does critical thinking involves bias

Critical thinking

We’ve already established that information can be biased. Now it’s time to look at our own bias.

Studies have shown that we are more likely to accept information when it fits into our existing worldview, a phenomenon known as confirmation or myside bias (for examples see Kappes et al., 2020 ; McCrudden & Barnes, 2016 ; Pilditch & Custers, 2018 ). Wittebols (2019) defines it as a “tendency to be psychologically invested in the familiar and what we believe and less receptive to information that contradicts what we believe” (p. 211). Quite simply, we may reject information that doesn’t support our existing thinking.

This can manifest in a number of ways with Hahn and Harris (2014) suggesting four main behaviours:

• Searching only for information that supports our held beliefs
• Failing to critically evaluate information that supports our held beliefs - accepting it at face value - while explaining away or being overly critical of information that might contradict them
• Becoming set in our thinking, once an opinion has been formed, and deliberately ignoring any new information on the topic
• A tendency to be overconfident with the validity of our held beliefs.

Peters (2020) also suggests that we’re more likely to remember information that supports our way of thinking, further cementing our bias. Taken together, the research suggests that bias has a huge impact on the way we think. To learn more about how and why bias can impact our everyday thinking, watch this short video.

Filter bubbles and echo chambers

The theory of filter bubbles emerged in 2011, proposed by an Internet activist, Eli Pariser. He defined it as “your own personal unique world of information that you live in online” ( Pariser, 2011, 4:21 ). At the time that Pariser proposed the filter bubble theory, he focused on the impact of algorithms, connected with social media platforms and search engines, which prioritised content and personalised results based on the individuals past online activity, suggesting “the Internet is showing us what it thinks we want to see, but not necessarily what we should see” (Pariser, 2011, 3:47. Watch his TED talk if you’d like to know more).

Our understanding of filter bubbles has now expanded to recognise that individuals also select and create their own filter bubbles. This happens when you seek out likeminded individuals or sources; follow your friends or people you admire on social media; people that you’re likely to share common beliefs, points-of-view, and interests with. Barack Obama (2017) addressed the concept of filter bubbles in his presidential farewell address:

For too many of us it’s become safer to retreat into our own bubbles, whether in our neighbourhoods, or on college campuses, or places of worship, or especially our social media feeds, surrounded by people who look like us and share the same political outlook and never challenge our assumptions… Increasingly we become so secure in our bubbles that we start accepting only information, whether it’s true or not, that fits our opinions, instead of basing our opinions on the evidence that is out there. ( Obama, 2017, 22:57 ).

Filter bubbles are not unique to the social media age. Previously, the term echo chamber was used to describe the same phenomenon in the news media where different channels exist, catering to different points of view. Within an echo chamber, people are able to seek out information that supports their existing beliefs, without encountering information that might challenge, contradict or oppose.

Other forms of bias

There are many different ways in which bias can affect the way you think and how you process new information. Try the quiz below to discover some additional forms of bias, or check out Buzzfeed’s 2017 article on cognitive bias.

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2.2: Overcoming Cognitive Biases and Engaging in Critical Reflection

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• Nathan Smith et al.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Label the conditions that make critical thinking possible.
• Classify and describe cognitive biases.
• Apply critical reflection strategies to resist cognitive biases.

To resist the potential pitfalls of cognitive biases, we have taken some time to recognize why we fall prey to them. Now we need to understand how to resist easy, automatic, and error-prone thinking in favor of more reflective, critical thinking.

Critical Reflection and Metacognition

To promote good critical thinking, put yourself in a frame of mind that allows critical reflection. Recall from the previous section that rational thinking requires effort and takes longer. However, it will likely result in more accurate thinking and decision-making. As a result, reflective thought can be a valuable tool in correcting cognitive biases. The critical aspect of critical reflection involves a willingness to be skeptical of your own beliefs, your gut reactions, and your intuitions. Additionally, the critical aspect engages in a more analytic approach to the problem or situation you are considering. You should assess the facts, consider the evidence, try to employ logic, and resist the quick, immediate, and likely conclusion you want to draw. By reflecting critically on your own thinking, you can become aware of the natural tendency for your mind to slide into mental shortcuts.

This process of critical reflection is often called metacognition in the literature of pedagogy and psychology. Metacognition means thinking about thinking and involves the kind of self-awareness that engages higher-order thinking skills. Cognition, or the way we typically engage with the world around us, is first-order thinking, while metacognition is higher-order thinking. From a metacognitive frame, we can critically assess our thought process, become skeptical of our gut reactions and intuitions, and reconsider our cognitive tendencies and biases.

To improve metacognition and critical reflection, we need to encourage the kind of self-aware, conscious, and effortful attention that may feel unnatural and may be tiring. Typical activities associated with metacognition include checking, planning, selecting, inferring, self-interrogating, interpreting an ongoing experience, and making judgments about what one does and does not know (Hackner, Dunlosky, and Graesser 1998). By practicing metacognitive behaviors, you are preparing yourself to engage in the kind of rational, abstract thought that will be required for philosophy.

Good study habits, including managing your workspace, giving yourself plenty of time, and working through a checklist, can promote metacognition. When you feel stressed out or pressed for time, you are more likely to make quick decisions that lead to error. Stress and lack of time also discourage critical reflection because they rob your brain of the resources necessary to engage in rational, attention-filled thought. By contrast, when you relax and give yourself time to think through problems, you will be clearer, more thoughtful, and less likely to rush to the first conclusion that leaps to mind. Similarly, background noise, distracting activity, and interruptions will prevent you from paying attention. You can use this checklist to try to encourage metacognition when you study:

• Check your work.
• Plan ahead.
• Select the most useful material.
• Infer from your past grades to focus on what you need to study.
• Ask yourself how well you understand the concepts.
• Check your weaknesses.
• Assess whether you are following the arguments and claims you are working on.

Cognitive Biases

In this section, we will examine some of the most common cognitive biases so that you can be aware of traps in thought that can lead you astray. Cognitive biases are closely related to informal fallacies. Both fallacies and biases provide examples of the ways we make errors in reasoning.

CONNECTIONS

See the chapter on logic and reasoning for an in-depth exploration of informal fallacies.

Watch the video to orient yourself before reading the text that follows.

Cognitive Biases 101, with Peter Bauman

Click to view content

Confirmation Bias

One of the most common cognitive biases is confirmation bias , which is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information that confirms or supports your prior beliefs. Like all cognitive biases, confirmation bias serves an important function. For instance, one of the most reliable forms of confirmation bias is the belief in our shared reality. Suppose it is raining. When you first hear the patter of raindrops on your roof or window, you may think it is raining. You then look for additional signs to confirm your conclusion, and when you look out the window, you see rain falling and puddles of water accumulating. Most likely, you will not be looking for irrelevant or contradictory information. You will be looking for information that confirms your belief that it is raining. Thus, you can see how confirmation bias—based on the idea that the world does not change dramatically over time—is an important tool for navigating in our environment.

Unfortunately, as with most heuristics, we tend to apply this sort of thinking inappropriately. One example that has recently received a lot of attention is the way in which confirmation bias has increased political polarization. When searching for information on the internet about an event or topic, most people look for information that confirms their prior beliefs rather than what undercuts them. The pervasive presence of social media in our lives is exacerbating the effects of confirmation bias since the computer algorithms used by social media platforms steer people toward content that reinforces their current beliefs and predispositions. These multimedia tools are especially problematic when our beliefs are incorrect (for example, they contradict scientific knowledge) or antisocial (for example, they support violent or illegal behavior). Thus, social media and the internet have created a situation in which confirmation bias can be “turbocharged” in ways that are destructive for society.

Confirmation bias is a result of the brain’s limited ability to process information. Peter Wason (1960) conducted early experiments identifying this kind of bias. He asked subjects to identify the rule that applies to a sequence of numbers—for instance, 2, 4, 8. Subjects were told to generate examples to test their hypothesis. What he found is that once a subject settled on a particular hypothesis, they were much more likely to select examples that confirmed their hypothesis rather than negated it. As a result, they were unable to identify the real rule (any ascending sequence of numbers) and failed to “falsify” their initial assumptions. Falsification is an important tool in the scientist’s toolkit when they are testing hypotheses and is an effective way to avoid confirmation bias.

In philosophy, you will be presented with different arguments on issues, such as the nature of the mind or the best way to act in a given situation. You should take your time to reason through these issues carefully and consider alternative views. What you believe to be the case may be right, but you may also fall into the trap of confirmation bias, seeing confirming evidence as better and more convincing than evidence that calls your beliefs into question.

Anchoring Bias

Confirmation bias is closely related to another bias known as anchoring. Anchoring bias refers to our tendency to rely on initial values, prices, or quantities when estimating the actual value, price, or quantity of something. If you are presented with a quantity, even if that number is clearly arbitrary, you will have a hard discounting it in your subsequent calculations; the initial value “anchors” subsequent estimates. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) reported an experiment in which subjects were asked to estimate the number of African nations in the United Nations. First, the experimenters spun a wheel of fortune in front of the subjects that produced a random number between 0 and 100. Let’s say the wheel landed on 79. Subjects were asked whether the number of nations was higher or lower than the random number. Subjects were then asked to estimate the real number of nations. Even though the initial anchoring value was random, people in the study found it difficult to deviate far from that number. For subjects receiving an initial value of 10, the median estimate of nations was 25, while for subjects receiving an initial value of 65, the median estimate was 45.

In the same paper, Tversky and Kahneman described the way that anchoring bias interferes with statistical reasoning. In a number of scenarios, subjects made irrational judgments about statistics because of the way the question was phrased (i.e., they were tricked when an anchor was inserted into the question). Instead of expending the cognitive energy needed to solve the statistical problem, subjects were much more likely to “go with their gut,” or think intuitively. That type of reasoning generates anchoring bias. When you do philosophy, you will be confronted with some formal and abstract problems that will challenge you to engage in thinking that feels difficult and unnatural. Resist the urge to latch on to the first thought that jumps into your head, and try to think the problem through with all the cognitive resources at your disposal.

Availability Heuristic

The availability heuristic refers to the tendency to evaluate new information based on the most recent or most easily recalled examples. The availability heuristic occurs when people take easily remembered instances as being more representative than they objectively are (i.e., based on statistical probabilities). In very simple situations, the availability of instances is a good guide to judgments. Suppose you are wondering whether you should plan for rain. It may make sense to anticipate rain if it has been raining a lot in the last few days since weather patterns tend to linger in most climates. More generally, scenarios that are well-known to us, dramatic, recent, or easy to imagine are more available for retrieval from memory. Therefore, if we easily remember an instance or scenario, we may incorrectly think that the chances are high that the scenario will be repeated. For instance, people in the United States estimate the probability of dying by violent crime or terrorism much more highly than they ought to. In fact, these are extremely rare occurrences compared to death by heart disease, cancer, or car accidents. But stories of violent crime and terrorism are prominent in the news media and fiction. Because these vivid stories are dramatic and easily recalled, we have a skewed view of how frequently violent crime occurs.

Another more loosely defined category of cognitive bias is the tendency for human beings to align themselves with groups with whom they share values and practices. The tendency toward tribalism is an evolutionary advantage for social creatures like human beings. By forming groups to share knowledge and distribute work, we are much more likely to survive. Not surprisingly, human beings with pro-social behaviors persist in the population at higher rates than human beings with antisocial tendencies. Pro-social behaviors, however, go beyond wanting to communicate and align ourselves with other human beings; we also tend to see outsiders as a threat. As a result, tribalistic tendencies both reinforce allegiances among in-group members and increase animosity toward out-group members.

Tribal thinking makes it hard for us to objectively evaluate information that either aligns with or contradicts the beliefs held by our group or tribe. This effect can be demonstrated even when in-group membership is not real or is based on some superficial feature of the person—for instance, the way they look or an article of clothing they are wearing. A related bias is called the bandwagon fallacy . The bandwagon fallacy can lead you to conclude that you ought to do something or believe something because many other people do or believe the same thing. While other people can provide guidance, they are not always reliable. Furthermore, just because many people believe something doesn’t make it true. Watch the video below to improve your “tribal literacy” and understand the dangers of this type of thinking.

The Dangers of Tribalism, Kevin deLaplante

Sunk Cost Fallacy

Sunk costs refer to the time, energy, money, or other costs that have been paid in the past. These costs are “sunk” because they cannot be recovered. The sunk cost fallacy is thinking that attaches a value to things in which you have already invested resources that is greater than the value those things have today. Human beings have a natural tendency to hang on to whatever they invest in and are loath to give something up even after it has been proven to be a liability. For example, a person may have sunk a lot of money into a business over time, and the business may clearly be failing. Nonetheless, the businessperson will be reluctant to close shop or sell the business because of the time, money, and emotional energy they have spent on the venture. This is the behavior of “throwing good money after bad” by continuing to irrationally invest in something that has lost its worth because of emotional attachment to the failed enterprise. People will engage in this kind of behavior in all kinds of situations and may continue a friendship, a job, or a marriage for the same reason—they don’t want to lose their investment even when they are clearly headed for failure and ought to cut their losses.

A similar type of faulty reasoning leads to the gambler’s fallacy , in which a person reasons that future chance events will be more likely if they have not happened recently. For instance, if I flip a coin many times in a row, I may get a string of heads. But even if I flip several heads in a row, that does not make it more likely I will flip tails on the next coin flip. Each coin flip is statistically independent, and there is an equal chance of turning up heads or tails. The gambler, like the reasoner from sunk costs, is tied to the past when they should be reasoning about the present and future.

There are important social and evolutionary purposes for past-looking thinking. Sunk-cost thinking keeps parents engaged in the growth and development of their children after they are born. Sunk-cost thinking builds loyalty and affection among friends and family. More generally, a commitment to sunk costs encourages us to engage in long-term projects, and this type of thinking has the evolutionary purpose of fostering culture and community. Nevertheless, it is important to periodically reevaluate our investments in both people and things.

In recent ethical scholarship, there is some debate about how to assess the sunk costs of moral decisions. Consider the case of war. Just-war theory dictates that wars may be justified in cases where the harm imposed on the adversary is proportional to the good gained by the act of defense or deterrence. It may be that, at the start of the war, those costs seemed proportional. But after the war has dragged on for some time, it may seem that the objective cannot be obtained without a greater quantity of harm than had been initially imagined. Should the evaluation of whether a war is justified estimate the total amount of harm done or prospective harm that will be done going forward (Lazar 2018)? Such questions do not have easy answers.

Table 2.1 summarizes these common cognitive biases.

Table 2.1 Common Cognitive Biases

Think Like A Philosopher

As we have seen, cognitive biases are built into the way human beings process information. They are common to us all, and it takes self-awareness and effort to overcome the tendency to fall back on biases. Consider a time when you have fallen prey to one of the five cognitive biases described above. What were the circumstances? Recall your thought process. Were you aware at the time that your thinking was misguided? What were the consequences of succumbing to that cognitive bias?

Write a short paragraph describing how that cognitive bias allowed you to make a decision you now realize was irrational. Then write a second paragraph describing how, with the benefit of time and distance, you would have thought differently about the incident that triggered the bias. Use the tools of critical reflection and metacognition to improve your approach to this situation. What might have been the consequences of behaving differently? Finally, write a short conclusion describing what lesson you take from reflecting back on this experience. Does it help you understand yourself better? Will you be able to act differently in the future? What steps can you take to avoid cognitive biases in your thinking today?

Contextual Debiasing and Critical Thinking: Reasons for Optimism

• Published: 26 April 2016
• Volume 37 , pages 103–111, ( 2018 )

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• Vasco Correia 1  

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In this article I argue that most biases in argumentation and decision-making can and should be counteracted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I develop a contextualist approach, according to which cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented by extra-psychic devices that rely on social and environmental constraints in order to promote rational reasoning. Finally, I examine several examples of contextual debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Work on this article was conducted under the grant SFRH/BPD/101744/2014 by the “Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology” (FCT), as part of the project “Values in argumentative discourse” (PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014).

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How to Approach Critical Thinking in This Misinformation Era

Is there any way we can know what's true and what's false.

Posted August 12, 2021 | Reviewed by Vanessa Lancaster

• Critical thinking is a discipline of thought and communication that boils down to one word: Truth.
• Four classic and time-honored strategies for engaging in critical thinking include asking who is making a statement and exploring biases.
• Reading a book that involves new ideas and concepts can help the brain develop new neural pathways and alternative modes of thinking.

One of the most important disciplines we can practice is the discipline of Critical Thinking. It involves holding a kind of magnifying glass up to our thoughts and the information and data constantly swirling around us.

What’s true and what isn’t? It’s the job of critical thinking to find out.

We are all constantly making decisions. Some of those decisions are trivial and unimportant (Should I wear the blue or yellow shirt today?). But other decisions can affect our very lives and the lives of those around us. We want those decisions to be based on truth so that they have good outcomes. Critical thinking can help make that possible.

Where do we start?

Here are seven questions, thoughts, and strategies to have available at all times to help with our different decision-making processes:

• Who is saying it? Who is it that is proclaiming the idea or thought in question? Are they dependable and truthful? Do you trust what this person says?
• How do they know what it is they are saying? Are they open about how they know what it is they're sharing? Do you trust their route to knowledge? Is it credible and reliable?
• What’s in it for them? Do they have an obvious incentive to promote the idea they’re sharing? Is there a conflict of interest?
• Explore your own biases. Our own personal biases may dispose us to (falsely) accept or reject the idea being presented. A good way to assess our own personal biases is to look at two or three close friends. What are their attitudes toward such things as race, politics , religion, money, family, or personal life values? Our own values or biases may likely be very similar to theirs.
• Remember, the whole point of critical thinking is about finding the truth. Don’t allow yourself to be distracted from seeking and valuing the truth in all areas of your life.
• Read a book about some subject you’re not interested in. This may sound like a strange idea, but in fact, it is beneficial. Read a book involving new ideas and concepts can help your brain develop new neural pathways and alternative modes of thinking. Reading a book filled with unfamiliar material can be like giving your brain a “re-set.”

Almost ten years ago, I undertook just such an experience. I chose a book about the Panama Canal, a topic I had zero interest in. The title was The Path Between the Seas .

I knew it was by an excellent writer (David McCullough), but it was about a subject I was not in the least attracted to.

The book was enthralling! I had never imagined what huge, consequential problems the building of the Panama Canal presented! There were multiple crises involving leadership , manpower, disease, technology, weather, administration, bizarre personalities, feuds, government bureaucracies, and constantly inadequate funding. How could they ever hope to achieve their impossible goal? It was truly a page-turner and is one of my all-time favorite books I always recommend to friends.

And it helped freshen my mind for the critical thinking that is always essential.

The Serenity Prayer

The serenity prayer might seem like a surprising suggestion to aid critical thinking, but I believe it is one of the most important.

Here’s why:

In situations where good critical thinking is essential, we become tangled up emotionally. We may feel that we ought to act decisively, but we don’t know if it will do any good, and there are often complicated constraints against any actions we might take. Then we find ourselves confused, not knowing what to do.

It is in this kind of situation that the Serenity Prayer is so clarifying. Simply stated, the prayer is this:

Lord, help me accept the things I cannot change, give me the courage to change the things I can change, and give me the wisdom to know the difference.

Instead of getting emotionally bogged down in determining what we can or should change, the Serenity Prayer removes ambiguity and brings clarity.

So, critical thinking is an essential life discipline, and these seven strategies can help bring us clarity of thought and understanding.

It's all about truth.

© David Evans

David Evans is an award-winning writer and mediator. He has an Emmy Award (shared) for writing on The Monkees and two Outstanding Case of the Year Awards for The Los Angeles County Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Program.

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• PMC10672018

Critical Thinking, Intelligence, and Unsubstantiated Beliefs: An Integrative Review

Associated data.

This research did not involve collection of original data, and hence there are no new data to make available.

A review of the research shows that critical thinking is a more inclusive construct than intelligence, going beyond what general cognitive ability can account for. For instance, critical thinking can more completely account for many everyday outcomes, such as how thinkers reject false conspiracy theories, paranormal and pseudoscientific claims, psychological misconceptions, and other unsubstantiated claims. Deficiencies in the components of critical thinking (in specific reasoning skills, dispositions, and relevant knowledge) contribute to unsubstantiated belief endorsement in ways that go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. Specifically, people who endorse unsubstantiated claims less tend to show better critical thinking skills, possess more relevant knowledge, and are more disposed to think critically. They tend to be more scientifically skeptical and possess a more rational–analytic cognitive style, while those who accept unsubstantiated claims more tend to be more cynical and adopt a more intuitive–experiential cognitive style. These findings suggest that for a fuller understanding of unsubstantiated beliefs, researchers and instructors should also assess specific reasoning skills, relevant knowledge, and dispositions which go beyond what intelligence tests test.

1. Introduction

Why do some people believe implausible claims, such as the QAnon conspiracy theory, that a cabal of liberals is kidnapping and trafficking many thousands of children each year, despite the lack of any credible supporting evidence? Are believers less intelligent than non-believers? Do they lack knowledge of such matters? Are they more gullible or less skeptical than non-believers? Or, more generally, are they failing to think critically?

Understanding the factors contributing to acceptance of unsubstantiated claims is important, not only to the development of theories of intelligence and critical thinking but also because many unsubstantiated beliefs are false, and some are even dangerous. Endorsing them can have a negative impact on an individual and society at large. For example, false beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic, such as believing that 5G cell towers induced the spread of the COVID-19 virus, led some British citizens to set fire to 5G towers ( Jolley and Paterson 2020 ). Other believers in COVID-19 conspiracy theories endangered their own and their children’s lives when they refused to socially distance and be vaccinated with highly effective vaccines, despite the admonitions of scientific experts ( Bierwiaczonek et al. 2020 ). Further endangering the population at large, those who believe the false conspiracy theory that human-caused global warming is a hoax likely fail to respond adaptively to this serious global threat ( van der Linden 2015 ). Parents, who uncritically accept pseudoscientific claims, such as the false belief that facilitated communication is an effective treatment for childhood autism, may forego more effective treatments ( Lilienfeld 2007 ). Moreover, people in various parts of the world still persecute other people whom they believe are witches possessing supernatural powers. Likewise, many people still believe in demonic possession, which has been associated with mental disorders ( Nie and Olson 2016 ). Compounding the problems created by these various unsubstantiated beliefs, numerous studies now show that when someone accepts one of these types of unfounded claims, they tend to accept others as well; see Bensley et al. ( 2022 ) for a review.

Studying the factors that contribute to unfounded beliefs is important not only because of their real-world consequences but also because this can facilitate a better understanding of unfounded beliefs and how they are related to critical thinking and intelligence. This article focuses on important ways in which critical thinking and intelligence differ, especially in terms of how a comprehensive model of CT differs from the view of intelligence as general cognitive ability. I argue that this model of CT more fully accounts for how people can accurately decide if a claim is unsubstantiated than can views of intelligence, emphasizing general cognitive ability. In addition to general cognitive ability, thinking critically about unsubstantiated claims involves deployment of specific reasoning skills, dispositions related to CT, and specific knowledge, which go beyond the contribution of general cognitive ability.

Accordingly, this article begins with an examination of the constructs of critical thinking and intelligence. Then, it discusses theories proposing that to understand thinking in the real world requires going beyond general cognitive ability. Specifically, the focus is on factors related to critical thinking, such as specific reasoning skills, dispositions, metacognition, and relevant knowledge. I review research showing that that this alternative multidimensional view of CT can better account for individual differences in the tendency to endorse multiple types of unsubstantiated claims than can general cognitive ability alone.

