has to be narrow and concept-based. For writing a sociological essay, make sure that the sources from where you read are academically acclaimed and accepted.  

Some of the websites that you can use for academic research are: 

• Google Scholar
• Shodhganga 

[Explanation through example, assumed topic: “Explore Culinary Discourse among the Indian Diasporic Communities” . 

For best search, search for your articles by typing “Food+Diaspora”, “Food+Nostalgia”, adding a plus sign (+) improves the search result.]

Step 3: Make Notes 

This is a step that a lot of people miss when they are preparing to write their essays. It is important to read, but how you read is also a very vital part. When you are reading from multiple sources then all that you read becomes a big jumble of information in your mind. It is not possible to remember who said what at all times. Therefore, what you need to do while reading is to maintain an ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY . Whenever you’re reading for writing an academic essay then have a notebook handy, or if you prefer electronic notes then prepare a Word Document, Google Docs, Notes, or any tool of your choice to make notes. 

As you begin reading, note down the title of the article, its author, and the year of publication. As you read, keep writing down all the significant points that you find. You can either copy whole sentences or make shorthand notes, whatever suits you best. Once you’ve read the article and made your notes, write a summary of what you just read in 8 to 10 lines. Also, write keywords, these are the words that are most used in the article and reflect its essence. Having keywords and a summary makes it easier for you to revisit the article. A sociological essay needs a good amount of research, which means that you have to read plenty, thus maintaining an annotated bibliography helps you in the greater picture.  

Annotate and divide your notes based on the outline you made. Having organized notes will help you directly apply the concepts where they are needed rather than you going and searching for them again.] 

Phase II: Write a Sociological Essay

A basic essay includes a title, an introduction, the main body, and a conclusion. A sociological essay is not that different as far as the body of contents goes, but it does include some additional categories. When you write a sociological essay, it should have the following contents and chronology: 

• Subtitle (optional)
• Introduction

Conclusion 

• References/ Bibliography 

Now let us get into the details which go into the writing of a sociological essay.  

Step 4: Writing a Title, Subtitle, Abstract, and Keywords 

The title of any document is the first thing that a reader comes across. Therefore, the title should be provocative, specific, and the most well-thought part of any essay. Your title should reflect what your essay will discuss further. There has to be a sync between the title and the rest of your content. The title should be the biggest font size you use in your essay. 

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: A title preferably should not exceed 5 to 7 words.  

This is an optional component of any essay. If you think that your title cannot justify the rest of the contents of your essay, then you opt for a subtitle. The subtitle is the secondary part of the title which is used to further elucidate the title. A subtitle should be smaller in font than the Title but bigger than the rest of the essay body.  

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: Make the font color of your subtitle Gray instead of Black for it to stand out. 

The abstract is a 6 to 10 line description of what you will talk about in your essay. An abstract is a very substantial component of a sociological essay. Most of the essays written in academia exceed the word limit of 2000 words. Therefore, a writer, i.e., you, provides the reader with a short abstract at the beginning of your essay so that they can know what you are going to discuss. From the point of view of the reader, a good abstract can save time and help determine if the piece is worth reading or not. Thus, make sure to make your abstract as reflective to your essay as possible using the least amount of words.  

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: If you are not sure about your abstract at first, it is always great to write the abstract in the end after you are done with your essay. 

Your abstract should highlight all the points that you will further discuss. Therefore your abstract should mention how diasporic communities are formed and how they are not homogeneous communities. There are differences within this large population. In your essay, you will talk in detail about all the various aspects that affect food and diasporic relationships. ]

Keywords are an extension of your abstract. Whereas in your abstract you will use a paragraph to tell the reader what to expect ahead, by stating keywords, you point out the essence of your essay by using only individual words. These words are mostly concepts of social sciences. At first, glance, looking at your keywords, the reader should get informed about all the concepts and themes you will explain in detail later. 

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: Bold your Keywords so that they get highlighted.

Your keywords could be: Food, Diaspora, Migration, and so on. Build on these as you continue to write your essay.]   

Step 5: Writing the Introduction, Main Body, and Conclusion 

Introduction 

Your introduction should talk about the subject on which you are writing at the broadest level. In an introduction, you make your readers aware of what you are going to argue later in the essay. An introduction can discuss a little about the history of the topic, how it was understood till now, and a framework of what you are going to talk about ahead. You can think of your introduction as an extended form of the abstract. Since it is the first portion of your essay, it should paint a picture where the readers know exactly what’s ahead of them. 

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: An apt introduction can be covered in 2 to 3 paragraphs (Look at the introduction on this article if you need proof). 

Since your focus is on “food” and “diaspora”, your introductory paragraph can dwell into a little history of the relationship between the two and the importance of food in community building.] 

This is the most extensive part of any essay. It is also the one that takes up the most number of words. All the research and note-making which you did was for this part. The main body of your essay is where you put all the knowledge you gathered into words. When you are writing the body, your aim should be to make it flow, which means that all paragraphs should have a connection between them. When read in its entirety, the paragraphs should sing together rather than float all around. 

The main body is mostly around 4 to 6 paragraphs long. A sociological essay is filled with debates, theories, theorists, and examples. When writing the main body it is best to target making one or two paragraphs about the same revolving theme. When you shift to the other theme, it is best to connect it with the theme you discussed in the paragraph right above it to form a connection between the two. If you are dividing your essay into various sub-themes then the best way to correlate them is starting each new subtheme by reflecting on the last main arguments presented in the theme before it. To make a sociological essay even more enriching, include examples that exemplify the theoretical concepts better. 

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: Though there is no word limit to the length of the paragraphs, if you keep one paragraph between 100 to 200 words, it makes the essay look more organized. 

The main body can here be divided into the categories which you formed during the first step of making the rough outline. Therefore, your essay could have 3 to 4 sub-sections discussing different themes such as: Food and Media, Caste and Class influence food practices, Politics of Food, Gendered Lens, etc.] 

This is the section where you end your essay. But ending the essay does not mean that you lose your flair in conclusion. A conclusion is an essential part of any essay because it sums up everything you just wrote. Your conclusion should be similar to a summary of your essay. You can include shortened versions of the various arguments you have referred to above in the main body, or it can raise questions for further research, and it can also provide solutions if your topic seeks one. Hence, a conclusion is a part where you get the last chance to tell your reader what you are saying through your article. 

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: As the introduction, the conclusion is smaller compared to the main body. Keep your conclusion within the range of 1 to 2 paragraphs. 

Your conclusion should again reiterate all the main arguments provided by you throughout the essay. Therefore it should bind together everything you have written starting from your introduction to all the debates and examples you have cited.]

Step 6: Citation and Referencing 

This is the most academic part of your sociological essay. Any academic essay should be free of plagiarism. But how can one avoid plagiarism when their essay is based on research which was originally done by others. The solution for this is to give credit to the original author for their work. In the world of academia, this is done through the processes of Citation and Referencing (sometimes also called Bibliography). Citation is done within/in-between the text, where you directly or indirectly quote the original text. Whereas, Referencing or Bibliography is done at the end of an essay where you give resources of the books or articles which you have quoted in your essay at various points. Both these processes are done so that the reader can search beyond your essay to get a better grasp of the topic. 

There are many different styles of citations and you can determine which you want to follow. Some of the most common styles of citation and referencing are MLA, APA, and Chicago style. If you are working on Google Docs or Word then the application makes your work easier because they help you curate your citations. There are also various online tools that can make citing references far easier, faster, and adhering to citation guidelines, such as an APA generator. This can save you a lot of time when it comes to referencing, and makes the task far more manageable. 

How to add citations in Google Doc: Tools → Citation

How to add citations in Word Document: References → Insert Citations 

But for those who want to cite manually, this is the basic format to follow:

• Author’s Name with Surname mentioned first, then initials 
• Article’s Title in single or double quotes
• Journal Title in Italics 
• Volume, issue number 
• Year of Publication

Example: Syrkin, A. 1984. “Notes on the Buddha’s Threats in the Dīgha Nikāya ”, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies , vol. 7(1), pp.147-58.

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: Always make sure that your Bibliography/References are alphabetically ordered based on the first alphabet of the surname of the author and NOT numbered or bulleted. 

Phase III: Editing 

Step 7: edit/review your essay.

The truth of academic writing is that it can never be written in one go. You need to write, rewrite, and revisit your material more than once. Once you have written the first draft of your essay, do not revise it immediately. Leave it for some time, at least for four hours. Then revisit your essay and edit it based on 3 criteria. The first criteria you need to recheck for is any grammatical and/or spelling mistakes. The second criteria are to check the arguments you have posed and if the examples you have cited correlate or not. The final criteria are to read the essay as a reader and read it objectively. 

Pro Tip by Sociology Group: The more you edit the better results you get. But we think that your 3rd draft is the magic draft. Draft 1: rough essay, Draft 2: edited essay, Draft 3: final essay.

Hello! Eiti is a budding sociologist whose passion lies in reading, researching, and writing. She thrives on coffee, to-do lists, deadlines, and organization. Eiti's primary interest areas encompass food, gender, and academia.

Self in Sociology

• Key Concepts
• Major Sociologists
• News & Issues
• Research, Samples, and Statistics
• Recommended Reading
• Archaeology

From a classical sociological perspective, the self is a relatively stable set of perceptions of who we are in relation to ourselves, others, and to social systems. The self is socially constructed in the sense that it is shaped through interaction with other people. As with socialization in general, the individual is not a passive participant in this process and have a powerful influence over how this process and its consequences develop.

• Symbolic Interaction Theory: History, Development, and Examples
• Why We Selfie
• Introduction to Sociology
• The Sociology of Gender
• The Concept of "Other" in Sociology
• Assessing a Situation, in Terms of Sociology
• The Major Theoretical Perspectives of Sociology
• Major Sociological Theories
• What Is Feminism Really All About?
• What Is Symbolic Interactionism?
• Understanding Primary and Secondary Groups in Sociology
• The Sociology of Race and Ethnicity
• Studying Race and Gender with Symbolic Interaction Theory
• What Is a Schema in Psychology? Definition and Examples
• What Is Self-Concept in Psychology?
• Understanding Resocialization in Sociology

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

Chapter 3. The Self

3.3 The Social Self: The Role of the Social Situation

Learning Objectives

• Describe the concept of the looking-glass self and how it affects our self-concept.
• Explore the impact of the labeling bias, self-labeling, and internalized prejudice on people’s self-concepts, particularly in those from marginalized social groups.
• Define social comparison, and summarize how people use it to define their self-concepts and self-esteem.
• Give examples of the use of upward and downward social comparison and their influences on social cognition and affect.
• Explain the concept of social identity and why it is important to human behavior.
• Describe how self-evaluation maintenance theory helps to explain how we react when other people’s behaviors threaten our sense of self.
• Describe the concept of self-presentation and the various strategies we use to portray ourselves to others.
• Outline the concept of reputation management and how it relates to self-presentation.
• Discuss the individual-difference variable of self-monitoring and how it relates to the ability and desire to self-present.

To this point, we have seen, among other things, that human beings have complex and well-developed self-concepts and that they generally attempt to view themselves positively. These more cognitive and affective aspects of ourselves do not, of course, occur in a vacuum. They are heavily influenced by the social forces that surround us. We have alluded to some of these forces already; for example, in our review of self-verification theory, we saw how feedback from others can affect our self-concept and esteem. We also looked at ways that our sociocultural backgrounds can affect the content of our self-concept.

In this section, we will consider in more detail these and other social aspects of the self by exploring the many ways that the social situation influences our self-concept and esteem. The self is not created in isolation; we are not born with perceptions of ourselves as shy, interested in jazz, or charitable to others, for example. Rather, such beliefs are determined by our observations of and interactions with others. Are you rich or poor? Beautiful or ugly? Smart or not? Good or bad at playing video games? And how do you know? These questions can be answered only by looking at those around us. The self has meaning only within the social context, and it is not wrong to say that the social situation defines our self-concept and our self-esteem. We rely on others to provide a “social reality”—to help us determine what to think, feel, and do (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). But what forms do these social influences take? It is to this question that we will now turn.

The Looking-Glass Self: Our Sense of Self is Influenced by Others’ Views of Us

The concept of the looking-glass self  states that part of how we see ourselves comes from our perception of how others see us (Cooley, 1902). We might feel that we have a great sense of humor, for example, because others have told us, and often laugh (apparently sincerely) at our jokes. Many studies have supported a basic prediction derived from the notion of the looking-glass self, namely that our self-concepts are often quite similar to the views that others have of us (Beer, Watson, & McDade-Montez, 2013). This may be particularly so with people from our own families and culture. Perkins, Wiley, and Deaux (2014), for example, found that, in the United States, how members of ethnic minority groups believed other members of the same culture perceived them significantly correlated with their self-esteem scores. In contrast, their perceived appraisal of European Americans toward them was only weakly related to their self-esteem.

This evidence is merely correlational, though, so we cannot be sure which way the influence is working. Maybe we develop our self-concept quite independently of others, and they then base their views of us on how we see ourselves. The work of Mark Baldwin and colleagues has been particularly important in demonstrating that how we think we are being perceived by others really can affect how we see ourselves.

For example, Baldwin and Holmes (1987) conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that our self-concepts derive partly from the way we imagine that we would be perceived by significant others. In the first study, 40 women were instructed to visualize the faces of either two acquaintances or two older members of their own family. Later they were asked to rate their perceived enjoyableness of a piece of fiction with sexual content, and they typically responded in keeping with the responses they perceived the people they had visualized would have had. This effect was more pronounced when they sat in front of a mirror (remember the earlier discussion of self-awareness theory). In the second study, 60 men were exposed to a situation involving failure, and their self-evaluations to this setback were then measured. As with the women’s study, the men’s self-evaluations matched those they perceived that the people they were asked to visualize would have made, particularly when they were more self-aware. At least some of the time, then, we end up evaluating ourselves as we imagine others would. Of course, it can work both ways, too. Over time, the people around us may come to accept the self-concept that we present to others (Yeung & Martin, 2003).

Sometimes, the influence of other people’s appraisals of ourselves on our self-concept may be so strong that we end up internalizing them. For example, we are often labeled in particular ways by others, perhaps informally in terms of our ethnic background, or more formally in terms of a physical or psychological diagnosis. The labeling bias occurs when we are labeled, and others’ views and expectations of us are affected by that labeling (Fox & Stinnett, 1996). For example, if a teacher knows that a child has been diagnosed with a particular psychological disorder, that teacher may have different expectations and explanations of the child’s behavior than he or she would if not aware of that label. Where things get really interesting for our present discussion is when those expectations start to become self-fulfilling prophecies, and our self-concept and even our behavior start to align with them. For example, when children are labeled in special education contexts, these labels can then impact their self-esteem (Taylor, Hume, & Welsh, 2010).

If we are repeatedly labeled and evaluated by others, then self-labeling may occur, which happens when we  adopt others’ labels explicitly into our self-concept . The effects of this self-labeling on our self-esteem appear to depend very much on the nature of the labels. Labels used in relation to diagnosis of psychological disorders can be detrimental to people whom then internalize them. For example, Moses (2009) found that adolescents who self-labeled according to diagnoses they had received were found to have higher levels of self-stigma in their self-concepts compared with those who described their challenges in non-pathological terms. In these types of situation, those who self-label may come to experience  internalized prejudice, which occurs  when individuals turn prejudice directed toward them by others onto themselves.  Internalized prejudice has been found to predict more negative self-concept and poorer psychological adjustment in members of various groups, including sexual minorities (Carter, 2012) and racial minorities (Szymanski & Obiri, 2011).

In other cases, labels used by wider society to describe people negatively can be positively reclaimed by those being labeled. Galinsky and colleagues (2013) explored this use of self-labeling by members of oppressed groups to reclaim derogatory terms, including “queer” and “bitch,” used by dominant groups. After self-labeling, minority group members evaluated these terms less negatively, reported feeling more powerful, and were also perceived by observers as more powerful. Overall, these results indicate that individuals who incorporate a formerly negative label into their self-concept in order to reclaim it can sometimes undermine the stigma attached to the label.

Social Comparison Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by Comparisons with Others

Self-concept and self-esteem are also heavily influenced by the process of  social comparison  (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Van Lange, 2008). Social comparison occurs when we learn about our abilities and skills, about the appropriateness and validity of our opinions, and about our relative social status by comparing our own attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors with those of others . These comparisons can be with people who we know and interact with, with those whom we read about or see on TV, or with anyone else we view as important. However, the most meaningful comparisons we make tend to be with those we see as similar to ourselves (Festinger, 1954).

Social comparison occurs primarily on dimensions on which there are no correct answers or objective benchmarks and thus on which we can rely only on the beliefs of others for information. Answers to questions such as “What should I wear to the interview?” or “What kind of music should I have at my wedding?” are frequently determined at least in part by using the behavior of others as a basis of comparison. We also use social comparison to help us determine our skills or abilities—how good we are at performing a task or doing a job, for example. When students ask their teacher for the class average on an exam, they are also seeking to use social comparison to evaluate their performance.

