stalin's economic policies essay

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In the 1920s , Stalin inherited Russia's frozen economy and immediately set out a series of ruthless economic reforms to catapult Russia into one of the world's strongest economic powers. But what were these reforms, how successful were they, and how did they impact the Russian people? Let's examine Stalin 's economic policies!

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Stalin's Economic Policies

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Stalin's Five Year Plan

When he came into power in 1929 , Stalin had a vision to improve the Russian economy radically . He wanted to transform it into a thoroughly modern economy that could compete with and out-produce the capitalist economies of the West.

Even before the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russia's economy had failed to equal those of Western countries, particularly in heavy industry. Stalin felt it was particularly important to boost heavy industry during the 1930s and 40s with the advent of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War .

Heavy Industry

An economic sector that manufactures raw materials on a massive scale, using large machinery and facilities and vast areas of land. Examples include the manufacturing of iron and coal, as well as building vehicles such as ships.

To achieve this, Stalin introduced the economic concept of "Five Year Plans". For the First Five-Year Plan, Stalin initiated two key policies - Rapid Industrialisation and the Collectivisation of Agriculture .

Industrialisation and the Five-Year Plan

To achieve the level of industrialisation that Stalin wanted, he needed to create a planned economy for the USSR. This meant that the state would decide production goals and the methods through which those goals would be achieved.

The State Planning Committee (known as Gosplan ) created the First Five-Year Plan in 1928 , which set out an extremely ambitious plan for the Soviet economy from 1929 to 1933. The Plan set out the following agenda:

• Targets were set for every industry , divided between regions, towns and individual factories. The targets established were incredibly ambitious.
• Workers were strictly regulated - absenteeism and lateness were punished, and wages could be deducted if workers didn't meet their targets.
• The plan focused on heavy industry - building new hydroelectric dams and power stations and improving the production of coal , oil , steel, and gas .
• Agriculture was collectivised to increase and control agricultural output to feed workers and to export more grain. This would provide income to support industrialisation plans.

In 1932 , Stalin declared that the First Five-Year Plan had been a success and achieved all its goals a year earlier than planned - but how accurate was that statement? Well, the First Five-Year Plan certainly had its successes - production in electricity trebled , while coal and iron output doubled . Soviet engineering developed in line with industry demands, and thousands of people moved into cities to join the industrial workforce.

A reputable source?

It must be noted that the Soviet government very likely inflated the output figures to make the USSR seem more impressive and superior to the capitalist West .

The reality was that the quotas set at the beginning of the plan were not fully achieved, and the immense pressure and restriction on workers made life very difficult for most of the population. Furthermore, the focus on heavy industry meant other sectors, like consumer industries , were neglected.

The USSR would continue with these economic plans until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 , as the First-Five Year plan had proved so successful. Throughout Stalin's tenure as leader, the focus of these plans remained broadly the same, with industrialisation and collectivisation as the main policies.

Stalin's Economic and Social Policies

Of course, the restructuring of the economy to improve industrialisation also had a big impact on how people lived their lives. Education changed significantly as hundreds of new schools were built to improve literacy rates and encourage a more skilled labour force . These schools' lessons mainly focused on engineering and mechanical skills, in line with the desire for industrialisation under the First Five-Year Plan.

Did you know ? In 1928, 55% of the Soviet population was literate. This was already a significant improvement since 1914 when literacy rates were at 38%. After the First Five-Year Plan, Soviet literacy had increased to 68%, and by 1939 literacy rates were at a staggering 94% of the entire Soviet population.

Due to the push for industrialisation, towns and cities expanded , with some springing up around the newly built factories. Transportation also became a key focus for industrialisation to ensure that materials, food, and workers could be transported easily.

Stalin and Collectivisation Policy

The other central policy of the First Five-Year Plan was the collectivisation of agriculture . This involved stopping the individual farms that had created the Kulak class and making peasants work in large collective farms, known as k olkhoz . This policy was implemented firstly to reduce the economic power of the Kulaks. Soviet officials also thought it would increase grain yields, a goal of the Five-Year Plan.

A class of wealthier, land-owning peasants which emerged after the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 and had particularly benefitted from selling their extra produce under Lenin 's New Economic Policy in 1921. This was Lenin's compromise by allowing a form of capitalism to enter the socialist USSR. Stalin wanted to enforce socialism and eliminate this class which he regarded as greedy and a problem to the USSR.

However, collectivisation had significant drawbacks . The peasants had no choice and were forced to join these collective farms. In particular, many Kulaks objected to it, even going as far as slaughtering their livestock and destroying their machinery , so the government could not seize them. The systems of collectivisation also meant that the government could requisition as much grain as they wanted to support industrial workers in the cities, often not leaving enough for the rural working peasants themselves.

Holodomor (1932-3)

Stalin used collectivisation policies to punish Ukrainians who wanted their own identity separate from the USSR. He increased the Ukrainian grain quotas to unachievably high rates and requisitioned nearly all the grain to feed other parts of the Soviet Union . As a result, Stalin created a man-made famine known as Holodomor between 1932-3. An estimated 3.9 million people died in the famine, demonstrating how Stalin was prepared to push collectivisation to the extreme to punish deference from the USSR.

Impact of Collectivisation

While it did have some successes, Collectivisation had a severe negative impact on the people in the Soviet Union. Here is an overview of how the Collectivisation policy was detrimental:

• Many peasants resisted the change through passive resistance . They slaughtered animals and destroyed machinery so the state could not use it, leading to shortages even before the kolkhozy were set up.
• Those who worked in collective farms were managed very carefully. Eventually, it became impossible for workers to leave their region without a government permit .
• The Kulaks , a whole class of people, were targeted and attacked by the state as Stalin wanted them eradicated. They lost their livelihoods and, in some cases, their lives.
• Priority for food was given to those working in the cities. Combined with the reluctance of peasants to work efficiently in the kolkhoz, the Soviet Union experienced a famine from 1931-34, in which an estimated 6-9 million people died of hunger.
• The lack of food was used to enact a genocide via starvation in USSR-controlled Ukraine, known as Holodomor. Of the 6-9 million who died in the famine, an estimated 3.9 million were Ukrainian.

Impact of Stalin's Economic Policies

Stalin's Economic Policies had both big successes and terrible failures. Let's look at how the Soviet economy and people were helped or hindered by Stalin's policies.

Success of Stalin's Economic Policies

Early successes were seen with Stalin's First Five-Year Plan.

• The First Five-Year Plan certainly helped to put Russia on the path to becoming a fully industrialised nation on par with the West.
• Under the First Five-Year Plan, steel output increased by one-third , iron and coal output doubled , and electricity production tripled .
• Rapid industrialisation was crucial for the USSR to defend itself during World War Two . It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would have been able to resist the German invasion in 1941 without the industrialisation from Stalin's economic policies that helped build up the Soviet military.

Failure of Stalin's Economic Policies

Despite the initial successes, Stalin's economic policies had some significant failures.

• While the First Five-Year Plan was successful, the government most likely manipulated the figures to make output increases seem more than they were . Therefore, it is hard to gauge exactly how successful the First Five-year plan actually was.
• Collectivisation was very detrimental to the lives of the working people in the Soviet Union. The Kulaks were harshly treated, and those who worked on the farms had their freedoms restricted significantly.
• Government requisitioning of grain from the collective farms often meant insufficient food was left for those in rural areas. The lack of food combined with a growing population resulted in a famine from 1931-1934, which killed around 5 million people - including 3.9 million Ukrainians.