2. Defining Critical Thinking and Intelligence

Critical thinking is an almost universally valued educational objective in the US and in many other countries which seek to improve it. In contrast, intelligence, although much valued, has often been viewed as a more stable characteristic and less amenable to improvement through specific short-term interventions, such as traditional instruction or more recently through practice on computer-implemented training programs. According to Wechsler’s influential definition, intelligence is a person’s “aggregate or global capacity to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment” ( Wechsler 1944, p. 3 ).

Consistent with this definition, intelligence has long been associated with general cognitive or intellectual ability and the potential to learn and reason well. Intelligence (IQ) tests measure general cognitive abilities, such as knowledge of words, memory skills, analogical reasoning, speed of processing, and the ability to solve verbal and spatial problems. General intelligence or “g” is a composite of these abilities statistically derived from various cognitive subtests on IQ tests which are positively intercorrelated. There is considerable overlap between g and the concept of fluid intelligence (Gf) in the prominent Cattell–Horn–Carroll model ( McGrew 2009 ), which refers to “the ability to solve novel problems, the solution of which does not depend on previously acquired skills and knowledge,” and crystalized intelligence (Gc), which refers to experience, existing skills, and general knowledge ( Conway and Kovacs 2018, pp. 50–51 ). Although g or general intelligence is based on a higher order factor, inclusive of fluid and crystallized intelligence, it is technically not the same as general cognitive ability, a commonly used, related term. However, in this article, I use “general cognitive ability” and “cognitive ability” because they are the imprecise terms frequently used in the research reviewed.

Although IQ scores have been found to predict performance in basic real-world domains, such as academic performance and job success ( Gottfredson 2004 ), an enduring question for intelligence researchers has been whether g and intelligence tests predict the ability to adapt well in other real-world situations, which concerns the second part of Wechsler’s definition. So, in addition to the search for the underlying structure of intelligence, researchers have been perennially concerned with how general abilities associated with intelligence can be applied to help a person adapt to real-world situations. The issue is largely a question of how cognitive ability and intelligence can help people solve real-world problems and cope adaptively and succeed in dealing with various environmental demands ( Sternberg 2019 ).

Based on broad conceptual definitions of intelligence and critical thinking, both intelligence and CT should aid adaptive functioning in the real world, presumably because they both involve rational approaches. Their common association with rationality gives each term a positive connotation. However, complicating the definition of each of these is the fact that rationality also continues to have a variety of meanings. In this article, in agreement with Stanovich et al. ( 2018 ), rationality is defined in the normative sense, used in cognitive science, as the distance between a person’s response and some normative standard of optimal behavior. As such, degree of rationality falls on a continuous scale, not a categorical one.

Despite disagreements surrounding the conceptual definitions of intelligence, critical thinking, and rationality, a commonality in these terms is they are value-laden and normative. In the case of intelligence, people are judged based on norms from standardized intelligence tests, especially in academic settings. Although scores on CT tests seldom are, nor could be, used to judge individuals in this way, the normative and value-laden basis of CT is apparent in people’s informal judgements. They often judge others who have made poor decisions to be irrational or to have failed to think critically.

This value-laden aspect of CT is also apparent in formal definitions of CT. Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) defined critical thinking as “the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed.” The positive conception of CT as helping a person adapt well to one’s environment is clearly implied in “desirable outcome”.

Robert Ennis ( 1987 ) has offered a simpler, yet useful definition of critical thinking that also has normative implications. According to Ennis, “critical thinking is reasonable, reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” ( Ennis 1987, p. 102 ). This definition implies that CT helps people know what to believe (a goal of epistemic rationality) and how to act (a goal of instrumental rationality). This is conveyed by associating “critical thinking” with the positive terms, “reasonable” and “reflective”. Dictionaries commonly define “reasonable” as “rational”, “logical”, “intelligent”, and “good”, all terms with positive connotations.

For critical thinkers, being reasonable involves using logical rules, standards of evidence, and other criteria that must be met for a product of thinking to be considered good. Critical thinkers use these to evaluate how strongly reasons or evidence supports one claim versus another, drawing conclusions which are supported by the highest quality evidence ( Bensley 2018 ). If no high-quality evidence is available for consideration, it would be unreasonable to draw a strong conclusion. Unfortunately, people’s beliefs are too often based on acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. This is a failure of CT, but is it also a failure of intelligence?

3. Does Critical Thinking “Go Beyond” What Is Meant by Intelligence?

Despite the conceptual overlap in intelligence and CT at a general level, one way that CT can be distinguished from the common view of intelligence as general cognitive ability is in terms of what each can account for. Although intelligence tests, especially measures of general cognitive ability, have reliably predicted academic and job performance, they may not be sufficient to predict other everyday outcomes for which CT measures have made successful predictions and have added to the variance accounted for in performance. For instance, replicating a study by Butler ( 2012 ), Butler et al. ( 2017 ) obtained a negative correlation ( r = −0.33) between scores on the Halpern Critical Thinking Appraisal (HCTA) and a measure of 134 negative, real-world outcomes, not expected to befall critical thinkers, such as engaging in unprotected sex or posting a message on social media which the person regretted. They found that higher HCTA scores not only predicted better life decisions, but also predicted better performance beyond a measure of general cognitive ability. These results suggest that CT can account for real-world outcomes and goes beyond general cognitive ability to account for additional variance.

Some theorists maintain that standardized intelligence tests do not capture the variety of abilities that people need to adapt well in the real world. For example, Gardner ( 1999 ), has proposed that additional forms of intelligence are needed, such as spatial, musical, and interpersonal intelligences in addition to linguistic and logical–mathematical intelligences, more typically associated with general cognitive ability and academic success. In other theorizing, Sternberg ( 1988 ) has proposed three additional types of intelligence: analytical, practical, and creative intelligence, to more fully capture the variety of intelligent abilities on which people differ. Critical thinking is considered part of analytical skills which involve evaluating the quality and applicability of ideas, products, and options ( Sternberg 2022 ). Regarding adaptive intelligence, Sternberg ( 2019 ) has emphasized how adaptive aspects of intelligence are needed to solve real-world problems both at the individual and species levels. According to Sternberg, core components of intelligence have evolved in humans, but intelligence takes different forms in different cultures, with each culture valuing its own skills for adaptation. Thus, the construct of intelligence must go beyond core cognitive ability to encompass the specific abilities needed for adaptive behavior in specific cultures and settings.

Two other theories propose that other components be added to intelligent and rational thinking. Ackerman ( 2022 ) has emphasized the importance of acquiring domain-specific knowledge for engaging in intelligent functioning in the wide variety of tasks found in everyday life. Ackerman has argued that declarative, procedural, and tacit knowledge, as well as non-ability variables, are needed to better predict job performance and performance of other everyday activities. Taking another approach, Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) have proposed that critical thinking is essentially the adaptive application of intelligence for solving real-world problems. Elsewhere, Butler and Halpern ( 2019 ) have argued that dispositions such as open-mindedness are another aspect of CT and that domain-specific knowledge and specific CT skills are needed to solve real-world problems.

Examples are readily available for how CT goes beyond what IQ tests test to include specific rules for reasoning and relevant knowledge needed to execute real-world tasks. Take the example of scientific reasoning, which can be viewed as a specialized form of CT. Drawing a well-reasoned inductive conclusion about a theory or analyzing the quality of a research study both require that a thinker possess relevant specialized knowledge related to the question and specific reasoning skills for reasoning about scientific methodology. In contrast, IQ tests are deliberately designed to be nonspecialized in assessing Gc, broadly sampling vocabulary and general knowledge in order to be fair and unbiased ( Stanovich 2009 ). Specialized knowledge and reasoning skills are also needed in non-academic domains. Jurors must possess specialized knowledge to understand expert, forensic testimony and specific reasoning skills to interpret the law and make well-reasoned judgments about a defendant’s guilt or innocence.

Besides lacking specific reasoning skills and domain-relevant knowledge, people may fail to think critically because they are not disposed to use their reasoning skills to examine such claims and want to preserve their favored beliefs. Critical thinking dispositions are attitudes or traits that make it more likely that a person will think critically. Theorists have proposed numerous CT dispositions (e.g., Bensley 2018 ; Butler and Halpern 2019 ; Dwyer 2017 ; Ennis 1987 ). Some commonly identified CT dispositions especially relevant to this discussion are open-mindedness, skepticism, intellectual engagement, and the tendency to take a reflective, rational–analytic approach. Critical thinking dispositions are clearly value-laden and prescriptive. A good thinker should be open-minded, skeptical, reflective, intellectually engaged, and value a rational–analytic approach to inquiry. Conversely, corresponding negative dispositions, such as “close-mindedness” and “gullibility”, could obstruct CT.

Without the appropriate disposition, individuals will not use their reasoning skills to think critically about questions. For example, the brilliant mystery writer, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who was trained as a physician and created the hyper-reasonable detective Sherlock Holmes, was not disposed to think critically about some unsubstantiated claims. Conan Doyle was no doubt highly intelligent in cognitive ability terms, but he was not sufficiently skeptical (disposed to think critically) about spiritualism. He believed that he was talking to his dearly departed son though a medium, despite the warnings of his magician friend, Harry Houdini, who told him that mediums used trickery in their seances. Perhaps influenced by his Irish father’s belief in the “wee folk”, Conan Doyle also believed that fairies inhabited the English countryside, based on children’s photos, despite the advice of experts who said the photos could be faked. Nevertheless, he was skeptical of a new theory of tuberculosis proposed by Koch when he reported on it, despite his wife suffering from the disease. So, in professional capacities, Conan Doyle used his CT skills, but in certain other domains for which he was motivated to accept unsubstantiated claims, he failed to think critically, insufficiently disposed to skeptically challenge certain implausible claims.

This example makes two important points. Conan Doyle’s superior intelligence was not enough for him to reject implausible claims about the world. In general, motivated reasoning can lead people, even those considered highly intelligent, to accept claims with no good evidentiary support. The second important point is that we would not be able to adequately explain cases like this one, considering only the person’s intelligence or even their reasoning skills, without also considering the person’s disposition. General cognitive ability alone is not sufficient, and CT dispositions should also be considered.

Supporting this conclusion, Stanovich and West ( 1997 ) examined the influence of dispositions beyond the contribution of cognitive ability on a CT task. They gave college students an argument evaluation test in which participants first rated their agreement with several claims about real social and political issues made by a fictitious person. Then, they gave them evidence against each claim and finally asked them to rate the quality of a counterargument made by the same fictitious person. Participants’ ratings of the counterarguments were compared to the median ratings of expert judges on the quality of the rebuttals. Stanovich and West also administered a new measure of rational disposition called the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale and the SAT as a proxy for cognitive ability. The AOT was a composite of items from several other scales that would be expected to measure CT disposition. They found that both SAT and AOT scores were significant predictors of higher argument analysis scores. Even after partialing out cognitive ability, actively open-minded thinking was significant. These results suggest that general cognitive ability alone was not sufficient to account for thinking critically about real-world issues and that CT disposition was needed to go beyond it.

Further examining the roles of CT dispositions and cognitive ability on reasoning, Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) studied myside bias, a bias in reasoning closely related to one-sided thinking and confirmation bias. A critical thinker would be expected to not show myside bias and instead fairly evaluate evidence on all sides of a question. Stanovich and West ( 2007 ) found that college students often showed myside bias when asked their opinions about real-world policy issues, such as those concerning the health risks of smoking and drinking alcohol. For example, compared to non-smokers, smokers judged the health risks of smoking to be lower. When they divided participants into higher versus lower cognitive ability groups based on SAT scores, the two groups showed little difference on myside bias. Moreover, on the hazards of drinking issue, participants who drank less had higher scores on the CT disposition measure.

Other research supports the need for both reasoning ability and CT disposition in predicting outcomes in the real world. Ren et al. ( 2020 ) found that CT disposition, as measured by a Chinese critical thinking disposition inventory, and a CT skill measure together contributed a significant amount of the variance in predicting academic performance beyond the contribution of cognitive ability alone, as measured by a test of fluid intelligence. Further supporting the claim that CT requires both cognitive ability and CT disposition, Ku and Ho ( 2010 ) found that a CT disposition measure significantly predicted scores on a CT test beyond the significant contribution of verbal intelligence in high school and college students from Hong Kong.

The contribution of dispositions to thinking is related to another way that CT goes beyond the application of general cognitive ability, i.e., by way of the motivation for reasoning. Assuming that all reasoning is motivated ( Kunda 1990 ), then CT is motivated, too, which is implicit within the Halpern and Dunn ( 2021 ) and Ennis ( 1987 ) definitions. Critical thinking is motivated in the sense of being purposeful and directed towards the goal of arriving at an accurate conclusion. For instance, corresponding to pursuit of the goal of accurate reasoning, the CT disposition of “truth-seeking” guides a person towards reaching the CT goal of arriving at an accurate conclusion.

Also, according to Kunda ( 1990 ), a second type of motivated reasoning can lead to faulty conclusions, often by directing a person towards the goal of maintaining favored beliefs and preconceptions, as in illusory correlation, belief perseverance, and confirmation bias. Corresponding to this second type, negative dispositions, such as close-mindedness and self-serving motives, can incline thinkers towards faulty conclusions. This is especially relevant in the present discussion because poorer reasoning, thinking errors, and the inappropriate use of heuristics are related to the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, all of which are CT failures. The term “thinking errors” is a generic term referring to logical fallacies, informal reasoning fallacies, argumentation errors, and inappropriate uses of cognitive heuristics ( Bensley 2018 ). Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, commonly used to simplify judgment tasks and reduce mental effort. Yet, when used inappropriately, heuristics often result in biased judgments.

Stanovich ( 2009 ) has argued that IQ tests do not test people’s use of heuristics, but heuristics have been found to be negatively correlated with CT performance ( West et al. 2008 ). In this same study, they found that college students’ cognitive ability, as measured by performance on the SAT, was not correlated with thinking biases associated with use of heuristics. Although Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) found that susceptibility to biases, such as the conjunction fallacy, framing effect, base-rate neglect, affect bias, and myside bias were all uncorrelated with cognitive ability (using SAT as a proxy), other types of thinking errors were correlated with SAT.

Likewise, two types of knowledge are related to the two forms of motivated reasoning. For instance, inaccurate knowledge, such as misconceptions, can derail reasoning from moving towards a correct conclusion, as in when a person reasons from false premises. In contrast, reasoning from accurate knowledge is more likely to produce an accurate conclusion. Taking into account inaccurate knowledge and thinking errors is important to understanding the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims because these are also related to negative dispositions, such as close-mindedness and cynicism, none of which are measured by intelligence tests.

Critical thinking questions are often situated in real-world examples or in simulations of them which are designed to detect thinking errors and bias. As described in Halpern and Butler ( 2018 ), an item like one on the “Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment” (HCTA) provides respondents with a mock newspaper story about research showing that first-graders who attended preschool were better able to learn how to read. Then the question asks if preschool should be made mandatory. A correct response to this item requires recognizing that correlation does not imply causation, that is, avoiding a common reasoning error people make in thinking about research implications in everyday life. Another CT skills test, “Analyzing Psychological Statements” (APS) assesses the ability to recognize thinking errors and apply argumentation skills and psychology to evaluate psychology-related examples and simulations of real-life situations ( Bensley 2021 ). For instance, besides identifying thinking errors in brief samples of thinking, questions ask respondents to distinguish arguments from non-arguments, find assumptions in arguments, evaluate kinds of evidence, and draw a conclusion from a brief psychological argument. An important implication of the studies just reviewed is that efforts to understand CT can be further informed by assessing thinking errors and biases, which, as the next discussion shows, are related to individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.

4. Dual-Process Theory Measures and Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Dual-process theory (DPT) and measures associated with it have been widely used in the study of the endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs, especially as they relate to cognitive style. According to a cognitive style version of DPT, people have two modes of processing, a fast intuitive–experiential (I-E) style of processing and a slower, reflective, rational–analytic (R-A) style of processing. The intuitive cognitive style is associated with reliance on hunches, feelings, personal experience, and cognitive heuristics which simplify processing, while the R-A cognitive style is a reflective, rational–analytic style associated with more elaborate and effortful processing ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Epstein 2008 ). As such, the rational–analytic cognitive style is consistent with CT dispositions, such as those promoting the effortful analysis of evidence, objective truth, and logical consistency. In fact, CT is sometimes referred to as “critical-analytic” thinking ( Byrnes and Dunbar 2014 ) and has been associated with analytical intelligence Sternberg ( 1988 ) and with rational thinking, as discussed before.

People use both modes of processing, but they show individual differences in which mode they tend to rely upon, although the intuitive–experiential mode is the default ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Morgan 2016 ; Pacini and Epstein 1999 ), and they accept unsubstantiated claims differentially based on their predominate cognitive style ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Epstein 2008 ). Specifically, individuals who rely more on an I-E cognitive style tend to endorse unsubstantiated claims more strongly, while individuals who rely more on a R-A cognitive style tend to endorse those claims less. Note, however, that other theorists view the two processes and cognitive styles somewhat differently, (e.g., Kahneman 2011 ; Stanovich et al. 2018 ).

Researchers have often assessed the contribution of these two cognitive styles to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, using variants of three measures: the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) of Frederick ( 2005 ), the Rational–Experiential Inventory of Epstein and his colleagues ( Pacini and Epstein 1999 ), and the related Need for Cognition scale of Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982 ). The CRT is a performance-based test which asks participants to solve problems that appear to require simple mathematical calculations, but which actually require more reflection. People typically do poorly on the CRT, which is thought to indicate reliance on an intuitive cognitive style, while better performance is thought to indicate reliance on the slower, more deliberate, and reflective cognitive style. The positive correlation of the CRT with numeracy scores suggests it also has a cognitive skill component ( Patel et al. 2019 ). The Rational–Experiential Inventory (REI) of Pacini and Epstein ( 1999 ) contains one scale designed to measure an intuitive–experiential cognitive style and a second scale intended to measure a rational–analytic (R-A) style. The R-A scale was adapted from the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale of Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982 ), another scale associated with rational–analytic thinking and expected to be negatively correlated with unsubstantiated beliefs. The NFC was found to be related to open-mindedness and intellectual engagement, two CT dispositions ( Cacioppo et al. 1996 ).

The cognitive styles associated with DPT also relate to CT dispositions. Thinking critically requires that individuals be disposed to use their reasoning skills to reject unsubstantiated claims ( Bensley 2018 ) and that they be inclined to take a rational–analytic approach rather than relying on their intuitions and feelings. For instance, Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) found that students who endorsed more psychological misconceptions adopted a more intuitive cognitive style, were less disposed to take a rational–scientific approach to psychology, and scored lower on a psychological critical thinking skills test. Further supporting this connection, West et al. ( 2008 ) found that participants who tended to use cognitive heuristics more, thought to be related to intuitive processing and bias, scored lower on a critical thinking measure. As the Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) results suggest, in addition to assessing reasoning skills and dispositions, comprehensive CT assessment research should assess knowledge and unsubstantiated beliefs because these are related to failures of critical thinking.

5. Assessing Critical Thinking and Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Assessing endorsement of unsubstantiated claims provides another way to assess CT outcomes related to everyday thinking, which goes beyond what intelligence tests test ( Bensley and Lilienfeld 2020 ). From the perspective of the multi-dimensional model of CT, endorsement of unsubstantiated claims could result from deficiencies in a person’s CT reasoning skills, a lack of relevant knowledge, and in the engagement of inappropriate dispositions. Suppose an individual endorses an unsubstantiated claim, such as believing the conspiracy theory that human-caused global warming is a hoax. The person may lack the specific reasoning skills needed to critically evaluate the conspiracy. Lantian et al. ( 2020 ) found that scores on a CT skills test were negatively correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs. The person also must possess relevant scientific knowledge, such as knowing the facts that each year humans pump about 40 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas which traps heat in the atmosphere. Or, the person may not be scientifically skeptical or too cynical or mistrustful of scientists or governmental officials.

Although endorsing unsubstantiated beliefs is clearly a failure of CT, problems arise in deciding which ones are unsubstantiated, especially when considering conspiracy theories. Typically, the claims which critical thinkers should reject as unsubstantiated are those which are not supported by objective evidence. But of the many conspiracies proposed, few are vigorously examined. Moreover, some conspiracy theories which authorities might initially deny turn out to be real, such as the MK-Ultra theory that the CIA was secretly conducting mind-control research on American citizens.

A way out of this quagmire is to define unsubstantiated beliefs on a continuum which depends on the quality of evidence. This has led to the definition of unsubstantiated claims as assertions which have not been supported by high-quality evidence ( Bensley 2023 ). Those which are supported have the kind of evidentiary support that critical thinkers are expected to value in drawing reasonable conclusions. Instead of insisting that a claim must be demonstrably false to be rejected, we adopt a more tentative acceptance or rejection of claims, based on how much good evidence supports them. Many claims are unsubstantiated because they have not yet been carefully examined and so totally lack support or they may be supported only by low quality evidence such as personal experience, anecdotes, or non-scientific authority. Other claims are more clearly unsubstantiated because they contradict the findings of high-quality research. A critical thinker should be highly skeptical of these.

Psychological misconceptions are one type of claim that can be more clearly unsubstantiated. Psychological misconceptions are commonsense psychological claims (folk theories) about the mind, brain, and behavior that are contradicted by the bulk of high-quality scientific research. Author developed the Test of Psychological Knowledge and Misconceptions (TOPKAM), a 40-item, forced-choice measure with each item posing a statement of a psychological misconception and the other response option stating the evidence-based alternative ( Bensley et al. 2014 ). They found that higher scores on the APS, the argument analysis test applying psychological concepts to analyze real-world examples, were associated with more correct answers on the TOPKAM. Other studies have found positive correlations between CT skills tests and other measures of psychological misconceptions ( McCutcheon et al. 1992 ; Kowalski and Taylor 2004 ). Bensley et al. ( 2014 ) also found that higher correct TOPKAM scores were positively correlated with scores on the Inventory of Thinking Dispositions in Psychology (ITDP) of Bensley ( 2021 ), a measure of the disposition to take a rational and scientific approach to psychology but were negatively correlated with an intuitive cognitive style.

Bensley et al. ( 2021 ) conducted a multidimensional study, assessing beginner psychology students starting a CT course on their endorsement of psychological misconceptions, recognition of thinking errors, CT dispositions, and metacognition, before and after CT instruction. Two classes received explicit instruction involving considerable practice in argument analysis and scientific reasoning skills, with one class receiving CT instruction focused more on recognizing psychological misconceptions and a second class focused more on recognizing various thinking errors. Bensley et al. assessed both classes before and after instruction on the TOPKAM and on the Test of Thinking Errors, a test of the ability to recognize in real-world examples 17 different types of thinking errors, such as confirmation bias, inappropriate use of the availability and representativeness heuristics, reasoning from ignorance/possibility, gambler’s fallacy, and hasty generalization ( Bensley et al. 2021 ). Correct TOPKAM and TOTE scores were positively correlated, and after CT instruction both were positively correlated with the APS, the CT test of argument analysis skills.

Bensley et al. found that after explicit instruction of CT skills, students improved significantly on both the TOPKAM and TOTE, but those focusing on recognizing misconceptions improved the most. Also, those students who improved the most on the TOTE scored higher on the REI rational–analytic scale and on the ITDP, while those improving the most on the TOTE scored higher on the ITDP. The students receiving explicit CT skill instruction in recognizing misconceptions also significantly improved the accuracy of their metacognitive monitoring in estimating their TOPKAM scores after instruction.