Research Focus

Affiliation and Social Comparison

The extent to which individuals use social comparison to determine their evaluations of events was demonstrated in a set of classic research studies conducted by Stanley Schachter (1959). Schachter’s experiments tested the hypothesis that people who were feeling anxious would prefer to affiliate with others rather than be alone because having others around would reduce their anxiety. Female college students at the University of Minnesota volunteered to participate in one of his experiments for extra credit in their introductory psychology class. They arrived at the experimental room to find a scientist dressed in a white lab coat, standing in front of a large array of electrical machinery. The scientist introduced himself as Dr. Zilstein of the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, and he told the women that they would be serving as participants in an experiment concerning the effects of electrical shock. Dr. Zilstein stressed how important it was to learn about the effects of shocks, since electroshock therapy was being used more and more commonly and because the number of accidents due to electricity was also increasing!

At this point, the experimental manipulation occurred. One half of the participants (those in the high-anxiety condition ) were told that the shocks would be “painful” and “intense,” although they were assured that they could do no permanent damage. The other half of the participants (those in the low-anxiety condition ) were also told that they would be receiving shocks but that they would in no way be painful—rather, the shocks were said to be mild and to resemble a “tickle” or a “tingle.” Of course, the respondents were randomly assigned to conditions to assure that the women in the two conditions were, on average, equivalent except for the experimental manipulation.

Each of the women was then told that before the experiment could continue the experimenter would have to prepare the equipment and that they would have to wait until he was finished. He asked them if they would prefer to wait alone or with others. The outcome of Schachter’s research was clear: while only 33% of the women who were expecting mild shocks preferred to wait with others, 63% of the women expecting to get painful shocks wanted to wait with others. This was a statistically significant difference, and Schachter concluded that the women chose to affiliate with each other in order to reduce their anxiety about the upcoming shocks.

In further studies, Schachter found that the research participants who were under stress did not want to wait with just any other people. They preferred to wait with other people who were expecting to undergo the same severe shocks that they were rather than with people who were supposedly just waiting to see their professor. Schachter concluded that this was not just because being around other people might reduce our anxiety but because we also use others who are in the same situation as we are to help us determine how to feel about things. As Schachter (1959) put it, “Misery doesn’t just love any kind of company, it loves only miserable company” (p. 24). In this case, the participants were expecting to determine from the other participants how afraid they should be of the upcoming shocks.

In short, and as predicted by the idea of social comparison, the women in Schachter’s studies relied on each other to help them understand what was happening to them and to find out how they should feel and respond to their social situations. Again, the power of the social situation—in this case, in determining our beliefs and attitudes—is apparent.

Although Schachter’s studies were conducted in relatively artificial lab settings, similar effects have been found in field studies in more naturally occurring settings. For instance, Kulik, Mahler, and Moore (1996) found that hospital patients who were awaiting surgery preferred to talk to other individuals who were expecting to have similar procedures rather than to patients who were having different procedures, so that they could share information about what they might expect to experience. Furthermore, Kulik and his colleagues found that sharing information was helpful: people who were able to share more information had shorter hospital stays.

Upward and Downward Comparisons Influence Our Self-Esteem

Although we use social comparison in part to develop our self-concept—that is, to form accurate conclusions about our attitudes, abilities, and opinions—social comparison has perhaps an even bigger impact on our self-esteem. When we are able to compare ourselves favorably with others, we feel good about ourselves, but when the outcome of comparison suggests that others are better or better off than we are, then our self-esteem is likely to suffer. This is one reason why good students who attend high schools in which the other students are only average may suddenly find their self-esteem threatened when they move on to colleges and universities in which they are no longer better than the other students (Marsh, Kong, & Hau, 2000). Perhaps you’ve had the experience yourself of the changes in self-esteem that occur when you have moved into a new year in school, got a new job, or changed your circle of friends. In these cases, you may have felt much better about yourself or much worse, depending on the nature of the change. You can see that in these cases the actual characteristics of the individual person have not changed at all; only the social situation and the comparison with others have changed.

Because many people naturally want to have positive self-esteem, they frequently attempt to compare themselves positively with others. Downward social comparison occurs when we attempt to create a positive image of ourselves through favorable comparisons with others who are worse off than we are. In one study Morse and Gergen (1970) had students apply for a job, and they also presented the students with another individual who was supposedly applying for the same job. When the other candidate was made to appear to be less qualified for the job, the downward comparison with the less-qualified applicant made the students feel better about their own qualifications. As a result, the students reported higher self-esteem than they did when the other applicant was seen as a highly competent job candidate. Research has also found that people who are suffering from serious diseases prefer to compare their condition with other individuals whose current condition and likely prognosis is worse than their own (Buunk, Gibbons, & Visser, 2002). These comparisons make them feel more hopeful about their own possible outcomes. More frequent use of downward than upward social comparison with similar others has been been shown to be a commonly used coping strategy for preserving self-esteem in the face of a wide variety of challenging life situations, including experiences of physical decline, rheumatoid arthritis, AIDS, occupational burnout, eating disorders, unemployment, educational difficulties, and intellectual disabilities (Buunk, Gibbons, & Buunk, 1997).

Although downward comparison provides us with positive feelings, upward social comparison , which occurs when we compare ourselves with others who are better off than we are , is also common (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999; Vrugt & Koenis, 2002). Upward comparison may lower our self-esteem by reminding us that we are not as well off as others. The power of upward social comparison to decrease self-esteem has been documented in many domains (Buunk, Gibbons, & Buunk, 1997). Thinking back to our case study at the beginning of this chapter, this power can sometimes be strongly felt when looking at social networking sites. Imagine someone who has had a bad day, or is generally unhappy with how life is going, then logs onto Facebook to see that most of his or her friends have posted very positive status updates about how happy they are, how well they are doing, or the wonderful vacations they are having. What would your prediction be about how that person would feel? Would that person take pleasure from knowing that the friends were happy, or would the friends’ happiness make the person feel worse? The research on upward social comparisons to similar others would suggest the latter, and this has been demonstrated empirically. Feinstein and colleagues (2013) investigated whether a tendency to make upward social comparisons on Facebook led to increased symptoms of depression over a three-week period. Sure enough, making more upward comparisons predicted increased rumination, which in turn was linked to increased depressive symptoms. 

Despite these negative effects of upward comparisons, they can sometimes be useful because they provide information that can help us do better, help us imagine ourselves as part of the group of successful people that we want to be like (Collins, 2000), and give us hope (Snyder, Cheavens, & Sympson, 1997). The power of upward social comparison can also be harnessed for social good. When people are made aware that others are already engaging in particular prosocial behaviors, they often follow suit, partly because an upward social comparison is triggered. This has been shown in relation to sustainable environmental practices, for example, with upward social comparisons helping to facilitate energy-saving behaviors in factory workers (Siero, Bakker, Dekker, & van den Berg, 1996) and hotel guests (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008).  As with downward comparisons, the effects of looking upward on our self-esteem tend to be more pronounced when we are comparing ourselves to similar others. If, for example, you have ever performed badly at a sport, the chances are that your esteem was more threatened when you compared yourselves to your teammates as opposed to the top professional athletes in that sport.

The outcomes of upward and downward social comparisons can have a substantial impact on our feelings, on our attempts to do better, and even on whether or not we want to continue performing an activity. When we compare positively with others and we feel that we are meeting our goals and living up to the expectations set by ourselves and others, we feel good about ourselves, enjoy the activity, and work harder at it. When we compare negatively with others, however, we are more likely to feel poorly about ourselves and enjoy the activity less, and we may even stop performing it entirely. When social comparisons come up poorly for us, we may experience depression or anxiety, and these discrepancies are important determinants of our self-esteem (Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; Strauman & Higgins, 1988).

Although everyone makes social comparisons, both upward and downward, there are some sources of differences in how often we do so and which type we tend to favor. As downward social comparisons generally increase and upward ones generally decrease self-esteem, and the pursuit of high self-esteem, as we have seen, is more prominent in Western as opposed to Eastern cultures, then it should come as no surprise that there are cultural differences here. White and Lehman (2005), for example, found that Asian Canadians made more upward social comparisons than did European Canadians, particularly following failures and when the opportunity to self-improve was made salient. These findings, the authors suggest, indicate that the Asian Canadians were using social comparisons more as a vehicle for self-improvement than self-enhancement.

There are also some age-related trends in social comparison. In general, older adults tend to make more downward comparisons than do younger adults, which is part of the reason why their self-esteem is typically higher (Helgeson & Mickelson, 2000). Older adults also use more downward social comparisons to cope with feelings of regret than do younger adults, and these comparisons are often more effective for them (Bauer, Wrosch, & Jobin, 2008). In addition to these cultural and age differences in social comparison processes, there are also individual differences. People who score higher on a measure of social comparison orientation have been found to experience more positive affect following downward social comparisons and more negative affect following upward ones (Buunk, Zurriaga, Peiró, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 2005).

Social Identity Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Groups We Belong To

In our discussion of social comparisons, we have seen that who we compare ourselves to can affect how we feel about ourselves, for better or worse. Another social influence on our self-esteem is through our group memberships. For example, we can gain self-esteem by perceiving ourselves as members of important and valued groups that make us feel good about ourselves. Social identity theory asserts that  we draw part of our   sense of identity and self-esteem from the social groups that we belong to  (Hogg, 2003; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Tajfel, 1981).

Normally, group memberships result in positive feelings, which occur because we perceive our own groups and thus ourselves in a positive light. If you are an Arsenal F.C. fan, or if you are an Australian, or if you are a Muslim, for example, then your membership in the group becomes part of what you are, and the membership often makes you feel good about yourself. The list that follows presents a measure of the strength of social identity with a group of university students. If you complete the measure for your own school, university, or college, the research evidence would suggest that you would agree mostly with the statements that indicate that you identify with the group.

Figure 3.10 A Measure of Social Identity

This 10-item scale is used to measure identification with students at the University of Maryland, but it could be modified to assess identification with any group. The items marked with an R are reversed (so that low numbers become high numbers and vice versa) before the average of the scale is computed. The scale was originally reported by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992).

For each of the following items, please indicate your response on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) by writing a number in the blank next to the question.

• ___ I identify with the group of University of Maryland students.
• ___ I am glad to belong to the group of University of Maryland students.
• ___ I make excuses for belonging to the group of University of Maryland students.
• ___ I consider the group of University of Maryland students to be important.
• ___ I feel held back by the group of University of Maryland students. (R)
• ___ I criticize the group of University of Maryland students. (R)
• ___ I see myself as belonging to the group of University of Maryland students.
• ___ I try to hide belonging to the group of University of Maryland students. (R)
• ___ I feel strong ties with the group of University of Maryland students.
• ___ I am annoyed to say that I am a member of the group of University of Maryland students. (R)

Kay Deaux and her colleagues (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995) asked U.S. college students to list the groups that they identified with. As you can see in Table 3.1 ,”Varieties of Social Identities,” the students reported belonging to a wide variety of groups and claimed that many of these groups provided them with social identities. The categories that they listed included ethnic and religious groups (e.g., Asian, Jewish), political affiliations (e.g., conservative, Democrat), occupations and hobbies (e.g., gardener, tennis player), personal relationships (e.g., husband, girlfriend), and marginalized groups (e.g., gay, homeless). You can see that these identities were likely to provide a lot of positive feelings for the individuals.

Which of our many identities is most accessible for us will vary from day to day as a function of the particular situation we are in (Yakushko, Davidson, & Williams, 2009). Seeing our national flag outside a government office may remind of us our national identity, whereas walking past our local soccer stadium may remind us of our identification with our team. Identity can also be heightened when it is threatened by conflict with another group—such as during an important sports game with a rival team. We each have multiple social identities, and which of our identities we draw our self-esteem from at a given time will depend on the situation we are in, as well as the social goals we have.

In particular, we use occasions when our social groups are successful in meeting their goals to fuel our self-worth. Robert Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1976) studied the idea that we can sometimes enhance our self-esteem by basking in the reflected glory of our ingroups, which occurs when we use and advertise our ingroups’ positive achievements to boost our self-esteem . To test this idea, they observed the clothes and clothing accessories that students at different U.S. universities wore to classes on Mondays. They found that when the university’s football team had won its game on Saturday, students were likely to emphasize their university membership by wearing clothing, such as sweatshirts and hats with the symbols of the university on them. However, they were significantly less likely to wear university clothing on the Mondays that followed a football loss. Furthermore, in a study in which students from a university were asked to describe a victory by their university team, they frequently used the term “we,” whereas when asked to describe a game in which their school lost, they used the term “we” significantly less frequently. Emphasizing that “we’re a good school” and “we beat them” evidently provided a social identity for these students, allowing them to feel good about themselves.

When people in our ingroups perform well, social identity theory suggests that we tend to make intergroup social comparisons, and by seeing our group as doing better than other groups, we come to feel better about ourselves. However, this is not generally what happens when we make intragroup comparisons—those between ourselves and other ingroup members. In this case it is often not advantageous to bask in the glory of others in our ingroups, because in some cases the other person’s successes may create an upward comparison and thus more negative emotions.  Self-evaluation maintenance theory  (Tesser, 1988) asserts that our self-esteem can be threatened when someone else outperforms us, particularly if that person is close to us and the performance domain is central to our self-concept.  This theory leads to the interesting implication that these threats will often occur in the context of our family relationships, and they have been shown to be an integral part of both family functioning in general (Tesser, 1980) and marital relationships in particular (Beach et al., 1996).

When threats occur, the theory states that we will typically try to rebuild our self-esteem using one of three main strategies. The first is distancing, where we redefine ourselves as less close to the person in question. For example, if a close friend keeps beating you at tennis, you may, over time, seek out another playing partner to protect your bruised ego. Interestingly, people who are more narcissistic are more likely to use this tactic than people who are lower in these characteristics (Nicholls & Stukas, 2011). The second option is to redefine how important the trait or skill really is to your self-concept. For instance, you may decide that tennis ability just isn’t that important a part of who you are, and choose to take up another hobby instead. The third strategy is try to improve on the ability in question. In the current example, this would mean practicing more often or hiring a coach to improve your tennis game. Notice the clear parallels between these strategies that occur in response to threats to our self-esteem posed by the behavior of others, and those that are triggered by feelings of self-discrepancy, discussed earlier in this chapter. In both cases, we seek to rebuild our self-esteem by redefining the aspect of ourself that has been diminished.

Self-Presentation: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Audiences We Have

It is interesting to note that each of the social influences on our sense of self that we have discussed can be harnessed as a way of protecting our self-esteem. The final influence we will explore can also be used strategically to elevate not only our own esteem, but the esteem we have in the eyes of others. Positive self-esteem occurs not only when we do well in our own eyes but also when we feel that we are positively perceived by the other people we care about.

Because it is so important to be seen as competent and productive members of society, people naturally attempt to present themselves to others in a positive light. We attempt to convince others that we are good and worthy people by appearing attractive, strong, intelligent, and likable and by saying positive things to others (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 2003).  The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status , is known as self-presentation , and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life.

A big question in relation to self-presentation is the extent to which it is an honest versus more strategic, potentially dishonest enterprise. The sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) developed an influential theory of self-presentation and described it as a mainly honest process, where people need to present the parts of themselves required by the social role that they are playing in a given situation. If everyone plays their part according to accepted social scripts and conventions, then the social situation will run smoothly and the participants will avoid embarrassment. Seen in this way, self-presentation is a transparent process, where we are trying to play the part required of us, and we trust that others are doing the same. Other theorists, though, have viewed self-presentation as a more strategic endeavor, which may involve not always portraying ourselves in genuine ways (e.g., Jones & Pittman, 1982). As is often the case with two seemingly opposing perspectives, it is quite likely that both are true in certain situations, depending on the social goals of the actors.

Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people, and the use of these strategies may be evolutionarily selected because they are successful (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008). Edward Jones and Thane Pittman (1982) described five self-presentation strategies, each of which is expected to create a resulting emotion in the other person:

• The goal of  ingratiation  is to create  liking  by using flattery or charm.
• The goal of  intimidation  is to create  fear  by showing that you can be aggressive.
• The goal of  exemplification  is to create  guilt  by showing that you are a better person than the other.
• The goal of  supplication  is to create  pity  by indicating to others that you are helpless and needy.
• The goal of  self-promotion  is to create  respect  by persuading others that you are competent.

No matter who is using it, self-presentation can easily be overdone, and when it is, it backfires. People who overuse the ingratiation technique and who are seen as obviously and strategically trying to get others to like them are often disliked because of this. Have you ever had a slick salesperson obviously try to ingratiate him- or herself with you just so you will buy a particular product, and you end up not liking the person and making a hasty retreat from the premises? People who overuse the exemplification or self-promotion strategies by boasting or bragging, particularly if that boasting does not appear to reflect their true characteristics, may end up being perceived as arrogant and even self-deluded (Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). Using intimidation can also often backfire; acting more modestly may be more effective. Again, the point is clear: we may want to self-promote with the goal of getting others to like us, but we must also be careful to consider the point of view of the other person. Being aware of these strategies is not only useful for better understanding how to use them responsibly ourselves, it can also help us to understand that other people’s behaviors may often reflect their self-presentational concerns. This can, in turn, facilitate better empathy for others, particularly when they are exhibiting challenging behaviors (Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985). For instance, perhaps someone’s verbally aggressive behavior toward you is more about that person being afraid rather than about his or her desire to do you harm.