Stalin's Economic Policy - Key takeaways

• Stalin's economic policy focused on rapid industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture , aiming to transform the USSR into a modern industrial power that could compete with Western nations.
• Stalin introduced the Five-Year Plans , which set out goals to be achieved in the next five years, and the methods for achieving those goals.
• To increase industrialisation, workers were heavily regulated and targeted with propaganda to encourage hard work. Outputs of industrials goods rose significantly - although it is uncertain how much the government inflated the figures to seem more impressive than they actually were.
• The collectivisation of agriculture got rid of independent farms. It established larger, collective farms to produce enough grain to fuel industrialisation. It was not a popular policy and resulted in the loss of freedoms for many people. Over-requisitioning resulted in food shortages and famine for most of the USSR in the 1930s.
• Stalin continued with the Five-Year plans throughout his time as leader, and the USSR carried on with them after Stalin's death in 1953 .
• Fig. 2 Old Kolkhoz (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:441_Ancien_kolkhoze_pr%C3%A8s_de_Djermouk.JPG) by Moreau.henri ( https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Moreau.henri) Licensed under CC BY SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en)

Frequently Asked Questions about Stalin's Economic Policies

--> what were stalin's economic policies.

Stalin's key economic policies focused on rapid industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture. He enacted these through the Five Year Plans.

--> How did Stalin transform the economy in the Soviet Union?

Stalin significantly increased the Soviet economy through his policies, elevating the USSR to the world stage able to compete with capitalist giants such as the US. According to Soviet sources, electricity production trebled and coal and iron output doubled in the First Five Year Plan. However, as these are USSR figures, they are most likely inflated to further support for the economic policies.

--> How successful were Stalin's economic policies?

The USSR published the results of the first Five Year Plan, claiming that production in electricity trebled , while coal and iron output doubled.  However, as these come directly from USSR sources, it is likely these statistics were inflated.

--> What were the effects of Stalin's economic policies?

Although economically the USSR appeared to soar with rapid industrialisation benefitting from the requisition of grain under collectivised agriculture, the lives of citizens were not always a happy story. Literacy rates increased massively from 38% in 1914 to 94% by the end of 1939. However, forceful requisition of grain by the Soviet Union meant that rural, grain-producing regions such as Ukraine suffered greatly. A significant event is the man-made genocide of Holodomor, whereby Ukrainian farmers were given unachievable grain quotas and had nearly all of their grain requisitioned. This facilitated the deaths of around 3.9 million people between 1932-3 in Ukraine alone. Other regions suffered too, with a USSR-wide famine killing around 6-9 million people from 1930-3.

--> What was Stalin's five year plan? 

Stalin wanted the Soviet Union to improve its economy quickly. In order to enact his policies of rapid industrialisation and collectivisation, he created Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) which set quotas and goals for all industries in order to maximise output. These goals were set every 5 years with different agendas for each - as such they were known as the Five Year Plans.

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The main focus of the First Five Year plan was ______.

The new farms created under Collectivisation were called...

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What was Holodomor?

A man-made famine created by the Soviet Union to purge the Ukrainian peasantry and elite.

When did Holodomor take place?

Between 1932 and 1933.

Approximately how many people died during Holodomor?

3.9 million

Who was leader of the Soviet Union during Holodomor?

Joseph Stalin

When did Ukraine become the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic?

What was Lenin's policy of indigenisation?

An effort to promote national and cultural liberalisation in Ukraine.

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The History Hit Miscellany of Facts, Figures and Fascinating Finds

• 20th Century

How Did Stalin Transform Russia’s Economy?

Under the tsars

Russia had long been an autocracy, subject to absolute rule by the tsar. Bound by a strict social hierarchy, serfs (peasants of feudal Russian) had been owned by their masters, forced to work the lands and receiving nothing in return. Serfdom had been abolished in 1861, but many Russians continued to live in conditions which were little better.

The economy was predominantly agricultural, with limited heavy industry. The introduction of railways in the mid 19th century, and their expansion right up until 1915, looked promising, but ultimately they did little to transform or change the economy.

Lenin and the revolution

The Bolsheviks , leaders of the 1917 Russian Revolution, promised the people of Russia equality, opportunity and better living conditions. But Lenin was not a miracle worker. Russia was engulfed in civil war for several more years, and things would get worse before they got better.

However, the advent of electrification across Russia made the development of heavy industry possible and transformed the lives of millions of people. Eschewing capitalism, the state assumed control of the means of production, exchange and communication, with the aim of completing the process of collectivisation in the near future.

However, ‘War Communism’ and ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP) were not truly communist in nature: they both involved a certain degree of capitalism and pandering to the free market. For many, they did not go far enough and Lenin found himself clashing with those who wanted more radical reform.

Stalin’s first Five Year Plan

Joseph Stalin seized power in 1924 following Lenin’s death, and announced the advent of his first Five Year Plan in 1928. The idea was to transform the new Soviet Russia into a major industrial powerhouse in a virtually unprecedented period of time. To do this, he would need to implement large-scale social and cultural reforms too.

Newly collectivised farms, controlled by the state, transformed the lifestyle and existence of peasant farmers: as a result, peasants resisted the reforms much of the time. The programme also saw the infamous ‘ dekulakisation ‘ of the countryside, where kulaks (land-owning peasants) were dubbed class enemies and rounded up to be arrested, deported or executed at the hands of the state.

A parade in the Soviet Union under the banners “We will liquidate the kulaks as a class” and “All to the struggle against the wreckers of agriculture”. Sometime between 1929 and 1934.

Image Credit: Courtesy of Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Andrej K. Sokolov / GNU Free Documentation Licence via Wikimedia Commons.

However, whilst the collectivised farming system proved to be more productive in the long run (farms were required to sell their grain to the state at a fixed price), its immediate consequences were dire. Famine began to stalk the land: millions died during the plan, and millions more found themselves snapped up to jobs in the fast-developing industrial sector. Those peasants still farming often tried to squirrel away grain for their own use rather than reporting it and handing it over to the state as they should have done.

The first Five Year Plan could be considered a success in that, according to Soviet statistics at least, it met its targets: Stalin’s major propaganda campaigns had seen industrial output increase exponentially. The widespread famine and starvation had claimed the lives of millions, but at least in Stalin’s eyes, this was a price worth paying for Russia to become the second most industrialised nation in the world.

Subsequent Five Year Plans

Five Year Plans became a standard feature of Soviet economic development and before 1940, they proved relatively successful. Throughout the 1930s, as it became clear war was on the horizon, heavy industry was built up further. Benefitting from natural resources like coal, iron ore, natural gas and gold, the Soviet Union became one of the world’s largest exporters of these commodities.

Russia’s biggest tractor factory, Chelyabinsk, in the late 1930s.

Image Credit: Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons.

Railways were improved and expanded, and the introduction of childcare freed more women up to do their patriotic duty and contribute to the economy. Incentives were offered for meeting quotas and targets, and punishments were an ongoing threat for those who failed in their mission. Everyone was expected to pull their weight, and for the most part, they did.

By the time the Soviet Union entered World War Two , it was an advanced industrial economy. In under 20 years, Stalin had utterly transformed the essence of the nation, albeit at the high cost of famine, conflict and social upheaval.

The devastation of war

For all of the advancements of the 1920s and 1930s, World War Two ruined much of Russia’s economic progress. The Red Army suffered the loss of millions of soldiers and millions more died of hunger or disease. Farms, livestock and equipment had been ravaged by the advances of the German army, 25 million people had been made homeless and around 40% of the railways had been destroyed.

The high casualties meant that there was a labour shortage after the war, and despite being one of the victorious powers, the Soviet Union struggled to negotiate terms for a loan for Soviet reconstruction. This, in part, was driven by American fears over the potential power and ability of the Soviet Union should they return to the levels of industrial output they were reached pre-war.

Despite receiving reparations from Germany and other Eastern European countries, and then subsequently linking these countries to the Soviet Union economically through Comecon, Stalin never returned the dynamism and record-breaking achievements of the 1930s Russian economy to the Soviet Union.

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The Economic Policies of Stalin’s Russia

Introduction.