Given that before instruction neither class differed in GPA nor on the SAT, a proxy for general cognitive ability, CT instruction provided a good accounting for the improvement in recognition of thinking errors and misconceptions without recourse to intelligence. However, SAT scores were positively correlated with both TOTE scores and APS scores, suggesting that cognitive ability contributed to CT skill performance. These results replicated the earlier findings of Bensley and Spero ( 2014 ) showing that explicit CT instruction improved performance on both CT skills tests and metacognitive monitoring accuracy while controlling for SAT, which was positively correlated with the CT skills test performance.

Taken together, these findings suggest that cognitive ability contributes to performance on CT tasks but that CT instruction goes beyond it to further improve performance. As the results of Bensley et al. ( 2021 ) show, and as discussed next, thinking errors and bias from heuristics are CT failures that should also be assessed because they are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs and cognitive style.

6. Dual-Processing Theory and Research on Unsubstantiated Beliefs

Consistent with DPT, numerous other studies have obtained significant positive correlations between intuitive cognitive style and paranormal belief, often using the REI intuitive–experiential scale and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) of Tobacyk ( 2004 ) (e.g., Genovese 2005 ; Irwin and Young 2002 ; Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Pennycook et al. 2015 ; Rogers et al. 2018 ; Saher and Lindeman 2005 ). Studies have also found positive correlations between superstitious belief and intuitive cognitive style (e.g., Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Maqsood et al. 2018 ). REI intuitive–experiential thinking style was also positively correlated with belief in complementary and alternative medicine ( Lindeman 2011 ), conspiracy theory belief ( Alper et al. 2020 ), and with endorsement of psychological misconceptions ( Bensley et al. 2014 ; Bensley et al. 2022 ).

Additional evidence for DPT has been found when REI R-A and NFC scores were negatively correlated with scores on measures of unsubstantiated beliefs, but studies correlating them with measures of paranormal belief and conspiracy theory belief have shown mixed results. Supporting a relationship, REI rational–analytic and NFC scores significantly and negatively predicted paranormal belief ( Lobato et al. 2014 ; Pennycook et al. 2012 ). Other studies have also obtained a negative correlation between NFC and paranormal belief ( Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Rogers et al. 2018 ; Stahl and van Prooijen 2018 ), but both Genovese ( 2005 ) and Pennycook et al. ( 2015 ) found that NFC was not significantly correlated with paranormal belief. Swami et al. ( 2014 ) found that although REI R-A scores were negatively correlated with conspiracy theory belief, NFC scores were not.

Researchers often refer to people who are doubtful of paranormal and other unfounded claims as “skeptics” and so have tested whether measures related to skepticism are associated with less endorsement of unsubstantiated claims. They typically view skepticism as a stance towards unsubstantiated claims taken by rational people who reject them, (e.g., Lindeman and Aarnio 2006 ; Stahl and van Prooijen 2018 ), rather than as a disposition inclining a person to think critically about unsubstantiated beliefs ( Bensley 2018 ).

Fasce and Pico ( 2019 ) conducted one of the few studies using a measure related to skeptical disposition, the Critical Thinking Disposition Scale (CTDS) of Sosu ( 2013 ), in relation to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims. They found that scores on the CTDS were negatively correlated with scores on the RPBS but not significantly correlated with either a measure of pseudoscience or of conspiracy theory belief. However, the CRT was negatively correlated with both RPBS and the pseudoscience measure. Because Fasce and Pico ( 2019 ) did not examine correlations with the Reflective Skepticism subscale of the CTDS, its contribution apart from full-scale CTDS was not found.

To more directly test skepticism as a disposition, we recently assessed college students on how well three new measures predicted endorsement of psychological misconceptions, paranormal claims, and conspiracy theories ( Bensley et al. 2022 ). The dispositional measures included a measure of general skeptical attitude; a second measure, the Scientific Skepticism Scale (SSS), which focused more on waiting to accept claims until high-quality scientific evidence supported them; and a third measure, the Cynicism Scale (CS), which focused on doubting the sincerity of the motives of scientists and people in general. We found that although the general skepticism scale did not predict any of the unsubstantiated belief measures, SSS scores were a significant negative predictor of both paranormal belief and conspiracy theory belief. REI R-A scores were a less consistent negative predictor, while REI I-E scores were more consistent positive predictors, and surprisingly CS scores were the most consistent positive predictors of the unsubstantiated beliefs.

Researchers commonly assume that people who accept implausible, unsubstantiated claims are gullible or not sufficiently skeptical. For instance, van Prooijen ( 2019 ) has argued that conspiracy theory believers are more gullible (less skeptical) than non-believers and tend to accept unsubstantiated claims more than less gullible people. van Prooijen ( 2019 ) reviewed several studies supporting the claim that people who are more gullible tend to endorse conspiracy theories more. However, he did not report any studies in which a gullible disposition was directly measured.

Recently, we directly tested the gullibility hypothesis in relation to scientific skepticism ( Bensley et al. 2023 ) using the Gullibility Scale of Teunisse et al. ( 2019 ) on which people skeptical of the paranormal had been shown to have lower scores. We found that Gullibility Scale and the Cynicism Scale scores were positively correlated, and both were significant positive predictors of unsubstantiated beliefs, in general, consistent with an intuitive–experiential cognitive style. In contrast, we found that scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, the Scientific Skepticism Scale, and the REI rational–analytic scale were all positively intercorrelated and significant negative predictors of unsubstantiated beliefs, in general, consistent with a rational–analytic/reflective cognitive style. Scientific skepticism scores negatively predicted general endorsement of unsubstantiated claims beyond the REI R-A scale, but neither the CTDS nor the CTDS Reflective Skepticism subscale were significant. These results replicated findings from the Bensley et al. ( 2023 ) study and supported an elaborated dual-process model of unsubstantiated belief. The SSS was not only a substantial negative predictor, it was also negatively correlated with the Gullibility Scale, as expected.

These results suggest that both CT-related dispositions and CT skills are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated beliefs. However, a measure of general cognitive ability or intelligence must be examined along with measures of CT and unsubstantiated beliefs to determine if CT goes beyond intelligence to predict unsubstantiated beliefs. In one of the few studies that also included a measure of cognitive ability, Stahl and van Prooijen ( 2018 ) found that dispositional characteristics helped account for acceptance of conspiracies and paranormal belief beyond cognitive ability. Using the Importance of Rationality Scale (IRS), a rational–analytic scale designed to measure skepticism towards unsubstantiated beliefs, Stahl and van Prooijen ( 2018 ) found that the IRS was negatively correlated with paranormal belief and belief in conspiracy theories. In separate hierarchical regressions, cognitive ability was the strongest negative predictor of both paranormal belief and of conspiracy belief, but IRS scores in combination with cognitive ability negatively predicted endorsement of paranormal belief but did not significantly predict conspiracy theory belief. These results provided partial support that that a measure of rational–analytic cognitive style related to skeptical disposition added to the variance accounted for beyond cognitive ability in negatively predicting unsubstantiated belief.

In another study that included a measure of cognitive ability, Cavojova et al. ( 2019 ) examined how CT-related dispositions and the Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) were related to a measure of paranormal, pseudoscientific, and conspiracy theory beliefs. The SRS of Drummond and Fischhoff ( 2017 ) likely measures CT skill in that it measures the ability to evaluate scientific research and evidence. As expected, the unsubstantiated belief measure was negatively correlated with the SRS and a cognitive ability measure, similar to Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Unsubstantiated beliefs were positively correlated with dogmatism (the opposite of open-mindedness) but not with REI rational–analytic cognitive style. The SRS was a significant negative predictor of both unsubstantiated belief and susceptibility to bias beyond the contribution of cognitive ability, but neither dogmatism nor analytic thinking were significant predictors. Nevertheless, this study provides some support that a measure related to CT reasoning skill accounts for variance in unsubstantiated belief beyond cognitive ability.

The failure of this study to show a correlation between rational–analytic cognitive style and unsubstantiated beliefs, when some other studies have found significant correlations with it and related measures, has implications for the multidimensional assessment of unsubstantiated beliefs. One implication is that the REI rational–analytic scale may not be a strong predictor of unsubstantiated beliefs. In fact, we have recently found that the Scientific Skepticism Scale was a stronger negative predictor ( Bensley et al. 2022 ; Bensley et al. 2023 ), which also suggests that other measures related to rational–analytic thinking styles should be examined. This could help triangulate the contribution of self-report cognitive style measures to endorsement of unsubstantiated claims, recognizing that the use of self-report measures has a checkered history in psychological research. A second implication is that once again, measures of critical thinking skill and cognitive ability were negative predictors of unsubstantiated belief and so they, too, should be included in future assessments of unsubstantiated beliefs.

7. Discussion

This review provided different lines of evidence supporting the claim that CT goes beyond cognitive ability in accounting for certain real-world outcomes. Participants who think critically reported fewer problems in everyday functioning, not expected to befall critical thinkers. People who endorsed unsubstantiated claims less showed better CT skills, more accurate domain-specific knowledge, less susceptibility to thinking errors and bias, and were more disposed to think critically. More specifically, they tended to be more scientifically skeptical and adopt a more rational–analytic cognitive style. In contrast, those who endorsed them more tended to be more cynical and adopt an intuitive–experiential cognitive style. These characteristics go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. In some studies, the CT measures accounted for additional variance beyond the variance contributed by general cognitive ability.

That is not to say that measures of general cognitive ability are not useful. As noted by Gottfredson ( 2004 ), “g” is a highly successful predictor of academic and job performance. More is known about g and Gf than about many other psychological constructs. On average, g is closely related to Gf, which is highly correlated with working memory ( r = 0.70) and can be as high as r = 0.77 ( r 2 = 0.60) based on a correlated two-factor model ( Gignac 2014 ). Because modern working memory theory is, itself, a powerful theory ( Chai et al. 2018 ), this lends construct validity to the fluid intelligence construct. Although cognitive scientists have clearly made progress in understanding the executive processes underlying intelligence, they have not yet identified the specific cognitive components of intelligence ( Sternberg 2022 ). Moreover, theorists have acknowledged that intelligence must also include components beyond g, including domain-specific knowledge ( Ackerman 2022 ; Conway and Kovacs 2018 ) which are not yet clearly understood,

This review also pointed to limitations in the research that should be addressed. So far, not only have few studies of unsubstantiated beliefs included measures of intelligence, but they have also often used proxies for intelligence test scores, such as SAT scores. Future studies, besides using more and better measures of intelligence, could benefit from inclusion of more specifically focused measures, such as measures of Gf and Gc. Also, more research should be carried out to develop additional high-quality measures of CT, including ones that assess specific reasoning skills and knowledge relevant to thinking about a subject, which could help resolve perennial questions about the domain-general versus domain-specific nature of intelligence and CT. Overall, the results of this review encourage taking a multidimensional approach to investigating the complex constructs of intelligence, CT, and unsubstantiated belief. Supporting these recommendations were results of studies in which the improvement accrued from explicit CT skill instruction could be more fully understood when CT skills, relevant knowledge, CT dispositions, metacognitive monitoring accuracy, and a proxy for intelligence were used.

8. Conclusions

Critical thinking, broadly conceived, offers ways to understand real-world outcomes of thinking beyond what general cognitive ability can provide and intelligence tests test. A multi-dimensional view of CT which includes specific reasoning and metacognitive skills, CT dispositions, and relevant knowledge can add to our understanding of why some people endorse unsubstantiated claims more than others do, going beyond what intelligence tests test. Although general cognitive ability and domain-general knowledge often contribute to performance on CT tasks, thinking critically about real-world questions also involves applying rules, criteria, and knowledge which are specific to the question under consideration, as well as the appropriate dispositions and cognitive styles for deploying these.

Despite the advantages of taking this multidimensional approach to CT in helping us to more fully understand everyday thinking and irrationality, it presents challenges for researchers and instructors. It implies the need to assess and instruct multidimensionally, including not only measures of reasoning skills but also addressing thinking errors and biases, dispositions, the knowledge relevant to a task, and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. As noted by Dwyer ( 2023 ), adopting a more complex conceptualization of CT beyond just skills is needed, but it presents challenges for those seeking to improve students’ CT. Nevertheless, the research reviewed suggests that taking this multidimensional approach to CT can enhance our understanding of the endorsement of unsubstantiated claims beyond what standardized intelligence tests contribute. More research is needed to resolve remaining controversies and to develop evidence-based applications of the findings.

Funding Statement

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This research involved no new testing of participants and hence did not require Institutional Review Board approval.

Informed Consent Statement

This research involved no new testing of participants and hence did not require an Informed Consent Statement.

Data Availability Statement

Conflicts of interest.

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Critical Thinking & Evaluating Information

• Critical Thinking Skills
• Critical Thinking Questions
• Fake News & Misinformation
• Checkers & Cheat Sheets
• Evaluate Using T.R.A.A.P.
• Alternate Videos
• Sources & Links

What is Bias?

Biases also play a role in how you approach all information. The short video below provides definitions of 12 types of cognitive biases.

There are two forms of bias of particular importance given today's information laden landscape, implicit bias and confirmation bias .

Implicit Bias & Confirmation Bias

Implicit / Unconscious Bias 

"Original definition (neutral) - Any personal preference, attitude, or expectation that unconsciously affects a person's outlook or behaviour.

Current definition (negative) - Unconscious favouritism towards or prejudice against people of a particular race, gender, or group that influences one's actions or perceptions; an instance of this."

"unconscious bias, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, December 2020, www.oed.com/view/Entry/88686003 .

"Thoughts and feelings are “implicit” if we are unaware of them or mistaken about their nature. We have a bias when, rather than being neutral, we have a preference for (or aversion to) a person or group of people. Thus, we use the term “implicit bias” to describe when we have attitudes towards people or associate stereotypes with them without our conscious knowledge." 

https://perception.org/research/implicit-bias/

Confirmation Bias – "Originating in the field of psychology; the tendency to seek or favour new information which supports one’s existing theories or beliefs, while avoiding or rejecting that which disrupts them." 

Addition of definition to the Oxford Dictionary in 2019 

"confirmation, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, December 2020, www.oed.com/view/Entry/38852. 

Simply put, confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out and/ or interpret new information as confirmation of one's existing beliefs or theories and to exclude contradictory or opposing information or points of view.

Put Bias in Check!

Now that you are aware of bias, your personal biases and bias that can be found in sources of information, you can put it in check . You should approach information objectively, neutrally and critically evaluate it. Numerous tools included in this course can help you do this, like the critical thinking cheat sheet in the previous module.

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Cultivating Human Resiliency

7 Ways to Improve Critical Thinking and Challenge Brain Bias

In a world where we are bombarded with quick bites of information with questionable validity, the need for critical thinking is more important than ever. However, our brain is designed to make quick decisions with a limited amount of information through the processes of assimilation and generalization. This enables us to learn and adapt quicker but it also can result in a brain bias. Cultivating a resiliency toward this bias takes practice. Here are seven ways to improve critical thinking and challenge brain bias:

Look for alternative premises:   Our brain is wired to interpret information through existing contexts causing us to overly focus on information that supports our current beliefs. Counteracting this requires a deliberate shift in focus. If you believe something to be so, look for the evidence that it is not so. Actively seek information that disputes your conclusion.

Challenge cause and effect assumptions:   We tend to assume that there is a causal relationship if one event precedes another. This can be an error in thinking. To challenge this, make it a habit to ask yourself “what else might be the reason for this to happen?”

Step in someone else’s shoes :  When you find yourself judging another’s behavior, try to imagine what it would be like to be in their place. This requires more than just thinking about how you would respond to the situation. It requires considering the thoughts and feelings involved given that person’s past experiences as well as the current circumstances. This not only increases your empathy, it challenges your brain to broaden its perspective.

Expose yourself to opposing views:   Give yourself a chance to interact and dialogue with people who hold different opinions than your own. Try to keep an open mind. Don’t just focus on convincing them of what you believe. Listen closely to their rationales for what they believe. Healthy debate is a good way to grow and learn.

Consider the source:   People tend to give undue weight to anything published or broadcast. We also can be easily swayed by numbers and statistics. With the internet and social media, it is easy to mistake questionable sources as legitimate. Even legitimate news agencies or research can and often do contain bias. Understand the source of where you are getting information and ask yourself how their bias is influencing their argument. Better yet, get in the habit of checking information from more than one source and don’t limit your exposure to your own bias.

Expand your cultural experiences :  Make it a habit to read books by authors with different cultural backgrounds. See movies depicting characters from other cultures. Travel to different regions or countries and experience how others live. This opens your mind to ways of thinking and perceiving different than your limited experiences.

Think outside the box:   Don’t get trapped into thinking there are only one or two ways to do things when there might be a wide array of choices. Learn how to creatively brainstorm solutions to problems.

Good critical thinking skills keep the brain resilient.   What other ways have you found to challenge brain bias?

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2.2 Overcoming Cognitive Biases and Engaging in Critical Reflection

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Label the conditions that make critical thinking possible.
• Classify and describe cognitive biases.
• Apply critical reflection strategies to resist cognitive biases.

To resist the potential pitfalls of cognitive biases, we have taken some time to recognize why we fall prey to them. Now we need to understand how to resist easy, automatic, and error-prone thinking in favor of more reflective, critical thinking.

Critical Reflection and Metacognition

To promote good critical thinking, put yourself in a frame of mind that allows critical reflection. Recall from the previous section that rational thinking requires effort and takes longer. However, it will likely result in more accurate thinking and decision-making. As a result, reflective thought can be a valuable tool in correcting cognitive biases. The critical aspect of critical reflection involves a willingness to be skeptical of your own beliefs, your gut reactions, and your intuitions. Additionally, the critical aspect engages in a more analytic approach to the problem or situation you are considering. You should assess the facts, consider the evidence, try to employ logic, and resist the quick, immediate, and likely conclusion you want to draw. By reflecting critically on your own thinking, you can become aware of the natural tendency for your mind to slide into mental shortcuts.

This process of critical reflection is often called metacognition in the literature of pedagogy and psychology. Metacognition means thinking about thinking and involves the kind of self-awareness that engages higher-order thinking skills. Cognition, or the way we typically engage with the world around us, is first-order thinking, while metacognition is higher-order thinking. From a metacognitive frame, we can critically assess our thought process, become skeptical of our gut reactions and intuitions, and reconsider our cognitive tendencies and biases.

To improve metacognition and critical reflection, we need to encourage the kind of self-aware, conscious, and effortful attention that may feel unnatural and may be tiring. Typical activities associated with metacognition include checking, planning, selecting, inferring, self-interrogating, interpreting an ongoing experience, and making judgments about what one does and does not know (Hackner, Dunlosky, and Graesser 1998). By practicing metacognitive behaviors, you are preparing yourself to engage in the kind of rational, abstract thought that will be required for philosophy.

Good study habits, including managing your workspace, giving yourself plenty of time, and working through a checklist, can promote metacognition. When you feel stressed out or pressed for time, you are more likely to make quick decisions that lead to error. Stress and lack of time also discourage critical reflection because they rob your brain of the resources necessary to engage in rational, attention-filled thought. By contrast, when you relax and give yourself time to think through problems, you will be clearer, more thoughtful, and less likely to rush to the first conclusion that leaps to mind. Similarly, background noise, distracting activity, and interruptions will prevent you from paying attention. You can use this checklist to try to encourage metacognition when you study:

• Check your work.
• Plan ahead.
• Select the most useful material.
• Infer from your past grades to focus on what you need to study.
• Ask yourself how well you understand the concepts.
• Check your weaknesses.
• Assess whether you are following the arguments and claims you are working on.

Cognitive Biases

In this section, we will examine some of the most common cognitive biases so that you can be aware of traps in thought that can lead you astray. Cognitive biases are closely related to informal fallacies. Both fallacies and biases provide examples of the ways we make errors in reasoning.

Connections

See the chapter on logic and reasoning for an in-depth exploration of informal fallacies.

Watch the video to orient yourself before reading the text that follows.

Cognitive Biases 101, with Peter Bauman

Confirmation bias.

One of the most common cognitive biases is confirmation bias , which is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information that confirms or supports your prior beliefs. Like all cognitive biases, confirmation bias serves an important function. For instance, one of the most reliable forms of confirmation bias is the belief in our shared reality. Suppose it is raining. When you first hear the patter of raindrops on your roof or window, you may think it is raining. You then look for additional signs to confirm your conclusion, and when you look out the window, you see rain falling and puddles of water accumulating. Most likely, you will not be looking for irrelevant or contradictory information. You will be looking for information that confirms your belief that it is raining. Thus, you can see how confirmation bias—based on the idea that the world does not change dramatically over time—is an important tool for navigating in our environment.

Unfortunately, as with most heuristics, we tend to apply this sort of thinking inappropriately. One example that has recently received a lot of attention is the way in which confirmation bias has increased political polarization. When searching for information on the internet about an event or topic, most people look for information that confirms their prior beliefs rather than what undercuts them. The pervasive presence of social media in our lives is exacerbating the effects of confirmation bias since the computer algorithms used by social media platforms steer people toward content that reinforces their current beliefs and predispositions. These multimedia tools are especially problematic when our beliefs are incorrect (for example, they contradict scientific knowledge) or antisocial (for example, they support violent or illegal behavior). Thus, social media and the internet have created a situation in which confirmation bias can be “turbocharged” in ways that are destructive for society.

Confirmation bias is a result of the brain’s limited ability to process information. Peter Wason (1960) conducted early experiments identifying this kind of bias. He asked subjects to identify the rule that applies to a sequence of numbers—for instance, 2, 4, 8. Subjects were told to generate examples to test their hypothesis. What he found is that once a subject settled on a particular hypothesis, they were much more likely to select examples that confirmed their hypothesis rather than negated it. As a result, they were unable to identify the real rule (any ascending sequence of numbers) and failed to “falsify” their initial assumptions. Falsification is an important tool in the scientist’s toolkit when they are testing hypotheses and is an effective way to avoid confirmation bias.

In philosophy, you will be presented with different arguments on issues, such as the nature of the mind or the best way to act in a given situation. You should take your time to reason through these issues carefully and consider alternative views. What you believe to be the case may be right, but you may also fall into the trap of confirmation bias, seeing confirming evidence as better and more convincing than evidence that calls your beliefs into question.

Anchoring Bias

Confirmation bias is closely related to another bias known as anchoring. Anchoring bias refers to our tendency to rely on initial values, prices, or quantities when estimating the actual value, price, or quantity of something. If you are presented with a quantity, even if that number is clearly arbitrary, you will have a hard discounting it in your subsequent calculations; the initial value “anchors” subsequent estimates. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) reported an experiment in which subjects were asked to estimate the number of African nations in the United Nations. First, the experimenters spun a wheel of fortune in front of the subjects that produced a random number between 0 and 100. Let’s say the wheel landed on 79. Subjects were asked whether the number of nations was higher or lower than the random number. Subjects were then asked to estimate the real number of nations. Even though the initial anchoring value was random, people in the study found it difficult to deviate far from that number. For subjects receiving an initial value of 10, the median estimate of nations was 25, while for subjects receiving an initial value of 65, the median estimate was 45.

In the same paper, Tversky and Kahneman described the way that anchoring bias interferes with statistical reasoning. In a number of scenarios, subjects made irrational judgments about statistics because of the way the question was phrased (i.e., they were tricked when an anchor was inserted into the question). Instead of expending the cognitive energy needed to solve the statistical problem, subjects were much more likely to “go with their gut,” or think intuitively. That type of reasoning generates anchoring bias. When you do philosophy, you will be confronted with some formal and abstract problems that will challenge you to engage in thinking that feels difficult and unnatural. Resist the urge to latch on to the first thought that jumps into your head, and try to think the problem through with all the cognitive resources at your disposal.