—Now that we have explored some of the commonly used self-presentation tactics, let’s look at how they manifest in specific social behaviors. One concrete way to self-promote is to display our positive physical characteristics. A reason that many of us spend money on improving our physical appearance is the desire to look good to others so that they will like us. We can also earn status by collecting expensive possessions such as fancy cars and big houses and by trying to associate with high-status others. Additionally, we may attempt to dominate or intimidate others in social interactions. People who talk more and louder and those who initiate more social interactions are afforded higher status. A businessman who greets others with a strong handshake and a smile, and people who speak out strongly for their opinions in group discussions may be attempting to do so as well. In some cases, people may even resort to aggressive behavior, such as bullying, in attempts to improve their status (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).

Self-promotion can also be pursued in our online social behaviors. For example, a study in Taiwan conducted by Wang and Stefanone (2013) used survey methodology to investigate the relationship between personality traits, self-presentation and the use of check-ins on Facebook. Interestingly, narcissism was found to predict scores on a measure of exhibitionistic, self-promoting use of Facebook check-ins, which included items like “I check in so people know that I am with friends,” and “I expect friends to like or leave comments on my check-in status on Facebook.”

Other studies have also found associations between narcissistic traits and self-promotional activity on Facebook. Mehdizadeh (2010), for example, found that narcissistic personality scores were positively correlated with the amount of daily logins on Facebook and the duration of each login. Furthermore, narcissistic traits were related to increased use of self-promotional material in the main photo, view photos, status updates, and notes sections of people’s Facebook pages.

Analysis of the content and language used in Facebook postings has also revealed that they are sometimes used by individuals to self-promote. Bazarova, Taft, Choi, and Cosley (2013) explored self-presentation through language styles used in status updates, wall posts, and private messages from 79 participants. The use of positive emotion words was correlated with self-reported self-presentation concern in status updates. This is consistent with the idea that people share positive experiences with Facebook friends partly as a self-enhancement strategy.

Online self-presentation doesn’t seem to be limited to Facebook usage. There is also evidence that self-promotional concerns are often a part of blogging behaviors, too. Mazur and Kozarian (2010), for example, analyzed the content of adolescents’ blog entries and concluded that a careful concern for self-presentation was more central to their blogging behavior than direct interaction with others. This often seems to apply to micro-blogging sites like Twitter. Marwick and Boyd (2011) found that self-presentational strategies were a consistent part of celebrity tweeting, often deployed by celebrities to maintain their popularity and image.

You might not be surprised to hear that men and women use different approaches to self-presentation. Men are more likely to present themselves in an assertive way, by speaking and interrupting others, by visually focusing on the other person when they are speaking, and by leaning their bodies into the conversation. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be modest; they tend to create status by laughing and smiling, and by reacting more positively to the statements of others (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keation, 1988).

These gender differences are probably in large part socially determined as a result of the different reinforcements that men and women receive for using particular self-presentational strategies. For example, self-promoting by speaking out and acting assertively can be more effective for men than it is for women, in part because cross-culturally consistent stereotypes tend to depict assertiveness as more desirable in men than in women. These stereotypes can have very important consequences in the real world. For instance, one of the reasons for the “glass ceiling” existing in some occupations (where women experience discrimination in reaching top positions in organizations) may be attributable to the more negative reactions that their assertive behaviors, necessary for career advancement, receive than those of their male colleagues  (Eagly & Carli, 2007).

There are also some cultural differences in the extent to which people use self-presentation strategies in social contexts. For instance, when considering job interviews, Konig, Haftseinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann (2011) found that individuals from Iceland and Switzerland used less self-presentational behavior than people from the United States. Differences in self-presentation have also been found in job interviews involving individuals from Ghana, Turkey, Norway, and Germany, with the former two groups showing higher impression management scores than the latter two (Bye et al., 2011).

So far we have been talking about self-presentation as it operates in particular situations in the short-term. However, we also engage in longer-term self-presentational projects, where we seek to build particular reputations with particular audiences. —Emler & Reicher (1995) describe the unique capacity humans have to know one another by repute and argue that, accordingly, we are often engaged in a process of reputation management , which is a form of long-term self-presentation, where individuals seek to build and sustain specific reputations with important audiences . According to this perspective, our behaviors in current social situations may not only be to serve our self-presentational goals in that moment, but also be based on a consideration of their longer-term repercussions for our reputations. As many politicians, for example, know only too well, a poor decision from their past can come back to haunt them when their reputation is being assessed during a campaign.

The concept of reputation management can be used to help explain a wide variety of social and antisocial behaviors, including corporate branding (Smith, Smith, & Wang, 2010), sociomoral debate (Emler, Tarry, & St. James, 2007), and teenage criminal activity (Lopez-Romero & Romero, 2011). In the last example, it is argued that a lot of teenage antisocial behavior results from a desire to build a reputation for toughness and rebelliousness with like-minded peer audiences (Emler & Reicher, 1995). Similarly, antisocial and self-destructive online actions, like people posting to Facebook their involvement in illegal acts during riots, or individuals engaging in life-threatening activities in Internet crazes like Neknominate, may make more sense if they are considered partly as stemming from a desire to project a particular reputation to specific audiences. Perhaps the perceived social kudos from doing these things outweighs the obvious personal risks in the individuals’ minds at the time.

People often project distinct reputations to different social audiences. For example, adolescents who engage in antisocial activity to build reputations for rebelliousness among their peers will often seek to construct very different reputations when their parents are the audience (Emler & Reicher, 1995). The desire to compartmentalize our reputations and audiences can even spill over into our online behaviors. Wiederhold (2012) found that, with some adolescents’ Facebook friends numbering in the hundreds or thousands, increasing numbers are moving to Twitter in order to reach a more selective audience. One critical trigger for this has been that their parents are now often friends with them on Facebook, creating a need for young people to find a new space where they can build reputations that may not always be parent-friendly (Wiederhold, 2012).

Although the desire to present the self favorably is a natural part of everyday life, both person and situation factors influence the extent to which we do it. For one, we are more likely to self-present in some situations than in others. When we are applying for a job or meeting with others whom we need to impress, we naturally become more attuned to the social aspects of the self, and our self-presentation increases.

There are also individual differences. Some people are naturally better at self-presentation—they enjoy doing it and are good at it—whereas others find self-presentation less desirable or more difficult. An important individual-difference variable known as  self-monitoring  has been shown in many studies to have a major impact on self-presentation. Self-monitoring refers to  the tendency to be both motivated and capable of regulating our behavior to meet the demands of social situations  (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). High self-monitors are particularly good at reading the emotions of others and therefore are better at fitting into social situations—they agree with statements such as “In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons,” and “I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.” Low self-monitors, on the other hand, generally act on their own attitudes, even when the social situation suggests that they should behave otherwise. Low self-monitors are more likely to agree with statements such as “At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like,” and “I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.” In short, high self-monitors use self-presentation to try to get other people to like them by behaving in ways that the others find desirable, whereas low self-monitors tend to follow their internal convictions more than the demands of the social situation.

In one experiment that showed the importance of self-monitoring, Cheng and Chartrand (2003) had college students interact individually with another student (actually an experimental confederate) whom they thought they would be working with on an upcoming task. While they were interacting, the confederate subtly touched her own face several times, and the researchers recorded the extent to which the student participant mimicked the confederate by also touching his or her own face.

The situational variable was the status of the confederate. Before the meeting began, and according to random assignment to conditions, the students were told either that they would be the leader and that the other person would be the worker on the upcoming task, or vice versa. The person variable was self-monitoring, and each participant was classified as either high or low on self-monitoring on the basis of his or her responses to the self-monitoring scale.

As you can see in Figure 3.14, “Self-Monitoring and Behavioral Mimicry,” Cheng and Chartrand found an interaction effect: the students who had been classified as high self-monitors were more likely to mimic the behavior of the confederate when she was described as being the leader than when she was described as being the worker, indicating that they were “tuned in” to the social situation and modified their behavior to appear more positively. Although the low self-monitors did mimic the other person, they did not mimic her more when the other was high, versus low, status. This finding is consistent with the idea that the high self-monitors were particularly aware of the other person’s status and attempted to self-present more positively to the high-status leader. The low self-monitors, on the other hand—because they feel less need to impress overall—did not pay much attention to the other person’s status.

High self-monitors imitated more when the person they were interacting with was of higher (versus lower) status. Low self-monitors were not sensitive to the status of the other. Data are from Cheng and Chartrand (2003).

This differential sensitivity to social dynamics between high and low self-monitors suggests that their self-esteem will be affected by different factors. For people who are high in self-monitoring, their self-esteem may be positively impacted when they perceive that their behavior matches the social demands of the situation, and negatively affected when they feel that it does not. In contrast, low self-monitors may experience self-esteem boosts when they see themselves behaving consistently with their internal standards, and feel less self-worth when they feel they are not living up to them (Ickes, Holloway, Stinson, & Hoodenpyle, 2006).

H5P: TEST YOUR LEARNING: CHAPTER 3 DRAG THE WORDS – CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOR IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

Social psychologists often use concepts from the study of the self to make sense of important social issues For example, many are interested in understanding sustainable behaviors in relation to climate change. To test your learning of some key concepts from this chapter, read through each of the following sustainability-related scenarios. For each one, select the most relevant concept from chapter 3 by matching it with the correct scenarios.

Concepts: self-affirmation, deindividuation, self-monitoring, basking in reflected glory, cognitive dissonance, social comparison, self-complexity, social identity theory, self-consciousness, self-presentation.

• Some politicians may change how much they publicly endorse sustainability initiatives that may clash with economic concerns, depending on which groups of people they are meeting with.
• Many people feel a sense of inconsistency because they think that tackling climate change is an important issue, but do not always practice sustainable behaviors.
• Some activists for climate change see their activist identity as a large part of their self-concept, and may have relatively few other important identities.
• People may feel more judged on whether they practice sustainability in public, as opposed to more private settings.
• Individuals may feel that their own commitments to sustainable behavior are inadequate if they see peers who are doing more.
• Some people involved in climate change activism find that they draw self-esteem from the positive achievements of the relevant groups they belong to.
• Some individuals may claim to practice more sustainable behaviors than is accurate, in order to appear in a positive light in front of particular audiences.
• A student at a school that receives an institutional award for their sustainable practices may feel good about this and talk about their membership of the school more regularly in the aftermath.
• When someone is criticized for not pursuing sustainable behaviors, for example not regularly recycling, they may respond with a counter claim in a related area, such as by noting that they drive a hybrid vehicle.
• When people are in a large crowd, they may sometimes feel less personally accountable and practice less sustainable behaviors because of this. For instance when attendees at a music festival leave large amounts of litter behind.

Key Takeaways

• Our self-concepts are affected by others’ appraisals, as demonstrated by concepts including the looking-glass self and self-labeling.
• The self-concept and self-esteem are also often strongly influenced by social comparison. For example, we use social comparison to determine the accuracy and appropriateness of our thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
• When we are able to compare ourselves favorably with others through downward social comparison, we feel good about ourselves. Upward social comparison with others who are better off than we are leads to negative emotions.
• Social identity refers to the positive emotions that we experience as a member of an important social group.
• Normally, our group memberships result in positive feelings, which occur because we perceive our own groups, and thus ourselves, in a positive light.
• Which of our many category identities is most accessible for us will vary from day to day as a function of the particular situation we are in.
• In the face of others’ behaviors, we may enhance our self-esteem by “basking in the reflected glory” of our ingroups or of other people we know.
• If other people’s actions threaten our sense of self according to self-evaluation maintenance theory, we may engage in a variety of strategies aimed at redefining our self-concept and rebuilding our self-esteem.
• The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status, is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life. Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people.
• We often use self-presentation in the longer term, seeking to build and sustain particular reputations with specific social audiences.
• The individual-difference variable of self-monitoring relates to the ability and desire to self-present.

Exercises and Critical Thinking

• Describe some aspects of your self-concept that have been created through social comparison.
• Describe times when you have engaged in downward and upward social comparison and the effects these comparisons have had on your self-esteem. To what extent do your experiences fit with the research evidence here?
• What are your most salient social identities? How do they create positive feelings for you?
• Outline a situation where someone else’s behavior has threatened your self-concept. Which of the strategies outlined in relation to self-evaluation maintenance theory did you engage in to rebuild your self-concept?
• Identify a situation where you basked in the reflected glory of your ingroup’s behavior or peformance. What effect did this have on your self-esteem and why?
• Describe some situations where people you know have used each of the self-presentation strategies that were listed in this section. Which strategies seem to be more and less effective in helping them to achieve their social goals, and why?
• Consider your own level of self-monitoring. Do you think that you are more of a high or a low self-monitor, and why? What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages for you of the level of self-monitoring that you have?

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Part of how we see ourselves comes from our perception of how others see us.

When we are labeled, and others' views and expectations of us are affected by that labeling.

When we adopt others' labels explicitly into our self-concept.

When individuals turn prejudice directed toward them by others onto themselves.

When we learn about our abilities and skills, about the appropriateness and validity of our opinions, and about our relative social status by comparing our own attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors with those of others.

When we attempt to create a positive image of ourselves through favorable comparisons with others who are worse off than we are.

When we compare ourselves with others who are better off than we are.

We draw part of our sense of identity and self-esteem from the social groups that we belong to.

When we use and advertise our ingroups' positive achievements to boost our self-esteem.

Our self-esteem can be threatened when someone else outperforms us, particularly if that person is close to us and the performance domain is central to our self-concept.

The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status.

a form of long-term self-presentation, where individuals seek to build and sustain specific reputations with important audiences.

The tendency to be both motivated and capable of regulating our behavior to meet the demands of social situations.

Principles of Social Psychology - 1st International H5P Edition Copyright © 2022 by Dr. Rajiv Jhangiani and Dr. Hammond Tarry is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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5.1 Theories of Self-Development

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you should be able to:

• Differentiate psychological and sociological theories of self-development
• Explain the process of moral development

When we are born, we have a genetic makeup and biological traits. However, who we are as human beings develops through social interaction. Many scholars, both in the fields of psychology and in sociology, have described the process of self-development as a precursor to understanding how that “self” becomes socialized.

Psychological Perspectives on Self-Development

Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was one of the most influential modern scientists to put forth a theory about how people develop a sense of self. He divided the maturation process into stages, and posited that people’s self-development is closely linked to their early stages of development.

According to Freud, failure to properly engage in or disengage from a specific stage results in emotional and psychological consequences throughout adulthood.

Psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994) created a theory of personality development based, in part, on the work of Freud. However, Erikson believed the personality continued to change over time and was never truly finished. His theory includes eight stages of development, beginning with birth and ending with death. According to Erikson, people move through these stages throughout their lives. In contrast to Freud’s focus on psychosexual stages and basic human urges, Erikson’s view of self-development gave credit to more social aspects, like the way we negotiate between our own base desires and what is socially accepted (Erikson 1982).

Jean Piaget (1896–1980) was a psychologist who focused on the role of social interactions in child development. He recognized that the development of self evolved through a negotiation between the world as it exists in one’s mind and the world that exists as it is experienced socially (Piaget 1954). All three of these thinkers have contributed to our modern understanding of self-development.

Psychologist Harry Harlow (1905–1981) is known for studying the role of social relationships in human development by observing the impact of isolation and maternal deprivation on the development of young rhesus monkeys. Harlow found that the monkeys, when subjected to isolation, exhibit disturbed behaviors, including self-harm, and had a difficult time integrating when reconnected with other monkeys. Harlow also introduced isolated monkeys to simulated surrogate mothers, some that were covered in cloth while others were constructed out of wire. Based on observed behaviors, the young monkeys appeared to develop attachment with the cloth mothers and lean on them for emotional support. More than seven decades later, this experiment continues to inform the research of psychologists, sociologists, and those interested in human development.

Sociological Research

Sociology or psychology: what’s the difference.

You might be wondering: if sociologists and psychologists are both interested in people and their behavior, how are these two disciplines different? What do they agree on, and where do their ideas diverge? The answers are complicated, but the distinction is important to scholars in both fields.

As a general difference, we might say that while both disciplines are interested in human behavior, psychologists are focused on how the mind influences that behavior, while sociologists study the role of society in shaping behavior. Psychologists are interested in people’s mental development and how their minds process their world. Sociologists are more likely to focus on how different aspects of society contribute to an individual’s relationship with his world. Another way to think of the difference is that psychologists tend to look inward (mental health, emotional processes), while sociologists tend to look outward (social institutions, cultural norms, interactions with others) to understand human behavior.

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) was the first to make this distinction in research, when he attributed differences in suicide rates among people to social causes (religious differences) rather than to psychological causes (like their mental wellbeing) (Durkheim 1897). Today, we see this same distinction. For example, a sociologist studying how a couple gets to the point of their first kiss on a date might focus her research on cultural norms for dating, social patterns of sexual activity over time, or how this process is different for seniors than for teens. A psychologist would more likely be interested in the person’s earliest sexual awareness or the mental processing of sexual desire.

Sometimes sociologists and psychologists have collaborated to increase knowledge. In recent decades, however, their fields have become more clearly separated as sociologists increasingly focus on large societal issues and patterns, while psychologists remain honed in on the human mind. Both disciplines make valuable contributions through different approaches that provide us with different types of useful insights.

Sociological Theories of Self-Development

One of the pioneering contributors to sociological perspectives was Charles Cooley (1864–1929). He asserted that people’s self understanding is constructed, in part, by their perception of how others view them—a process termed “the looking glass self” (Cooley 1902).