Up until 1928, Stalin and Bukharin presented themselves as the upholders of Lenin’s legacy through his 1921 New Economic Policy, but this had changed by 1928 when Stalin completely cut down the New Economic Policy and took steps which were even more radical than what the Left Opposition had been advocating for.

Since its implementation, many communists had feared the long-term consequences of tolerating and encouraging the capitalist elements which culminated in the New Economic Policy. 

Problems with the New Economic Policy existed as early as 1924 but became increasingly prevalent in the years 1926 and 27. 

In August 1924, Soviet economist Yevgeni Preobrazhensky published ‘The Fundamental Law of Socialist Accumulation’, which theorised that the state should purchase food from peasants at a low price and sell it to consumers at a higher price, to provide funds for industrialisation. This idea was supported by Trotsky but opposed by Stalin who saw it as a threat to Lenin’s New Economic Policy. This conflict remained a significant factor in the power struggle between the right, centre and left. 

Click the links below for the sub-topic of industrial development:

Website Resource: Industry  

Link to Podcast: Click here for links to my episode focusing on industry (on your preferred streaming platform)  

Click the links below for the sub-topic of agriculture:

Website Resource: Agriculture

The Impact of Stalin's Economic and Social Policies

The impact of stalin’s economic and social policies, stalin’s economic impact.

Joseph Stalin , after assuming power in 1924, replaced Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) with his radical, centralized economic programs aiming to rapidly industrialise the Soviet Union.

The Five-Year Plans , launched in 1928, focussed on developing heavy industry, and increasing steel, coal and oil production, in stark contrast to the NEP, and aimed at ending Soviet reliance on western economies.

Collectivisation , another key part of Stalin’s economic policies, introduced between 1928 and 1933, aimed at modernising agriculture, but its implementation resulted in disruption of food production, resulting in famines and millions of deaths, particularly in Ukraine.

The Five-Year Plans and Collectivisation caused initial economic hardships, but also led to a significant increase in the output of industrial goods, transforming the USSR into a leading industrial nation.

However, the economic benefits of Stalin’s policies came at a heavy cost, with widespread famine, poor living standards and immense loss of life.

Stalin’s Social Impact

Stalin used intense propaganda to promote industrialisation and collectivisation. The government controlled all aspects of culture including literature, music, and art, effectively using them as propaganda tools.

The Great Purge , a series of campaigns of political repression and persecution, resulted in fear and self-censorship within Soviet society, and secured Stalin’s absolute power by eliminating potential opposition.

As a result of the Purge and constant surveillance by secret police, society became increasingly paranoid and fearful, affecting personal relationships & community spirit.

Stalin promoted a cult of personality around himself, depicted as a caring leader, a hero and the father of the nation through manipulated photographs, songs, films, and books. This was a prominent feature of Soviet society through his leadership.

Stalin’s policies hugely changed the role of women in society, giving them equal rights to work and creating opportunities for employment in the new industries. But it also added a double burden with continuation of traditional household chores.

Stalin’s rule, with its intense industrialisation and spread of communism, drastically transformed Soviet society. His methods led to acute hardship and immense loss of life, but also helped shape the USSR into a global superpower.

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Successes and Failure of Stalin’s economic policies

Related Papers

Rajiv Shahani

Abbie O'Hara

1. Was the policy of collectivization motivated more by a desire to destroy the peasants' traditional way of life or by a desire to achieve socialist modernization? Choose a side, discuss the evidence you find for that position in our two textbooks, and evaluate how successful the policy was in terms of the objective you decided to highlight. Although the lives of peasants were greatly impacted by collectivization in a myriad of ways, some of which included violence and terror, the policy of collectivization was more motivated by a desire to achieve socialist modernization and catch up to the industrial progress of the West. This is clear due to the widespread cultural reorganization in Russia, such as the secularization of church and state as well as in the use of terror as a means to subdue public resistance and secure the stability of new leadership, despite the atrocities and injustices inflicted upon the lower and peasant classes as a result. It was the primary concern of the Bolsheviks and Stalin to modernize and industrialize Russia. This modernization meant a shift in the entirety of Russian culture in order to dispose of the old regime and, as a result, the peasant way of life was also altered; however, this was not the primary intention of the Bolshevik party, simply a side effect of their political agenda. Stalin once said, "socialism in one country," advocating for a monolithic and nationalistic culture that united the people under collectivization and socialism. "He meant that the country could bring about socialism by creating an industrial base and by raising the cultural level of the people without waiting for international revolution," (78, Kenez, emph mine). Stalin advocated for "independence and pride" meaning the people must be united through a culture that valued socialism and industrialization. This meant that Russian way of life was being challenged and altered in order to fit these new political ideals of the country. We can see the more encompassing ways in which the entirety of Russian culture was altered, not just the peasantry, in the secularization of Russia. The soviets believed that the old regime used religion in order to manipulate the lower classes into accepting their lowly conditions in life as divine or destiny. In order to take power from the church, religious institutions were forced to register members, holidays were outlawed and replaced with socialist propaganda holidays, priests and religious people were arrested, and churches were shut down. Therefore, the challenging of traditional Russian culture, including that of the peasant way of life, was used as a tool to dismantle the remnants of the old regime to prevent revolt and resistance. This can be seen within Russian society on a larger scale than simply the peasantry. The utopian ideals of the soviets were seen as only possible by cutting ties with old traditions and ways of life that supported the ideals of the monarchy. Although peasant life was undoubtedly altered and challenged, it was only a result of soviet's political goal to dismantle the old regime and institute a new leadership. This was clearly effective according to Kenez in that 60% of the general public supported the effort to collectivize, abandoning (albeit resentfully) their old way of life. 1 1 Page 85 kenez

Neel Maharaj

Erdogan Ahmet

The task of the first five‐year plan, set by the Communist Party, was to build the foundation of a socialist economy in the shortest possible time in the form of powerful heavy industry and socialist agriculture, to strengthen the countryʹs defense capability, and to eliminate the capitalist elements of town and country. Proceeding from this task, almost three quarters of capital investments in industry were directed to heavy industry, which produces the means of production. The implementation of the first five‐year plan took place in a difficult situation and with enormous difficulties associated with the capitalist encirclement, the class struggle within the country, the actions of the right opposition against the high rates of socialist construction, and the attack on the kulak.

From War Communism (1917/18 to 1921) and the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) there was continual debate and revision of economic policy, on labour management and economic planning, till in 1928 the Stalin faction in the Bolshevik Party launched an all drive to "collectivize agriculture" and launch the "Forced Industrialization" drive from 1928. The effects and "politics of production" is discussed critically.

The economic tasks of the second five‐year plan, set by the party, were to master the advanced technology of newly built and reconstructed enterprises during the first five‐year plan, complete the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, create the latest technical base for all its branches and continue the industrial development of the eastern regions of the country. In the second five‐year plan, it was also planned to ensure a higher rate of growth in the production of consumer goods. Based on these tasks, it was necessary to significantly increase the volume of capital construction not only of machine building plants, but also of power plants, enterprises of ferrous and non‐ferrous metallurgy, coal mines, textile and shoe factories.

This collection is an integral part of an all-Union series of documents and materials on the history of industrialization of the USSR (1926-1941). It contains documents describing the industrial development of the country during the third five-year plan (before the start of the Great Patriotic War) and thus completes the all-union volumes of the series. By the end of the second five-year plan, the Soviet Union had successfully completed, in the main, the building of a socialist society. The victory of socialism opened up tremendous opportunities for the development and improvement of the productive forces of Soviet society, its political and spiritual life.

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Economic developments: Lenin’s decrees; the Stalinist economy; collectivisation and the Five Year Plans

Lenin’s decrees.

Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union, issued a series of decrees in 1917 that aimed to redistribute land and resources to the working class. These decrees were part of Lenin’s vision for a socialist economy, where the means of production and distribution were owned and controlled by the state.