Availability Heuristic

The availability heuristic refers to the tendency to evaluate new information based on the most recent or most easily recalled examples. The availability heuristic occurs when people take easily remembered instances as being more representative than they objectively are (i.e., based on statistical probabilities). In very simple situations, the availability of instances is a good guide to judgments. Suppose you are wondering whether you should plan for rain. It may make sense to anticipate rain if it has been raining a lot in the last few days since weather patterns tend to linger in most climates. More generally, scenarios that are well-known to us, dramatic, recent, or easy to imagine are more available for retrieval from memory. Therefore, if we easily remember an instance or scenario, we may incorrectly think that the chances are high that the scenario will be repeated. For instance, people in the United States estimate the probability of dying by violent crime or terrorism much more highly than they ought to. In fact, these are extremely rare occurrences compared to death by heart disease, cancer, or car accidents. But stories of violent crime and terrorism are prominent in the news media and fiction. Because these vivid stories are dramatic and easily recalled, we have a skewed view of how frequently violent crime occurs.

Another more loosely defined category of cognitive bias is the tendency for human beings to align themselves with groups with whom they share values and practices. The tendency toward tribalism is an evolutionary advantage for social creatures like human beings. By forming groups to share knowledge and distribute work, we are much more likely to survive. Not surprisingly, human beings with pro-social behaviors persist in the population at higher rates than human beings with antisocial tendencies. Pro-social behaviors, however, go beyond wanting to communicate and align ourselves with other human beings; we also tend to see outsiders as a threat. As a result, tribalistic tendencies both reinforce allegiances among in-group members and increase animosity toward out-group members.

Tribal thinking makes it hard for us to objectively evaluate information that either aligns with or contradicts the beliefs held by our group or tribe. This effect can be demonstrated even when in-group membership is not real or is based on some superficial feature of the person—for instance, the way they look or an article of clothing they are wearing. A related bias is called the bandwagon fallacy . The bandwagon fallacy can lead you to conclude that you ought to do something or believe something because many other people do or believe the same thing. While other people can provide guidance, they are not always reliable. Furthermore, just because many people believe something doesn’t make it true. Watch the video below to improve your “tribal literacy” and understand the dangers of this type of thinking.

The Dangers of Tribalism, Kevin deLaplante

Sunk cost fallacy.

Sunk costs refer to the time, energy, money, or other costs that have been paid in the past. These costs are “sunk” because they cannot be recovered. The sunk cost fallacy is thinking that attaches a value to things in which you have already invested resources that is greater than the value those things have today. Human beings have a natural tendency to hang on to whatever they invest in and are loath to give something up even after it has been proven to be a liability. For example, a person may have sunk a lot of money into a business over time, and the business may clearly be failing. Nonetheless, the businessperson will be reluctant to close shop or sell the business because of the time, money, and emotional energy they have spent on the venture. This is the behavior of “throwing good money after bad” by continuing to irrationally invest in something that has lost its worth because of emotional attachment to the failed enterprise. People will engage in this kind of behavior in all kinds of situations and may continue a friendship, a job, or a marriage for the same reason—they don’t want to lose their investment even when they are clearly headed for failure and ought to cut their losses.

A similar type of faulty reasoning leads to the gambler’s fallacy , in which a person reasons that future chance events will be more likely if they have not happened recently. For instance, if I flip a coin many times in a row, I may get a string of heads. But even if I flip several heads in a row, that does not make it more likely I will flip tails on the next coin flip. Each coin flip is statistically independent, and there is an equal chance of turning up heads or tails. The gambler, like the reasoner from sunk costs, is tied to the past when they should be reasoning about the present and future.

There are important social and evolutionary purposes for past-looking thinking. Sunk-cost thinking keeps parents engaged in the growth and development of their children after they are born. Sunk-cost thinking builds loyalty and affection among friends and family. More generally, a commitment to sunk costs encourages us to engage in long-term projects, and this type of thinking has the evolutionary purpose of fostering culture and community. Nevertheless, it is important to periodically reevaluate our investments in both people and things.

In recent ethical scholarship, there is some debate about how to assess the sunk costs of moral decisions. Consider the case of war. Just-war theory dictates that wars may be justified in cases where the harm imposed on the adversary is proportional to the good gained by the act of defense or deterrence. It may be that, at the start of the war, those costs seemed proportional. But after the war has dragged on for some time, it may seem that the objective cannot be obtained without a greater quantity of harm than had been initially imagined. Should the evaluation of whether a war is justified estimate the total amount of harm done or prospective harm that will be done going forward (Lazar 2018)? Such questions do not have easy answers.

Table 2.1 summarizes these common cognitive biases.

Think Like a Philosopher

As we have seen, cognitive biases are built into the way human beings process information. They are common to us all, and it takes self-awareness and effort to overcome the tendency to fall back on biases. Consider a time when you have fallen prey to one of the five cognitive biases described above. What were the circumstances? Recall your thought process. Were you aware at the time that your thinking was misguided? What were the consequences of succumbing to that cognitive bias?

Write a short paragraph describing how that cognitive bias allowed you to make a decision you now realize was irrational. Then write a second paragraph describing how, with the benefit of time and distance, you would have thought differently about the incident that triggered the bias. Use the tools of critical reflection and metacognition to improve your approach to this situation. What might have been the consequences of behaving differently? Finally, write a short conclusion describing what lesson you take from reflecting back on this experience. Does it help you understand yourself better? Will you be able to act differently in the future? What steps can you take to avoid cognitive biases in your thinking today?

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What is Critical Thinking in Academics – Guide With Examples

Published by Grace Graffin at October 17th, 2023 , Revised On October 17, 2023

In an era dominated by vast amounts of information, the ability to discern, evaluate, and form independent conclusions is more crucial than ever. Enter the realm of “critical thinking.” But what does this term truly mean? 

What is Critical Thinking?

Critical thinking is the disciplined art of analysing and evaluating information or situations by applying a range of intellectual skills. It goes beyond mere memorisation or blind acceptance of information, demanding a deeper understanding and assessment of evidence, context, and implications.

Moreover, paraphrasing in sources is an essential skill in critical thinking, as it allows for representing another’s ideas in one’s own words, ensuring comprehension.

Critical thinking is not just an academic buzzword but an essential tool. In academic settings, it serves as the backbone of genuine understanding and the springboard for innovation. When students embrace critical thinking, they move from being passive recipients of information to active participants in their own learning journey.

They question, evaluate, and synthesise information from various sources, fostering an intellectual curiosity that extends beyond the classroom. Part of this involves understanding how to integrate sources into their work, which means not only including information from various places, but also doing so in a cohesive and logical way.

The importance of critical thinking in academics cannot be overstated. It equips students with the skills to discern credible sources from unreliable ones, develop well-informed arguments, and approach problems with a solution-oriented mindset.

The Origins and Evolution of Critical Thinking

The idea of critical thinking isn’t a new-age concept. Its roots reach back into ancient civilisations, moulding the foundations of philosophy, science, and education. To appreciate its evolution, it’s vital to delve into its historical context and the influential thinkers who have championed it.

Historical Perspective on the Concept of Critical Thinking

The seeds of critical thinking can be traced back to Ancient Greece, particularly in the city-state of Athens. Here, the practice of debate, dialogue, and philosophical inquiry was valued and was seen as a route to knowledge and wisdom. This era prized the art of questioning, investigating, and exploring diverse viewpoints to reach enlightened conclusions.

In medieval Islamic civilisation, scholars in centres of learning, such as the House of Wisdom in Baghdad, played a pivotal role in advancing critical thought. Their works encompassed vast areas, including philosophy, mathematics, and medicine, often intertwining rigorous empirical observations with analytical reasoning.

The Renaissance period further nurtured critical thinking as it was a time of revival in art, culture, and intellect. This era championed humanistic values, focusing on human potential and achievements. It saw the rebirth of scientific inquiry, scepticism about religious dogma, and an emphasis on empirical evidence.

Philosophers and Educators Who Championed Critical Thinking

Several philosophers and educators stand out for their remarkable contributions to the sphere of critical thinking:

Known for the Socratic method, a form of cooperative argumentative dialogue, Socrates would ask probing questions, forcing his pupils to think deeply about their beliefs and assumptions. His methodology still influences modern education, emphasising the answer and the path of reasoning that leads to it.

A student of Socrates, Plato believed in the importance of reason and inquiry. His allegory of the cave highlights the difference between blindly accepting information and seeking true knowledge.

He placed great emphasis on empirical evidence and logic. His works on syllogism and deductive reasoning laid the foundation for systematic critical thought.

Al-Farabi And Ibn Rushd (Averroes)

Islamic philosophers, who harmonised Greek philosophy with Islamic thought, emphasised the importance of rationality and critical inquiry.

Sir Francis Bacon

An advocate for the scientific method, Bacon believed that knowledge should be based on empirical evidence, observation, and experimentation rather than mere reliance on accepted truths.

A modern proponent of critical thinking, Dewey viewed it as an active, persistent, and careful consideration of a belief or supposed form of knowledge. He emphasised that students should be taught to think for themselves rather than just memorise facts.

Paulo Freire

Recognised for his ideas on “problem-posing education,” Freire believed that students should be encouraged to question, reflect upon, and respond to societal issues, fostering critical consciousness.

Characteristics of Critical Thinkers

Critical thinkers are not defined merely by the knowledge they possess, but by the manner in which they process, analyse, and use that knowledge. While the profile of a critical thinker can be multifaceted, certain core traits distinguish them. Let’s delve into these characteristics:

1. Open-mindedness

Open-mindedness refers to the willingness to consider different ideas, opinions, and perspectives, even if they challenge one’s existing beliefs. It allows critical thinkers to avoid being trapped in their own biases or preconceived notions. By being open to diverse viewpoints, they can make more informed and holistic decisions.

• Listening to a debate without immediately taking sides.
• Reading literature from different cultures to understand various world views.

2. Analytical Nature

An analytical nature entails the ability to break down complex problems or information into smaller, manageable parts to understand the whole better. Being analytical enables individuals to see patterns, relationships, and inconsistencies, allowing for deeper comprehension and better problem-solving.

• Evaluating a research paper by examining its methodology, results, and conclusions separately.
• Breaking down the components of a business strategy to assess its viability.

3. Scepticism

Scepticism is the tendency to question and doubt claims or assertions until sufficient evidence is presented. Skepticism ensures that critical thinkers do not accept information at face value. They seek evidence and are cautious about jumping to conclusions without verification.

• Questioning the results of a study that lacks a control group.
• Doubting a sensational news headline and researching further before believing or sharing it.

4. Intellectual Humility

Intellectual humility involves recognising and accepting the limitations of one’s knowledge and understanding. It is about being aware that one does not have all the answers. This trait prevents arrogance and overconfidence. Critical thinkers with intellectual humility are open to learning and receptive to constructive criticism.

• Admitting when one is wrong in a discussion.
• Actively seeking feedback on a project or idea to enhance it.

5. Logical Reasoning

Logical reasoning is the ability to think sequentially and make connections between concepts in a coherent manner. It involves drawing conclusions that logically follow from the available information. Logical reasoning ensures that decisions and conclusions are sound and based on valid premises. It helps avoid fallacies and cognitive biases.

• Using deductive reasoning to derive a specific conclusion from a general statement.
• Evaluating an argument for potential logical fallacies like “slippery slope” or “ad hominem.”

The Difference Between Critical Thinking and Memorisation

In today’s rapidly changing educational landscape, there is an ongoing debate about the importance of rote memorisation versus the significance of cultivating critical thinking skills. Both have their place in learning, but they serve very different purposes.

Nature Of Learning

• Rote Learning: Involves memorising information exactly as it is, without necessarily understanding its context or underlying meaning. It’s akin to storing data as-is, without processing.
• Analytical Processing (Critical Thinking): Involves understanding, questioning, and connecting new information with existing knowledge. It’s less about storage and more about comprehension and application.

Depth of Engagement

• Rote Learning: Often remains at the surface level. Students might remember facts for a test, but might forget them shortly after.
• Analytical Processing: Engages deeper cognitive skills. When students think critically, they’re more likely to retain information because they’ve processed it deeper.

Application in New Situations

• Rote Learning: Information memorised through rote often does not easily apply to new or unfamiliar situations, since it is detached from understanding.
• Analytical Processing: Promotes adaptability. Critical thinkers can transfer knowledge and skills to different contexts because they understand underlying concepts and principles.

Why Critical Thinking Produces Long-Term Academic Benefits

Here are the benefits of critical thinking in academics. 

Enhanced Retention

Critical thinking often involves active learning—discussions, problem-solving, and debates—which promotes better retention than passive memorisation.

Skill Development

Beyond content knowledge, critical thinking develops skills like analysis, synthesis, source evaluation , and problem-solving. These are invaluable in higher education and professional settings.

Adaptability

In an ever-evolving world, the ability to adapt is crucial. Critical thinkers are better equipped to learn and adapt because they don’t just know facts; they understand concepts.

Lifelong Learning

Critical thinkers are naturally curious. They seek to understand, question, and explore, turning them into lifelong learners who continually seek knowledge and personal growth.

Improved Decision-Making

Analytical processing allows students to evaluate various perspectives, weigh evidence, and make well-informed decisions, a skill far beyond academics.

Preparation for Real-World Challenges

The real world does not come with a textbook. Critical thinkers can navigate unexpected challenges, connect disparate pieces of information, and innovate solutions.

Steps in the Critical Thinking Process

Critical thinking is more than just a skill—it is a structured process. By following a systematic approach, critical thinkers can navigate complex issues and ensure their conclusions are well-informed and reasoned. Here’s a breakdown of the steps involved:

Step 1. Identification and Clarification of the Problem or Question

Recognizing that a problem or question exists and understanding its nature. It’s about defining the issue clearly, without ambiguity. A well-defined problem serves as the foundation for the subsequent steps. The entire process may become misguided without a clear understanding of what’s being addressed.

Example: Instead of a vague problem like “improving the environment,” a more specific question could be “How can urban areas reduce air pollution?”

Step 2. Gathering Information and Evidence

Actively seeking relevant data, facts, and evidence. This might involve research, observations, experiments, or discussions. Reliable decisions are based on solid evidence. The quality and relevance of the information gathered can heavily influence the final conclusion.

Example: To address urban air pollution, one might gather data on current pollution levels, sources of pollutants, existing policies, and strategies employed by other cities.

Step 3. Analysing the Information

Breaking down the gathered information, scrutinising its validity, and identifying patterns, contradictions, and relationships. This step ensures that the information is not just accepted at face value. Critical thinkers can differentiate between relevant and irrelevant information and detect biases or inaccuracies by analysing data.

Example: When examining data on pollution, one might notice that certain industries are major contributors or that pollution levels rise significantly at specific times of the year.

Step 4. Drawing Conclusions and Making Decisions

After thorough analysis, formulating an informed perspective, solution, or decision-based on the evidence. This is the culmination of the previous steps. Here, the critical thinker synthesises the information and applies logic to arrive at a reasoned conclusion.

Example: Based on the analysis, one might conclude that regulating specific industries and promoting public transportation during peak pollution periods can help reduce urban air pollution.

Step 5. Reflecting on the Process And The Conclusions Reached

Take a step back to assess the entire process, considering any potential biases, errors, or alternative perspectives. It is also about evaluating the feasibility and implications of the conclusions. Reflection ensures continuous learning and improvement. Individuals can refine their approach to future problems by evaluating their thinking process.

Example: Reflecting on the proposed solution to reduce pollution, one might consider its economic implications, potential industry resistance, and the need for public awareness campaigns.

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The Role of Critical Thinking in Different Academic Subjects

Critical thinking is a universal skill applicable across disciplines. Its methodologies might differ based on the subject, but its core principles remain consistent. Let us explore how critical thinking manifests in various academic domains:

1. Sciences

• Hypothesis Testing: Science often begins with a hypothesis—a proposed explanation for a phenomenon. Critical thinking is essential in formulating a testable hypothesis and determining its validity based on experimental results.
• Experimental Design: Designing experiments requires careful planning to ensure valid and reliable results. Critical thinking aids in identifying variables, ensuring controls, and determining the best methodologies to obtain accurate data.
• Example: In a biology experiment to test the effect of light on plant growth, critical thinking helps ensure variables like water and soil quality are consistent, allowing for a fair assessment of the light’s impact.

2. Humanities

• Analysing Texts: Humanities often involve studying texts—literature, historical documents, or philosophical treatises. Critical thinking lets students decode themes, discern authorial intent, and recognise underlying assumptions or biases.
• Understanding Contexts: Recognizing a text or artwork’s cultural, historical, or social contexts is pivotal. Critical thinking allows for a deeper appreciation of these contexts, providing a holistic understanding of the subject.
• Example: When studying Shakespeare’s “Othello,” critical thinking aids in understanding the play’s exploration of jealousy, race, and betrayal, while also appreciating its historical context in Elizabethan England.

3. Social Sciences

• Evaluating Arguments: Social sciences, such as sociology or political science, often present various theories or arguments about societal structures and behaviours. Critical thinking aids in assessing the merits of these arguments and recognising their implications.
• Understanding Biases: Since social sciences study human societies, they’re susceptible to biases. Critical thinking helps identify potential biases in research or theories, ensuring a more objective understanding.
• Example: In studying economic policies, critical thinking helps weigh the benefits and drawbacks of different economic models, considering both empirical data and theoretical arguments.

4. Mathematics

• Problem-Solving: Mathematics is more than just numbers; it is about solving problems. Critical thinking enables students to identify the best strategies to tackle problems, ensuring efficient and accurate solutions.
• Logical Deduction: Mathematical proofs and theorems rely on logical steps. Critical thinking ensures that each step is valid and the conclusions sound.
• Example: In geometry, when proving that two triangles are congruent, critical thinking helps ensure that each criterion (like side lengths or angles) is met and the logic of the proof is coherent.

Examples of Critical Thinking in Academics

Some of the critical thinking examples in academics are discussed below. 

Case Study 1: Evaluating A Scientific Research Paper

Scenario: A research paper claims that a new herbal supplement significantly improves memory in elderly individuals.

Critical Thinking Application:

Scrutinising Methodology:

• Was the study double-blind and placebo-controlled?
• How large was the sample size?
• Were the groups randomised?
• Were there any potential confounding variables?

Assessing Conclusions:

• Do the results conclusively support the claim, or are there other potential explanations?
• Are the statistical analyses robust, and do they show a significant difference?
• Is the effect size clinically relevant or just statistically significant?

Considering Broader Context:

• How does this study compare with existing literature on the subject?
• Were there any conflicts of interest, such as funding from the supplement company?

Critical analysis determined that while the study showed statistical significance, the effect size was minimal. Additionally, the sample size was small, and there was potential bias as the supplement manufacturer funded the study.

Case Study 2: Analysing a Literary Text

Scenario: A reading of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “The Great Gatsby.”

Understanding Symbolism:

• What does the green light represent for Gatsby and in the broader context of the American Dream?
• How does the Valley of Ashes symbolise societal decay?

Recognising Authorial Intent:

• Why might Fitzgerald depict the characters’ lavish lifestyles amid underlying dissatisfaction?
• What critiques of American society is Fitzgerald potentially making?

Contextual Analysis:

• How does the era in which the novel was written (Roaring Twenties) influence its themes and characters?

Through critical analysis, the reader recognises that while “The Great Gatsby” is a tale of love and ambition, it’s also a poignant critique of the hollowness of the American Dream and the societal excesses of the 1920s.

Case Study 3: Decoding Historical Events

Scenario: The events leading up to the American Revolution.

Considering Multiple Perspectives:

• How did the British government view the colonies and their demands?
• What were the diverse perspectives within the American colonies, considering loyalists and patriots?

Assessing Validity of Sources:

• Which accounts are primary sources, and which are secondary?
• Are there potential biases in these accounts, based on their origins?

Analysing Causation and Correlation:

• Were taxes and representation the sole reasons for the revolution, or were there deeper economic and philosophical reasons?

Through critical analysis, the student understands that while taxation without representation was a significant catalyst, the American Revolution was also influenced by Enlightenment ideas, economic interests, and long-standing grievances against colonial policies.

Challenges to Developing Critical Thinking Skills

In our complex and rapidly changing world, the importance of critical thinking cannot be overstated. However, various challenges can impede the cultivation of these vital skills. 

1. Common Misconceptions and Cognitive Biases

Human brains often take shortcuts in processing information, leading to cognitive biases. Additionally, certain misconceptions about what constitutes critical thinking can hinder its development.

• Confirmation Bias: The tendency to search for, interpret, and recall information that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs.
• Anchoring Bias: Relying too heavily on the first piece of information encountered when making decisions.
• Misconception: Believing that critical thinking merely means being critical or negative about ideas, rather than evaluating them objectively.

These biases can skew perception and decision-making, making it challenging to objectively approach issues.

2. The Influence of Technology and Social Media

While providing unprecedented access to information, the digital age also presents unique challenges. The barrage of information, the immediacy of social media reactions, and algorithms that cater to user preferences can hinder critical thought.

• Information Overload: The sheer volume of online data can make it difficult to discern credible sources from unreliable ones.
• Clickbait and Misinformation: Articles with sensational titles designed to generate clicks might lack depth or accuracy.
• Algorithmic Bias: Platforms showing users content based on past preferences can limit exposure to diverse viewpoints.

Relying too heavily on technology and social media can lead to superficial understanding, reduced attention spans, and a narrow worldview.

3. The Danger of Echo Chambers and Confirmation Bias

An echo chamber is a situation in which beliefs are amplified or reinforced by communication and repetition inside a closed system, cutting off differing viewpoints.

• Social Media Groups: Joining groups or following pages that only align with one’s beliefs can create a feedback loop, reinforcing existing opinions without challenge.
• Selective Media Consumption: Only watching news channels or reading websites that align with one’s political or social views.

Echo chambers reinforce confirmation bias, limit exposure to diverse perspectives, and can polarise opinions, making objective, critical evaluation of issues challenging.

Benefits of Promoting Critical Thinking in Education

When cultivated and promoted in educational settings, critical thinking can have transformative effects on students, equipping them with vital skills to navigate their academic journey and beyond. Here’s an exploration of the manifold benefits of emphasising critical thinking in education:

Improved Problem-Solving Skills

Critical thinking enables students to approach problems methodically, breaking them down into manageable parts, analysing each aspect, and synthesising solutions.

• Academic: Enhances students’ ability to tackle complex assignments, research projects, and unfamiliar topics.
• Beyond School: Prepares students for real-world challenges where they might encounter problems without predefined solutions.

Enhanced Creativity and Innovation

Critical thinking is not just analytical but also involves lateral thinking, helping students see connections between disparate ideas and encouraging imaginative solutions.

• Academic: Promotes richer discussions, more creative projects, and the ability to view topics from multiple angles.
• Beyond School: Equips students for careers and situations where innovative solutions can lead to advancements in fields like technology, arts, or social entrepreneurship.

Better Decision-Making Abilities

Critical thinkers evaluate information thoroughly, weigh potential outcomes, and make decisions based on evidence and reason rather than impulse or peer pressure.

• Academic: Helps students make informed choices about their studies, research directions, or group projects.
• Beyond School: Prepares students to make sound decisions in personal and professional spheres, from financial choices to ethical dilemmas.