Later, George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) studied the self , a person’s distinct identity that is developed through social interaction. In order to engage in this process of “self,” an individual has to be able to view him or herself through the eyes of others. That’s not an ability that we are born with (Mead 1934). Through socialization we learn to put ourselves in someone else's shoes and look at the world through their perspective. This assists us in becoming self-aware, as we look at ourselves from the perspective of the "other."

How do we go from being newborns to being humans with “selves?” Mead believed that there is a specific path of development that all people go through. During the preparatory stage, children are only capable of imitation: they have no ability to imagine how others see things. They copy the actions of people with whom they regularly interact, such as their caregivers. This is followed by the play stage, during which children begin to take on the role that one other person might have. Thus, children might try on a parent’s point of view by acting out “grownup” behavior, like playing dress-up and acting out the “mom” role, or talking on a toy telephone the way they see adults do.

During the game stage, children learn to consider several roles at the same time and how those roles interact with each other. They learn to understand interactions involving different people with a variety of purposes. For example, a child at this stage is likely to be aware of the different responsibilities of people in a restaurant who together make for a smooth dining experience (someone seats you, another takes your order, someone else cooks the food, while yet another clears away dirty dishes).

Finally, children develop, understand, and learn the idea of the generalized other , the common behavioral expectations of general society. By this stage of development, an individual is able to imagine how he or she is viewed by one or many others—and thus, from a sociological perspective, to have a “self” (Mead 1934; Mead 1964).

Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development

Moral development is an important part of the socialization process. The term refers to the way people learn what society considers to be “good” and “bad,” which is important for a smoothly functioning society. Moral development prevents people from acting on unchecked urges, instead considering what is right for society and good for others. Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) was interested in how people learn to decide what is right and what is wrong. To understand this topic, he developed a theory of moral development that includes three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional.

In the preconventional stage, young children, who lack a higher level of cognitive ability, experience the world around them only through their senses. It isn’t until the teen years that the conventional theory develops, when youngsters become increasingly aware of others’ feelings and take those into consideration when determining what’s “good” and “bad.” The final stage, called postconventional, is when people begin to think of morality in abstract terms, such as Americans believing that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. At this stage, people also recognize that legality and morality do not always match up evenly (Kohlberg 1981). When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out in 2011 to protest government corruption, they were using postconventional morality. They understood that although their government was legal, it was not morally correct.

Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development and Gender

Another sociologist, Carol Gilligan (1936–), recognized that Kohlberg’s theory might show gender bias since his research was only conducted on male subjects. Would females study subjects have responded differently? Would a female social scientist notice different patterns when analyzing the research? To answer the first question, she set out to study differences between how boys and girls developed morality. Gilligan’s research suggested that boys and girls do have different understandings of morality. Boys appeared to have a justice perspective, by placing emphasis on rules and laws. Girls, on the other hand, seem to have a care and responsibility perspective; they consider people’s reasons behind behavior that seems morally wrong.

While Gilligan is correct that Kohlberg’s research should have included both male and female subjects, her study has been scientifically discredited due to its small sample size. The results Gilligan noted in this study also have not been replicated by subsequent researchers. The differences Gilligan observed were not an issue of the development of morality, but an issue of socialization. Differences in behavior between males and females is the result of gender socialization that teaches boys and girls societal norms and behaviors expected of them based on their sex (see “What a Pretty Little Lady”).

Gilligan also recognized that Kohlberg’s theory rested on the assumption that the justice perspective was the right, or better, perspective. Gilligan, in contrast, theorized that neither perspective was “better”: the two norms of justice served different purposes. Ultimately, she explained that boys are socialized for a work environment where rules make operations run smoothly, while girls are socialized for a home environment where flexibility allows for harmony in caretaking and nurturing (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1990).

Sociology in the Real World

What a pretty little lady.

“What a cute dress!” “I like the ribbons in your hair.” “Wow, you look so pretty today.”

According to Lisa Bloom, author of Think: Straight Talk for Women to Stay Smart in a Dumbed Down World , most of us use pleasantries like these when we first meet little girls. “So what?” you might ask.

Bloom asserts that we are too focused on the appearance of young girls, and as a result, our society is socializing them to believe that how they look is of vital importance. And Bloom may be on to something. How often do you tell a little boy how attractive his outfit is, how nice looking his shoes are, or how handsome he looks today? To support her assertions, Bloom cites, as one example, that about 50 percent of girls ages three to six worry about being fat (Bloom 2011). We’re talking about kindergarteners who are concerned about their body image. Sociologists are acutely interested in of this type of gender socialization, by which societal expectations of how boys and girls should be —how they should behave, what toys and colors they should like, and how important their attire is—are reinforced.

One solution to this type of gender socialization is being experimented with at the Egalia preschool in Sweden, where children develop in a genderless environment. All the children at Egalia are referred to with neutral terms like “friend” instead of “he” or “she.” Play areas and toys are consciously set up to eliminate any reinforcement of gender expectations (Haney 2011). Egalia strives to eliminate all societal gender norms from these children’s preschool world.

Extreme? Perhaps. So what is the middle ground? Bloom suggests that we start with simple steps: when introduced to a young girl, ask about her favorite book or what she likes. In short, engage with her mind … not her outward appearance (Bloom 2011).

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27 The Social Construction of Self

Kenneth J. Gergen Department of Psychology Swarthmore College Swarthmore, PA, USA

• Published: 02 May 2011
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This article evaluates the view that the self is social constructed. It explains that a social constructionist approach to the self is critical insofar as it targets many of the traditional conceptions of self under discussion in this volume. It analyses the primary use of the term self in psychological and mental discourse, suggesting many ways in which the sources of knowledge about the realm of the mental are open to question. It cites the work of Michel Foucault and others who develop a sustained critique of what may be the dark side of the construction of the self as an autonomous, alienated entity differentiated from the other.

In treating the social construction of self it is first necessary to identify the boundaries of the domain. At the outset, there is the matter of the self. History has prepared us to speak of the self in many different ways, and some of these are more central to constructionist concerns than others. My particular concern in the present chapter will be with a family of uses that generally refer to a psychological or mental world within the individual. The members of this family are many and varied. We variously speak of persons as possessing mental concepts of themselves, and it is often said that these concepts are saturated with value, that they may be defective or dysfunctional, that they figure importantly in the individual's rational calculus, and that they ultimately supply resources for the exercise of personal agency. And too, many simply identify the process of conscious choice as equivalent to the individual self. Such assumptions are deeply embedded in Western culture, and provide the under‐girding rationale for practices of jurisprudence, childrearing, education, counseling, and psychotherapy, among others. Further, such assumptions furnish the basis for myriad research studies in psychology and sociology. Individual self‐esteem, for example, has been one of the most intensively studied topics in psychology. Indeed, the Western traditions of democracy and capitalism are both wedded to conceptions of the individual self as alluded to above.

With this particular focus on self in place, I shift attention to the matter of social construction. In this case, it is important to outline some of the major assumptions that play themselves out in contemporary constructionist scholarship. The ground is then prepared for treating issues in the social construction of the self. Here I will begin with a discussion of the ungrounded character of mental accounts in general. Following this, I will discuss major lines of inquiry into the social construction of self, along with its socio‐political implications. Finally, I will introduce an alternative to traditional conceptions of self, one that emerges distinctly from social constructionist theory.

The Emergence of Social Constructionist Theory

There are many stories to be told about the development of social constructionism in scholarly worlds. I offer here but one, although one that is congenial with much common understanding. To be sure, one may trace the intellectual roots of social constructionism to Vico, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Wittgenstein, among others. And Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1966) was a landmark volume with strong reverberations in neighboring disciplines. However, the social movements and intellectual ferment taking shape in the late 1960s in the United States and Western Europe were perhaps more influential in paving the way to social construction in psychology. Resistance to the Vietnam War and to the country's political leadership was intense; profound skepticism of the established order was voiced. Much of the academic community was deeply engaged in political protest. The context was optimal for reassessing the established rationale and practices within the sciences and other scholarly traditions. In brief, one can locate at least three major forms of broadly shared critique that resulted from such reassessment. Each of them found expression in the psychological literature. Most importantly, the amalgamation of these forms of critique—sometimes identified with postmodernism—largely serves as the basis for most social constructionist inquiry in the scholarly world today. 1

Perhaps the strongest and most impassioned form of critique of the dominant orders has been, and continues to be, ideological . In this case, critics challenge various taken‐for‐granted realities in society and reveal the political ends that they achieve. In effect, such analysis discloses the socio‐political consequences of the sedimented accounts of reality, in the attempt to liberate the reader from their subtle grasp. Within the scholarly world more generally, such ‘unmasking’ has played a major role in Marxist scholarship, along with anti‐psychiatry, feminist, racial, gay and lesbian, and anti‐colonialist movements, among others.

The second major form of critique may be viewed as literary/rhetorical . With developments in semiotic theory in general and literary deconstruction in particular (Derrida 1976 ), attention was variously drawn to the ways in which linguistic convention governs all claims to knowledge. Thus, whatever reality posits one puts forward, they will bear the marks of the linguistic forms (including, for example, grammatical rules, narrative conventions, and binary distinctions) necessary for communication. In this sense the forms of language are not driven by reality so much as they provide the forestructure for what we take to be its nature.

The third significant critique of foundational science was stimulated largely by the 1970 publication of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Kuhn portrayed normal science as guided by paradigms of thought and practice shared by particular communities. In effect, the outcomes of science were not demanded by the world as it is, but are the result of communal negotiation. This social account of science was further buttressed by a welter of research in the sociology of knowledge and the history of science (see e.g. Feyerabend 1978 ; Latour and Woolgar 1986 ). 2 Although these movements largely originated within separate scholarly spheres, scholars increasingly discovered affinities among them. In effect, one could recognize the contours of a broader movement, often identified as social constructionist. Within this movement, three domains of agreement are noteworthy: the social origins of knowledge, the centrality of language, and the politics of knowledge.

The social origins of knowledge

Perhaps the most generative idea emerging from the constructionist dialogues is that what we take to be knowledge of the world and self finds its origins in human relationships. What we take to be true as opposed to false, objective as opposed to subjective, scientific as opposed to mythological, rational as opposed to irrational, moral as opposed to immoral is brought into being through historically and culturally situated social processes. This view stands in dramatic contrast to two of the most important intellectual and cultural traditions of the West. On the one hand is the tradition of the individual knower, the rational, self‐directing, morally centered, and knowledgeable agent of action. Within the constructionist dialogues we find that it is not in the individual mind that knowledge, reason, emotion, and morality reside, but in relationships.

The communal view of knowledge also represents a major challenge to the view of Truth, or the possibility that the accounts of scientists, or any other group, reveal or approach the objective truth about what is the case. In effect, propose the constructionists, no one arrangement of words is necessarily more objective or accurate in its depiction of reality than any other. To be sure, accuracy may be achieved within a given community or tradition—according to its rules and practices. Physics and chemistry generate useful truths from within their communal traditions, just as psychologists, sociologists, and priests do from within theirs. But from these often‐competing traditions there is no means by which one can locate a transcendent truth, a ‘truly true’. Any attempt to determine the superior account would itself be the outcome of a given community of agreement.

To be sure, these arguments have provoked antagonistic reactions among scientific communities in particular. There remains a substantial number in the scientific community, including the social sciences, who still cling to a vision of science as generating ‘Truth beyond community’. For scientists who see themselves as generating pragmatic or instrumental truths, constructionist arguments are quite congenial. Thus, for example, both would agree that while Western medical science does succeed in generating what might commonly be called ‘cures’ for that which is termed ‘illness’, these advances are dependent upon culturally and historically specific constructions of what constitutes an impairment, health and illness, life and death, the boundaries of the body, the nature of pain, and so on. When these assumptions are treated as universal—true for all cultures and times—alternative conceptions are undermined and destroyed. To understand death, for example, as merely the termination of biological functioning would be an enormous impoverishment of human existence. The constructionist does not abandon medical science, but attempts to understand it as a cultural tradition—one among many.

The centrality of language

Central to the constructionist account of the social origins of knowledge is a concern with language. If accounts of the world are not demanded by what there is, then the traditional view of language as a mapping device ceases to compel. Rather, following Wittgenstein ( 1953 ), a view of language is invited, in which meaning is understood as a derivative of language use within relationships. And, given that games of language are essentially conducted in a rule‐like fashion, accounts of the world are governed in significant degree by conventions of language use. Psychological research could not reveal, for example, that ‘motives are oblong’. The utterance is grammatically correct, but it is cultural nonsense. Rather, while it is perfectly satisfactory to speak of motives as varying in intensity or content, conventions of talk about motivation in the twenty‐first century do not happen to include the adjective, ‘oblong’. Expanding on this point, many constructionists see attempts at generating philosophical foundations for scientific study as forms of language games. For example, the long‐standing question of whether and to what degree the mind has access to the external world—the central problem of epistemology—is a problem only within a given game of language (see Rorty 1979 ). To play the game we must agree that there is a ‘mental world’ on the one hand and a ‘material world’ on the other (an ‘in here’ and ‘out there’), and that the former may possibly reflect the latter. If one does not agree to play by these rules, there is no ‘problem of individual knowledge’.

Of special relevance to an understanding of research methods, constructionists also tend to accept Wittgenstein's view of language games as embedded within broader ‘forms of life’. Thus, for example, the language conventions for communicating about human motivation are linked to certain activities, objects, and settings. For the research psychologist there may be ‘assessment devices’ for motivation (e.g. questionnaires, thematic analysis of discourse, controlled observations of behavior), and statistical technologies to assess differences between groups. Given broad agreement within a field of study about ‘the way the game is played’, conclusions can be reached about the nature of human motivation. As constructionists also suggest, playing by the rules of a given community is enormously important to sustaining these relationships. Not only does conformity to the rules affirm the reality, rationality, and values of the research community, but the very raison d'être of the profession itself is sustained. To abandon the discourse of the mind would threaten the discipline of psychology; to dispense with the discourse of social structure would threaten the collapse of sociology. Without conventions of construction, action loses value.

The politics of knowledge

As indicated above, social constructionism is closely allied with a pragmatic conception of knowledge. That is, traditional issues of truth and objectivity are replaced by concerns with that which research brings forth. It is not whether an account is true from a god's eye view that matters, but rather, the implications for cultural life that follow from taking any truth claim seriously. This concern with consequences essentially eradicates the long‐standing distinction between fact and value , between is and ought. The forms of life within any knowledge‐making community represent and sustain the values of that community. In establishing ‘what is the case’, the research community also place value on their particular metatheory of knowledge, constructions of the world, and practices of research. When others embrace such knowledge they wittingly or unwittingly extend the reach of these values.

Thus, for example, the scientist may use the most rigorous methods of testing intelligence, and amass tomes of data that indicate racial differences in intelligence. However, the presumptions that there is something called ‘human intelligence’, that a series of question and answer games reveal this capacity, and that there are separable ‘races’ in the world, are all specific to a given tradition or paradigm. Such concepts and measures are not required by ‘the way the world is’. Most importantly, to accept the paradigm and extend its implications into policy within the tradition is deeply injurious to those people classified as inferior by its standards.

This line of reasoning has had enormous repercussions in the academic community and beyond. Drawing sustenance in particular from Foucault's ( 1978 , 1979 ) power/knowledge formulations, one comes to understand that the realities, rationalities, and values created within any social enclave have socio‐political ramifications. And particularly because those within a given interpretive community seldom appreciate that their realities are local and contingent, there is a strong tendency toward reification. Those who fail to share the local realities and values are thus viewed as misled, ignorant, immoral, and possibly evil. In effect, with the process of reality building set in motion, the result is often social division and antagonism. Each tradition of the real becomes a potential enemy to all those who do not share in the tradition. To illustrate, experimental psychologists are generally committed to a causal view of human action, and view the experimental method as the most valuable means of demonstrating cause–effect relations. There is little doubting these assumptions and practices; they are simply taken for granted. However, this form of life cannot accommodate the concept of human agency. To include an uncaused cause within the formulations would destroy a way of life. At the same time, to embrace the experimental way of life is to threaten the legitimacy of claims to voluntary action and thus a tradition of moral responsibility. With this background in place, we may now turn to more specific concerns with the self.

Mental Discourse in Question

The term ‘self’ is employed in many different settings, and for different purposes, and in this sense is richly polysemic. On the present account, all such meanings are essentially constructed within social enclaves. However, the more difficult task is to remove the sediment sense of the real accumulating from long‐standing usages. It is only when the painstaking work of denaturalizing has taken place that one is liberated from the past, and thus positioned to reformulate as conditions require. It is in this context that I wish to focus specifically on the self as a constituent member in the family of mental discourse. Over the past three centuries Western culture has developed an enormous vocabulary referring to mental states, mechanisms, processes, or conditions. Although subject to long‐standing contention within philosophy (see e.g. Almoq 2005 ; Ryle 1949 ), for most people there is little doubting the existence of the world created by these terms. We readily speak of one's thoughts, desires, emotions, and motives, in the same way we refer to one's ‘self‐image’, ‘self esteem’, ‘self love’, and ‘voluntary choice’. As indicated earlier, these ‘realities’ are insinuated into the rationale for many of the major institutions and traditions of Western culture. In what follows I wish to outline some of the major problems inhering in the attempt to anchor the discourse of the psychological self in an independent world of existents. This brief account should move toward unsettling existing assumptions. In the following section we explore some of the major means by which the psychological self is constructed. These explorations will set the stage for considering alternatives to the psychological conception of self.