Historian Anthony Beevor describes them as Lenin’s three lies:

Peace: An immediate end to Russia’s involvement in the First World War (Beevor points out that Lenin wanted a global civil war in which the bourgeoisie world wide would be destroyed).

Land: Lenin offered the redistribution of the land to the peasants (a promise he never intended to keep, believing that state control of land was the only way that the new Bolshevik state could feed itself).

All power to the Soviets: Lenin proposed that the workers and soldiers councils take power in the USSR (Beevor points out that this was merely a vehicle for the Bolsheviks, who controlled the Soviets by late 1917).

The most significant of these decrees was the Decree on Land, which abolished private ownership of land and instead of transferring it to the peasants, transferred it to the state. The Decree on Workers’ Control gave workers the right to control production and distribution in their workplaces (something that was overturned during the period of War Communism), while the Decree on Nationalisation allowed the state to take over key industries such as transportation, banking, and communication.

Lenin’s decrees, at first glance, appeared intended to create a more equal and just society, where the working class had greater control over their lives and livelihoods. However, Lenin’s increasingly dictatorial stance following the seizure of power in 1917 was at odds with this new emancipatory philosophy. From 1918 onwards the Bolsheviks were fighting a civil war and saw the new state they had captured as being under siege from anti revolutionary forces within Russia and overseas.

Lenin believed that the most brutal and authoritarian methods were necessary for the regime’s survival and this included the state control of the economy.

For a full description of Lenin’s two key policies – War Communism and The New Economic Policy – click here.

The Stalinist economy, which emerged in the 1930s, built on Lenin’s vision by implementing policies of rapid industrialisation and collectivisation.

The Stalinist Economy

(For expert advice on writing essays on the Five Year Plans, click here )

Following Lenin’s death, Joseph Stalin became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1924. He implemented a series of economic policies that transformed the country into a industrial power. Stalin’s economic policies were characterized by the development of a command economy, rapid industrialization, and collectivization.

One of Stalin’s first actions was to implement the First Five-Year Plan in 1928. This plan aimed to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union, and it set ambitious targets for heavy industry, such as coal, iron, and steel production. The plan was successful in achieving its targets, but it came at a cost. The Soviet Union experienced a shortage of consumer goods, and the living standards of ordinary people declined.

Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick, in her book Everyday Stalinism, states that during the first five year plan, hunger and hardship were as extreme as they had been during the Russian civil war. Ordinary Soviet citizens struggled with acute housing shortages along with food shortages in Russia’s cities. The USSR was still a highly chaotic country by the early Stalin period, with hunger and desperation fuelling violence and crime.

Stalin’s economic policies also included collectivization, which aimed to consolidate individual farms into large collective farms. This policy was intended to increase agricultural productivity and feed the growing urban population. However, collectivization was met with resistance from the peasantry, and it led to widespread famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933.

Despite the challenges and human cost of Stalin’s economic policies, the Soviet Union became a major industrial power by the end of the 1930s. The country’s heavy industry grew rapidly, and it was able to withstand the German invasion during World War II. However, the Stalinist economy was characterized by a lack of innovation, inefficiency, and corruption, which ultimately contributed to its decline in the post-war period.

In conclusion, Stalin’s economic policies had a significant impact on the Soviet Union and the world. The Stalinist economy was characterized by rapid industrialization, collectivization, and a command economy. Although it achieved its goals, it came at a cost, including the suppression of individual rights and the suffering of ordinary people.

The end goal of rapid industrialisation was to build a defence industry that would withstand the war that Stalin believed would inevitably come to the USSR from the ‘enemies’ he perceived in the capitalist world (Stalin initially thought that Germany, Poland and Japan would be the three main threats, with older imperial countries like Britain and France supplying the finance and equipment).

When Nazi Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, there was a substantial industrial base beyond the Ural mountains with which to produce aircraft and tanks in vast numbers (by the end of the Second World War, the USSR was able to outproduce Nazi Germany), suggesting that rapid industrialisation had a significant impact on the outcome of the Second World War.

Collectivisation

Collectivisation was a policy implemented by Stalin in the late 1920s with the aim of consolidating individual peasant farms into collective farms. This policy was seen as a way to increase agricultural productivity and to support the industrialisation drive of the Soviet Union. The process of collectivisation was met with resistance from many peasants who were reluctant to give up their land and property.

In order to implement collectivisation, the Soviet government used a combination of propaganda, coercion, and force. Peasants were encouraged to join collective farms voluntarily, but those who refused were often subjected to violent repression, including the confiscation of their land and property, and imprisonment or execution.

The process of collectivisation was a difficult and painful one for many peasants. The forced collectivisation of agriculture led to a decrease in agricultural productivity and a decline in living standards for many peasants. In addition, the collectivisation process was often accompanied by violence and repression, which led to the deaths of millions of people.

For a full article on Collectivisation, click here

For an exploration of the differing debates on Collectivisation click on the following historians below:

Timothy Snyder

Robert Conquest

Sheila Fitzpatrick

Five Year Plans

The Five Year Plans were a series of economic development plans created by the Soviet government under Stalin’s leadership. The first plan was implemented in 1928 and the last one ended in 1991, with a total of 13 plans being implemented. The main goal of the Five Year Plans was to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union and catch up with the Western powers.

The plans were characterized by centralized control, with the government setting production targets for each industry and directing resources towards achieving those targets. The emphasis was on heavy industry, such as steel, coal, and machinery, rather than consumer goods.

Each Five Year Plan had specific targets for production, and the success of the plan was measured by how well those targets were met. The targets were often ambitious and required significant investment in infrastructure and technology. The government used a variety of methods to achieve the targets, including forced labour, collectivization, and the use of incentives and rewards for workers who exceeded their targets.

The Five Year Plans were successful in rapidly industrializing the Soviet Union, but they came at a high cost. The emphasis on heavy industry meant that consumer goods were often in short supply, and living standards for ordinary people were low. The forced labour and collectivization policies led to widespread famine and suffering, particularly in rural areas.

Despite these drawbacks, the Five Year Plans helped to transform the Soviet Union from a largely agrarian society into an industrial powerhouse. The legacy of the Five Year Plans can still be seen in the infrastructure and technology that was developed during this period.

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Was Stalin Necessary for Russia's Economic Development?

This paper studies structural transformation of Soviet Russia in 1928-1940 from an agrarian to an industrial economy through the lens of a two-sector neoclassical growth model. We construct a large dataset that covers Soviet Russia during 1928-1940 and Tsarist Russia during 1885-1913. We use a two-sector growth model to compute sectoral TFPs as well as distortions and wedges in the capital, labor and product markets. We find that most wedges substantially increased in 1928-1935 and then fell in 1936-1940 relative to their 1885-1913 levels, while TFP remained generally below pre-WWI trends. Under the neoclassical growth model, projections of these estimated wedges imply that Stalin's economic policies led to welfare loss of -24 percent of consumption in 1928-1940, but a +16 percent welfare gain after 1941. A representative consumer born at the start of Stalin's policies in 1928 experiences a reduction in welfare of -1 percent of consumption, a number that does not take into account additional costs of political repression during this time period. We provide three additional counterfactuals: comparison with Japan, comparison with the New Economic Policy (NEP), and assuming alternative post-1940 growth scenarios.

The authors thank Mark Aguiar, Bob Allen, Paco Buera, V.V. Chari, Hal Cole, Andrei Markevich, Joel Mokyr, Lee Ohanian, Richard Rogerson for useful comments. We also thank participants at the EIEF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Harvard, NBER EFJK Growth, Development Economics, and Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, New Economic School, Northwestern, Ohio State, Princeton. Financial support from NSF is gratefully acknowledged. Golosov and Tsyvinski also thank Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance for hospitality. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their colleagues, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.