Greater Resilience in the Face of Complex Challenges

Critical thinking nurtures a growth mindset. When students think critically, they are more likely to view challenges as opportunities for learning rather than insurmountable obstacles.

• Academic: Increases perseverance in difficult subjects, promoting a deeper understanding rather than superficial learning. Students become more resilient in handling academic pressures and setbacks.
• Beyond School: Cultivates individuals who can navigate the complexities of modern life, from career challenges to societal changes, with resilience and adaptability.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is critical thinking.

Critical thinking is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue to form a judgment. It involves gathering relevant information, discerning potential biases, logically connecting ideas, and questioning assumptions. Essential for informed decision-making, it promotes scepticism and requires the ability to think independently and rationally.

What makes critical thinking?

Critical thinking arises from questioning assumptions, evaluating evidence, discerning fact from opinion, recognising biases, and logically connecting ideas. It demands curiosity, scepticism, and an open mind. By continuously challenging one’s beliefs and considering alternative viewpoints, one cultivates the ability to think clearly, rationally, and independently.

What is the purpose of critical thinking?

The purpose of critical thinking is to enable informed decisions by analysing and evaluating information objectively. It fosters understanding, problem-solving, and clarity, reducing the influence of biases and misconceptions. Through critical thinking, individuals discern truth, make reasoned judgments, and engage more effectively in discussions and debates.

How to improve critical thinking?

• Cultivate curiosity by asking questions.
• Practice active listening.
• Read widely and diversely.
• Engage in discussions and debates.
• Reflect on your thought processes.
• Identify biases and challenge assumptions.
• Solve problems systematically.

What are some critical thinking skills?

• Analysis: breaking concepts into parts.
• Evaluation: judging information’s validity.
• Inference: drawing logical conclusions.
• Explanation: articulating reasons.
• Interpretation: understanding meaning.
• Problem-solving: devising effective solutions.
• Decision-making: choosing the best options.

What is information literacy?

Information literacy is the ability to find, evaluate, and use information effectively. It encompasses understanding where to locate information, determining its credibility, distinguishing between facts and opinions, and using it responsibly. Essential in the digital age, it equips individuals to navigate the vast sea of data and make informed decisions.

What makes a credible source?

• Authorship by experts or professionals.
• Reliable publisher or institution backing.
• Transparent sourcing and references.
• Absence of bias or clear disclosure of it.
• Recent publications or timely updates.
• Peer review or editorial oversight.
• Clear, logical arguments.
• Reputability in its field or domain.

How do I analyse information critically?

• Determine the source’s credibility.
• Identify the main arguments or points.
• Examine the evidence provided.
• Spot inconsistencies or fallacies.
• Detect biases or unspoken assumptions.
• Cross-check facts with other sources.
• Evaluate the relevance to your context.
• Reflect on your own biases or beliefs.

You May Also Like

The CRAAP Test is an acronym used as a checklist to help individuals evaluate the credibility and relevance of sources, especially in academic or research contexts. CRAAP stands for Currency, Relevance, Authority, Accuracy, and Purpose. Each of these criteria can help a researcher determine if a source is trustworthy and suitable for their needs.

A credible source can be trusted to provide accurate, reliable, and unbiased information. Credible sources are essential for various purposes, including academic research, journalism, decision-making, and gaining knowledge on various topics.

In academia, research, journalism, and writing, the skill of quoting sources is fundamental. Accurate and proper quoting adds credibility to your work and demonstrates respect for the original authors and their ideas.

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Article Contents

Introduction, the central argument, where should non-western contributions to logic and critical thinking be taught, acknowledgements.

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Does Critical Thinking and Logic Education Have a Western Bias? The Case of the Nyāya School of Classical Indian Philosophy

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Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, Does Critical Thinking and Logic Education Have a Western Bias? The Case of the Nyāya School of Classical Indian Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy of Education , Volume 51, Issue 1, February 2017, Pages 132–160, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12189

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In this paper I develop a cross-cultural critique of contemporary critical thinking education in the United States, the United Kingdom, and those educational systems that adopt critical thinking education from the standard model used in the US and UK. The cross-cultural critique rests on the idea that contemporary critical thinking textbooks completely ignore contributions from non-western sources, such as those found in the African, Arabic, Buddhist, Jain, Mohist and Nyāya philosophical traditions. The exclusion of these traditions leads to the conclusion that critical thinking educators, by using standard textbooks are implicitly sending the message to their students that there are no important contributions to the study of logic and argumentation that derive from non-western sources. As a case study I offer a sustained analysis of the so-called Hindu Syllogism that derives from the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I close with a discussion of why contributions from non-western sources, such as the Hindu Syllogism, belong in a Critical Thinking course as opposed to an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy .

One question in the philosophy of education is the question concerning education for democracy , EDQ: How should public education enable the ethical implementation and proper functioning of democratic processes, such as voting on the basis of public and civic discourse? At least one plausible answer is that a public education should provide citizens of a political body with basic skills in public discourse, which is inclusive of critical thinking and civic debate. That is, education for democracy should have an element that enables ethical public discourse on topics of shared concern. This answer is grounded on two ideas. First, democratic processes, such as voting, take into account the will of the people through reflective deliberation and the exchange of ideas on matters of public concern, such as prison reform, marriage, taxation and gun control. Second, critical thinking through civic engagement allows for the expression of individual autonomy on a matter of public concern. Call this general answer to EDQ, the critical thinking and civic debate response , CTCD. Two important questions the CTCD response faces are the content question : What exactly are critical thinking, civic debate and ethical public discourse? And the normative question : What are the appropriate forms, norms and intellectual virtues by which we should engage in critical thinking, civic debate and ethical public discourse? 1

On March 24, 2014 at the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) Championships at Indiana University, two Towson University students, Ameena Ruffin and Korey Johnson, became the first African-American women to win a national college debate tournament, for which the resolution asked whether the US president's war powers should be restricted. Rather than address the resolution straight on, Ruffin and Johnson, along with other teams of African-Americans, attacked its premise. The more pressing issue, they argued, is how the US government is at war with poor black communities. In the final round, Ruffin and Johnson squared off against Rashid Campbell and George Lee from the University of Oklahoma, two highly accomplished African-American debaters with distinctive dreadlocks and dashikis. Over four hours, the two teams engaged in a heated discussion of concepts like “nigga authenticity” and performed hip-hop and spoken-word poetry in the traditional timed format. At one point during Lee's rebuttal, the clock ran out but he refused to yield the floor. “Fuck the time!” he yelled. His partner Campbell, who won the top speaker award at the National Debate Tournament two weeks later, had been unfairly targeted by the police at the debate venue just days before, and cited this experience as evidence for his case against the government's treatment of poor African-Americans.

In the 2013 championship, two men from Emporia State University, Ryan Walsh and Elijah Smith, employed a similar style and became the first African-Americans to win two national debate tournaments. Many of their arguments, based on personal memoir and rap music, completely ignored the stated resolution, and instead asserted that the framework of collegiate debate has historically privileged straight, white, middle-class students . ( emphasis added ) 3

Although there are many important features that these cases bring to light, here I want to draw attention to three features that help us understand the importance of both the content question and the normative question. First, the kind of evidence that is appealed to does not just consist in objective facts, such as what the law states, and reasoning deductively or inductively from a set of premises, it also contains personal experience. Second, the mode of engagement used does not consist simply in rational argumentation through the use of the standard format of ethical theory, followed by premise, application and finally a conclusion. Rather, it includes poetry and hip-hop that takes both a reason-based approach and an emotional and musical element into play. Third, the norm of engagement used does not see deference to rules as trumping either the importance of what is talked about or the length of time one talks about it. We might summarise a caricature reaction to these students by a hypothetical critic as follows: how rude of these students to not debate the issue, to disregard the rules, and to fail to take into consideration the kinds of evidence required for public debate and discourse on matters of social and political concern. In light of these cases and the caricature, the critical thinking and civic debate community faces an important and unexamined question : does critical thinking and civic debate education rest on an uncritical examination of its very foundation? Is the foundation perhaps insensitive to race, class, gender and non-western traditions of critical thinking and debate? Call this question the meta-critical question about critical thinking.

The meta-critical question about critical thinking and civic debate education is extremely important to any education policy that embraces the CTCD response to EDQ. Furthermore, it is central to the project of coming to understand how public discourse is possible in a community that has diverse individuals with non-overlapping conceptions of the good life. In the next section, I present, explain, and defend the central argument leading to the conclusion that critical thinking education should include contributions from non-western sources. As a case study I present some material, well known in the classical Indian philosophical and comparative philosophy community, concerning contributions to logic and critical thinking deriving from the Nyāya tradition of orthodox Indian philosophy. My examination of these contributions aims to establish that there are things that critical thinking education can take on board from non-western traditions that are important and valuable to critical thinking and logic education. In the third section , I present and respond to the objection that contributions to critical thinking from non-western traditions should not be taught in a Critical Thinking course but rather in an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy .

At present there is a social blindspot that critical thinking and debate education suffers from in the US, UK and those countries that use the standard model that originates from the US and UK. In short the blindspot is that critical thinking and debate education is insensitive to variation over what could count as critical thinking and civic debate based on an examination of non-western contributions to critical thinking and debate. The neglect of these traditions is largely due to the fact that those that work on critical thinking, logic and debate, such as members of the informal logic community are generally not historically informed about non-western contributions to critical thinking through engagement with those that work on Asian and comparative philosophy. Simply put, institutional separation has led to an impoverished educational package for critical thinking education for the past 100 years in which the modern university has developed. The central argument I will develop to expose the problem is as follows.

Critical thinking, and practice in ethical civic debate, is important to public discourse on social and political issues that citizens of a democratic body vote on when making policy decisions that concern all members of the public. The current model for critical thinking and civic debate education is dominated by a western account of informal logic, formal logic, debate rules and intellectual virtues. Critical thinking education should include contributions from non-western philosophers.∴ Critical thinking education should be revised so as to be inclusive of contributions from non-western thinkers.

Why should we accept the premises of this argument?

Premise 1: Critical thinking, and practice in ethical civic debate, is important to public discourse on social and political issues that citizens of a democratic body vote on when making policy decisions that concern all members of the public.

The main objection to Premise 1 derives from the work of Michael Huemer's (2005) paper: Is Critical Thinking Epistemically Responsible? In this work he provides an argument against the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking. The core idea is that if one is forming a belief on an issue of public concern one ought to do so responsibly. Given that one ought to form the belief in a responsible way, one might consider different strategies open to the person for how to form the belief. Consider the following belief forming strategies.

Credulity : In forming a belief a person is to canvass the opinions of a number of experts and adopt the belief held by most of them. In the best case, the person finds a poll of the experts; failing that, the person may look through several reputable sources, such as scholarly books and peer-reviewed journal articles, and identify the conclusions of the experts.

Skepticism : In forming a belief a person is to form no opinion on the matter; that is, the person is to withhold judgement about the issue.

Critical Thinking : In forming a belief a person is to gather arguments and evidence that are available on the issue, from all sides, and assess them. The person tries thereby to form some overall impression on the issue. If the person forms such an impression, then she bases her belief on it. Otherwise, the person suspends judgement.

Now, where P is a specific controversial and publicly debated issue, and C b P is the context of belief formation for P, the central argument against the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking is the following.

Adopting Critical Thinking about P in C b P is epistemically responsible only if Critically Thinking about P is the most reliable strategy from the available strategies in C b P. One ought to always use the most reliable strategy available in forming a belief about an issue of public concern. Critical Thinking about P is not the most reliable strategy from the available strategies in C b P.∴ It is not the case that Critical Thinking about P in C b P is epistemically responsible.

In Vaidya (2013) , I offered an extensive argument against Huemer's position. That argument depends on a development of a theory of what constitutes an autonomous critical identity, and why forming a critical identity is valuable for a person. As a consequence, I will not go into a sustained response to Huemer's argument here. Rather, I will note a simple set of points that can be used to assuage the initial force of what is being argued.

First, in so far as the claim is that critical thinking about an issue is not to be preferred over taking the view of an expert on an issue it is clear that choosing who the expert is on the issue is a matter of critical thinking. In order for one to identify someone as an expert one must understand how to track through sources for the appropriate identification of experts. So, in general, deference to experts actually depends on critical thinking , since deference is a choice one must make. The core idea is that one cannot outsource all cognition to an alternative source, since outsourcing is itself a decision that has to be made .

Secondly, it is important to distinguish between the different types of issues in which deference to experts can be made. For example, there is a difference between an argument that contains a scientific conclusion, with mathematical and scientific premises, and an argument that contains moral premises and has a moral conclusion. Given this difference, it is plausible to maintain that deference to experts in the scientific and mathematics case is not the same as deference in the moral case. While I can defer to a moral expert to tell me what a moral theory says, such as what the details of consequentialism, as opposed to deontology, are, I can't defer to a moral expert on the issue of what the correct moral conclusion is, independently of the adoption of a specific moral view. By contrast, I can defer to a scientist or a mathematician as to which conclusion to believe on the basis of the premises.

Premise 2: The current model for critical thinking and civic debate education is dominated by a western account of informal logic, formal logic, debate rules and intellectual virtues.

The key defence I will offer for Premise 2 relies on an examination of two of the most commonly used textbooks for critical thinking in the US and UK, Patrick Hurley's A Concise Introduction to Logic and Lewis Vaughn's The Power of Critical Thinking: Effective Reasoning about Ordinary and Extraordinary Claims . The guiding idea of the argument is that if our main textbooks for teaching critical thinking and logic at the introductory level do not engage non-western philosophy, we can reasonably infer that those that use the textbook are not teaching critical thinking and logic by way of engaging non-western sources. Of course there will be those that supplement the texts, perhaps even for the very reason I am presenting here—that they lack non-western ideas. But we can safely examine and entertain the claim that I am defending as being primarily about textbooks as opposed to variable classroom practice . More importantly, if the textbooks are widely used, which they are, we can ask: what do they represent about critical thinking and civic debate education?

I will focus my examination of non-western contributions to critical thinking on two places in critical thinking education where adjustments can be made. The point of this presentation is to show that our main textbooks can be altered to include non-western sources in specific ways. Although there are many contributions I could discuss, for simplicity I will focus on contributions from the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy concerning the nature of argumentation. In future work I will discuss other cases, such as those deriving from Africana, Arabic, Jaina, and Jewish philosophy. I begin my investigation of the Nyāya by answering a basic question: Is there a distinction in Indian philosophy between different kinds of discussions that allows us to isolate out critical discourse from non-critical discourse?

Is there any critical thinking in Indian philosophy?

Of course this question cannot be seriously entertained by anyone who works in Indology or Asian and Comparative Philosophy. However, for those who are not in the know, a presentation and defence of an affirmative answer must be made. For if one is to include non-western ideas about critical thinking in a textbook that is eventually used to teach the subject, one needs to show that non-western traditions are in fact engaging in critical thinking. In order to do that we need to look at competing views of what critical thinking is, the content question , in order to locate critical thinking outside of the west.

The Skill View holds that critical thinking is exhausted by the acquisition and proper deployment of critical thinking skills.

The Character View holds that critical thinking involves the acquisition and proper deployment of specific skills as well as the acquisition of specific character traits, dispositions, attitudes, and habits of mind. These components are aspects of the “critical spirit” ( Siegel, 1993 , 163–165).

Given this distinction, where does classical Indian philosophy fall? We have three options. Indian philosophical traditions take one or another of the views, or there is no discussion at all of either of these views. I will show that some Indian philosophical traditions make a distinction between various kinds of discussion, one of which is a critical discussion, and that there is evidence for the character view of critical thinking.

Discussion is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analyzed in the form of the five members, and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets ( Sinha, 1990 , p. 19).

Wrangling , which aims at gaining victory, is the defense or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, futilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke ( Sinha, 1990 , p. 20).

Cavil is a kind of wrangling, which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side ( Sinha, 1990 , p. 20).

Matilal maintains, on the basis of Akṣapāda's Nyāya Sūtras that there are three distinct kinds of discussions. Vāda is an honest debate where both sides, proponent and opponent, are seeking the truth, that is, wanting to establish the right view. Jalpa , by contrast, is a discussion/debate in which one tries to win by any means, fair or unfair. Vitaṇdā is a discussion in which one aims to destroy or demolish the opponent no matter how. One way to explain the distinctions is as follows: (i) vāda is an honest debate for the purposes of finding the truth, (ii) jalpa is a debate aimed at victory where one propounds a thesis; (ii) vitaṇdā is a debate aimed at victory, where no thesis is defended, one simply aims to demolish the view propounded by the proponent. 4   The distinction between these three kinds of discussions grounds the claim that classical Indian philosophers were aware of different kinds of discussions based on the purpose of the discussion, and that critical thinking, for the purposes of finding the truth on an issue, was not at all a foreign idea .

One who has acquired the knowledge (given by the authoritative text) based on various reasons and refuting the opponent's view in debates, does not get fastened by the pressure of the opponent's arguments nor does he get subdued by their arguments ( Van Loon, 2002 , p. 115).

Discussion with specialists: promotes pursuit and advancement of knowledge, provides dexterity, improves power of speaking, illumines fame, removes doubt in scriptures, if any, by repeating the topics, and it creates confidence in case there is any doubt, and brings forth new ideas. The ideas memorized in study from the teacher, will become firm when applied in (competitive) discussion ( Van Loon, 2002 , pp. 115–116).

Discussion with specialists is of two types— friendly discussion and hostile discussion. The friendly discussion is held with one who is endowed with learning, understanding and the power of expression and contradiction, devoid of irritability, having uncensored knowledge, without jealousy, able to be convinced and convince others, enduring and adept in the art of sweet conversation. While in discussion with such a person one should speak confidently, put questions unhesitatingly, reply to the sincere questioner with elaborateness, not be agitated with fear of defect, not be exhilarated on defeating the partner, nor boast before others, not hold fast to his solitary view due to attachment, not explain what is unknown to him, and convince the other party with politeness and be cautious in that. This is the method of friendly discussion ( Van Loon, 2002 , pp. 117–118, emphasis added ).

The passages from the Handbook of Ayurveda , especially the emphasised area, substantiate the idea that the character view is in play in one of the oldest recorded presentations of critical reasoning and how it is to be executed.

Furthermore, in his Indian Logic , Jonardon Ganeri (2004) presents a picture of argumentation and critical thinking in ancient India by turning to the classic dialogue of the Buddhist tradition: Milinda-pañha ( Questions for King Milinda ). Ganeri presents an important passage on discussion and critical thinking. 5

Milinda: Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again?

Nāgasena: If your Majesty will discuss ( vāda ) as a scholar, well, but if you will discuss as a king, no.

Milinda: How is it that scholars discuss?

Nāgasena: When scholars talk a matter over one with another, then there is a winding up, an unraveling, one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake; distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions; and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O King, discuss.

Milinda: And how do kings discuss?

Nāgasena: When a king, your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying “Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!” Thus, your Majesty, do kings discuss.

Milinda: Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss.( As quoted in   Ganeri, 2004 , p. 17)

When scholars talk a matter over one with another, then is there a winding up, an unraveling, one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake ; distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions; and yet thereby they are not angered ( as quoted in   Ganeri, 2004 , p. 17, emphasis added ).

One reading of this claim is that Nāgasena is pointing out that a good discussion requires not only that certain moves are made ‘a winding up’ and an ‘unraveling’, but that the persons involved in making those moves have a certain epistemic temper . Participants in a good debate moreover have the capacity, and exercise the capacity, to (i) acknowledge mistakes , and (ii) not become angered by the consequences of where the inquiry leads . Nāgasena's answer to King Milinda suggests that Buddhist accounts of critical thinking also adopt the character view as opposed to the skill view . It is not enough to simply know how to ‘make moves’, ‘destroy’ or ‘demolish’ an opponent by various techniques. What is central to an honest debate is that a participant must also have a certain attitude and character that exemplifies a specific epistemic temper .

If one agrees with the character view, then this simple passage from Milinda - pañha could be compared with other passages, such as from the Meno , to teach critical thinking students what critical thinking is about. 6

The tale of two syllogisms

But once we have introduced students to what critical thinking is we are often faced with having to show them how to present their ideas for the purposes of a critical discussion. This takes us to the normative question : what are the appropriate forms, norms and intellectual virtues by which we should engage in critical thinking and civic debate? Many contemporary introductory level textbooks, such as Hurley's Concise Introduction to Logic and Vaughn's The Power of Critical Thinking contain some section where they present and discuss how an argument should be put into, what is often called, standard form . The notion of a standard form is normative . It suggests that an argument has a way that it should be presented for the purposes of engaging someone in a dialectical inquiry. Often discussion of standard form takes place either in the context of the presentation of how to identify an argument, or in the area where Aristotelian Categorical Logic is presented. However, the presentation of what constitutes a good argument, in either Hurley or Vaughn, is not given comparatively by considering other traditions. For example, it is simply presupposed that there is no alternative way in which one could present an argument. In contrast to the Aristotelian picture, the Hindu Syllogism has a different structure. It was developed and debated in classical Hindu, Buddhist and Jain philosophy for centuries. What is the basic contrast between the Aristotelian Syllogism and the Hindu Syllogism?

Aristotle was the ancient Greek philosopher who first codified logic for the western tradition. Students of logic and critical thinking are often brought into the topic of the syllogism and the standard form of reasoning by the following example from Aristotle.

Major Premise: All men are mortal.

Minor Premise: Socrates is a man.

Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.

Akṣapāda Gautama was the founding father of the Nyāya School of philosophy. Like Aristotle he was also concerned with the proper form of how an argument should be displayed. The most commonly discussed argument in Indian philosophy deriving from his work, and perhaps even earlier, is the following:

Thesis: The hill has fire.

Reason/Mark: Because of smoke.

Rule/Examples: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.

Application: This is such a case, i.e., the hill has smoke pervaded by fire.

Conclusion: Therefore it is so, i.e., the hill has fire. 7

There are many differences between the two examples. Two of the most important, highlighted by Matilal (1985 , pp. 6–7), are: (i) Aristotle's Syllogism is in subject-predicate form, Akṣapāda's Syllogism is in property-location form; (ii) Aristotle's study of syllogistic inference is primarily about universal and particular form propositions, Akṣapāda's study involves singular propositions in the thesis and conclusion. However, even though there are these differences, both examples have a similar normative force . They are both offered as a case of good reasoning , and they both are examples of what counts as how one should present their argument in a debate.

Given that neither Hurley nor Vaughn discuss the Hindu Syllogism, we might ask all of the following questions. Does it make sense as an argument form? Is there any benefit to teaching it? What do we gain by including it?

The western gaze on classical Indian logic

To answer these questions we need to look at the history of the reception of the Hindu Syllogism and how to correct the colonialist interpretation of it.

In the study of classical Indian logic from the Anglo-European point of view it is well known that the Hindu Syllogism received a great deal of criticism and was often presented as being inferior to the Aristotelian Syllogism. Jonardon Ganeri (2001) has compiled a list of some of these critiques in his work on Indian Logic:

[Western philosophy] looks outward and is concerned with Logic and with the presuppositions of scientific knowledge; [Indian philosophy] looks inward, into the ‘deep yet dazzling darkness’ of the mystical consciousness ( as quoted in   Ganeri, 2001 , p. 1).

I have a great doubt of [Indian Logical] views becoming of any value whatever in the cause of general knowledge or science, or of ever having any fair claim to be admitted as an integral part of the Catholic philosophy of mankind. It is absurd to conceive that a logic can be of any value from a people who have not a single sound philosophical principle, nor any intellectual power whatever to work out a problem connected with human nature in a manner that is at all rational or intelligent. Reasoning at least in the higher forms of it among such semi-barbarous nations, must be at its lowest ebb; [and there] does [not] seem to be any intellectual stamina, in such races of men, to impart to it more vigour and rationality. ( as quoted in , brackets added, Ganeri, 2001 , p. 7).