As proposed, we typically employ such terms as ‘thought’, ‘emotion’, ‘motivation’, and ‘self‐esteem’ as if they referred to existing states or entities within the individual. Yet, one may ask, on what grounds do we make such references? In many domains, and science in particular, we justify the favored vocabulary through ostensive definition. In effect, we can point to what we take to be an entity and declare, ‘that is a cow’, or ‘this is the left hemisphere of the cerebral cortex’. To be sure, such constructions may be shared only within particular traditions, but the ability to relate the vocabulary to a publicly shared world of observables can serve as a local form of grounding. In contrast, there is little way of wedding mental terms to a world of ostensively designated referents. The Western tradition does suggest two major candidates for justification: self‐observation and observation by others . In the former case, we might presume that we can know with confidence about mental states such as self‐esteem because we are intimately acquainted with them. As psychologists often say, we have metacognitive knowledge of our psychological processes. In the case of external observation, we might presume a warrant for psychological knowledge based on the reasoned inferences of neutrally positioned observers. Let us consider these possibilities further.

First, in the case of knowledge through self‐observation, a scan of both philosophic and psychological analyses suggests that the very concept of internal observation is deeply flawed. To succinctly summarize some of the major problems (for a more extended summary of these arguments, see Gergen, 2009 ):

How can consciousness turn in upon itself to identify its own states? How can experience become an object to itself? Can a mirror reflect its own image?

How can one be certain that various mental processes would not obstruct the attempt to identify one's states? Could other processes (e.g. repression, defense) not prevent accurate self‐appraisal?

What are the characteristics of mental states by which one could identify them? By what criteria does one distinguish, let us say, among states of anger, fear, and love? What is the color of hope, the size of a thought, or the shape of anger? Why do none of these attributes seem quite applicable to mental states? Is it because our observations of the states prove to us that they are not? What would we be observing in this case?

By what criterion could one determine that what one experiences as ‘certain recognition’ of a mental state is indeed certain recognition? Wouldn't this recognition (‘I am certain in my assessment’) require yet another round of self‐assessments (‘I am certain that what I am experiencing is certainty…’), the results of which would require additional processes of internal identification, and so on in an infinite regress?

How could one identify an inner state save through an a priori agreement about what exists in the mind? Could one identify an emotion that was not already given within the prevailing discourse on emotion? Could a Westerner identify ‘liget’ or ‘amae’ (terms from non‐Western cultures)?

Could one identify one's mental states through their physiological manifestations—blood pressure, heart rate, etc.? Can one know he or she is ‘thinking’ by examining one's blood pressure, or that one has ‘hope’ through a recording of neurological activity? And, if one did have access to brain scan data, how could one know to which states such scans referred?

Of course, many contemporary psychologists (along with many psychoanalysts) are quite willing to abandon the idea of inner observation (or introspection) as a valid source of psychological knowledge. For many, it is the external observer—rationally systematic and personally dispassionate—who is ideally situated to draw valid conclusions about people's internal states. Yet, the past thirty years of poststructural and hermeneutic deliberation leave the presumption of external observation as imperiled as that of introspection. Again in abbreviated form, consider some of the major flaws:

If we were to base our knowledge on our subjects' descriptions of their internal states (e.g. ‘I am depressed’, ‘I am angry’) how would we know to what the terms referred within their own mind/brain? We have no access to the states or conditions. What if one person's referent for ‘love’ was another's referent for ‘anxiety’? Without access to the putative referents, there would be no means of sorting out the differences. Indeed, how could one be certain that mental terms refer to anything at all (e.g. ‘my soul is anguished’)?

If we abandon introspection as the basis of knowledge, how can we trust any self‐reports (e.g. ‘I feel…’, ‘I aspire to…’, ‘It is my opinion that…’) as the basis of external inference? How could the person know about these conditions, sufficient that the reports would count as inferential evidence?

Even if self‐reports converge (as in the items making up a self‐esteem scale), how would we know to what (in the individual's mind/brain) the individual items referred—if anything (could we not also generate a twelve‐item scale of ‘soul anguish’)? How could we trust the subject to know?

How can we determine the nature of what we are observing, save through the lens of a theory already established? Could we identify ‘cognitive conservation’ without a theory enabling us to interpret a child's action in just this way? Could we observe aggression, moral behavior, altruism, conformity, obedience, or learning, for example, without a pre‐understanding that would call our attention to certain patterns of activity as opposed to others? Can we observe a ‘causal relation’ without at least a rudimentary theory of cause already in place? Or, in effect, aren't our observations of psychologically relevant behavior theory determined?

If we propose to identify psychological states through their physiological correlates (as in ‘the physiology of memory’), how can we determine to what psychological states the physiology provides the underpinning? If we cannot determine when a ‘memory’, ‘a thought’, or ‘an agitation of the spirit’ has occurred, how are we to establish the physiological correlates?

As this brief account suggests, the discourse of the psychological self cannot be anchored in a referential base sufficient to inspire, direct, or constrain its usage. It is largely for this reason that the conception of self has been such an inviting topic of exploration for social constructionist scholars.

The Construction and Critique of Self

Inquiry into the social construction of self can roughly be divided into three categories. The first is primarily concerned with establishing the self as a social construction; the second is focused on specific social processes in which the conception of self is embedded; and the third involves critical assessments of the cultural and political repercussions of traditional beliefs in the self. I consider each in turn.

The self in historical and cultural context

One gains an acute appreciation of the extent to which one's everyday understandings are both culturally and historically situated—and perhaps precariously so—through comparisons with commonplace beliefs in other cultures and times. In this sense, such comparisons not only illustrate the richness in human constructions of the self, but function as well as a destabilizing device in contemporary culture. The historical and cultural literature in this case is enormous, and as these topics are relevant to other discussions in this volume, I will simply earmark here two significant lines of inquiry. On the historical side, two of the most extensive accounts of the vicissitudes in Western conceptualizations of the self are those of Charles Taylor ( 1989 ) and Jerrold Siegel ( 2001 ). Both explore this history in an attempt to locate resources for a morally or personally meaningful life. Numerous other accounts treat the emergence of particular concepts of self within circumscribed historical periods (see e.g. Cary 2000 ; Cushman 1996 ; Holstein and Gubrium 2000 ). Much the same denaturalization of the self takes place in cross‐cultural comparisons. Perhaps the major theme that pervades this work is the comparison between the individuated, bounded, and autonomous view of the self that is shared within Western culture, and the more socially or communally embedded vision of the self that may be found in many other cultures of the world (see e.g. Marsella et al . 1985 ; Becker 1995 ; Markus and Kitayama 1991 ).

The self as social accomplishment

A second significant line of constructionist inquiry builds on the first. If the self is socially constructed, one asks, how are we to understand the processes central to this achievement? Echoing the earlier discussion of the literary and rhetorical contributions to social construction, the major focus of this line of inquiry has been on discourse practices. To be sure, psycholinguistic study of the relation of mind (or cognition) to language, along with research into grammar and syntax, for example, has generated a large corpus of literature. However, within a constructionist frame, this tradition has not been engaging. For one, studies relating mind to language have presumed a dualism between mind and speech that many constructionists call into question. Further, in its search for ‘the truth about language’, traditional research was stripped of concern with political and ideological context, and thus of little relevance for many constructionists.

Inquiry into social achievement of the self has taken two major forms. The first is concerned with the structure of language and the demands made by linguistic convention on the conception of self. The second has focused on ongoing conversational practices. In the case of language structure, for example, Sampson ( 2008 ) has drawn attention to the binary structure of language and its contribution to the self/other dichotomy. As Harré ( 1991 ) has also proposed, the existence of personal pronouns (e.g. I, you, he, me) contributes significantly to an ontology of separate selves. Perhaps the most prominent form of inquiry linking discursive structure to conceptions of self has centered on narrative. Drawing from a long‐standing emphasis in semiotic studies on the formative influence of narrative structure, scholars have variously explored the way in which conceptions of the self are guided by a narrative forestructure. As MacIntyre ( 1984 ) cogently argued, one's conception of self, and indeed one's moral integrity, emerges from one's narrative of self. It is the form of this narrative, as shared within an interpretive tradition, that underlies one's sense of self. The work of Gergen and Gergen ( 1983 ), Sarbin ( 1986 ), Polkinghorne ( 1988 ), Rosenwald and Ochberg ( 1990 ), and Bruner ( 1990 ) has given the study of narrative a prominent place in the psychology of the self. The long‐standing concern in psychology with life history has also been highly congenial to narrative study. The work of Dan McAdams ( 1985 , 1997) has underscored the centrality of narrative not only to self‐understanding but to the trajectory of one's actions. His inquiry into ‘redemptive narratives’ has also fired interest in the relationship of self‐understanding and spiritual traditions (McAdams, 2006 ).

The second major line of inquiry into the self as a social accomplishment has been concerned with ongoing interaction. Such inquiry was initially stimulated by the work of Harold Garfinkel ( 1967 ) and the ethnomethods by which realities are constituted within conversation. The link between ethnomethodology and the psychological self was secured in Jeff Coulter's 1979 volume, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy . Coulter's work demonstrated the ways in which the self is continuously fashioned and refashioned as conversation unfolds. Inquiry into discursive positioning (Davies and Harré, 1990 ; Van Langenhove and Harré, 1998 ) offered subsequent insight into a critical aspect of this process. The concern in this case is with the way in which conversational interlocutors position each other's identity as they speak. However, while further work in discourse and conversational analysis adds depth and richness to these views, such inquiry reaches a juncture at which the specifically psychological self is no longer in focus (see e.g. Benwell and Stokoe 2006 , and Buchholtz 1999 ). Such inquiry focuses almost exclusively on the spoken or written word, while simultaneously placing the ‘conversational object’ at ontological risk. Thus, analysts will demonstrate how conversational references to the self deconstruct the psychological referent. Attention is then drawn to publicly defined identity.

Critical reflection on the psychological self

For the constructionist, the realities created by people together are functionally insinuated into their daily relationships. The discursive ontologies and ethics are embedded within normal and normative practices. Or, more succinctly, the discourses of daily life are constitutive of living traditions. In this sense, scholars have been concerned with the way in which vocabularies of the self both rationalize and sustain cultural practices. It is in this vein that many constructionists have drawn sustenance from Foucault's ( 1978 , 1979 ) writings on knowledge and power. Language, for Foucault, serves as a major medium for carrying out relations. Because language constitutes what we take to be the world, and rationalizes the form of reality thus created, it also serves as a socially binding force. By acting within language, relations of power and privilege are sustained. And, by engaging in the further circulation of a form of language, the array of power relations is further extended (see Rose 1985 , 1990).

In particular, as many critics see it, there is a substantial dark side to constructing a world of individual and agentic selves. When a fundamental distinction between self and other is established, the social world is constituted in terms of differences. The individual stands as an isolated entity, essentially alone and alienated. Further, such a view lends itself to a prizing of autonomy—of becoming a ‘self‐made man’, who ‘does it my way’. To be dependent is a sign of weakness and incapacity. To construct a world of separation in this way is also to court distrust; one can never be certain of the other's motives. And given distrust, it becomes reasonable to ‘take care of number one’. Self‐gain becomes an unquestionable motive, within both the sciences (such as economics and social psychology) and the culture at large. In this context, loyalty, commitment, and community are all thrown into question, as all may potentially interfere with ‘self‐realization’. Such views represent an extended critique of Western individualism. (See e.g. Gelpi 1989 ; Hewitt 1989 ; Bellah et al . 1985 ; Heller et al . 1986 ; Lasch 1978 ; Leary 2004 .)

These critiques become more pointed in their implications when self‐dysfunction is considered. At the outset, an extensive literature illuminates the constructed character of the psychiatric concepts of mental illness, and points to the ideological and political interests served by diagnostic categorization. Thus, for example, scholars have explored the social construction of schizophrenia (Sarbin and Mancuso 1980 ), anorexia (Hepworth 1999 ), depression (Blazer 2005 ), attention deficit disorder (Divorky and Schrag 1975 ), post traumatic stress disorder (Quosh and Gergen 2008), and many other forms of ‘mental disorder’ (see e.g. Neimeyer 2000 ; Fee 2000 ). These deconstructions of illness categories have been accompanied by critical assessments of the impact on both clients and the society more generally. For example, diagnostic categories are variously seen as devices used largely for purposes of social control (e.g. client management, insurance justification), that mystify the values agendas they express, and sustain the myth of mental health practice as medical science in such a way that problems in living are increasingly treated with pharmaceutical suppressants (Kutchins and Kirk 1997 ; Szasz 1961 ). Further, by disseminating ‘knowledge of mental illness’ to the culture, people cease to examine the societal conditions that may favor depression or hyperactivity, for example, and increasingly come to construct themselves in these terms (Gergen 2006 ; Hare‐Mustin 1994 ). Further, to be categorized as mentally ill frequently increases the anguish of those who bear the labels. To hear voices, to be hyperactive, or to be chronically sad, for example, is not inherently to possess an illness, and there are more beneficial constructions possible (Parker et al . 1995 ).

The Relational Self

The preceding critiques of the psychological self have brought about an active movement to reconceptualize the mind in general, and the self in particular. The attempt in this case is to construct an ontology that replaces the vision of the bounded self as the atom of the social world with relational process. From this standpoint, it would not be selves who come together to form relationships, but relational process out of which the very idea of the psychological self could emerge. As can be seen, the development of such a view follows congenially from the constructionist perspective so instrumental in denaturalizing the traditional view of the psychological self. If what we call knowledge emerges from social process, then social process stands as an ontological prior to the individual.

Relational explorations draw nourishment from a number of early lines of scholarship. Phenomenologists have long been concerned with the arbitrary character of the mind/world dichotomy. For example, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) proposed that all experience is intentional , essentially directed toward or absorbed by some pattern (object, person, etc.). Thus, conscious experience is fundamentally relational; subject and object—or self and other—are unified within experience. For many psychologists George Herbert Mead's volume, Mind, Self and Society w as the first important step toward a relational account of self. As Mead proposed, there is no thinking, or indeed any sense of being a self, that is independent of social process. For Mead, we are born with rudimentary capacities to adjust to each other, largely in response to gestures—with the hands, vocal sounds, facial expressions, gaze, and so on. It is through others' response to our gestures that we slowly begin to develop the capacities for mental symbolization; as others respond to our gestures, and we experience these responses within us, we are able to gain a sense of what the other's gesture symbolizes for him or her. ‘No hard‐and‐fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such in our experience also’ (Mead 1934 ).

The work of Lev Vygotsky ( 1978 ) also offered a bold alternative to the dominant conception of mind independent from social process. For Vygotsky, individuals are inextricably related, both to each other and to their physical surrounds. Of particular interest for Vygotsky were the ‘higher mental functions’ such as thinking, planning, attending, and remembering. For Vygotsky, these higher processes are lodged within relationships: ‘social relations or relations among people genetically underlie all higher (mental) functions and their relationships.’ In effect, mental functioning reflects social process. On the psychoanalytic front, theory has shifted toward ‘object relations’ (or the mental representation of others). Here therapists have become increasingly concerned with the complex relations between transference and counter‐transference. As relational analysts propose, it is no longer possible to view the therapist as a neutral investigator of the client's mind, as the therapist's psychological functioning cannot be extricated from that of the client. Literary theory has also served as a vital stimulus to theorizing a relational self. Bakhtin's explorations of dialogicality in the novel have been especially significant. As Bakhtin ( 1981 ) reasons, self and other are locked together in the generation of meaning: ‘Consciousness is never self‐sufficient, it always finds itself in an intense relationship with another consciousness.’ Or, in brief, ‘To be means to communicate.’

With these resources serving as a vital background, the question emerges as to whether it is possible to eliminate entirely the ‘thinker behind the words’. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953) provides the groundwork for such a venture. For Wittgenstein, language obtains its meaning and significance primarily from the way in which it is used in human interaction. Thus, for example, the meaning of ‘yellow card’ and ‘corner kick’ gain their significance from their use in the game of soccer. This same logic may be applied to the discourse of the self, and in particular, to the way in which one refers to states of mind. We may expand on the implications with the following propositions.

The self as discursive action . As we have seen, there is no viable way of understanding such utterances as ‘I decided’ or ‘I am angry’ as reports on what we presume to be an inner state of mind. We may thus relinquish the view of such discourse as a manifestation or ‘outward expression of an inner world’. Rather, we may view the meaning of such discourse as dependent upon its use in relationships. Thus, to announce, ‘I am unhappy’ about a given state of affairs, the term ‘unhappy’ would not be rendered meaningful or appropriate by virtue of its manifesting the state of one's neurons, emotions, or cognitive schema. Rather, the report plays a significant social function. It may be used, for example, to call an end to a set of deteriorating conditions, enlist support and/or encouragement, or to invite further opinion. Both the conditions of the report and the functions it can serve are also circumscribed by social convention. The phrase ‘I am deeply sad’ can be satisfactorily reported at the death of a close relative but not the demise of a spring moth. A report of depression can secure others' concern and support; however it cannot easily function as a greeting, an invitation to laughter, or a commendation. In this sense to use mental language is more like a handshake or an embrace than a mirror of the interior. In effect, mental terms are used by people to carry out relationships.