National Science Foundation, Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance, Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.

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• Stalinism: Stalin’s Economic Policy (1930-40)

Lenin had decided abandon the socialization of agriculture and the communization of property under the NEP of 1921. He would allow for  private ownership in the rural sector and private production.The result of this was that Soviet agriculture soon returned to its prewar levels. The war and revolution had cost Russia 13 years of economic growth, but by the late 1920’s it appeared that Russia stood on the verge of another period of growth.

But events prompted Stalin to believe that there would not be enough time for economic development to follow its own course and Russia laboured under its traditional economic weaknesses.

There was no foreign investment available for development and Russia would have to rely on domestic sources to finance the development of large-scale industry, as well as the creation of a substantial armed forces in the face of a increasingly threatening world. By 1926 the Russian middle class had been eliminated, which could have been a source for investment capital, and 78% of the Russian population worked in the agricultural sector. The vast majority of Russian farmers farmed on private plots and produced private surpluses.  In such a context, Stalin saw that there would only be one way for the state to raise money and accumulate capital, and simultaneously transform the economic base of Russia from farming to industry.

The solution for Stalin was to collectivize agriculture, forcing the peasants into communes, destroying the kulaks, controlling agricultural output, and fixing the prices of wages and food.  In essence the state interposed itself between rural producers and urban consumers, and extracted money from each.The result of this was that the share of Russian GNP devoted to private consumption, which in other countries going through the same “take off” developmental stage was around 80% was driven down to 50% with the state expropriating the other 50% for its own uses.

There were two momentous consequences of this strategy to create a socialist command economy. First, Soviet agriculture declined catastrophically, as the peasant resisted the forced collectivization of agriculture. In a sense in Stalin’s mind peasants were expendable as they, in the future would not be useful. Millions of peasant starved to death in 1933 because of the dislocations in the countryside, and cannibalism was rampant throughout the rural sector.

The second consequence was somewhat more positive, at least for the development of Soviet economic and military power. Having driven private consumptions share of the GNP down to levels unmatched in 20 th century history, the state was able to deploy over 25% of GNP for industrial investment and still have considerable sums for investments in science, education and the armed forces. Russian society was literally transformed in the period from 1928 to 1940. The  percentage of the population working in agriculture fell from 75% to less than 50% by 1940.

In order to free labor for industry and to secure food for the swelling urban population Stalin sped up the collectivization of farming. In 1929 there were 25,000,000 small peasant farms, by 1952 these had been transformed into 100,000 large and highly mechanized collective farms.

The resulting upturn in manufacturing output and national income was something unprecedented in the history of industrialization. Soviet manufacturing boomed during the Great Depression. If one examines the period of the two five year plans of 1928 to 1937 Soviet national income rose from 24.4 to 96.3 billion rubles, coal output increased from 35.4 to 128 million tons, steel production from 4 to 17.7 million tons, electricity output rose 700%, machine-tool production 20,000% and tractor production (factories that could be easily converted in tank production) rose 40,000%.

By the late 1930’s, the Soviet Union  that had been last in terms of economic development and output in Europe only 8 years before had pulled off a stunning achievement. It had become the 2 nd largest economy in the world.  But behind this impressive and unparalleled rate of development there still lurked many deficiencies. By the mid-1930’s Soviet farm output was less capable of feeding the growing urban population, let alone produce a surplus for export. Farm yields per acre were appallingly low and the infrastructure of Russia was still underdeveloped.

Having been born out of war and feeling acutely threatened by potential enemies—Poland, Japan, Germany, Britain—the USSR devoted more than 16% of its GNP to defense and the military which skewed industrial development towards military production and produced private surpluses.

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The impact of Lenin and Stalin’s policies on the rights of the Russian people

We have already examined Lenin's policies, lets briefly examine Stalins. The impact of the policies is examined in the table at the end.

Stalin: The First Five- Year Plans (1928-1933)

Stalin believed that a strong economy needed a strong country. He felt that industrialisation was the key to achieving this strength and was convinced that the peasant class needed to accept socialism. Stalin preferred the economic policies of War Communism. He felt Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) had diluted socialism, but he was nervous about losing the support of the peasants who benefited from the NEP and wanted to unite them with the working class. The launch of the first Five-Year Plan and a collectivisation drive dramatically reversed the NEP model.

The Congress of the Communist Party accepted Stalin's national economic plan in 1927. The plan was to run from 1928 to 1933, and the objectives of this plan were:

The rapid industrialisation of Russia.

The introduction of socialised farming.

Elimination of private enterprise.

Development of education and transport.

A state planning commission, the Gosplan, was empowered to direct the economic activities of the country. The main aim of the Gosplan was to control the means of production and make recommendations to the government on issues regarding to the import and export of raw materials for manufacturing.

Industrialisation

Stalin's decision to begin a policy of rapid industrialisation flowed from his particular belief in socialism.  Stalin believed Russia had to be delivered from its backwardness and introduced to modern wonders of metal tractors and motorcars. The target of the first Five-Year Plan was to double production.

Propaganda was used to inspire workers and to stress the significance of working together for a better future. Emphasis was also placed on the development of heavy industries, steel and electrical plants. Transportation systems, scientists and engineering skills from the West were needed for Russia to reach the same level as other industrialised countries in Europe. Tools and machinery were desperately needed.

To pay for this help and equipment they needed ready money, as the capitalist countries were wary of granting credit to Communist Russia. Stalin believed that attention to education was necessary in order to have a skilled industrial labour force. Improvements in transport would help move raw materials, manufactured products and agricultural produce. In order to reach the required targets, new railway lines were built and the old ones upgraded.

Agricultural Reform

A new agricultural system was introduced, bringing together numerous small farms into collective and state agriculture. Peasant and wealthy farmers who refused to sell their extra products were heavily taxed. Wealthy farmers responded angrily by destroying their crops and killing their livestock. Stalin punished them by destroying their homes and deporting most of them to Siberia.

Mechanisation and scientific farming were introduced on a large scale. Profits were divided three ways among the state, workers and a reserve operation fund to support community services such as schools, recreation centres and hospitals. Agriculture began to prosper.

These reforms introduced socialised farming to the masses and were made possible by the expertise of the capitalists who owned large individual farms during the rule of the Tsar and Lenin. It was Stalin's aim to see all farms nationalised, with the state becoming the sole owner. This was one area where Stalin blamed Lenin for allowing capitalism to emerge on a large scale, as if it was not a communist state.

Elimination of private enterprise

Private traders and wealthy farmers were progressively taxed until they could no longer afford to run their businesses. In December 1932, the First Five-Year Plan was completed. Rapid industrialisation had been achieved, although the quality was poor compared to western countries. Many basic industries were established and new industries such as plastics and synthetic rubber also came into being. The foundations had been laid for the development of Russia as a major industrial and political world power.

Education and Transport

Thousands of new schools were built to provide basic education for all children and education was made compulsory. Adult literacy classes, which were also emphasised, reduced the rate of illiteracy rate from 50% in 1924 to 20% in 1939. Education was structured around mechanical and engineering lessons.

Stalin felt that proper education would lead to more innovative ideas and ways and means of industrialising Russia. To achieve that goal, the transport system needed improvements in order to import and export goods out of the country. New railway links were built, like the Turkestan-Siberian line, and old ones were upgraded.

The building of networks of hard-surface roads, and canal systems to link rivers for practical navigation became essential. The shortage of trains that were supposed to link various cities meant that some raw materials and food never reached their destinations in time. In order to avoid rotten food, efficient trains had to be built.

The Second and Third Five-Year Plan (1933-1938)

The Communist Party Congress formally passed the Second Five-Year Plan in January 1934. Importance was placed on the improvement of efficiency and techniques in industry. Light factories were built to provide more consumer goods in order to raise the standard of living of the Russian population.