One point alone appears certain, and that is, that they [the Nyāya] can lay but slight claims to accuracy of exposition. This is proved clearly enough by the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by the introduction of an example in the third the universality of the conclusion is vitiated ( as quoted in   Ganeri, 2001 , p. 9).

That Hindu philosophy will have any great influence on the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization must be denied. You are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you to the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems … The Hindus, on the other hand, are dogmatical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led to them ( as quoted in   Ganeri, 2001 , p. 14).

As a consequence, of these attitudes one can see how and why it may have been acceptable to exclude Indian contributions to logic for the purposes of teaching. The guiding idea is that if the Hindu Syllogism is actually confused and not a good form of reasoning, then we ought not to teach it in a critical thinking course . Thus, one needs to defend the plausibility of teaching the Hindu Syllogism through a partial defence of what is valuable in it. Below I offer an account of some of the criticisms of the Hindu Syllogism, based on the work of Ganeri (1996 , 2001 ). From there I proceed to a defence of the Hindu Syllogism through an examination of J. L. Shaw's (2010 , 2016a , 2016b ) work on the distinctions between inference for oneself and inference for another, and Ga n ˙ ngeśa's notion of relevance, and my own distinction between different models through which we can understand a piece of reasoning.

The criticisms of the so-called Hindu Syllogism come largely from having two important figures in western logic in mind when thinking about the Hindu Syllogism. The figures are Aristotle and Mill. The former is important for his work on the codification of deductive patterns of inference. The latter is important for his work on inductive inference. Here are some common criticisms of the Hindu Syllogism:

It is redundant, since the Thesis and Conclusion say the same thing. It is superfluous, since the Application step is unnecessary. It is a convoluted hybrid of two distinct types of reasoning: inductive and deductive. In particular the argument can be broken down as follows:Deductive component:

All locations where there is smoke are locations where there is fire. There is smoke on the hill. ∴ There is fire on the hill. Notice this has the same form as Aristotle's argument: All Men are Mortal. Socrates is a Man. ∴ Socrates is Mortal. Inductive component: In a kitchen a fire is followed by smoke. ∴ In all cases fire is followed by smoke.

Given that the argument can be broken down into two independent and distinct arguments it can be argued that: (i) the good part is simply the deductive version offered by Aristotle, and (ii) the bad part is offered by Akṣapāda when the inductive component is combined with the deductive component. The inductive component joined to the deductive component is bad because a single instance is never capable of proving a universal rule. On an available western interpretation the critical question is: why does Akṣapāda think that the observation of fire in the kitchen followed by smoke is enough to justify the claim that all locations where there is smoke are locations where there is fire ? This question can be amplified into an argument that suggests that we should not teach the Hindu Syllogism in critical thinking, since it would confuse students about the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning. Although that critique assumes that we have the right account of how to divide different kinds of reasoning, I will forgo challenging that claim and simply show how the Hindu Syllogism can be defended even with that account in place. Thus, it will be useful to decode the western gaze on the Hindu Syllogism by providing an interpretative lens that is available from within western philosophy and classical Indian philosophy. 8

A corrective lens for the western gaze on the Hindu Syllogism

Not all western philosophers saw classical Indian philosophy in a negative light. Some who were more careful readers of the tradition saw that something drastically different could be going on. These interpretations are largely in line with how several philosophers in the Nyāya tradition see the steps in the set up of the Hindu Syllogism. I will build a defence of the Hindu Syllogism based on some of these ideas in conjunction with the following idea. Tarka-vidyā is the science of debate. It is an open question whether we should think of the classical Indian tradition of engaging debate, logic and philosophy along the same lines as we find in Plato's presentation of philosophy as distinct from rhetoric, and Aristotle's codification of logic separately from rhetoric. In particular there is nothing in classical Indian philosophy that speaks to the issue of separating ‘philosophy’ from the art of persuasion. All traditions of Indian philosophy are steeped in debate, and have their own competing manuals of debate.

Following the work of J. L. Shaw (2016a) it is worth noting three points. First , the theory of inference in classical Indian philosophy is largely based on the idea of how to cause a specific cognition (the conclusion) to arise on the basis of steps leading to the conclusion. Second , a good argument is one that is free of specific kinds of defects that can block the conclusion from arising in the correct way. Third , it is central to understanding inference in classical Indian philosophy to pay attention to the distinction between inference for oneself vs. inference for another and the concept of relevance as it pertains to questions and answers. 9 Finally, as a helpful comparative guide, we can distinguish between three models of reasoning:

In the manipulation model reasoning is fundamentally about manipulating a person's mind so that they believe what you want them to believe—no matter how that is brought about through reasoning. In the veritic model reasoning is fundamentally about finding the truth. In the erotetic model reasoning is fundamentally about engaging questions that arise from natural doubts or through dialectical inquiry.

Given the different models of reasoning we might ask: what base model of reasoning is at play in the western interpretation of the Hindu Syllogism? If the answer comes from philosophers and logicians from the Anglo-European tradition, it is likely to be the case that the veritic model is used, since that model is what is associated with philosophy and with the science of logic. Logic is about what follows from what. For example, propositional logic is about what we can conclude about the truth of a compound formula, such as (P ∧ Q), on the basis of what the truth-value is of each of its components, such as that P is true and Q is true. However, we can look at the Hindu Syllogism from another perspective.

According to the Nyāya each of the sentences in an inference for others is an answer to a question and each of them, except the last one, will give rise to a question. Moreover, each of them is used to generate a cognition in the hearer ( Shaw, 2010 , p. 45).

In an inference for others, all the five sentences are needed, because each of them is an answer to a different question and gives some new information. But in an inference for oneself all of them are not required and there is no need to use a sentence. Hence a deaf and a mute person can also have an inferential cognition ( Shaw, 2010 , p. 46).

According to Ga n ˙ ngeśa, a Navya-Nyāya philosopher, there are several types of relevance ( san n ˙ gati ). The three important kinds for inference are: (i) justification ( upodghāta ), (ii) causing-effect ( kāryatva ), and (iii) cessation of objectionable questions ( avasara ). These three concepts of relevance are tied to an epistemic account of inference in terms of answering certain questions that arise from doubt. The steps in an inference aim to provide justification that puts an end to questions, including questions about the sequence of steps. This conception is central for understanding the classical Indian conception of dialectical reasoning. This account of relevance deals with (erotetic ordering-effects). The core idea is that by sequencing statements in a certain way relative to certain intellects we can lead one to the conclusion we want and end questions that arise either from doubt or objections ( Shaw, 2016b , pp. 286–293).

Let us look at what happens when you reinterpret the Hindu Syllogism as an inference for others under the erotetic model bearing in mind the sequencing of statements:

According to Shaw ( 2016a , pp. 92–100), the correct account of the Hindu Syllogism is the following:

( pratijñā ): The hill has fire. (The thesis is an answer to a question that arises on the basis of doubt. The question is: what is to be established?)

( hetu) : Because of smoke. (The reason is an answer to the question: what signifies what is to be established? In this case smoke signifies what is to be established.)

( udāharaṇa ): Wherever there is smoke there is fire, like in a kitchen when one is cooking and observes fire followed by smoke. (The rule/example is an answer to the question: why should one consider a to be a signifier of b ? In this case: why is smoke a signifier of fire? The answer is given by stating a rule along with examples.)

( upanaya ): The case of smoke on the hill is like the case of smoke in the kitchen. (The application step answers the question: Is the hill characterised by the particular and relevant kind of smoke?)

( nigamana ): The hill has fire. (The conclusion is an answer to the question: Is the fire, which is the significate of this kind of smoke, present on the hill? This is how the conclusion removes the doubt expressed in the thesis.)

Under the erotetic/inference-for-others model nothing is redundant and nothing is superfluous, the steps follow naturally from a series of questions that one would ask their interlocutor for the purposes of understanding why they believe that there is a fire on the hill. And importantly, the erotetic model does not preclude the discovery of truth. Rather, it aims at it through the investigation of questions. The main point is that one is brought into critiquing the Hindu Syllogism as redundant and superfluous in virtue of not drawing a distinction between an inference for oneself vs . an inference for others as well as failing to distinguish between different models we can use to understand a representation of reasoning. Who or what is the representation for?

Furthermore, Shaw informs us that some theorists in classical Indian philosophy think of how many steps there should be in an inference for others relative to one person's understanding of another's intellect . 10 For example, some scholars point out that for a sharp intellect one might only use the third and fourth step, and for a middle intellect one might only use the third, fourth and fifth step; while for a soft intellect one should use all five steps. This kind of theory makes sense if we are focused on a causal account of how the conclusion is caused to be cognised in an individual. The core question being: what does it take to correctly cause someone to cognise the conclusion in a way in which they will understand it ?

Thus, a complete understanding of the theory of cognition and the context of how the theory of argument and debate developed in India is required for understanding why exactly the steps are given. Once that is in place the initial objections go away.

Consider the Inductive Veritic version:

I have observed fire followed by smoke in my kitchen. ∴ Wherever there is smoke there is fire.

By contrast, the Analogical Erotetic version looks good.

Asha: Why do you believe that wherever there is smoke there is fire?

Anu: I have observed fire followed by smoke in my kitchen. Have you observed that?

Anu: I think the case of fire followed by smoke in my kitchen is the same as what is going on over there where I see smoke on the hill.

Asha: Why do you think these cases are similar?

Anu: Well I have never seen fire without smoke nor have I ever seen smoke without fire. That is I have always observed the co-presence of smoke and fire and co-absence of smoke and fire.

In the dialogue the main point of offering the example is not to inductively offer support for the conclusion. Rather, the point is to offer an example that has the following properties:

The interlocutor is likely to have experienced the same thing. The example has the properties of the universal claim. One can move from the example to an understanding of why one would believe the universal claim.

We can see the force of the use of the example in the dialogue by paying attention to what would happen had the interlocutor, Asha, responded differently. Imagine the following alteration in the conversation.

Asha: No! I have never seen fire followed by smoke in my kitchen because I don't cook. So, I don't see any reason to think that there is smoke on the hill over there because there is fire on the hill in a way that is similar to what is observed in a kitchen when one is cooking.

We can interpret Anu as giving the example of the kitchen, as opposed to observing fire followed by smoke in another case, because there is a likelihood that Asha has experienced something similar that would allow her to see why Anu holds that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Now, when Asha answers in the negative, this puts Anu in the situation of having to produce another example, since the first example cannot be used to persuade or help Asha understand why one should or would believe that there is fire on the hill simply because there is smoke on the hill and wherever there is smoke there is fire.

Moreover, we should be sensitive to the difference between the following questions:

Argument : What is the argument?

Knowledge : How are the premises of the argument known?

Persuasion : How do I get someone to believe the conclusion?

A natural question to ask after we have identified an argument is: how are the premises known? While the tradition stemming from Aristotle forward tends to separate the identification of the argument from how the premises are known, and how we should go about convincing someone in a debate, the tradition stemming from Akṣapāda does not. The Hindu Syllogism binds the logical, epistemic and persuasive aspects of reasoning together. And in fact when we look at scientific reasoning, this is what we often see. In science we are always concerned with using induction and deduction together. The idea that an argument can be good in science independently of the knowability of the premises is anathema to scientific investigation. Thus, we can see that there are virtues to at least a comparative examination of what counts as a legitimate argument form, and that by introducing our students to what an argument is through a comparative examination we allow them to have an open mind about how discussion and argumentation can be conducted.

Premise 3: Critical thinking education should include contributions from non-western philosophers.

Even though I have argued that there are legitimate things we can teach from outside the western tradition of logic and critical thinking, it does not follow that we should include them in a course on critical thinking and logic. Thus, I will begin a defence of this premise by examining a change that has occurred in textbooks for critical thinking. I will use the change that has occurred as the basis for posing a critical question: how can we allow for one kind of change, and not another kind of change?

If we examine, for example, the 1 st –10 th editions of Hurley's Concise Introduction to Logic and compare it to the 12 th edition we will see some changes with respect to explanations and problem sets, but we will also note an additional stark contrast. While the earlier editions only discuss philosophical contributions from men, such as Aristotle, Boole, Venn, Frege, Quine and Kripke, the 12 th edition includes discussion of Ruth Barcan Marcus and Ada Byron Lovelace. 11 Why was the change made? One hypothesis is that there was external pressure on the author from either the public at large, the external reviewers, or from publishers to change the fact that they were representing critical thinking and logic as a place where only men contributed. There are two basic ideas here. First, it is wrong to present logic through the eyes of the contributions of men, if in fact women did make contributions. Second, there might be something like an upward identity trajectory for women in logic and critical thinking when we present it alongside the fact that women made important contributions to the field. Another way to see the second point is as follows: by not presenting the works of women in logic, teachers and the book itself reinforced, the already present idea, that logic and critical thinking is for men, and not for women (more on this in the third section). But now to the critical question: why include women and leave out non-western thinkers? One way to show that there is no good reason to draw a difference is simply to examine a number of responses to this question and show how each is ineffective. The responses to the question will come by way of objections to the idea of including non-western sources.

Objection 1: Non-western thinkers do not belong in a logic and critical thinking textbook because they have no ideas that pertain to logic and critical thinking .

Response 1: In the prior section I have defended the idea that the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy has important ideas that are contributions to logic and critical reasoning. So, at this point what is important to point out is that the Nyāya School is one of many traditions that could be appealed to. Contributions, to name a few, have also been made by Africana, Jain, Buddhist, Arabic and Mohist traditions.

Objection 2: Non-western thinkers contributed ideas to logic and critical thinking, but all of their contributions are false, irrelevant, or not important .

Response 2: In the prior section I argued that one can read the Hindu Syllogism as a confused bit of proto-logic that forms part of the general history of logic, but that this reading is not necessarily the only one available. Against the reading I offered a corrective lens internal to the western tradition, based on the distinction between veritic and erotetic models of reasoning, that can be used to show how the Hindu Syllogism makes sense. Thus, the main response is that some of our thoughts about contributions from non-western philosophers are themselves confused by imposing a singular western lens on them when we are interpreting them. More importantly, we have the following situation. In some cases we could be interpreting a contribution from a non-western thinker as being incoherent because we are using the wrong lens for interpreting what is going on. In another case, it may be that the contribution is wrong only because we assume that there is only one correct understanding of western logic, as if no one in western logic has debated what the correct account of logic is. For example, independently of the contributions of non-western thinkers there is a debate, internal to western philosophy, over whether the logical connectives should be given a classical, intuitionistic or paraconsistent interpretation. And that debate sits alongside the debate over whether logical monism or logical pluralism is correct, the debate about whether there is more than one correct account of the consequence relationship: B is a logical consequence of A. But perhaps it is too much to defend the claim that the contributions coming from non-western traditions are in fact correct or better than those found in a standard logic and critical thinking textbook. So, lets consider a stronger, and distinct objection.

Objection 3: Logic and critical thinking textbooks should only contain information that is to the best of our knowledge true .

Response 3: The core of the objection is that we should only include contributions from non-western thinkers once they have been defended at a higher level and shown to be superior to, or at least as good as, the ideas that are presently discussed in an introductory level book. One argument for this is by way of analogy. Just as we don't include discussion of intuitionistic logic in an introduction to logic and critical thinking course, but rather only classical logic, we need not include ideas from non-western logic. Only the best, and true ideas about logic and critical thinking should be in an introductory level book.

Of course, this objection would be powerful, if it were in fact true. That is, if it were true that logic and critical thinking textbooks only contain true theories about how to reason. Lets consider one issue found in many introductory level textbooks: the inference from a universal proposition to a particular, often discussed as existential import .

1. All men are mortal ∴ 2. Some men are mortal.

Under Aristotle's interpretation the universal claim that All As are Bs entails the particular claim that Some As are Bs, because we can only be talking about categories that contain at least one instance. However, Boole disagrees, since some universal sentences articulate essential properties of entities, or definitions of entities, which are true, without there being anything that falls under one of the categories.

1. All unicorns are single-horned creatures. ∴ 2. Some unicorns are single-horned creatures.

On Boole's interpretation, universal claims, such as All As are Bs, need not imply particular claims, such as Some As are Bs, because there might not be any entities that fall under one or the other of the categories. The fact that we have a true statement about unicorns embedded in the sentence ‘All unicorns are single-horned creatures’ can be very useful even if there are no unicorns. For example, we may wonder whether there are any creatures of a certain kind, and then go search for them on the basis of the statement. Surely, we can discover that there are no creatures of the relevant kind. As a consequence, we would conclude that there are no unicorns.

Thus, Boole's interpretation and Aristotle's both make sense. So, it seems reasonable to teach them. But then what is the objection to teaching the Hindu Syllogism alongside Aristotle's syllogism? The fact is: logic and critical thinking textbooks do not teach: (i) only things that are true, and (ii) things that are uncontroversial truths. For the most part they teach that which has been canonised. There is no reason a comparative presentation of the Hindu Syllogism and Aristotle's Syllogism cannot be taught in much the same way that we currently teach Aristotle's Square of Opposition comparatively with Boole's interpretation of it, where existential import fails. The fact is: even if the Hindu Syllogism is inferior to Aristotle's ( which it isn't ) we can still teach them comparatively as we already do in the case of teaching universal to particular inferences.

Conclusion: Critical thinking education should be revised so as to be inclusive of contributions from non-western thinkers.

Let me conclude my presentation of the argument by clarifying the conclusion of it so as to block an immediate objection to it, as opposed to the premises. One might simply object to the conclusion by pointing to the fact that there are textbooks available to educators that focus on cross-cultural critical thinking, or at least there are texts that are sensitive to ideas that come from outside of the western canon. For example, Wanda Teays's (1996) ground breaking Second Thoughts: Critical Thinking from a Multicultural Perspective , and Maureen Linker's (2015) Intellectual Empathy: Critical Thinking for Social Justice , are two texts that include material from non-western traditions. However, this objection to the conclusion, based on pointing to texts like Teays's and Linker's rests on a confusion between two ways in which critical thinking can be cross-culturally sensitive.

The multicultural approach to critical thinking takes critical thinking tools that originated in the west and applies them to the multicultural world we live in. By contrast, the cross - cultural approach to critical thinking aims to include tools that originated from non-western traditions into the actual curriculum of critical thinking for the purposes of improving the set of tools available and being respectful of the idea of inclusion in critical thinking. While the two approaches are distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. One could write a text that is both cross-cultural and multicultural. For example, meditation is a tool of critical thinking that derives from Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. It aims to help us gain critical self-understanding of our own mental states. It can be included in a critical thinking textbook as an example of critical thinking from outside the western canon. It is, for the most part, a non-western contribution to critical thinking.

Moreover, it should be clear that the argument offered here aims at the cross-cultural inclusion approach.

Suppose now that the argument for inclusion of non-western ideas into critical thinking education is good. One critical question we can ask is the following: where should non-western ideas about critical thinking and logic be taught? One response is simply the following: of course non-western contributions to logic and critical thinking should be taught. However, they should be taught in an area studies course, such as Asian Philosophy . They do not belong in an introductory level course on logic and critical thinking, especially one that aims to help us understand how to critically think in the context of public policy and decision making through civic debate and public discourse.

The Character View holds that critical thinking involves the acquisition and proper deployment of specific skills as well as the acquisition of specific character traits, dispositions, attitudes, and habits of mind. These components are aspects of the ‘critical spirit’.

The Comprehensive View holds that critical thinking involves (i) the development of the appropriate skills that are constitutive of critical thinking, (ii) along with the appropriate character traits, dispositions, attitudes, and habits of mind, which are constitutive of the ‘critical spirit’. However, it also requires (iii) that the skills/tools and the nature of the ‘critical spirit’ be derived from all traditions that have contributed to critical discourse. Finally, the view requires that at some point a critical thinker engage the meta-critical question about critical thinking. That is, that a critical thinker acquire a proper understanding and appreciation of the sources of critical discourse for the purposes of bringing harmony to all that participate in the activity.

On the basis of this distinction, the following argument can be made. At the introductory level the primary goal of a course on critical thinking and logic is to teach students thinking skills, since the skills are essential for college success, life-long learning, civic engagement and public discourse. As a consequence, the historical source from which the skills derive is not important. Rather, the skill itself is important. One way to amplify the argument's force is to concede that it was a mistake to include references to western thinkers in the presentation of logic and critical thinking in the first place. The simple idea is that just as there is a difference between maths and the history of maths, there is a difference between logic and critical thinking, and the history of it.

This argument is powerful, since there is so much need for students to learn critical thinking skills as opposed to the mere history of the discipline. But as soon as this point is made, a key presumption is revealed: there are no skills that can be acquired through studying non-western contributions to logic and there is nothing to be gained critically by studying logic and critical thinking from a historically informed global perspective .

However, there is an interesting and substantial response that can be given to this point. The argument builds from the discussion in the prior section where I explored the relationship between the inclusion of women in critical thinking and logic textbooks in contrast to the absence of non-western thinkers. I will present the argument as an analogy:

Inclusion of women in critical thinking and logic textbooks along with women role models for critical thinking and logic education reduces stereotype threat . The problem that women face in critical thinking and logic education is sufficiently similar to the case of minorities.∴ Inclusion of minorities in critical thinking and logic textbooks with minority role models for critical thinking and logic education would reduce stereotype threat for minorities.

Stereotype threat occurs when a person believes they will be judged on the basis of some group-based stereotype. They do not need to believe the stereotype , and the stereotype need not even be prevalent in their environment . All that is necessary to activate this particular social identity threat is that a person believes that others will treat them negatively or evaluate them unfairly on the basis of one of their social identities. For example, a woman who thinks either that ‘women are not logical’ is true or that many other people believe this to be true may find that such a belief impacts her performance on logical tasks or enjoyment of these tasks ( Lehan, 2015 , pp. 3–4).

A female philosophy student will probably be in the minority as a woman in her department, and she'll almost certainly be in the minority as a woman if she takes classes in the more stereotypically male areas like (for example) logic, language and metaphysics. As she continues on to higher levels of study, the number of women will be steadily diminishing. In any class she takes other than feminist philosophy, she's likely to encounter a syllabus that consists overwhelmingly (often exclusively) of male authors . The people teaching most of the classes are also very likely to be male. All of these factors calling attention to low numbers of women are known to provoke stereotype threat. Since stereotype threat has its strongest effect on the most committed students, this means that the most committed women are likely to underperform ( Saul, 2013 , p. S. 2.1, emphasis added ).

Saul's point, in the emphasised text, is equally true of minority students and their upward trajectory in philosophy. The syllabi and the people teaching the courses will largely be white males.

[A] successful method for reducing stereotype threat is the introduction of counter-stereotype role models. One way to do this is to introduce students to members of the stereotyped group who have done well in the area. For example, “when female students are exposed to women that have performed successfully in mathematics and science related fields, they perform better than female students who do not have examples of women with such performance” … One study showed that reading essays about women who are successful in math can reduce the negative effects of stereotype threat … “Thus, direct and indirect exposure to women that have successfully navigated the field can be enough to reduce the negative impacts of stereotype threat for female students”… This suggests the importance of highlighting women in logic. “[T]he direction of [the] impact [of role model introduction] depends on the believed attainability of their success: Models of attainable success can be inspiring and self-enhancing, whereas models of unattainable success can be threatening and deflating”. In the interest of attainability, it is also extremely important to mention women currently working in logic such as Audrey Yap, Penelope Maddy, Dorothy Edgington, Susan Haack and many others conveniently listed on the Women in Logic list ( Lehan, 2015 , pp. 10–11).