Discourse of the self as performance . As theorists further reason, we are not dealing here with ‘mere words’ used by people to ‘get what they want from the other’. One's utterances are essentially performative in function. That is, in the very saying of something, one is also performing an action within a relationship. As performance, more than the felicitous use of words is required. For example, if spoken in a faint voice, eyes on the floor, and with a smile, the words ‘I am angry’ would constitute a failed performance. It would be culturally bewildering. In order to perform anger properly within Western culture, voice intensity and volume are essential; a stern face and a rigid posture may be required. Much is gained, then, by replacing the image of private ‘feelings’ with public action; it is not that one has emotions, a thought, or a memory so much as one does them.

Discursive action as relationally embedded . If it is reasonable to view psychological discourse as embedded within an embodied performance, one may then inquire into its origins. If there is no animating origin lying behind the action, one is then drawn to its roots within relationship. In the same way that one cannot achieve intelligibility by using a word of his own creation, one's actions will not make sense if they do not borrow from a cultural tradition. Thus, the performance of self carries a history of relationships, manifesting and extending them. One may also ask about audience; for whom are these intelligible performances? As Bakhtin ( 1981 ) pointed out, to speak is always to address someone—either explicitly or implicitly—within some kind of relationship. This is also to say that the performances are fashioned with respect to the recipient. The other enters expressions of the self in their very formulation.

The relational rewriting of self

Relational theorizing of this sort has been a significant stimulus to a range of constructionist inquiry, which together essentially reconfigures both the conception of the psychological self and its implications for practice. In one of the earliest provocations of this kind, Potter and Wetherell ( 1987 ) demonstrated the problems inhering in the supposition that attitudes in the head cause overt public actions. As they went on to demonstrate, an attitude is more fruitfully understood as a public action in itself, or essentially, a position taken in a conversation. Much the same line of argument may be applied to the concept of reason. Replacing the Cartesian view of thinking as that process establishing the very certitude of self, reasoning may be viewed as a form of public performance. As Billig ( 1987 ) has proposed, most of what we take to be rational thought is more adequately viewed as a social process of argumentation. We do not argue because we have private thoughts, but rather, private thinking comes into being through the social practice of argumentation. What we consider ‘good reasoning’, then, is not distinguishable from effective rhetoric.

Echoing this line of reasoning is a substantial movement focused on communal memory . Common conceptions of memory—and indeed the conceptions that ground most scientific study of memory—presume the existence of an interior process. Following the preceding line of reasoning, however, one may consider the word ‘memory’ in its performative role. It makes little sense to view the phrase ‘I remember’ as a report on a particular psychological or neurological condition. What kind of condition would one be reporting on, how would one be able to ‘look inside’ and recognize when we had a memory as opposed to a ‘thought’ or a ‘desire’. Rather, as John Shotter has put it, ‘Our ways of talking about our experiences work not primarily to represent the nature of those experiences in themselves, but to represent them in such a way as to constitute and sustain one or another kind of social order’ (1990: 145). In effect, memory is not an individual act but a collective one.

In this sense, if a school child is asked ‘what does three times three equal?’ the answer ‘nine’ is not a report on an inner condition of memory, but an action that has been fashioned within a complex relational history. And when the family gathers at a reunion, the stories of yore are not pictures of their minds, but forms of conversation that have typically been incubated in a long history of conversation. In their study of how people recall political events—such as wars or revolutions—the researchers conclude, ‘Every memory, as personal as it may be—even of events that are private and strictly personal and have not been shared with anyone—exists through its relation with what has been shared with others: language, idiom, events, and everything that shapes the society of which individuals are a part.’ For an extended review of the literature on collective or relational memory the reader may consult Middleton and Brown ( 2005 ).

A final line of inquiry adds further dimension to this relational reconstruction of self. One tends to think of emotions as ‘natural givens’, simply part of one's biological makeup. We generally assume that infants are born into the world with fully functioning emotions; a child's cry is taken as a sign of anger, and a smile as an expression of happiness. Psychologists attempt to locate the physiological basis of emotion, and argue for its universality. The argument for universality is appealing on one level, as it suggests that human understanding is part of our biological makeup. We are innately prepared, for example, to appreciate another's fear or love or joy. Yet, it is also a dangerous assumption, in as much as what one assumes to be ‘natural’ is typically the emotions of one's own culture. What the Ifaluk call fago or the Japanese call mayae , for example, we in the West simply delete from the universal vocabulary of emotion.

In the present context, it is more helpful to view emotional expressions as relational performances. More specifically, one may employ the concept of a relational scenario , that is, a scripted set of interdependent actions such as one might find in a stage performance. Each action in the scenario sets the stage for that which follows; what follows gives intelligibility to that which has preceded. In effect, the performance of each actor is required to give the play its coherent unity; each performance depends on the others for its intelligibility. In these terms, one can view emotional performances as constituents of culturally specific scenarios—parts of a play in which others are required. This is to propose that the angry shout or the sluggish expression of depression only make sense by virtue of their position in a relational scenario. That is, such expressions cannot take place anywhere and anytime, but only within a culturally appropriate sequence. One cannot easily jump to his feet in the middle of family dinner and shout, ‘I am so sorry’; such behavior would be unintelligible. But if accused of an implicitly racist remark, the same expression would not only seem fitting, but desirable. More generally, there are socially prescribed times and places where it is appropriate to perform an emotion.

Further, once an emotion is performed the relational scenario also prescribes what follows. Thus, if a friend announces that he fears he has a fatal disease, certain actions are virtually required by the cultural scenarios and others prohibited. One may properly respond with sympathy and nurturance, but it would be tasteless to reply with a silly joke or talk about one's vacation. Further, like good stories, many emotional scenarios also have beginnings and endings . If it is late at night and one's electric power is suddenly lost, that is the beginning of a scenario in which expressions of fear (as opposed, for example, to jealously or ecstasy) would be appropriate. In contrast, if someone is reporting one's sorrow, another may continue to give nurturance and support until the sorrow subsides. At that point the scenario is terminated.

The relational reconstruction of the self has naturally given rise to a range of criticism. Two of these critical points are most prominent. In the first case, critics charge that such relational views create a black box or empty organism, bereft of all subjective life. In reply, the relational theorist points to the desirability of abandoning dualism, and the problematic distinction between inner and outer , between self and identity. This is not to deny that one is doing something privately in one's prolonged gaze into the distance as one begins to write an essay. However, it is a mistake if it is proposed to view this silent period specifically in terms of psychological processes, that is, functioning according to their own autonomous demands. Rather, the relational theorist proposes, when preparing to write, one is readying oneself to put socially intelligible statements on paper, that is, preparing to engage in a social action. Thus, one may be doing something privately—which we might want to call reasoning, pondering, or feeling—but from the relational standpoint these are essentially public actions carried out in private. To illustrate, consider the actress preparing her lines for a play. The lines are essentially nonsense independent of their placement within the play; that is, they require a relationship to be intelligible. Yet, the actress can rehearse the lines in private, quietly performing the words without voicing them. We might say she was ‘imagining’ or ‘thinking them through’. But essentially she is carrying out a public action, only without audience and full performance. In effect, they are partial performances (Gergen 2009 ).

The second significant critique is that a relational view represents an eradication of individual agency, and thus undermines long‐standing traditions of moral responsibility. To this the relational constructionist replies that there is no eradication of tradition implied. The relational account is itself a construction, and not a truth posit. No traditions need be abandoned; however, all may be subjected to critical reflection. At this point, questions may be raised concerning the wisdom, and indeed the justice, of holding single individuals responsible for their actions. Not only do such practices generate alienation and resentment, but in selecting a target of scorn, they relieve those in judgment from assaying their own contribution to the unwanted outcome. In contrast, the relational theorist proposes, a relational account abandons the determinist/voluntarist antinomy of long standing, and shifts the concern with ‘wrong‐doing’ to the collaborative practices that may be viewed as its origin. One begins to inquire into practices of justice that may sustain viable relationships as opposed to severing them.

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Sarbin, T. (ed.) ( 1986 ). Narrative Psychology (New York: Praeger).

—— and Mancuso, J. ( 1980 ). Schizophrenia: Medical Diagnosis or Verdict? (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon).

Shotter, J. ( 1990 ). ‘The Social Construction of Remembering and Forgetting’, in D. Middleton and D. Edwards (eds), Collective Remembering (London: Sage), 142–9.

Siegel, J. ( 2001 ). The Idea of the Self, Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Szasz, T. S. ( 1961 ). The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York: Hoeber‐Harper).

Taylor, C. ( 1989 ). Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Van Langenhove, L. , and Harré, R. ( 1998 ). Positioning Theory (London: Blackwell).

Vygotsky, L. S. ( 1978 ). Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Wittgenstein, L. ( 1953 ). Philosophical Investigations , tr. G. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan).

For a more detailed account of these critiques within psychology, see Gergen ( 1994 b ). Additional accounts of social constructionist premises and potentials may be found in Potter 1996 ; Gergen 2009 ; Hacking 1999 .

It should be noted that the term constructivism is sometimes used interchangeably with constructionism. However, unlike social construction, early scholars tended to define constructivism in terms of cognitive processes within the individual mind. For these theorists the focus was placed on the individual's perceptions and interpretative capacities as the originating source of their constructions of the world. Recent scholarship has made it increasingly difficult to sustain the distinction between constructivism and constructionism. Constructivists increasingly view mental practices as reflections or embodiments of social process. Many now speak of social constructivism, or use the terms interchangeably.

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4.2C: Psychological Approaches to the Self

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The psychology of self is the study of either the cognitive or affective representation of one’s identity.

Learning Objectives

• Discuss the development of a person’s identity in relation to both the Kohut and Jungian self
• The earliest formulation of the self in modern psychology derived from the distinction between the self as I, the subjective knower, and the self as Me, the object that is known.
• Heinz Kohut, an American psychologist, theorized that the self was bipolar, and was comprised of two systems of narcissistic perfection, one of which contained ambitions and the other of which contained ideals.
• In Jungian theory, derived from the psychologist C.G. Jung, the Self is one of several archetypes. It signifies the coherent whole, unifying both the consciousness and unconscious mind of a person.
• Social constructivists claim that timely and sensitive intervention by adults when a child is on the edge of learning a new task could help children learn new tasks.
• Attachment theory focuses on open, intimate, emotionally meaningful relationships.
• The nativism versus empiricism debate focuses on the relationship between innateness and environmental influence in regard to any particular aspect of development.
• A nativist account of development would argue that the processes in question are innate, that is, they are specified by the organism’s genes. An empiricist perspective would argue that those processes are acquired in interaction with the environment.
• cognitive : the part of mental functions that deals with logic, as opposed to affective functions which deal with emotions
• affective : relating to, resulting from, or influenced by the emotions
• archetype : according to the Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, a universal pattern of thought, present in an individual’s unconscious, inherited from the past collective experience of humanity

Psychology of the Self

The psychology of the self is the study of the cognitive or affective representation of one’s identity. In modern psychology, the earliest formulation of the self derived from the distinction between the self as “I,” the subjective knower, and the self as “me,” the object that is known. Put differently, let us say an individual wanted to think about their “self” as an analytic object. They might ask themselves the question, “what kind of person am I? ” That person is still, in that moment, thinking from some perspective, which is also considered the “self. ” Thus, in this case, the “self” is both what is doing the thinking, and also, at the same time, the object that is being thought about. It is from this dualism that the concept of the self initially emerged in modern psychology. Current psychological thought suggests that the self plays an integral part in human motivation, cognition, affect, and social identity.

The Kohut Self

Heinz Kohut, an American psychologist, theorized a bipolar self that was comprised of two systems of narcissistic perfection, one of which contained ambitions and the other of which contained ideals. Kohut called the pole of ambitions the narcissistic self (later called the grandiose self). He called the pole of ideals the idealized parental imago. According to Kohut, the two poles of the self represented natural progressions in the psychic life of infants and toddlers.

The Jungian Self

In Jungian theory, derived from the psychologist C.G. Jung, the Self is one of several archetypes. It signifies the coherent whole, unifying both the conscious and unconscious mind of a person. The Self, according to Jung, is the end product of individuation, which is defined as the process of integrating one’s personality. For Jung, the Self could be symbolized by either the circle (especially when divided into four quadrants), the square, or the mandala. He also believed that the Self could be symbolically personified in the archetypes of the Wise Old Woman and Wise Old Man.

In contrast to earlier theorists, Jung believed that an individual’s personality had a center. While he considered the ego to be the center of an individual’s conscious identity, he considered the Self to be the center of an individual’s total personality. This total personality included within it the ego, consciousness, and the unconscious mind. To Jung, the Self is both the whole and the center. While Jung perceived the ego to be a self-contained, off-centered, smaller circle contained within the whole, he believed that the Self was the greater circle. In addition to being the center of the psyche, Jung also believed the Self was autonomous, meaning that it exists outside of time and space. He also believed that the Self was the source of dreams, and that the Self would appear in dreams as an authority figure that could either perceive the future or guide an individual’s present.

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Essay on the ‘self’.

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The ‘self may be viewed from two angles: the self as subject and the self as object. The nature of the self, as seen by oneself from inside, is something which transcends all scientific investigations. It is a mystery which language fails to describe. Every person has a consciousness of self, such consciousness finds expression in the use of the pronoun this is the subjective self.’

G.M. Mead pointed out that an essential characteristic of the self is its “reflexive character”. By this he means that the self can be both subject and object to itself. Thus, when we say “the nature of the self’, we reflect upon self and become self-conscious. We make self an object and when we do so the subjective self disappears.

In sociology we are concerned with the objective self. “The heart of socialisation”, says Kingsley Davis, “is the emergence and gradual development of the self or ego. It is in terms of the self that personality takes shape and the mind comes to function”. The objective self, therefore, becomes an object of inquiry.

Where does this self arise? Are we born with it? Is it something the individual brings with him as he confronts society? Or, is it something that he receives from society as a gift of the confrontation? In seeking an answer to these questions, we may explore the theories developed by Charles Horton Cooley, George Herbert Mead and Sigmund Freud.

Though these three eminent scholars differ among themselves, yet all of them, having pursued the subject on the lines of their specialisation, come to the conclusion that the self is social and that self-consciousness arises only in and through interaction with others.

One of the earliest scholars to tackle this problem was C.H. Cooley. In his book, Social Organisation, he writes that “self and society are twin-born”, that “we know one as immediately as we know the other”, and further that “the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion”. In other words, self-consciousness can arise only in society and it is inseparable from social consciousness.

The self, in short, is social. In this connection, we may refer to Cooley’s famous “looking glass” conception of the self.

The basic idea of this conception is as follows:

“The way we imagine ourselves to appear to another person is an essential element in our conception of ourselves. Thus, I am not what I think I am and I am not what you think I am. I am what I think you think I am”.

To Cooley, the proof of this view may be found in our experience that “we are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straight-forward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the presence of a refined one…………”. It follows, therefore, that we make a conscious attempt to show a different self in the presence of different social groups.

Two corollaries follow from this inference:

(i) That we are different in different groups, and

(ii) That we depend upon the presence of other people and group for our conception of ourselves.

Having made such a step-by-step analysis, Cooley concludes that the self is social and that it is not possible to develop self-consciousness in the absence of society.

G.H. Mead (1863-1931), the philosopher and psychologist, agreed wholeheartedly with Cooley that it is absurd to look at the self or the mind from the viewpoint of an individual organism.

Although it may have its focus in the organism, it is undoubtedly a social product and a social phenomenon. The chain of arguments which Mead advances in support of this conclusion and also in support of his theory of “Me” and “I” may be briefly summarised.

The self arises in interaction with the social and non-social environment. The social environment is particularly important. The following example may be cited. The baby cries and mother responds by giving milk or something good.

If the mother continues to respond with care and love, the baby will eventually learn to distinguish between the state of affairs when the mother is present and the state of affairs when the mother is absent.

The mother will be ‘internalized’ as an object. Primitive symbolic communication will be established. Thus, when the baby cries it will mean “I want mother”. The mother’s behaviour will convey to him the meaning that ‘mother is pleased with me’, or that ‘mother loves me’. Here we have the beginning of the consciousness of self.

The formation of the self thus involves “taking the role of other”, seeing oneself, in imagination, as an object seen by someone else. The child, putting himself in the place of another, not only forms a concept of himself but also evaluates that concept and invests it with feeling and warmth.

Just as the child learns to develop an attitude towards objects in the environment, so he learns to take the same attitude toward himself that others take toward him. When the mother tells the child that he has done something good or bad, she is not only trying to teach the child what the words mean.

She treats the child as an object toward which she takes a certain attitude and tries to get the child to do the same. He is encouraged to take himself as an object.

He evaluates and controls himself the same way he evaluates and controls other object and he does so from the standpoint of someone else. In short, the child is taught to make appropriate responses to his own behaviour as well as to other objects in his environment.

This process is characterised by Mead in terms of the T and the ‘Me’— the ‘Me’ being that group of organised attitudes to which the individual responds as an T. He called the acting self the T. The ‘Me’, on the other hand, is that part of the self which consists of the internalized attitudes of others.