Consumption increased dramatically, but growth and development of heavy industries remained the government's priority. The most important successes were achieved in the machine making industry. This tripled in size. The Third Five-Year Plan of 1939 to 1942 was interrupted by the Second World War, which broke out on the 1 September 1939.

Assessing the five-year plans

Russia's production of arms for the war against Germany was proof of Stalin's success in industrialising the country despite the huge human cost. It was through the Five-Year Plans that Russia emerged from World War II as one of the superpowers, along with the United States of America.

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How successful were Stalin's economic policies?

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The Power of Joseph Stalin : Abuse of Power

This essay about Joseph Stalin’s abuse of power examines how he manipulated abortion laws for political gain, leading to devastating consequences for Soviet women and families. By restricting reproductive rights, Stalin aimed to control the population and bolster industrial growth, resulting in coercion, suffering, and societal upheaval. The essay underscores the profound impact of Stalin’s policies on individual autonomy and the broader fabric of Soviet society, highlighting the enduring legacy of his oppressive regime and the importance of defending fundamental human rights.

How it works

Joseph Stalin, the formidable leader of the Soviet Union from the mid-1920s until his death in 1953, wielded power with an iron fist, shaping the course of history and leaving a legacy marked by tyranny and oppression. Among his many policies, his approach towards abortion stands out as a poignant example of his abuse of power. In this essay, we will explore how Stalin manipulated abortion laws for political gain, ultimately leading to devastating consequences for millions of Soviet women and families.

Stalin’s rise to power was characterized by ruthless tactics and a relentless pursuit of control. Consolidating authority within the Communist Party, he sought to centralize power in himself, effectively becoming the sole arbiter of Soviet policy. As part of his broader agenda to transform Soviet society, Stalin implemented numerous social and economic policies, often with little regard for the well-being of the populace.

In the realm of reproductive rights, Stalin’s approach was both coercive and exploitative. Recognizing the potential of population control as a tool for political manipulation, he leveraged abortion policies to further his goals of industrialization and social engineering. Under Stalin’s rule, the Soviet Union experienced rapid industrial growth, fueled by the labor of millions of workers. However, this growth came at a staggering human cost, as individuals were reduced to mere cogs in the machinery of the state.

To maintain control over the population and ensure a steady supply of labor for industrial projects, Stalin instituted strict regulations regarding reproductive rights. Abortion, once considered a relatively common practice in the Soviet Union, became heavily restricted under Stalin’s regime. In 1936, the Soviet government enacted legislation criminalizing most abortions, except in cases where the mother’s life was in danger or if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.

On the surface, these policies were framed as measures to protect the health and well-being of women. However, in reality, they served a more insidious purpose: to control the reproductive choices of Soviet citizens and manipulate demographic trends to suit the regime’s needs. By restricting access to abortion, Stalin aimed to increase the birth rate, thereby replenishing the ranks of the Soviet workforce and bolstering the nation’s military capabilities.

Yet, the implementation of these policies had profound and far-reaching consequences, particularly for women. Denied the right to make decisions about their own bodies, Soviet women were subjected to state-sanctioned coercion and control. Forced to carry unwanted pregnancies to term, many women suffered physical and psychological harm, enduring immense pain and suffering in the process. Moreover, the lack of access to safe and legal abortion services led to a rise in dangerous and clandestine procedures, putting women’s lives at risk.

The impact of Stalin’s abortion policies extended beyond individual suffering to encompass broader societal repercussions. By prioritizing the needs of the state over the autonomy of its citizens, Stalin created a culture of fear and obedience, where dissent was met with harsh punishment. The suppression of reproductive rights served as a potent symbol of the regime’s disregard for human dignity and individual freedoms, cementing its reputation as a ruthless dictatorship.

Furthermore, the demographic consequences of Stalin’s abortion policies were profound and enduring. While the birth rate initially increased in response to the restrictions, the long-term effects were more nuanced. The imposition of strict reproductive controls disrupted natural demographic patterns, leading to imbalances in age cohorts and exacerbating social and economic inequalities. Moreover, the legacy of trauma and suffering inflicted upon generations of Soviet women reverberated throughout society, leaving scars that would endure for decades to come.

In conclusion, Joseph Stalin’s abuse of power is exemplified by his manipulation of abortion policies for political gain. By restricting access to reproductive rights and coercing women into compliance, Stalin sought to exert control over the Soviet populace, with devastating consequences for individual autonomy and societal well-being. The legacy of his oppressive regime serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of unchecked power and the importance of safeguarding fundamental human rights. As we reflect on Stalin’s reign of terror, we must remain vigilant in defending the principles of democracy, equality, and justice for all.

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Do we want Australia's economy to become more self-sufficient?

Analysis Do we want Australia's economy to become more self-sufficient?

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese gave a landmark speech last week about the future of Australia's economy.

If you didn't catch it, let's revisit its main theme quickly.

It's important to know what he said because it signals where our economy could be headed in the coming years.

I think we can draw parallels with a famous speech from the 1930s, another era of rapid economic change.

A future made in Australia

One of the great things about a landmark speech that flags an intention to do something big, but which is light on detail, is how it will smoke out bad-faith commentators.

And after the prime minister's speech last week, we saw the same old voices putting their hands up quickly to criticise it.

Some claimed Mr Albanese was planning to take us back to the bad old days.

Remember the folly of Australia's post-war car industry? They said he clearly hadn't learned anything from that failed attempt at homegrown manufacturing.

But what were they talking about?

I've read the  prime minister's speech a few times. I haven't been able to find anything in his speech that warrants such specific criticism.

What his speech did include, however, and what we can therefore comment on, was a broad vision of the future.

He was letting us know how he sees the world and where he thinks our economy's headed.

He said our global economic architecture had fractured.

Strategic competition had become a fact of life, he said, and major advanced economies were pouring trillions of dollars into their industrial bases, their manufacturing capability, and their economic sovereignty.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, when just-in-time global supply chains broke down and caused major problems for everyone, nations are now drawing an explicit link between economic security and national security.

"We need to be clear-eyed about the economic realities of this decade," the prime minister said.

"We must recognise there is a new and widespread willingness to make economic interventions on the basis of national interest and national sovereignty.

"And — critically — none of this is being left solely to market forces or trusted to the invisible hand.

"The heavy lifting of economic transition and industrial transformation is not being done by individuals, companies or communities on their own. It is being facilitated, enabled and empowered by national governments from every point on the political spectrum."

As a major speech signalling where the government's head is, it was fine.

It clearly raised the spectre of industrial policy, which is controversial in some economic circles (as Ha-Joon Chang explains in the lecture below) and which has spooked some industry groups.

But we'll have to wait to see more details from the government on that topic before we criticise it properly.

But while we wait, I thought I'd draw your attention to a fascinating lecture from the 1930s.

It's a short one, just five pages.

It came to mind last week when Albanese was speaking because it shares very similar themes about the break-down of old economic orders, and the need for governments to adapt to new realities and be prepared to toss orthodoxies aside if necessary.

The historical parallels between that era, and this moment, are interesting if nothing else.

National self-sufficiency, and economic nationalism

In April 1933, British economist John Maynard Keynes gave a lecture in Dublin titled National Self-Sufficiency.

At the time, there were fresh political tensions between Ireland and Britain following the election of a new government in Ireland .

Keynes used the opportunity to gently caution Ireland's new leadership about the economic risks of a small country such as Ireland pursuing protectionist policies against Britain, its largest trading partner.

Afterwards, he prepared edited versions of his lecture to be published in other countries, so the transcript of his Dublin lecture contained passages that didn't make it into his shorter essay version  for outside audiences.

But there was a wider political context to his lecture.

In early 1933 the Great Depression was in full swing.