Thus, given that the technique of including women in critical thinking textbooks, and as role models in the classroom, has successfully led to stereotype reduction for women, we can legitimately ask: would the same technique work for minorities? It seems that the relevant question to explore is: are the two cases similar enough? Are the stereotypes that women face the same as the stereotypes that minorities face? And interestingly: what about the intersectional case of minority women? Here are some important considerations.

Unlike the case of the category woman , the category minority is quite diverse with various stereotype alterations within the category. For example, do Asians face the same stereotype threat in a critical thinking and logic course that African Americans or Latin Americans face? Arguably they do not, given the model minority status that is often attributed to Asian Americans (Indians, Pakistani, Chinese, Koreans or Japanese). The difference is that teachers, in the US, don't typically look at Asian Americans thinking that they are going to do poorly in a critical thinking or logic course as much as they think that an African American or Latin American might. But this opens up the intersectionality question: given that everyone that has a race has a gender, could it be that the stereotype threat that women face applies without any thought to racial differences? More specifically, do teachers operate with different implicit biases about Asian women than African American women or Latin American women? And do these gender-race interactions alter the stereotype threat?

More research needs to be done on these questions. For the purposes of what I am arguing here, I cannot answer them. What is relevant to my argument is that we look closely at the fact that there are two distinct questions in the area, one concerning performance, the other concerning retention. Suppose that Asian Americans, either male or female, generally perform well on critical thinking and logic, so that they do not face a stereotype threat the way an African American male or a Latina female might. We might say something like the following. Because of the stereotype threats that the African American and the Latin American faces they perform poorly, and their poor performance is one factor that accounts for why they do not stay in the field of philosophy. However, this cannot be the explanation in the case of Asian Americans, since there is no relevantly similar stereotype threat. Many Asian women perform extremely well on first-year courses in logic and critical thinking.

Philosophy as a science could [not] originate among the Orientals, who, though susceptible of the elements of high culture, were content simply to retain them in a spirit of passive resignation ( as quoted in   Ganeri, 2001 , p. 13).

The core idea is that showing interest in Asian philosophy is showing interest in something that is mystical, non-rational and not really philosophy or science. Asians are often pressured into performing well in the sciences as a sign of intelligence. Thus, studying Asian philosophy is studying Asian religion, and not studying science. Anglophone philosophy focuses on logic and reason, and the stereotype of, for example Chinese or Indian philosophy, is that it does not, but in some form is mystical –in a bad sense. Consequently, Asian students typically adopt the dominant interests of western philosophers. The idea is that to be a real philosopher one must adopt an interest in western philosophy, since that is where one finds the true origins of rationality and science. In fact one often finds that it is easier for non-Asians to show a genuine interest in Asian philosophy than it is for an Asian to show an interest, since Europeans do not face a stereotype threat when engaging Asian philosophy. Rather, they are seen as having an open-minded interest in other traditions.

As a consequence, what can be seen is that the inclusion of non-western thinkers in critical thinking and logic education isn't just about informing others that non-western thinkers have contributed to critical thinking and logic in important ways. If it were about that, it could be solved by an area studies course. Rather, it is about altering perceptions, held by westerners and non-westerners about the content of Asian philosophy. By introducing it in the context of an introduction to critical thinking and logic course we do away with the idea that there is something called Buddhist logic or Chinese logic. We introduce students to critical thinking and logic through contributions from everyone that in fact did contribute. In short:

We can make clear that critical thinking doesn't just come from the Greco-Roman-European tradition. It is part of the human condition. Many cultures contributed in interesting and controversial ways to what falls under the semantic range of the English phrase ‘critical thinking’. By introducing critical thinking through a cross-cultural lens we can reduce stereotype threat revolving around the idea that non-western cultures did not contribute to critical thinking, which is often touted as the prized reason for studying the humanities. We can help minority students that are interested stay in philosophy. Help the dominant group come to a better understanding of the roots of critical thinking. We can point out that how one person debates and discusses an issue of importance to their lives doesn't always follow the way in which another person does. And that this kind of cross-cultural understanding is important for the possibility of meaningful public discourse, disagreement and the development of epistemic tolerance and temper—tolerance of other epistemic norms.

How should public education enable the ethical implementation and proper functioning of democratic processes, such as voting on the basis of public and civic discourse?

Public education should provide citizens of a political body with basic skills in critical thinking, civic debate and ethical public discourse,

We live in a multicultural world where it is no longer possible to say that the demographics of, for example the US and the UK, are not sufficiently diverse across Indian, Chinese, Arabic, African … persons of origin to leave out ideas about critical discourse and discussion emanating from these traditions. To present critical thinking as originating from the human condition, as opposed to the western condition, is to give proper place to each individual, in a diverse body of individuals, who participates in an ethical public exchange of ideas leading to an outcome that pertains to all.

I would like to thank Purushottama Bilimoria, Karin Brown, Janet Stemwedel, Rita Manning, Peter Hadreas, Tom Leddy, Krupa Patel, Jessica Kraft, Stephen Phillips, members of the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, The Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, San Jose State University's 2015 Buddhism Conference , and The Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy for discussion of this piece. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of JOPE for their generous and outstanding comments on this piece. The ideas in this paper were much improved by their suggestions and guidance. I also owe a special intellectual debt to B. K. Matilal's (1985 , 1998 ), and Jonardon Ganeri's (1996 , 2001 , 2004 , 2011 ) outstanding work on Indian Logic. I also owe a deep debt of gratitude to Jaysankar Lal Shaw for his patience in explaining the importance of the precise formulation of the Nyāya account of inference, relevance and the distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Manjula Rajan for helping me to see, through actual engagement, how the Hindu Syllogism works. Her constant evaluation of examples and pressing me for examples has shown me how the method actually works. This paper is actually written in a form that mixes Aristotle's Syllogism and Akṣapāda's Syllogism.

It should be noted here that the distinction between the content question and the normative question is notional. One could argue that the content question either determines the answer to the normative question or it restricts the acceptable answers to it. I am notionally separating these so as to not presuppose a specific answer to the question: how is the content of critical thinking related to the norms of civic debate and public discourse?

I take this work here to be an instance of the public-to-philosophy direction of fit through the aid of Kraft's work on public debate in The Atlantic . Her work pushed me to examine the presuppositions of what is going on in critical thinking and logic education.

It should be clear that in pointing to the actions of these students I am in no way endorsing their behaviour. Rather, I am using their actions as a moment for reflection on what constitutes critical thinking and what should be the norms for engaging in public discourse. Furthermore, it is important to note that there is more than one interpretation of what the students are trying to do by not engaging with the standard rules of civic debate that they were informed of prior to the competition. For example, it is possible to interpret their acts not as an engagement with an alternative model of critical thinking, but rather as an act of civil disobedience. If their act is one of civil disobedience, then it is unlikely that we can claim that they are engaging in an alternative form of critical thinking. However, regardless of the multiple interpretations, it is possible to use an interpretation of their actions as a guide to the critical question: could they be engaging in critical thinking and civic debate albeit an alternative one that may have its own merits?

Stephen Phillips's Critical Thinking in Service of Knowledge: Nyāya according to the Nyāya school of Classical Indian Philosophy , a currently unpublished presentation, has a discussion of this way of drawing the distinction.

In this section and the next I borrow heavily from the work of Ganeri, 1996 , 2001 and 2004 . While there are many controversies surrounding what actually happens in classical Indian logic, for the purposes of this paper I have decided to present a picture that shows that there are important contributions from Indian logic that can be used to teach critical thinking and logic at the introductory level. I take it that just as one can teach first-order logic while recognising that there are controversies concerning it, one can also teach portions of classical Indian logic while recognising that there are controversies concerning how to interpret it.

See Matilal, 1985 , p. 11 for discussion of the comparative point about division between different kinds of debate in Nyāya vs. Meno .

The version I am offering of the standard example derives from the work of Jaysankar Lal Shaw in his Nyāya on the Sources of Knowledge ( Shaw, 2016a ) and conversation. In his work he has articulated a sustained analysis of how the standard example of inference is to be presented. Although there is a debate in Indian philosophy, historically and in contemporary commentary, on the nature of inference, this should be no barrier to teaching the inference, for if the existence of a debate were sufficient, then we would not be teaching Aristotle either.

It is important to note, as B K. Matilal, 1985 , pp. 2–3 does, that western Indologists and philosophers are not the only people to blame when it comes to confusions about the so-called ‘Hindu Syllogism’. Matilal critiques S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's very own article Influence of Aristotle on the Development of the syllogism in Indian Logic, which appeared in the pioneering work History of Indian Logic published in 1920. In that article Vidyābhūṣaṇa attempts to show that there are some commonalities between ‘The Syllogism in Indian Logic’ and the ‘logical rules’ and syllogism as found in Aristotle.

For a sustained presentation of the core ideas see the Inference section in Shaw, 2016a , for an excellent discussion of the relevant points.

Shaw informs us that according to Srinivasa Dasa in his book Jyatīndramata-dīpikā we must think of how many steps there are in a syllogism for others relative to our understanding of their intellect.

For example, compare Chapters 1 & 6 of the 12th edition with Chapters 1 & 6 of the 8th edition. Both chapters are on propositional logic, but only the 12th edition contains the presentation of Ruth Barcan Marcus, p. 35, and Ada Byron Lovelace p. 353. The 8th edition does not contain either. Yet both editions contain a discussion note on the history of logic, see p. 5 in the 8th edition, and compare that to p. 5 in the 12th edition.

Ganeri , J. ( 1996 ) The Hindu Syllogism: Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of Indian Logical Thought , Philosophy East and West , 46 . 1 , pp. 1 – 16 .

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• Exploring the SCAMPER Technique for Creative Problem Solving
• Exploring Brainwalking: A Creative Problem-Solving Technique
• Logic Puzzles and Brain Teasers: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring the Serendipity Technique of Creative Problem Solving
• Analytical problem solving
• Identifying root causes
• Analyzing consequences
• Brainstorming solutions
• Heuristic problem solving
• Using analogies
• Applying existing solutions
• Trial and error
• Creative problem solving
• Mind mapping
• Brainstorming
• Lateral thinking
• Research skills
• Interpreting information
• Data collection and analysis
• Identifying patterns
• Critical thinking skills
• Recognizing bias
• Analyzing arguments logically
• Questioning assumptions
• Communication skills
• Negotiation and compromise
• Listening skills
• Explaining ideas clearly
• Planning techniques
• SWOT analysis
• Gantt charting
• Critical path analysis
• Decision making techniques
• Force field analysis
• Paired comparison analysis
• Cost-benefit analysis
• Root cause analysis
• Five whys technique
• Fault tree analysis
• Cause and effect diagrams
• Brainstorming techniques
• Brainwriting
• Brainwalking
• Round-robin brainstorming
• Creative thinking techniques
• Serendipity technique
• SCAMPER technique
• Innovation techniques
• Value innovation techniques
• Design thinking techniques
• Idea generation techniques
• Personal problems
• Deciding what career to pursue
• Managing finances effectively
• Solving relationship issues
• Business problems
• Increasing efficiency and productivity
• Improving customer service quality
• Reducing costs and increasing profits
• Environmental problems
• Preserving natural resources
• Reducing air pollution levels
• Finding sustainable energy sources
• Individual brainstorming techniques
• Thinking outside the box
• Word association and random word generation
• Mind mapping and listing ideas
• Group brainstorming techniques
• Synectics technique
• Online brainstorming techniques
• Online whiteboarding tools
• Virtual brainstorming sessions
• Collaborative mind mapping software
• Team activities
• Group decision making activities
• Debate activities and role-play scenarios
• Collaborative problem solving games
• Creative activities
• Creative writing exercises and storyboards
• Imagination activities and brainstorming sessions
• Visualization activities and drawing exercises
• Games and puzzles
• Crossword puzzles and Sudoku
• Logic puzzles and brain teasers
• Jigsaw puzzles and mazes
• Types of decisions
• Structured decisions
• Simple decisions
• Complex decisions
• Problem solving skills
• Recognizing Bias: A Problem Solving and Critical Thinking Skills Guide

Learn how to identify and address bias in decision making with our guide to recognizing bias in problem solving and critical thinking.

In today's world, it is becoming increasingly important to recognize bias and how it can affect our decision-making. Bias can cloud our judgement, lead us to make decisions that are not in our best interests, and limit our ability to solve problems effectively. In this guide, we will explore the concept of recognizing bias and how it can be used as a tool for developing critical thinking and problem-solving skills. We will discuss the various types of biases, why recognizing them is important, and how to identify and counteract them.

Confirmation bias

Cognitive bias.

This type of bias can lead to unfair judgments or decisions. Other common types of bias include cultural bias, which is the tendency to favor one’s own culture or group; and political bias, which is the tendency to favor one’s own political party or beliefs. In order to identify and address bias in oneself and others, it is important to be aware of potential sources of bias. This includes personal opinions, values, and preconceived notions. Being mindful of these potential sources of bias can help us become more aware of our own biases and recognize them in others.

Additionally, it is important to be open-minded and willing to consider alternative perspectives. Additionally, it is helpful to challenge our own assumptions and beliefs by questioning them and seeking out evidence that supports or refutes them. The potential implications of not recognizing or addressing bias are significant. If left unchecked, biases can lead to unfair decisions or judgments, as well as inaccurate conclusions. This can have serious consequences for individuals and organizations alike.

Implications of Not Recognizing or Addressing Bias

Strategies for identifying and addressing bias.

Recognizing bias in oneself and others is an important part of making informed decisions. There are several strategies that can be used to identify and address bias. One of the most effective strategies is to take a step back and look at the situation objectively. This involves examining the facts and assumptions that are being used to make decisions.

It can also involve assessing the potential impact of decisions on multiple stakeholders. By removing personal biases from the equation, it is possible to make more informed decisions. Another important strategy for identifying and addressing bias is to question the sources of information. It is important to consider the credibility of sources, as well as any potential biases that may be present.

Fact-checking sources and considering multiple perspectives can help identify any potential biases in the information being used. In addition, it is important to remain aware of our own biases. We all have preconceived notions about certain topics that can affect our decision-making process. By being mindful of our biases, we can avoid making decisions that are influenced by them. Finally, it is important to be open to other perspectives and willing to engage in meaningful dialogue with others.

Types of Bias

Halo effect, what is bias.

It can be an unconscious preference that influences decision making and can lead to adverse outcomes. It is important to recognize bias because it can have a negative impact on our ability to make sound decisions and engage in problem solving and critical thinking. Bias can manifest itself in various ways, from subtle mental shortcuts to overt prejudices. Types of bias include confirmation bias, where we seek out information that confirms our existing beliefs; availability bias, where we base decisions on the information that is most readily available; and representativeness bias, where we assume that two events or objects are related because they share similar characteristics. Other forms of bias include halo effect, where a single positive quality or trait can influence the perception of an entire person; and stereotyping, which is the tendency to make judgments about individuals based on their perceived membership in a certain group. It is important to recognize bias in ourselves and others so that we can make informed decisions and engage in problem solving and critical thinking.

Sources of Bias

Bias can have a profound effect on decisions, leading to outcomes that are not based on facts or evidence. Personal opinions and values can lead to biased decision-making. They can be shaped by past experiences, cultural background , and other personal factors. For example, someone's opinion about a certain topic may be based on what they have previously heard or read. Similarly, preconceived notions can also lead to biased conclusions. Cultural norms can also play a role in creating bias.

For instance, people may be more likely to believe information from a source they trust or respect, even if it is not based on fact. Similarly, people may be more likely to make decisions that conform to the expectations of their culture or society. In addition, people can also be influenced by their own prejudices or stereotypes. This type of bias can lead to unfair treatment of certain individuals or groups of people. Finally, it is important to be aware of the potential for confirmation bias, where people will seek out information that confirms their existing beliefs and disregard any contradictory evidence. By recognizing and understanding these sources of bias, people can make more informed decisions and engage in more effective problem solving and critical thinking.

In conclusion, recognizing and addressing bias is an essential part of problem solving and critical thinking. Bias can come from many sources, including our own beliefs, cultural norms, and past experiences. Knowing the types of bias and strategies for identifying and addressing them can help us make informed decisions and better engage in critical thinking. Taking time to reflect on our own biases is also important for making unbiased decisions.

Ultimately, recognizing and addressing bias will improve our problem-solving and critical thinking skills.

• Mind Mapping: A Creative Problem Solving Tool

Learn all about mind mapping and how it can help you to solve problems creatively and effectively.

• Visualization Activities and Drawing Exercises

Learn more about visualization activities and drawing exercises, from problem-solving activities to creative activities.

• Brainstorming Solutions: A Problem-Solving Guide

Learn how to use brainstorming to come up with creative solutions to complex problems. Discover problem-solving strategies that work.

• Thinking Outside the Box: An Overview of Individual Brainstorming Techniques

Learn about individual brainstorming techniques to help you think outside the box and come up with creative solutions.

• Mind Mapping - Creative Problem Solving and Creative Thinking Techniques
• Collaborative Problem Solving Games: Exploring Creative Solutions for Teams
• Force Field Analysis for Problem Solving and Decision Making
• Finding Sustainable Energy Sources

Improving Customer Service Quality

• Value Innovation Techniques
• Mind Mapping and Listing Ideas
• Collaborative Mind Mapping Software
• SWOT Analysis: A Comprehensive Overview
• Fault Tree Analysis: A Comprehensive Overview
• Data Collection and Analysis - Problem Solving Skills and Research Skills
• Virtual Brainstorming Sessions: A Comprehensive Overview
• Cause and Effect Diagrams: A Problem-Solving Technique

Exploring Trial and Error Problem Solving Strategies

• Interpreting Information: A Problem-Solving and Research Skills Primer
• Brainstorming: A Comprehensive Look at Creative Problem Solving
• Gantt Charting: A Primer for Problem Solving & Planning Techniques
• Debate Activities and Role-Play Scenarios
• Design Thinking Techniques: A Comprehensive Overview
• Cost-benefit Analysis: A Guide to Making Informed Decisions
• Managing Your Finances Effectively
• Idea Generation Techniques: A Comprehensive Overview
• Structured Decisions: An Overview of the Decision Making Process
• Preserving Natural Resources
• Critical Path Analysis: A Comprehensive Guide
• Maximizing Efficiency and Productivity
• Crossword Puzzles and Sudoku: A Problem-Solving Exploration
• Word Association and Random Word Generation
• Paired Comparison Analysis: A Comprehensive Overview
• Choosing the Right Career: Problem-Solving Examples
• Brainwriting: A Creative Problem-Solving Technique
• Applying Existing Solutions for Problem Solving Strategies
• Identifying Patterns: A Practical Guide
• Imagination Activities and Brainstorming Sessions
• How to Explain Ideas Clearly
• Analyzing Arguments Logically
• Reducing Costs and Increasing Profits: A Problem Solving Example
• Creative Writing Exercises and Storyboards
• Exploring Synectics Technique: A Comprehensive Guide
• Jigsaw Puzzles and Mazes: Problem Solving Activities for Fun and Learning
• Brainwriting: A Group Brainstorming Technique
• Questioning Assumptions: A Critical Thinking Skill
• Analyzing Consequences: A Problem Solving Strategy
• Identifying Root Causes
• Exploring Lateral Thinking: A Comprehensive Guide to Problem Solving Strategies
• Making Complex Decisions: A Comprehensive Overview
• Round-robin Brainstorming: A Creative Problem Solving Tool
• Solving Relationship Issues
• Negotiation and Compromise

Using Analogies to Solve Problems

• Five Whys Technique: A Comprehensive Analysis
• Exploring Online Whiteboarding Tools for Brainstorming
• Round-robin brainstorming: Exploring a Group Brainstorming Technique
• Listening Skills: A Comprehensive Overview
• Simple Decisions - An Overview
• Reducing Air Pollution Levels
• Group Decision Making Activities

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Perception and Critical Thinking: 2 Thinking Influences

The process of forming judgments and opinions involves using evidence and logic, which are common to both perception and critical thinking. Perception is the way we interpret information received through our senses from the environment, while critical thinking involves analyzing, evaluating, and synthesizing information from different sources. Perception can affect critical thinking by influencing the way we select, organize, and interpret the information that we encounter.

Sanju Pradeepa

You rely on your senses and brain to perceive and make sense of the world around you, but how often do you stop to consider how your own perceptions and thought processes actually work? Understanding your these abilities is vital to navigating life effectively. How you perceive and think critically about information directly impacts the choices you make, the relationships you have, and your overall well-being and success.

This article will explore how your senses, experiences, beliefs, and biases shape your perception of reality. You’ll gain insights into common thinking traps and logical fallacies that often distort your reasoning. And you’ll pick up practical techniques for sharpening your critical thinking through questioning assumptions, evaluating evidence objectively, and considering alternative perspectives.

Perception and critical thinking are life skills that require continuous development and practice. Make the effort to understand them, and you’ll be rewarded with a more accurate view of the world, better decision-making, and a deeper understanding of all areas of your life.

Table of Contents

What is perception.

Perception refers to how you interpret the world around you through your senses. How you perceive things depends a lot on your beliefs , experiences, culture, values, preferences, and biases. In other words, perception is subjective and shaped by many factors.

Your senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—are how you receive and process information from the environment. However, your senses alone don’t determine how you perceive things. Your brain also relies on context, memory, and expectations to interpret the information it receives.

For example, if you hear a loud bang in the middle of the night, you may perceive it as threatening because you expect the nighttime environment to be quiet and safe. The same loud bang during the day likely wouldn’t alarm you. Your perception depends heavily on the context.

Your perceptions can also be influenced by your beliefs and biases. For instance, if you believe a certain group of people tend to be untrustworthy , you may perceive individuals from that group in a more negative light, even if there is no objective evidence to support that view.

In summary, perception is a complex process. The world around us is filled with an infinite amount of information, so we tend to organize and interpret it subjectively based on what matters most to us. Understanding how perception works can help us gain insight into ourselves and others. It may also help us become aware of our biases so we can perceive things more openly and accurately.

Is Perception Subjective OR Objective: The Debate Continues

Factors that influence our perception.

The way we perceive the world around us is influenced by many factors. Our past experiences, biases, culture, beliefs, and environment all shape how we interpret information and events.

Past experiences

What we’ve gone through in life impacts how we see new things. If something reminds us of a past painful experience, we may perceive it more negatively. Positive associations from the past can make us view something in a more favorable light. Our experiences cause us to develop expectations about the world, which then influence our perceptions.

Biases and prejudices

The preconceptions and prejudices we hold sway how we perceive people and situations. Confirmation bias leads us to notice and accept information that confirms what we already believe while ignoring anything that contradicts our views. Stereotyping causes us to perceive people as having certain attributes based only on their social group. These prejudices distort our perceptions and make it hard to see things objectively.

Cultural influences

The culture we live in shapes our beliefs and behaviors, which then impact how we perceive the world. Those from individualistic cultures may focus more on personal goals and independence, while those from collectivistic cultures emphasize community and relationships. Our cultural values and norms provide a lens through which we interpret everything around us.

With awareness of these factors, we can work to expand our perspectives and improve our critical thinking skills. Examining our assumptions and the effects of our biases helps us perceive things more openly and objectively. Broadening our experiences and exposing ourselves to diverse cultures and ideas also helps create a more balanced view of the world.