The following illustration given by Mead will be instructive:

“Consider a politician or a statesman putting through some project in which he has the attitude of the community in himself. He knows how the community reacts to this, proposal. He reacts to this expression of the community in his own experience—he feels with it. He has a set of organised attitudes which are those of the community. His own contribution, the ‘I’  in this case, is a project of re-organisation, a project which he brings forward to the community as it is reflected in himself. He himself changes, of course, in so far as he brings this project forward and makes it a political issue. There has now arisen a new social situation as a result of the project which he is presenting. The whole procedure takes place in his own experience as well as in the general experience of the community. He is successful to the degree that the final ‘me’ reflects the attitude of all the community”.

If Mead used two components of the ‘self’, ‘I’ and ‘Me’, Freud used three, the id, the ego and the super ego. The id represents our appetites, those inborn drives that prompt us to act, the impulse to do what we want to do. It seeks pleasure and avoids pain, reminiscent of the famous saying of Jeremy Bentham that “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters. Pain and Pleasure”.

We are not, however, permitted to do what we want to do. As social beings, we are obliged to adjust our desires and impulses, so that no social disharmony takes place. The second mechanism of the mind, the ego, helps us to do this.

It mediates between the natural impulses of the id and the demands of the society in which we live. The ego thus acts as the manager of the self and facilitates the adjustment of the individual to society.

Apart from social restraint, there is another restraint upon the unfettered play of the impulses. This is the moral restraint. The third mechanism of the mind, the super-ego tells us what is morally right and what is morally wrong. It tells us what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided. The super-ego imposes the moral imperatives of society.

If we take the three components of mind together, it appears that the id and the super­ego stand in two opposite poles. Complications may develop as a result of such opposition. It is understandable that all our impulses cannot be satisfied in the social context.

At the same time, all our impulses cannot be restrained either without doing harm to emotional stability of the individual. It is the task of the ego, the manager of the self, to act as an umpire in the perennial conflict between the in-born impulses and drives on the one hand and the ‘thousand tongues’ of conscience on the other.

The conflict, referred to above, is an internal conflict, the ‘Self in conflict with itself. Consciousness of ‘self’ arises out of this conflict. “It is in the repression of impulse that we become conscious of the fact that there is something else in the universe than ourselves, and it is this consciousness that gives us also the sense of self”.

We have considered the views of three scholars who belong to three distinct disciplines. In spite of their different intellectual orientations, however, they arrive at a conception of the ‘self’ that requires society.

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Essays on Sociological Imagination

Sociological imagination essay topic examples, argumentative essays.

Argumentative sociological imagination essays require you to present and defend a viewpoint on a sociological issue or concept. Consider these topic examples:

• 1. Argue for or against the idea that social media has transformed the way we form and maintain relationships, considering its impact on social interactions and personal identity.
• 2. Defend your perspective on the role of economic inequality in shaping opportunities and life outcomes, and discuss potential solutions to address this issue.

Example Introduction Paragraph for an Argumentative Sociological Imagination Essay: The sociological imagination allows us to examine how individual experiences are intertwined with larger societal forces. In this essay, I will argue that the rise of social media has redefined our notions of friendship and identity, fundamentally altering the way we connect and interact with others.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for an Argumentative Sociological Imagination Essay: In conclusion, our sociological examination of the impact of social media on relationships highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of modern social interactions. As we navigate this evolving landscape, we must consider the profound influence of technology on our lives.

Compare and Contrast Essays

Compare and contrast sociological imagination essays involve analyzing the differences and similarities between sociological concepts, theories, or societal phenomena. Consider these topics:

• 1. Compare and contrast the perspectives of functionalism and conflict theory in explaining the role of education in society, emphasizing their views on social inequality and the education system.
• 2. Analyze the differences and similarities between rural and urban communities in terms of social structure, opportunities, and challenges, highlighting the impact of location on individuals' lives.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Compare and Contrast Sociological Imagination Essay: Sociological theories provide diverse lenses through which we can analyze and understand society. In this essay, we will compare and contrast the perspectives of functionalism and conflict theory in their explanations of the role of education in shaping social inequalities and the education system.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Compare and Contrast Sociological Imagination Essay: In conclusion, the comparison and contrast of functionalism and conflict theory underscore the complexity of educational systems and their implications for social inequality. As we delve into these theories, we are reminded of the multifaceted nature of sociological analysis.

Descriptive Essays

The sociological imagination prompts us to explore the complex interactions within society and culture. For those looking to deepen their analysis and needing support to craft thorough and insightful examinations, there are specialized services available. Read about the best websites where you can do your homework with the help of experts, ensuring academic success as you navigate these intricate topics.

Descriptive essays on sociological imagination allow you to provide in-depth accounts and analyses of societal phenomena, social issues, or individual experiences. Here are some topic ideas:

• 1. Describe the impact of globalization on cultural diversity, exploring how it has shaped the cultural landscape and individuals' sense of identity.
• 2. Paint a vivid picture of the challenges faced by immigrant communities in adapting to a new cultural and social environment, emphasizing their experiences and resilience.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Descriptive Sociological Imagination Essay: The sociological imagination encourages us to delve into the intricate dynamics of society and culture. In this essay, I will immerse you in the transformative effects of globalization on cultural diversity, examining how it has redefined our identities and cultural experiences.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Descriptive Sociological Imagination Essay: In conclusion, the descriptive exploration of the impact of globalization on cultural diversity reveals the interconnectedness of our world and the evolving nature of cultural identities. As we navigate this globalized society, we are challenged to embrace diversity and promote intercultural understanding.

Persuasive Essays

Persuasive sociological imagination essays involve convincing your audience of the significance of a sociological issue, theory, or perspective, and advocating for a particular viewpoint or action. Consider these persuasive topics:

• 1. Persuade your readers of the importance of gender equality in the workplace, emphasizing the societal benefits of promoting diversity and inclusion.
• 2. Argue for the integration of sociological education into school curricula, highlighting the value of fostering sociological thinking skills for informed citizenship.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Persuasive Sociological Imagination Essay: Sociological insights have the power to shape our understanding of pressing issues. In this persuasive essay, I will make a compelling case for the significance of promoting gender equality in the workplace, underscoring its positive effects on society as a whole.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Persuasive Sociological Imagination Essay: In conclusion, the persuasive argument for gender equality in the workplace highlights the broader societal benefits of creating inclusive and diverse environments. As we advocate for change, we are reminded of the transformative potential of sociological perspectives in addressing contemporary challenges.

Narrative Essays

Narrative sociological imagination essays allow you to share personal stories, experiences, or observations related to sociological concepts, theories, or societal phenomena. Explore these narrative essay topics:

• 1. Narrate a personal experience of cultural adaptation or encountering cultural diversity, reflecting on how it has shaped your perspectives and understanding of society.
• 2. Share a story of social activism or involvement in a community project aimed at addressing a specific societal issue, highlighting the impact of collective action.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Narrative Sociological Imagination Essay: The sociological imagination encourages us to explore our personal experiences within the broader context of society. In this narrative essay, I will take you through my personal journey of encountering cultural diversity and reflect on how it has influenced my worldview and understanding of society.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Narrative Sociological Imagination Essay: In conclusion, the narrative of my cultural adaptation experience underscores the transformative power of personal encounters with diversity. As we embrace the sociological imagination, we are reminded that our stories contribute to the broader narrative of societal change.

The Sociological Imagination: C. Wright Mills Analysis

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The concept of sociological imagination involves the ability to step outside of our familiar daily routines and examine them from a fresh and critical perspective. It encourages us to think beyond the confines of our personal experiences and consider the broader social, cultural, and historical factors that shape our lives.

The phrase was introduced by C. Wright Mills, an American sociologist, in his 1959 publication "The Sociological Imagination." Mills used this term to describe the unique perspective and understanding that sociology provides. He emphasized the importance of looking beyond individual experiences and examining the larger social structures and historical contexts that shape our lives.

The roots of sociological imagination can be traced back to earlier sociological thinkers such as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, who emphasized the importance of understanding society as a whole and the impact of social structures on individuals. Throughout the years, sociological imagination has evolved and expanded, with various scholars and researchers contributing to its development. It has become a fundamental tool for sociologists to analyze social issues, explore the intersections of individual lives and societal structures, and understand the complexities of human behavior. Today, sociological imagination continues to be a crucial concept in sociology, empowering individuals to critically analyze the social world and recognize the larger societal forces that shape their lives.

The application of sociological imagination encompasses a wide range of areas and disciplines, allowing us to understand and analyze various social phenomena, such as: Social Problems: Poverty, inequality, crime, and discrimination by understanding their underlying social structures and historical contexts. Public Policy: By analyzing social issues from a sociological perspective, policymakers can develop more informed and effective solutions. It helps in understanding the impact of policies on different social groups and anticipating their consequences. Education: Sociological imagination helps educators understand how social factors influence student experiences and academic outcomes. It highlights the significance of social class, race, gender, and other dimensions of inequality in educational settings, enabling educators to create inclusive and equitable learning environments. Health and Well-being: Applying sociological imagination to health allows us to recognize how social factors such as socioeconomic status, access to healthcare, and cultural norms impact individual and community well-being. Media and Culture: Sociological imagination aids in analyzing media representations, cultural practices, and popular trends. It helps us understand how media influences public opinion, shapes cultural values, and perpetuates or challenges social norms and stereotypes.

Functionalism, Conflict Theory, Symbolic Interactionism, Structuralism, Feminist Theory, Postmodernism.

The topic of sociological imagination holds immense importance as it allows us to go beyond our individual experiences and understand the broader social forces that shape our lives. It encourages critical thinking and helps us make connections between personal troubles and societal issues. By developing sociological imagination, we gain a deeper awareness of the social structures, cultural norms, and historical contexts that influence our thoughts, actions, and relationships. Sociological imagination enables us to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions and recognize the complexities of social life. It fosters empathy by helping us understand diverse perspectives and experiences. Furthermore, it empowers us to analyze social problems and inequalities, contributing to the pursuit of social justice and positive social change. The application of sociological imagination extends beyond academia, as it has practical implications for various fields such as policy-making, social work, and community development. It equips individuals with the skills to critically engage with the world, navigate complex social dynamics, and contribute to building more inclusive and equitable societies.

The topic of sociological imagination is essential for studying various social phenomena and understanding the intricate connections between individuals and society. Incorporating sociological imagination into the study process enhances critical thinking skills, expands analytical perspectives, and encourages a deeper comprehension of the social world. By utilizing sociological imagination, students can transcend individualistic explanations and recognize the broader social forces at play. It enables them to analyze social issues from multiple angles, considering historical, cultural, economic, and political factors that shape human behavior and social structures. This sociological lens challenges preconceived notions and encourages a more nuanced understanding of complex social phenomena. Moreover, the application of sociological imagination in study helps students develop empathy and cultural sensitivity by fostering an appreciation for diverse perspectives and experiences. It promotes a holistic view of society, emphasizing the interconnections between individuals and social institutions. By employing sociological imagination, students can better grasp the mechanisms of power, inequality, and social change, enabling them to contribute to informed decision-making, policy development, and social advocacy.

1. Hughes, E. C. (1963). Race relations and the sociological imagination. American Sociological Review, 879-890. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2090308) 2. Mudge, S. L., & Chen, A. S. (2014). Political parties and the sociological imagination: Past, present, and future directions. Annual Review of Sociology, 40, 305-330. (https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145632) 3. Denzin, N. K. (1990). Presidential address on the sociological imagination revisited. Sociological Quarterly, 31(1), 1-22. (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1990.tb00314.x) 4. Holliday, A. (1996). Developing a sociological imagination: Expanding ethnography in international English language education. Applied Linguistics, 17(2), 234-255. (https://academic.oup.com/applij/article-abstract/17/2/234/142850) 5. Durham, D. (2000). Youth and the social imagination in Africa: Introduction to parts 1 and 2. Anthropological quarterly, 73(3), 113-120. (https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/35/article/2059/summary) 6. Benjamin, R. (2016). Racial fictions, biological facts: Expanding the sociological imagination through speculative methods. Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience. (https://oar.princeton.edu/handle/88435/pr1kc67) 7. Dannefer, D., Kelley-Moore, J., & Huang, W. (2016). Opening the social: Sociological imagination in life course studies. Handbook of the Life Course: Volume II, 87-110. (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-20880-0_4) 8. Horowitz, I. L. (1962). In Memoriam: The Sociological Imagination of C. Wright Mills. (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/223270?journalCode=ajs)

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Sociology. Identity and Self-Reflection

Identity in the social sense can be described as the human craving to have a sense of belonging within one’s self, a sense of belonging to the people and the community around us, to the things happening around us, and to influence these things.

Self-reflection on the other hand is a process where an individual or individuals stop and reflect on what they have done or been through in their lives to look for a solution to the many questions one may have about the self. There are many ways to look at it; one way is from the satisfaction we gain, the creation of a culture which is mainly thought to be associated with some diverse thoughts that together form a society of distinct opinions. Just like the readings by Chan, Staples, and Heyward who all identify themselves as very unique people with different cultural backgrounds and insightful perspectives. However, they do fit themselves in some kind of boxes created by society. This is where the idea of the melting pot comes in. this idea shows that everyone is losing his/her identity gradually when society generates several boxes or categories. But in the face of this, do we have individual characters; are we able to take time off communal matters to attend to ourselves, to meet the needs of the innate being? This paper seeks to answer that question and to find out whether these people exist in these societies. It will also seek to find out if their perceptions of their beings affect their activities?

Proper self-reflection leads to self-efficacy. This is people’s internal belief about their abilities to produce quality levels of output that influence events that can change their lives. It opens up human beings to their inner beings, leading them to understand much about their fundamental nature and purpose in life. The principles surrounding self-efficacy are highly associated with beliefs and thoughts, people’s feelings, how they motivate themselves and their behaviors. The result is a person with a strong sense of well being, one that understands people and their capabilities. These people approach difficult situations as challenges to be overcome instead of fear that are to be scared off. They also set very high goals for themselves in life and commit their lives towards achieving the goals. Like in Chan’s essay about how she has been ill-treated by people who think disabilities would make hopeless both physically and mentally. According to Chan, people are always limited by their definitions of self. One could reverse the marker that has been put on them based upon their physical condition. Acting in the way one believed, is more likely to have a higher chance letting others perceiving the innate beauty of one (Chan, 68).

Chan also expounds on the issue of self by examining the nature of the personality of human beings. In defining the ‘self’ Chan explores the following aspects; “race, gender, economic class social status, religion, nationality, and sexuality. She states that these are some of the most significant ways by which we identify ourselves in the twenty-first century (Chan, 62). Chan takes our attention to not only these but also to the physical abilities and disabilities in individuals. Chan also includes the societal aspect by examining the stereotyping power. By this, she brings forth the questions that follow; “how do the views of others define us as individuals? How we allow those definitions to limit the boundaries of our ambitions and to circumscribe our relationships with fellow human-beings? And finally, how can we transgress and transcend these limits?” (Chan, 62)

This point of view in life encourages such deep interest making them fully engrossed in their daily activities. They are not discouraged when they are facing failure, instead they relate to it as a chance to stop and rediscover more to see what went wrong and where the mishaps occurred. They personally attribute failure to lack of preparedness and shortage of the required skills which are all achievable by harder practices. They also have this inner belief that they can exercise control over unfortunate circumstances.

Self efficacy in itself is, however, a process and is motivated by several factors, both individual and collective. The goals to be achieved by an individual are influenced by the internal belief in ones capabilities. The stronger the awareness, the higher the challenge one sets up. For these people the challenges become their goals in life. As if Chan was trying to prove herself to her family, doctors, colleagues, etc. She was basically doing everything she could to change her life, and more importantly, change the way others perceived her basing upon her unfortunate physical condition.

Motivational processes entail the inner ability of individuals to direct their behaviors and spur their spirits to persist in their endeavors until they attain the set goals. Self influence plays a greater part in this action. Self satisfaction is attained through accomplishment of the set goals. Like in Chan’s case her unfortunate state acted as a motivation in the achieving of greater goals. Unfairness reminds a person to intensify his/her output and quality. Beliefs of self efficacy also determine the degree of ambition in people, how much of their efforts would be required, their degree of persistence when challenge incurs, and their abilities to adjust themselves when they are facing failure or to adapt certain quick changes. When facing extreme hardships, people who have doubts about their abilities give up quickly. However, people who have strong belief in mind are capable of turning their ambitions to overcome challenges. This determination leads to one accomplishing the goal and tasks set upon them. Referring this back to the Staples’s essay, being over supervised and avoided on purpose in the public is something he feels very insulting.

The self and self reflection is also considered by the magnitude of our identity in self definition and to some extend the magnitude of this that is socially build. As shown by Staples (67), we should try to define the self through other people’s eyes and on the contrary which magnitude we anticipate them to be conventional to our anticipations of them. Staples, notably shows how people view the self of others by merely viewing their outer personality. He shows that the society can decide to label you with a tag which is not yourself. This he explains is brought about by the way we carry ourselves.