In January of that year, Adolf Hitler had been appointed chancellor of Germany. In Italy, Benito Mussolini had been in power for a decade. In Russia, Joseph Stalin had long ago consolidated his power.

Keynes was aware that people were losing faith in the global financial system and laissez-faire capitalism and globalisation.

He knew that an increasing number of countries were leaning towards nationalism, economic self-sufficiency, and economic experimentation.

So how should democratic societies position themselves in the new world order where old certainties and economic relationships were rapidly breaking down?

The inaugural Finlay Lecture

Keynes began his lecture with an admission.

He said his opinion of the 19th century's version of "free trade" had changed recently. He no longer saw it as an unalloyed good.

"I sympathise … with those who would minimise, rather than with those who would maximise, economic entanglement between nations," he told his audience.

"Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel — these are things which should of their nature be international.

"But let all goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily national."

He said a considerable degree of "international specialisation" was always necessary in a world with differences of climate and natural resources.

But he thought countries had increasingly more to gain from gradually bringing producers and consumers within the ambit of the same national, economic, and financial organisation, given what was happening in the world.

"The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the war, is not a success," he said.

"It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous, and it doesn't deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it and we are beginning to despise it.

"Even countries such as Great Britain and the United States, which still conform par excellence to the old model, are striving, under the surface, after a new economic plan," he said.

Keynes said no-one knew where things were headed, but countries had a right to restructure their economies to fit their new circumstances within a very different global system of trade and finance.

"We are, all of us, I expect, about to make many mistakes. No-one can tell which of the new systems will prove itself best," he said.

"But the point of my present discussion is this. We each have our own fancy. Not believing that we are saved already, we each would like to have a try at working out our own salvation."

He said there was no turning back to the past, either.

"It is my central contention that there is no prospect for the next generation of a uniformity of economic system throughout the world, such as existed, broadly speaking, during the 19th century," he said.

How costly would self-sufficiency be?

Then, Keynes turned his attention to the bean counters.

He said to build the kind of society we were capable of building, we had to ignore some old-value systems.

Part of the reason why people had become so exasperated with the old economic model, he argued, was due to the 19th century habit of judging every potential policy by its likely "financial results".

"The whole conduct of life was made into a sort of parody of an accountant's nightmare," he complained.

"Once we allow ourselves to be disobedient to the test of an accountant's profit, we have begun to change our civilisation," he said.

He said policymakers would still have to pay attention to costs, obviously, but they'd achieve far more than was once thought possible if they allowed themselves to re-imagine the role of government and government finances.

"It is the state, rather than the individual, which needs to change its criterion," he argued.

"If the functions and purposes of the state are to be thus enlarged, the decision as to what, broadly speaking, shall be produced within the nation and what shall be exchanged with abroad, must stand high amongst the objects of policy."

Three dangers involved with the transition

And he wrapped up his lecture by warning of the risks involved in the shift to greater economic self-sufficiency.

He could see "three outstanding dangers" in the movement, he said.

"In those countries where the advocates of national self-sufficiency have attained power, it appears to my judgement that, without exception, many foolish things are being done," he warned.

He said the first danger was "silliness" from policymakers, and the second danger was "haste".

"The economic transition of a society is a thing to be accomplished slowly," he cautioned.

"A rapid transition will involve so much pure destruction of wealth that the new state of affairs will be, at first, far worse than the old, and the grand experiment will be discredited. For men judge remorselessly by early results."

The third danger was "intolerance" from authorities and their attempts to stifle criticism.

He said policymakers would have to embrace the fact that economic experiments had a better chance of surviving if everyone was involved in a rolling conversation about where things were headed and how things were going.

"We have no clear idea laid up in our minds beforehand of exactly what we want," he admitted.

"We shall discover it as we move along, and we shall have to mould our material in accordance with our experience."

Adapting to new conditions

But let's end things there.

It's fascinating to see someone like Keynes thinking his way through the severe problems of the early 1930s and explaining why every country has the right to adapt their economic structure to changing circumstances at the expense of economic shibboleths.

What works in one era won't necessarily work in another.

And it's enjoyable watching someone like him assert their right to think for themselves and to ignore pressure from peers to conform to the usual way of doing things. 

"I bring my criticisms to bear, as one whose heart is friendly and sympathetic to the desperate experiments of the contemporary world, who wishes them well and who would like them to succeed, who has his own experiments in view, and who, in the last resort, prefers anything on earth to what the City reports are wont to call 'the best opinion in Wall Street'," he said.

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Jamie Dimon Issues an Economic Warning

The JPMorgan Chase chief executive used his annual letter to shareholders to flag higher-for-longer inflation, uncertain growth prospects and widening political divisions.

By Andrew Ross Sorkin ,  Ravi Mattu ,  Bernhard Warner ,  Sarah Kessler ,  Michael J. de la Merced ,  Lauren Hirsch and Ephrat Livni

Jamie Dimon sees America at a ‘Pivotal Moment’

Jamie Dimon’s annual letter to JPMorgan Chase shareholders has just been published. The widely read note offers a glimpse of his views on not just business, but the economy at a “pivotal moment for America and the free world,” with deep divisions at home and global uncertainty.

Here are some highlights.

The economy is resilient but the government underpinning it is a red flag. Consumers are spending and investors expect a soft landing. But Dimon warns that the economy is being fueled by government spending and rising deficits. “The deficits today are even larger and occurring in boom times — not as the result of a recession — and they have been supported by quantitative easing, which was never done before the great financial crisis,” he writes.

Inflation may be sticky. “These markets seem to be pricing in at a 70% to 80% chance of a soft landing — modest growth along with declining inflation and interest rates,” Dimon writes, adding that the odds are actually a lot lower.

Global uncertainty is another dark cloud. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East could further “disrupt energy and food markets, migration, and military and economic relationships.” That shock coincides with a surge in public investment to power a green transition, restructure supply chains and trade relationships, and boost health care spending.

Industrial policy is needed but should be limited and targeted. Dimon says the U.S. must be tough with China, but engage with Beijing. That includes establishing independence on supplies of materials crucial to national security, like rare earth, semiconductors and 5G infrastructure. (According to Dimon, the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPs Act get it right.)

Dimon warns about the deep political divisions at home. Dimon doesn’t explicitly weigh in on the election (his public backing for some of Donald Trump ’s economic policies caused a stir at Davos in January), but said the U.S. is grappling with “highly charged, emotional and political” issues centering around the border security crisis and the “fraying of the American dream.”

On Basel 3 endgame: Dimon reiterated his concerns that many of the proposed banking rules are “flawed and poorly calibrated.”

On corporate governance: Dimon argues that proxy advisory firms like ISS have become too influential (he recently backed Disney in its fight against Nelson Peltz). He is opposed to recent efforts to split chairman and C.E.O. roles and thinks the universal proxy “makes it easier to put poorly qualified directors on a board.”

HERE’S WHAT’S HAPPENING

Janet Yellen sees progress in China relations, but warns there’s “more work to do.” The Treasury secretary concluded meetings in Beijing on Monday saying that ties between the nations had stabilized, but it was unclear how the relationship would endure in an election year. Her comments came as the Biden administration agreed to give Taiwanese chipmaker TSMC $6.6 billion in grants to begin manufacturing in Arizona in 2028.

Brazil’s supreme court opens an investigation into Elon Musk. Alexandre de Moraes, the chief justice, opened the instruction of justice inquiry after Musk said he would reactivate some X accounts that the judge had ordered blocked. The accounts weren’t disclosed. Moraes has been investigating “digital militias” accused of spreading disinformation.

Gold hits a record high and an oil rally takes a breather. The safe-haven asset reached more than $2,300 a troy ounce , buoyed by worries over a widening conflict in the Middle East and higher demand for the precious metal from central banks and Chinese consumers. The price of Brent crude fell on Monday to trade near $90 a barrel, down from a five-month high reached last week.