How Our Perceptions Shape Our Reality

Our perceptions shape how we view and interpret the world around us. The way we perceive reality depends on several factors:

• Our beliefs and expectations: We tend to perceive what we already believe or expect to see. For example, if you believe that spiders are dangerous, you are more likely to perceive a spider you encounter as threatening, even if it’s harmless.
• Our biases and prejudices: The biases and stereotypes we hold can distort our perception of people and events. For instance, if you have a prejudice against a particular group, you may perceive members of that group in an unfairly negative light.
• Our emotional state: How we feel can influence what we perceive. When we’re fearful or anxious, we may perceive threats that aren’t actually there. When we’re happy, the world may seem brighter and more positive.
• Our senses—what we see, hear, smell, touch, and taste—provide the raw data for our perceptions. If one of our senses is impaired or limited, it can alter our perception of reality. For example, a blind or deaf person will have a very different perception of the world than a person with full sensory ability.

In summary, our perceptions are shaped by many psychological and sensory factors. We must be aware of how these influences can distort our view of reality and affect our critical thinking and judgment. By recognizing our own biases and limitations, we can gain a more accurate perception of the world and make better decisions.

Motivated Perception: Why We See What We Want to See

Common perceptual distortions and biases.

Our perception of the world around us is shaped by many factors, including some common biases and distortions. Be aware of these tendencies in yourself and others to improve critical thinking.

Confirmation bias

We tend to search for and favor information that confirms what we already believe. Make an effort to also seek out information that contradicts your preexisting views. Consider other perspectives with an open mind.

Anchoring bias

We rely too heavily on the first piece of information we receive, known as the “anchor,” and fail to sufficiently adjust our views in light of subsequent information. Be willing to consider each new piece of information objectively rather than comparing it only to your anchor.

Dunning-Kruger effect

When we lack knowledge or expertise in a particular area, we tend to overestimate our own competence. The less you know, the less aware you are of how much you have yet to learn. Seek out opportunities to expand your knowledge through reading, taking a course, or finding a mentor.

Bandwagon effect

We tend to believe or do things simply because others do. Resist the urge to go along with popular opinion or bandwagons,” and instead evaluate the facts and your own views objectively. Just because “everyone else” believes something does not necessarily make it true.

What Causes Cognitive Distortions: 8 Distortions Behind Them

Being aware of common biases and perceptual distortions is an important step toward improving your critical thinking. Make an effort to consider information objectively, seek out alternative perspectives, and base your judgments on facts rather than preconceptions. With practice, you can overcome these tendencies and develop sharper, more independent thinking.

Critical Thinking Skills: What Are They?

Critical thinking skills are vital in all areas of life. They allow you to analyze information objectively and form your own evaluations and interpretations. Some key critical thinking skills include:

• Observation: Paying close attention to details and gathering information through the senses Observe the world around you and notice subtle details.
• Analysis: Examining information or arguments in a logical, systematic way Break down information into parts to understand it fully. Look for evidence, logical flaws or weaknesses, and alternative interpretations.
• Interpretation: Giving meaning to observations, experiences, information, or arguments Try to understand the significance of the information and how it relates to the overall topic or issue.
• Inference: Drawing conclusions based on observations and analysis Make educated guesses about implications, consequences, outcomes, or the meaning of incomplete information. Inferring allows you to make predictions.
• Evaluation: Assessing the credibility, accuracy, and value of information, arguments, or methods Determine strengths and weaknesses, look for bias, and consider alternative perspectives. Evaluate the evidence and arguments objectively.
• Explanation: Providing a clear and coherent rationale or justification for an argument, conclusion, or outcome Explain your reasoning and thinking process to others in a logical, step-by-step manner.
• Problem-solving : Using critical thinking skills to solve complex problems in a systematic, logical way Identify the problem, gather information, evaluate options, and determine the best solution based on the available evidence. Consider obstacles and their ethical implications.

Developing strong critical thinking skills takes practice. Challenge yourself to think critically about information and arguments, ask probing questions, consider alternative perspectives, and avoid biases and logical fallacies. With regular practice, critical thinking can become second nature.

7 Types of Critical Thinking: A Guide to Analyzing Problems

The order to form a judgement through critical thinking.

Critical thinking is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgment. It is a crucial skill that allows you to think clearly and rationally about what to believe or what to do. Developing your critical thinking skills takes effort and practice.

1. Identify your biases and assumptions.

We all have implicit biases and make assumptions that can influence our thinking. Try to identify your biases and assumptions about the issue. Think about how they might impact your judgment. Try to put them aside and be open-minded.

2. Gather relevant information.

Do some research to determine the facts and evidence related to the issue. Look at a variety of reputable sources to get a full, objective understanding of the issue. Consider alternative perspectives and opinions, not just the ones you already agree with.

3. Evaluate the arguments and evidence.

Once you have information from multiple sources, evaluate the quality of the evidence and arguments. Determine if there are any logical flaws or weaknesses. Look for facts and evidence that contradict or challenge your beliefs. Try to stay objective and rational, not emotional .

4 . Draw a reasoned conclusion.

After evaluating the evidence and arguments, you can draw a logical, well-reasoned conclusion. Your conclusion should be based on factual evidence, not just your preexisting opinions or biases. Be willing to accept a conclusion that differs from what you originally believed.

Critical thinking is a vital skill that takes conscious effort to develop and apply. But with regular practice, you can strengthen your ability to think clearly and logically, even about complex and controversial issues. Applying critical thinking leads to better decision-making and helps create a more just, equitable, and progressive society.

Critical Thinking and Non-Critical Thinking: Key Differences

The relationship between perception and critical thinking.

They are deeply intertwined. How you perceive the world around you shapes your thinking, and your thinking influences what you perceive. Understanding this relationship allows you to strengthen both skills.

Your perceptions are formed by experiences, beliefs, values, biases, and logical reasoning. The more self-aware you are of what influences your perceptions, the better able you are to evaluate them critically. Some techniques that can help include:

• Check for evidence that confirms and disproves your perceptions. Weigh them objectively.
• Look for alternative explanations and interpretations. Don’t assume your initial perception is the only one.
• Consider the context and circumstances surrounding your perceptions. Are there factors that could be distorting your views?
• Examine if there are any personal biases or preconceptions affecting your perceptions. Work to overcome them.
• Ask probing questions to evaluate the accuracy and validity of your perceptions. Look at the issue from multiple angles.
• Discuss your perceptions with others to gain new insights. Be open to learning from different viewpoints.
• Practice empathy by trying to perceive situations from other perspectives than your own. Put yourself in other people’s shoes.

Critical thinking involves analyzing, interpreting, evaluating, and improving your thinking. When you apply critical thinking to your perceptions, you strengthen both skills in a virtuous cycle. Your perceptions become sharper and keener, feeding your critical thinking.

And your critical thinking helps shape perceptions that are more discerning and insightful. Together, perception and critical thinking are powerful combinations for understanding yourself and the world around you.

The Synergy of Perception and Critical Thinking in Personal Development

To develop yourself personally and professionally , improving both your skills are key. These cognitive abilities work together synergistically to help you gain valuable insights and make better judgments.

Perception refers to how you observe and understand the world around you through your senses. It involves noticing details, interpreting what you see and hear, and understanding the context. The more perceptive you are, the better you can assess situations accurately. Some ways to strengthen your perception include:

• Paying close attention to details and your surroundings. Notice subtle cues like body language, tone of voice , and small changes in your environment.
• Avoiding distractions and being fully present in the moment Give people and tasks your full focus.
• Looking at situations from multiple perspectives. Try to understand other points of view, not just your own.

Critical thinking means analyzing information objectively and making reasoned judgments. It enables you to evaluate arguments and ideas in a logical, unbiased way. To improve your critical thinking:

• Question assumptions and opinions. Consider the evidence and facts, not just beliefs.
• Look for logical flaws and biases. Watch out for emotional appeals, ad hominem attacks, and close-minded thinking.
• Consider alternative explanations and solutions. Don’t just accept the most obvious answer. Look for creative options.

By honing your perception and critical thinking, you can gain a more accurate understanding of yourself and the world. You’ll make wiser choices and decisions, build better relationships, and continue learning and developing new skills. Keep practicing, and these cognitive abilities will become second nature.

How Critical Thinking Complements and Enhances Perception

Critical thinking is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue or situation to form a judgment. It complements perception, our sensory experience of the world around us, by enabling us to logically analyze the information we receive through our senses. Together, perception and critical thinking allow us to make sense of the world in an insightful, pragmatic way.

Some key ways critical thinking enhances perception include :

• Evaluating evidence . We perceive a lot of information, but critical thinking helps us determine what evidence is most relevant and credible. We can assess the accuracy, reliability, and validity of what we perceive.
• Identifying assumptions . Our perceptions are influenced by our assumptions, biases, and preconceptions. Critical thinking helps us recognize and evaluate these assumptions to gain a more balanced perspective.
• Considering alternative interpretation s It’s easy to accept what we perceive at face value, but critical thinking pushes us to consider other ways of understanding the information. We can generate alternative hypotheses and explanations.
• Applying logical reasoning While perception relies on our senses, critical thinking relies on logic and reasoning. We can apply logical principles like deduction and induction to draw well-reasoned conclusions from what we perceive.
• Questioning and reflecting Critical thinking fosters an inquisitive mindset. We learn to habitually question and reflect on our perceptions, asking probing questions to gain deeper insight and understanding. Questioning and reflecting lead to a more thoughtful perspective.
• Gaining a broader perspective It helps us consider the wider context surrounding what we perceive. We can incorporate different points of view and relate new information to a broader framework of knowledge. This results in a balanced, well-informed perspective.

In summary, critical thinking and perception work together to shape how we understand ourselves and the world. Our senses may perceive, but our minds must think critically about that perception to gain wisdom. Critical thinking turns the raw materials of perception into knowledge and insight.

Building Resilience and Emotional Intelligence through Perception and Critical Thinking

To build resilience and emotional intelligence, it’s important to understand how perception and critical thinking work. Our perceptions are shaped by many factors, including:

• Our beliefs and experiences: What we already believe or have experienced can shape what we perceive in the present.
• Emotions: Feeling anxious, afraid, or upset can influence what we perceive and how we think about it.
• Biases: We all have implicit biases that can distort our perceptions and judgments.
• Selective attention: We can’t possibly take in all the information around us, so we selectively attend to certain details while ignoring others.

Developing strong critical thinking skills helps overcome the limitations and distortions in our perceptions. Some tips for improving your critical thinking include:

• Consider alternative perspectives. Try to understand how others may perceive the same situation differently. Ask open-ended questions to gain new insights. Seek out balanced and objective analyses of issues.
• Evaluate the evidence and arguments. Look for logical flaws, false assumptions, and inconsistencies. Consider the credibility and possible biases of the sources. Try to determine the accuracy and relevance of key facts.
• Challenge your own beliefs and assumptions. We often don’t recognize our own biases and preconceptions. Make the effort to question why you believe what you believe and look for evidence that contradicts your views. Remain open to other ways of thinking.
• Draw reasonable conclusions. Avoid making hasty generalizations or interpretations that are not well supported by evidence. Consider alternative explanations and hypotheses. Make sure your conclusions logically follow from the evidence and arguments.

Building perception and critical thinking skills is a lifelong endeavor, but one that is essential for success and well-being. With regular practice, these cognitive abilities can become habits of an intelligent and thoughtful mind.

Types of Resilience: Building Strength for Life’s Challenges

The impact of perception and critical thinking on relationships.

They have a significant impact on your relationships. How you perceive yourself and others, as well as your ability to think critically about social interactions, determines the quality and depth of your connections.

Self-Perception

The way you view yourself directly influences how you engage in relationships. If you have a negative self-image , you may come across as insecure, jealous, or needy to others. Work to develop a balanced and compassionate view of yourself. Learn to appreciate your own strengths, values, and accomplishments. When you feel good about who you are, you can build mutually supportive relationships based on trust and understanding.

Perception of Others

How you perceive people also shapes your relationships. If you make overly critical judgments about others or generalize their behaviors, you may miss opportunities to connect. Try to see others with an open and curious mind. Look for their positive qualities and the humanity you share. Ask clarifying questions instead of making assumptions. With a more generous perception of people, you can build healthier and happier relationships .

Critical Thinking

Your ability to think critically about social interactions impacts relationships too. Strong critical thinking skills allow you to better understand complex relationship dynamics, set appropriate boundaries, and resolve conflicts in constructive ways. Examine the reasons behind others’ behaviors before reacting. Look for compromise and common ground. Consider each person’s perspective, needs, and concerns. When you can think critically about your relationships, you are able to navigate challenges in a thoughtful, principled manner.

In summary, developing a balanced self-perception, an openness towards others, and strong critical thinking skills allows you to create and sustain meaningful connections with people. Focusing on these areas can help transform your relationships in positive ways.

Practical Strategies for Applying Perception and Critical Thinking in Daily Life

To apply these two skills in your daily life, here are some practical strategies:

Examine your biases.

We all have implicit biases that influence our perceptions and judgments. Make an effort to recognize your own biases and preconceptions about people and situations. Ask yourself how they might be impacting your thinking and be open to challenging them.

Seek out different perspectives.

Try exposing yourself to different opinions, cultures, and ways of thinking. Read news sources you disagree with, follow people on social media with different views, and engage in respectful debates with others. Widening your perspectives will make you a more perceptive and open-minded thinker.

Question assumptions

Don’t just accept information at face value. Ask questions like, What evidence supports this? What are the counterarguments? Are there any hidden assumptions or biases? Evaluating the reasoning and evidence behind claims and ideas will lead to improved critical thinking.

Consider context

Perception depends strongly on context. Try to understand people and events in the broader context of the situation and environment. Look for root causes and connections, not just surface appearances. Context provides meaning and helps avoid narrow or superficial judgments.

Stay curious

Cultivate a curious mindset. Ask questions, explore new topics that spark your interest, and seek to continuously expand your knowledge. Curious people tend to be more perceptive, open-minded , and willing to challenge their own thinking. A curious mind is a critical mind.

Think before reacting.

Take time to reflect on situations rather than just reacting impulsively. Try to tap into your ability to reason and evaluate before responding or passing judgment. Pausing to think leads to more perceptive responses and helps avoid rash or emotional reactions. With practice, critical thinking can become second nature.

As you have seen, perception and critical thinking are intertwined. How you perceive the world around you is shaped by your beliefs, experiences, assumptions, and biases. To develop strong critical thinking skills, you must continually challenge your perceptions and consider alternative perspectives. Notice when information confirms what you already believe and look for evidence that contradicts your views. Seek out opinions different from your own and try to understand other points of view.

Continually ask questions about the accuracy and validity of the information. The more you practice perceiving the world with an open and curious mind, the stronger your critical thinking abilities will become. Sharpening these skills takes deliberate effort but will serve you well in navigating an increasingly complex world.

• Stereotype From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
• Perception Is Not Reality – Just because you think something is reality doesn’t make it reality. Posted August 5, 2019 |   Reviewed by Lybi Ma

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment. Political and business leaders endorse its importance.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o'clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68-69; 1933: 91-92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot's position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Morevoer, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69-70; 1933: 92-93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond line from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on the subsequent emotive response (Siegel 1988).

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in frequency in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the frequency of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Critical thinking dispositions can usefully be divided into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started) (Facione 1990a: 25). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), and Black (2012).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work.

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? Abrami et al. (2015) found that in the experimental and quasi-experimental studies that they analyzed dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), and Bailin et al. (1999b).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT)
• Center for Teaching Thinking (CTT)
• Critical Thinking Across the European Higher Education Curricula (CRITHINKEDU)
• Critical Thinking Definition, Instruction, and Assessment: A Rigorous Approach (criticalTHINKING.net)
• Critical Thinking Research (RAIL)
• Foundation for Critical Thinking
• Insight Assessment
• Partnership for 21st Century Learning (P21)
• The Critical Thinking Consortium
• The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities , by Robert H. Ennis

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NPR defends its journalism after senior editor says it has lost the public's trust

David Folkenflik

NPR is defending its journalism and integrity after a senior editor wrote an essay accusing it of losing the public's trust. Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

NPR is defending its journalism and integrity after a senior editor wrote an essay accusing it of losing the public's trust.

NPR's top news executive defended its journalism and its commitment to reflecting a diverse array of views on Tuesday after a senior NPR editor wrote a broad critique of how the network has covered some of the most important stories of the age.

"An open-minded spirit no longer exists within NPR, and now, predictably, we don't have an audience that reflects America," writes Uri Berliner.

A strategic emphasis on diversity and inclusion on the basis of race, ethnicity and sexual orientation, promoted by NPR's former CEO, John Lansing, has fed "the absence of viewpoint diversity," Berliner writes.

NPR's chief news executive, Edith Chapin, wrote in a memo to staff Tuesday afternoon that she and the news leadership team strongly reject Berliner's assessment.

"We're proud to stand behind the exceptional work that our desks and shows do to cover a wide range of challenging stories," she wrote. "We believe that inclusion — among our staff, with our sourcing, and in our overall coverage — is critical to telling the nuanced stories of this country and our world."

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She added, "None of our work is above scrutiny or critique. We must have vigorous discussions in the newsroom about how we serve the public as a whole."

A spokesperson for NPR said Chapin, who also serves as the network's chief content officer, would have no further comment.

Praised by NPR's critics

Berliner is a senior editor on NPR's Business Desk. (Disclosure: I, too, am part of the Business Desk, and Berliner has edited many of my past stories. He did not see any version of this article or participate in its preparation before it was posted publicly.)

Berliner's essay , titled "I've Been at NPR for 25 years. Here's How We Lost America's Trust," was published by The Free Press, a website that has welcomed journalists who have concluded that mainstream news outlets have become reflexively liberal.

Berliner writes that as a Subaru-driving, Sarah Lawrence College graduate who "was raised by a lesbian peace activist mother ," he fits the mold of a loyal NPR fan.

Yet Berliner says NPR's news coverage has fallen short on some of the most controversial stories of recent years, from the question of whether former President Donald Trump colluded with Russia in the 2016 election, to the origins of the virus that causes COVID-19, to the significance and provenance of emails leaked from a laptop owned by Hunter Biden weeks before the 2020 election. In addition, he blasted NPR's coverage of the Israel-Hamas conflict.

On each of these stories, Berliner asserts, NPR has suffered from groupthink due to too little diversity of viewpoints in the newsroom.

The essay ricocheted Tuesday around conservative media , with some labeling Berliner a whistleblower . Others picked it up on social media, including Elon Musk, who has lambasted NPR for leaving his social media site, X. (Musk emailed another NPR reporter a link to Berliner's article with a gibe that the reporter was a "quisling" — a World War II reference to someone who collaborates with the enemy.)

When asked for further comment late Tuesday, Berliner declined, saying the essay spoke for itself.

The arguments he raises — and counters — have percolated across U.S. newsrooms in recent years. The #MeToo sexual harassment scandals of 2016 and 2017 forced newsrooms to listen to and heed more junior colleagues. The social justice movement prompted by the killing of George Floyd in 2020 inspired a reckoning in many places. Newsroom leaders often appeared to stand on shaky ground.

Leaders at many newsrooms, including top editors at The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times , lost their jobs. Legendary Washington Post Executive Editor Martin Baron wrote in his memoir that he feared his bonds with the staff were "frayed beyond repair," especially over the degree of self-expression his journalists expected to exert on social media, before he decided to step down in early 2021.

Since then, Baron and others — including leaders of some of these newsrooms — have suggested that the pendulum has swung too far.

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Legendary editor marty baron describes his 'collision of power' with trump and bezos.

New York Times publisher A.G. Sulzberger warned last year against journalists embracing a stance of what he calls "one-side-ism": "where journalists are demonstrating that they're on the side of the righteous."

"I really think that that can create blind spots and echo chambers," he said.

Internal arguments at The Times over the strength of its reporting on accusations that Hamas engaged in sexual assaults as part of a strategy for its Oct. 7 attack on Israel erupted publicly . The paper conducted an investigation to determine the source of a leak over a planned episode of the paper's podcast The Daily on the subject, which months later has not been released. The newsroom guild accused the paper of "targeted interrogation" of journalists of Middle Eastern descent.

Heated pushback in NPR's newsroom

Given Berliner's account of private conversations, several NPR journalists question whether they can now trust him with unguarded assessments about stories in real time. Others express frustration that he had not sought out comment in advance of publication. Berliner acknowledged to me that for this story, he did not seek NPR's approval to publish the piece, nor did he give the network advance notice.

Some of Berliner's NPR colleagues are responding heatedly. Fernando Alfonso, a senior supervising editor for digital news, wrote that he wholeheartedly rejected Berliner's critique of the coverage of the Israel-Hamas conflict, for which NPR's journalists, like their peers, periodically put themselves at risk.

Alfonso also took issue with Berliner's concern over the focus on diversity at NPR.

"As a person of color who has often worked in newsrooms with little to no people who look like me, the efforts NPR has made to diversify its workforce and its sources are unique and appropriate given the news industry's long-standing lack of diversity," Alfonso says. "These efforts should be celebrated and not denigrated as Uri has done."

After this story was first published, Berliner contested Alfonso's characterization, saying his criticism of NPR is about the lack of diversity of viewpoints, not its diversity itself.

"I never criticized NPR's priority of achieving a more diverse workforce in terms of race, ethnicity and sexual orientation. I have not 'denigrated' NPR's newsroom diversity goals," Berliner said. "That's wrong."

Questions of diversity

Under former CEO John Lansing, NPR made increasing diversity, both of its staff and its audience, its "North Star" mission. Berliner says in the essay that NPR failed to consider broader diversity of viewpoint, noting, "In D.C., where NPR is headquartered and many of us live, I found 87 registered Democrats working in editorial positions and zero Republicans."

Berliner cited audience estimates that suggested a concurrent falloff in listening by Republicans. (The number of people listening to NPR broadcasts and terrestrial radio broadly has declined since the start of the pandemic.)

Former NPR vice president for news and ombudsman Jeffrey Dvorkin tweeted , "I know Uri. He's not wrong."

Others questioned Berliner's logic. "This probably gets causality somewhat backward," tweeted Semafor Washington editor Jordan Weissmann . "I'd guess that a lot of NPR listeners who voted for [Mitt] Romney have changed how they identify politically."

Similarly, Nieman Lab founder Joshua Benton suggested the rise of Trump alienated many NPR-appreciating Republicans from the GOP.

In recent years, NPR has greatly enhanced the percentage of people of color in its workforce and its executive ranks. Four out of 10 staffers are people of color; nearly half of NPR's leadership team identifies as Black, Asian or Latino.

"The philosophy is: Do you want to serve all of America and make sure it sounds like all of America, or not?" Lansing, who stepped down last month, says in response to Berliner's piece. "I'd welcome the argument against that."

"On radio, we were really lagging in our representation of an audience that makes us look like what America looks like today," Lansing says. The U.S. looks and sounds a lot different than it did in 1971, when NPR's first show was broadcast, Lansing says.

A network spokesperson says new NPR CEO Katherine Maher supports Chapin and her response to Berliner's critique.

The spokesperson says that Maher "believes that it's a healthy thing for a public service newsroom to engage in rigorous consideration of the needs of our audiences, including where we serve our mission well and where we can serve it better."

Disclosure: This story was reported and written by NPR Media Correspondent David Folkenflik and edited by Deputy Business Editor Emily Kopp and Managing Editor Gerry Holmes. Under NPR's protocol for reporting on itself, no NPR corporate official or news executive reviewed this story before it was posted publicly.