Affective process, engages peoples’ strong mindset and their abilities facing extreme pressure and anxiety. People who believe they can handle stress do not get easily distracted by disturbing thoughts, but only those with weaker mindsets. Their thoughts mostly based on their shortages, and how they improve it. Mainly, they find out why they are suffering from the hardship, and what is necessary to overcome the toughness. The stronger the feeling of self efficacy, the more effective people become in dealing with their goals and ambitions in life. As Heyward points out in her essay, the boxes created by ourselves within the society have definitely slowed down the pace of our growth on the way to human civilization. Apparently she knows what she wants and what she needs to leading her through this frustration. We are participating in a society that has been divided into different boxes based upon religions, sexuality, and numerous other labels. “We live with contradictions and partial truths” (Heyward, 144). By coming out of the boxes, our civilization is achievable, and justice is also indeed.

Beliefs of personal efficacy influence the type of activities people engage in. They shape the path of one’s life through their influence on which activities one may choose to participate in (Bandura, 53). This narrows it down to the selection process, the choice of what to do or what not to do. It is influenced by factors such as the environment and the people around us. Most importantly, it is the level of self belief one may have. People with higher self belief tend to do many things and have this perception that they can do anything they set out to do. They have this sense of liberty in their inner being and tend to handle challenging situations with relative confidence. As Heyward mentions, the box is collapsing nowadays, women and men are coming out of the box. Coming out means becoming the true self one really is, pursuing love, sexuality and justice without considering too much about how others think.

While talking about self reflection we cannot escape the topic of sexuality. In an article by Heyward, there is the placing of a lot of significance on sexual identity in a particular theme called coming out. Heyward argues that in the creation of individuality or self for that matter, sexuality has a spiritual importance. Heyward states that, this aspect could be, “the source all of higher passions, including our desire for peace, justice, and freedom. Here she reconciles her apprehension over the correlation between sexual labels and religious ideologies, between her sense of self and her calling as a religious leader” (Heyward, 78).

In spite of this, societies are not shaped by individuals; they are shaped by the masses. The traditions and rules that govern a specific place are efforts to restrain some characters and uphold others. As a result we have uniform characters, characters that do not have forms, a people that don’t know what they really are and don’t know their individual strengths. They are more like slaves of the established rule. In some societies, thinking outside the box is discouraged; in some cases it involved facing punishment, even death. Nevertheless, according to Rampton and Stauber, how much trust should people put into the authority nowadays? In the society filled with manipulation and propagandas, seeking the truly inner thought is crucial. Yet, still hearing others out, especially the ones with opposing opinions who would in fact makes one think deeper on one’s own idea, discovering the beauty of liberty of thought and discussion. Not speaking out one’s idea is no better than having the truth buried (Mill, 47).

Everyone can be greater than their thoughts. When people stand for what they believe in, when they fight to protect their ideas, and when nothing could stop them from being who they are, revolution happens (Hayes, 76). Even if they fail, the idea will still be developed or inspire by someone else to counting our way to achieving a good society overall.

Works cited

Bandura, James. Self efficacy. London: Stanford University press, 2005. Print.

Chan, Sucheng. You are short besides . Boston: Bacon press, 1989. Print.

Hayes, Daniel. The rapture of maturity: New York, NY: Oxford University press, 2000. Print.

Heyward, Carter. Our passion for justice. New York, NY: The pilgrim P, 1984. Print.

Mill, Stuart. Of thought and decision. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 2008, Print.

Staples, Brent. Men and public places . Hapers, 1986. Print.

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Philosophical Perspective of Self Essay

Introduction, rene descartes, meditations on first philosophy, second meditation summary and analysis, analysis and definition of “i”, other definitions of self, works cited.

Throughout history, the philosophical perspective of “self” has received myriad descriptions and analyses from many philosophers, researchers, and even scholars. In gaining this understanding, these people are important in explaining how the knowledge of this concept affects the world and how people perceive themselves and their ultimate relationships with others.

An understanding of “self,” therefore, affirms a person’s identity in a social environment, allowing him/her to recognize others besides oneself (Sorabji 13). In other words, the way human beings socialize solely depends on how they perceive themselves and others through daily social interactions.

Innumerable philosophers, including Socrates and Aristotle, have immensely contributed towards gaining clarity in defining “I.” Yet, it is believed that some have been quite outstanding with regard to their input. In this category lies Rene Descartes, whose findings remain essential in defining the concept of “self” and how this definition affects people’s thinking and interactions.

This paper goes far ahead in synthesizing Descartes’ findings to achieve a concise definition of the word “I” that seems reasonable and critical from a philosophical perspective of the “self.” This essay further digs into several research findings unearthed by renowned scholars and experts who have devoted their time and resources to studying and exploring the definition and how it influences interpersonal relationships in one’s life.

By compiling ideas from an array of thinkers, this philosophy of “self” essay intends to explore the implications of defining “I” in a given manner and how such a stance would affect our self-reflection and perceptions of ourselves or how we treat ourselves. The survey also focuses on how these definitions would affect our knowledge of ourselves and the world outside our “selves.”

Born in 1596 in France, Rene Descartes was a great philosopher, thinker, writer, and mathematician who spent his adulthood in the Republic of Dutch. He has arguably been dubbed as the father of modern philosophy with special emphasis on the Western school of thought (Smith 1).

As a result, his pieces of writing remain key reference materials for scholars across the global plane. For example, meditations continue to serve as principal textbooks in most universities’ philosophy departments today. His contribution to mathematics set unbeaten records, with his efforts being widely applied in calculus and geometry. In the development of natural sciences, his input cannot go unnoticed.

He believed philosophy was a mega entity encompassing all aspects of knowledge expressed through it. Although most of the works and thoughts have been widely considered, there has been a strong emphasis on Meditations on First Philosophy. As mentioned before, this essay will emphasize the second meditation in defining the concept of “I,” also known as “self.”

These meditations are considered the origin of modern Western philosophy. In this coverage, Descartes criticizes most of Aristotle’s arguments and designs questions that have remained debatable in the world of philosophy today. He breaks from the norm created by Aristotle that knowledge is achieved through human senses and that mental statuses usually resemble what they are. As such, Descartes is able to develop brand new concepts about the mind, ideas, and matter (Frankfurt 185).

In this portion of his findings, Descartes explains the nature of the human mind and that it is better than the body. His research revolves around the search for certainty and ignores every idea that carries any slightest doubt. Throughout his memory, Descartes believes that whatever he happens to see is actually meaningless and may not ever exist in real life (Descartes 17).

As a result, we can view place and movement as mistaken notions in human life since lack of certainty is the only certain thing that exists in his life. This is essential in defining ourselves and our existence.

Is it possible for Descartes to believe that he does not have a body and senses, yet he exists? What about the nonexistence of the physical world, as proposed by the author? Ironically, he can only posses these doubts of nonexistence if he truly exists.

In other words, one can only be misled by the devil from within if he does exist. As such, “I” has to exist in order to doubt and be deceived by the evil one. Nevertheless, it can generally be viewed that “I” is a necessary and true preposition when suggested by somebody or conceived in one’s own mind (Descartes 72).

After conceiving the existence of “I,” the mediator does not stop at this particular point but aims at defining and explaining the meaning of the “I am.” This approach makes it possible to be certain that we possess a soul which augments our thinking, nourishment, movement, and sensibility. Furthermore, human beings have a body (Frankfurt 185).

Regardless of these initial doubts, many people sink into a ditch of doubts and hang on to the fact that one has the ability to think. In other words, our existence does not solely depend on the above-mentioned attributes of human beings, but we have no doubt about our breathing power.

This implies that thinking is essential for a person to exist regardless of whether he has other qualities like body and soul, among others. By the fact that thinking defines “self,” it is possible to relate it with human existence and consider it inseparable from being. From a general perspective, we can view one’s self as simply “thinking something.”

The definition of “I” is enshrined in Descartes’ cogito argument based on its formulation in Latin, “cogito ergo sum,” translated as “I think, therefore, I am.” This line is quite famous in the history of philosophy and is most probably regarded as the origin of Western philosophy and other schools of thought that developed after Descartes. In this line, the mediator gets in touch with a grip of certainty after his continuous disbelief is manifested in the First Mediation (Frankfurt 186).

In essence, the cogito exposes a different view of the world and states that the mind is the only thing in the world that can know itself. Notably, understanding our mind first before any other thing has remained rooted in Western philosophy, even though the main point of contention has been the connection between the mind and the real world. From this perspective, the mind is no longer an aid to understanding the world but an internally locked thing (Frankfurt 186).

In analyzing Descartes’ Second Meditation, it is of immense significance to note the existing differences between “I think, therefore I am” as described in the Discourse Method from the general formulation derived from meditations.

At this point of the synthesis, it is imperative to mention that the proposition “I am, I exist” holds only when it is put forward by a specific individual and conceived by the person’s mind. The mediation is further divided into an argument of three steps, which are: whatever thinks exists, I think therefore, and I exist (Frankfurt 188).

However, in understanding “self” through syllogistic reading and analysis, denied by Descartes in other pieces of writing is the fact that there is no reason why “whatever thinks exists” should not be doubtful as portrayed by the mediator. This reading approach further analyzes the cogito as a conclusion that has been reasoned out at a specific point in the doubtful mind of the mediator, even when inferences that have been well reasoned out are called to doubt (Frankfurt 189).

The question we need to ask ourselves in this definition of self is the path somebody takes to know the cogito when everything else is doubted. As a result, several proposals have been put forth as reading formats and methodologies aimed at simplifying this reading process and step (Frankfurt 202). It would be impossible for a person to say he/she exits or even thinks of existence without being in a real state.

Consequently, the truth is achieved by the utterance concerning the concept of existence. In this line of thought, it can be argued that the existence of a person can only be confirmed by oneself in the present tense, “I am.” It is also important to double emphasize the fact that cogito can only work when one is talking about thought. One cannot say: “I sleep, therefore I am,” since the act of sleeping can be doubted. In explaining this, one cannot doubt the act of thinking because doubt on its own is a form of thought.

Besides cogito , the mediator also affirms that he “thinks,” leading to an argument commonly referred to as sun res cogitans (Rorty 215). This comprises three controversial views regarding one being a “thinking thing.” In this approach, it is essential to comprehend the meaning of “thing” and “think” to establish their definitive relationship with “I am.”

There are two approaches to defining “self” at this point. This can be done both epistemologically and metaphysically. In other words, body and mind cannot be one since one has got either to know both of them or none of them. As a matter of fact, the existence of the body ceases since one is a “thinking thing with delinked body and mind. This gives way to the conclusion that one is a “thing that thinks.”

With preciseness, “I” can be defined as the “thing that thinks.” In addition, “I” possesses other attributes besides being able to think, understand, and be willing to do certain things. These qualities include but are not limited to imagination and the use of the senses. In the understanding of “I,” it is worth noting that senses and imagination cannot be trusted (Rorty 214). This is because imagination can trigger all forms of things that may not necessarily be real.

How can one identify wax? This is made possible through a sense of taste, color, smell, size, shape, and hardness, among others. When heated, the wax changes some properties but can be identified despite the deviation from the initial form. Due to the fact that wax can be identified even when its shape is infinitely changed, it suffices to mention that this cannot be possible via imagination but through the intellect alone and proper mental scrutiny.

Based on this argument, it can be concluded that the mind knows better than the body. In this approach, the human view is that one has to know the mind more than any other thing in his or her life as a way of understanding the self better (Rorty 214). There is no doubt in perceiving the identity of something, and these actions of thought clearly imply that the item exists in reality. Therefore, confirming one’s existence is the core of ascertaining the nature of the mind through the intellect alone.

As mentioned before, various authors have defined and described the concept of “self” throughout history. According to Sorabji, the idea of “self” is real in human history. He argues that the “self” comes to play when the owner of a body is intertwined with existing psychological states (Sorabji 13).

He further notes that in explaining the “self,” there is a stream of consciousness that lacks the owner. In his description of this analogy, Sorabji asserts that his definition of “self” fits other members like animals as embodied owners of the body. Based on this approach, Sorabji further double emphasizes the fact that there is a need to protect the human way of life and not only base it on its relationship with the “self” or the interaction between members of a given stream (Sorabji 13).

The broadness of “self” also encompasses the picture of human beings developing into male or female, baker or teacher, son or daughter, Indian or American, among other development attributes. Importantly, these cannot be visualized through the metaphysical conceptualization of the “self” because of its narrowness in determining the nature of the pictures to be adopted. Additionally, the pictures are not considered to be essential and are likely to be altered under extreme pressure (Sorabji 14).

However, visualized pictures are important in describing a complete image of selfhood, even though they can be philosophically studied differently. “I am” is also described by the use of unique features, which make human beings different from other creations (Sorabji 14). In essence, thoughts and actions people execute are usually a result of the self. It can be described as a substance that persists through time. This is to say that actions and thoughts experienced at different times of the day or in life may also concern the “self.”

In most cases, philosophical definitions of “self” are discussed based on the first-person attributes. This is because third-person definitions do not identify unique identification properties. Viewed from a different point, the “self” can be principally described through the discourse and conduct of a person.

As a result, intentions can only be deduced from something being observed through actions undertaken by an individual. Of great significance is the fact that the characteristics of a given “self” have the full potential of determining its real identity (Rorty 215).

Based on this analogy, it can be argued that “I” can be divided into various concepts as defined by specific qualities and attributes. For instance, the “self” can be viewed as an illusion (Sorabji 17). This is common in ancient spiritual traditions in which the human identity is conceived as a mere illusion for the existence of individual human beings. This identification further ensures that there is a boundary between humanity and other forms of creation, especially in terms of characteristics and abilities.

In general, individual existence is considered as the representation of a human being and advocates fighting for its rightful position in the world (Rorty 216). Moreover, “self” is linked with time and mind, which determine obsessive thinking based on the future than emphasizing the present. Most religions advocate for the dissolution of humans for human nature to prevail in the world. This is commonly known as nirvana, presence, or enlightenment.

Besides viewing the self as an illusion, other philosophers approach the concept by considering the “self” as an activity. Among these philosophers were Aristotle and Plato, who defined the human soul as the principal essence of humanity but posited against differences in existence.

Unlike Plato and other religious traditions who supported separate existence, Aristotle viewed the human “self” as an activity of the body which lacks the properties of becoming immortal (Sorabji 17). To be specific, the soul is viewed as the activity of any living body. In defining the soul, Aristotle divided his argument into four major parts, including the desiderative, calculative, rational, and scientific parts.

Another renowned philosopher and psychologist today who defines “self” is Dr. Phil. He believes that a person dwells on a state of fictional self or authentic self as created by the Supreme Being. According to Dr. Phil, most people define who they are by explaining what they are doing, where they are, or their role in society.

However, Dr. Phil argues that one’s authentic self encompasses the genuine existence of a person’s identity (McGraw 1). This is to say that an authentic self demonstrates core human qualities. Additionally, the self is made up of the part of an individual that is not defined by profession or a given role in society. It consists of an individual’s talents, skills, and wisdom.

The psychologist further argues that an authentic self revolves around a person’s uniqueness, including abilities, rather than what he/she is expected to do or become. This, therefore, implies that when an individual does not live to the standards of his authentic self, he adopts a fictional self that has emptiness and incompleteness (McGraw 1).

It is doubtless that the definition of “self” has a wide range of implications. For instance, this knowledge affects the way human beings view themselves differently from animals. It gives them an understanding of their uniqueness and potential in using their senses to recognize their surrounding and their imagination ability.

Additionally, the definition of self impacts how we interact with and perceive others. In other words, human beings are able to appreciate others regardless of their shortcomings and differences since each one of them possesses unique qualities and attributes.

Although numerous philosophers have devoted their lives to defining the “I am” concept, Rene Descartes is regarded as the father of Western philosophy and a great contributor to several schools of thought. In particular, Meditations on First Philosophy has widely been used as learning at teaching materials across the globe.

Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy . Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications, LLC, 2007. Print.

Frankfurt, Harry. Descartes’ Discussion of His Existence in the Second Mediation. United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2004. Print.

McGraw, Phillip. “Self Matters.” Dr. Phil , 2012. Web.

Rorty, Amélie. Essays on Descartes’ Meditations . California: University of California Press, 1986. Print.

Smith, Kurt, “Descartes’ Life and Works.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012. Web. < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/descartes-works/ >.

Sorabji, Richard. Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self. New York, NY: Springer, 2008. Print.

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IvyPanda. (2023, August 28). Philosophical Perspective of Self Essay. https://ivypanda.com/essays/who-am-i/

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Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Philosophical Perspective of Self Essay." August 28, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/who-am-i/.

• Descartes' Cogito Argument and Hume's Critique of the Self
• Husserl's and Descartes' Philosophies
• R.Descartes' and T.Aquinas' Views on God Existence
• Meditation Two: Concerning the Nature of the Human Mind
• Descartes and the Skeptics: An Incomplete Case
• Descartes and Hume’s Ideologies in Contemporary Psychology
• Physicalism as a Philosophical Approach
• Rene Descartes: A Brief Perspective
• David Hume: The Ideology of Self
• Descartes' and Buddhist Ideas of Self-Existence
• A Miracle as an Extraordinary Happening Occurring in the Physical World
• Philosophy Is Worth Doing
• Proof of an External World
• Rene Descartes and John Locke
• Sophist Reasoning: Reality Perception

Home / Essay Samples / Sociology / Sociological Imagination / The Sociological Imagination And Me

The Sociological Imagination And Me

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• Topic: Personal Experience , Society , Sociological Imagination

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