Is it show time for Warner Bros. Discovery?

Today marks the two-year anniversary of the Warner Bros. Discovery mega deal closing. Crossing that milestone means that the entertainment giant, which owns HBO, CNN and a lucrative piece of the March Madness broadcasts, can now strike a deal without facing a huge tax hit.

The industry is ripe for consolidation , given challenges in cable and streaming. An obstacle is President Biden’s antitrust cops. “Regulatory constraints are limiting what deals can get done, which is the case in most industries,” Rob Kindler, the global chair of the M.&A. Group at Paul, Weiss, told DealBook.

Warner Bros. Discovery hasn’t gone as hoped. Its stock is down 66 percent since the deal closed as its bet on streaming has languished (alongside rivals not named Netflix). The legacy cable business has been a bigger drag, hurt by cord-cutting.

Its $44 billion debt mountain could also make an acquisition more difficult. But John Malone, the media mogul and a board member, said in November that cash flow is improving, which could set the company up to scout for deals.

A merger with Paramount seems unlikely. Shares fell 5 percent when talks between the two leaked in December, a sign that investors may not look enthusiastically on the company increasing its exposure to linear media. It’s probably a moot point anyhow with Paramount in exclusive talks with Skydance .

Even still, would an alliance with Paramount’s TV networks, like, CNN and CBS through a spinoff or divestiture make sense, down the line?

Targeting Comcast could face challenges, too. Investors may like the potential to combine their cable, studio and streaming businesses. But regulators would likely have tough questions.

Still, don’t count out a deal. As Barry Diller told The Times last year : There seems to always be interest in the Warner media properties. “Whether that will happen depends on whether someone wants to take it,” said Diller, a longtime friend of the Warner Bros. Discovery chief, David Zaslav.

Rethinking the deals-are-bad trope

For decades, the common wisdom in corporate America — as encapsulated in the 2004 book “Mastering the Merger,” by two Bain & Company consultants — was that for all the billions spent on mergers, roughly 70 percent failed.

But a new white paper by one of the book’s authors and two other colleagues finds that the inverse is now true: 70 percent of takeovers succeed . DealBook got the first look at the research to learn what had changed.

Companies have gotten smarter about M.&A. In 2004, the defining deals of the era — including that of AOL-Time Warner — were meant to be transformative and deliver big savings. Today the goals are more modest, such as expanding into new geographies or adjacent businesses, or adding new talent.

Acquirers are also getting more practice. Having more-conservative aims for mergers means companies can do more of them, justifying having in-house teams of M.&A. specialists who can better identify promising acquisitions and make them work. One advancement: more sophisticated analysis of potential takeovers, compared with earlier deals that often relied on less exacting financial considerations like synergies.

“Frequent acquirers have the experience and capability to do the diligence that’s required,” Suzanne Kumar, a Bain vice president and one of the white paper’s authors, told DealBook, pointing to Thermo Fisher Scientific, Constellation Brands and tech giants.

Serial acquirers tend to have better returns. Between 2000 and 2010, companies that did at least one deal a year had 10-year total shareholder returns that were 57 percent higher than businesses that did no deals, Bain found. Between 2012 and 2022, that spread rose to 130 percent — a finding that surprised the researchers.

Unionization efforts come to Harvard Yard

With car companies on high alert over the United Auto Workers’ efforts to ramp up labor organizing, the union has racked up a series of wins far from the factory floor — on college campuses.

The most recent victory was at Harvard University. The school’s nontenure track employees — a group of roughly 6,000 that includes faculty, postdoctorate fellows and preceptors — overwhelmingly voted to unionize last week. That opens the door to negotiations for higher wages, improved job security and bolstering workplace protection.

The divide brings another source of tension to campus. Harvard has been embroiled in a fight over free speech and safety ever since Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, spurring a debate that led to a wave of high-level resignations.

Harvard is far from alone. Staff at Wellesley College and New York University also voted to unionize this year, joining efforts by adjunct professors and postdocs at Boston University, Columbia, Rutgers and the University of Connecticut.

The U.A.W. is at the center of the push. The union has been branching into higher education for years. And its hard-knuckled tactics in securing new contracts from Detroit’s Big Three automakers last year have given it momentum.

After N.Y.U.’s successful unionization vote, Shawn Fain, the U.A.W.’s president, hailed the moment as a historic one for labor organizing efforts on America’s university campuses. “We’ve got their back,” he said .

The week ahead

Congress returns today from its two-week recess to find Ukraine, the TikTok bill and repairing the Baltimore bridge in the spotlight — and a possible House leadership challenge looming. Elsewhere, inflation, central banks and the new earnings season will also be in focus.

Here’s what to watch:

Tuesday: Google’s Cloud Next developers conference opens amid expectations that the tech giant will make a raft of announcements to do with artificial intelligence.

Wednesday: The March Consumer Price Index is set for release. Economists forecast that overall inflation rose by 3.5 percent on an annualized basis, a slight increase from February. Core C.P.I., which removes food and fuel, is expected to have cooled.

Minutes from the last Fed meeting are also due to be published.

Elsewhere, President Biden will hold talks at the White House with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan. On the agenda : trade, A.I. and China. Also looming over the summit is Nippon Steel’s $14 billion bid for U.S. Steel.

Thursday: It’s decision day on rates for the European Central Bank. Inflation has fallen relatively quickly across much of Europe, prompting the question: Will the E.C.B. cut interest rates before the Fed?

Friday: Wall Street giants begin reporting first-quarter results, including JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and BlackRock.

THE SPEED READ

The luxury group Puig, owner of the brands Paco Rabanne and Charlotte Tilbury, plans to list in Spain and aims to raise more than 2.5 billion euros ($2.7 billion) in what would be the sector’s biggest I.P.O. in years. (FT)

Could investors’ relative apathy for European stocks push the continent’s biggest oil companies to consider bigger listings in the U.S. ? (Bloomberg Opinion)

Josh Shapiro, the Democratic governor of Pennsylvania, has warned that the Biden administration’s decision to pause liquefied natural gas projects could hurt the party’s chances in November. (FT)

“ Maryland Passes 2 Major Privacy Bills , Despite Tech Industry Pushback” (NYT)

Best of the rest

Solar eclipse mania has gripped North America, and there’s good news : The weather should cooperate for a decent viewing across big parts of the U.S. (NYT)

South Carolina has topped Caitlin Clark and Iowa to win the women’s national basketball championship. Up tonight: UConn takes on Purdue — and there’s a Bill Murray connection . (The Athletic, WSJ)

We’d like your feedback! Please email thoughts and suggestions to [email protected] .

Andrew Ross Sorkin is a columnist and the founder and editor at large of DealBook. He is a co-anchor of CNBC’s "Squawk Box" and the author of “Too Big to Fail.” He is also a co-creator of the Showtime drama series "Billions." More about Andrew Ross Sorkin

Ravi Mattu is the managing editor of DealBook, based in London. He joined The New York Times in 2022 from the Financial Times, where he held a number of senior roles in Hong Kong and London. More about Ravi Mattu

Bernhard Warner is a senior editor for DealBook, a newsletter from The Times, covering business trends, the economy and the markets. More about Bernhard Warner

Sarah Kessler is an editor for the DealBook newsletter and writes features on business and how workplaces are changing. More about Sarah Kessler

Michael de la Merced joined The Times as a reporter in 2006, covering Wall Street and finance. Among his main coverage areas are mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies and the private equity industry. More about Michael J. de la Merced

Lauren Hirsch joined The Times from CNBC in 2020, covering deals and the biggest stories on Wall Street. More about Lauren Hirsch

Ephrat Livni reports from Washington on the intersection of business and policy for DealBook. Previously, she was a senior reporter at Quartz, covering law and politics, and has practiced law in the public and private sectors.   More about Ephrat Livni