hegelian thesis

Hegel-by-HyperText Resources

Excerpt from Hegel for Beginners

Source : Hegel for Beginners , by Llyod Spencer and Andrzej Krauze, Published by Icon Books, 14 of 175 pages reproduced here, minus the abundant illustrations.

"Classical reasoning assumes the principle of logical identity: A = A or A is not non-A".

"But in writing that book I became aware of employing a new and unprecedented way of thinking".

Dialectical Thinking

Aufhebung or sublation, a grammar of thinking.

"I liken my study of logic to the study of grammar. You only really see the rewards when you later come to observe language in use and you grasp what it is that makes the language of poetry so evocative".

Three Kinds of Contradiction

• The three divisions of the Science of Logic involve three different kinds of contradiction. In the first division Being the opposed pair of concepts at first seem flatly opposed, as if they would have nothing at all to do with one another: Being Nothing / Quantity Quality. Only be means of analysis or deduction can they be shown to be intimately interrelated.
• In the second division Essence the opposed pairs immediately imply one another. The Inner and the Outer, for example: to define one is at the same time to define the other.
• In the third division the Concept [ Notion ] we reach an altogether more sophisticated level of contradiction. Here we have concepts such as identity whose component parts, Universality and Particularity, are conceptually interrelated.

Triadic Structure

• The analytic logic of understanding which focuses the data of sense-experience to yield knowledge of the natural phenomenal world.
• The dialectical logic of understanding which operates independently of sense-experience and erroneously professes to give knowledge of the transcendent noumena ("things in themselves" or also the "infinite" or the "whole")
• Analytic understanding is only adequate for natural science and practical everyday life, not for philosophy.
• Dialectic reason s not concerned with Kant's "transcendent", nor with the abstract "mutilated" parts of reality, but with reality as a totality , and therefore gives true knowledge.

What is Knowing?

"the whole of philosophy resembles a circle of circles".

Further Reading: Introduction to Shorter Logic | Meaning of Hegel's Logic

—  Hegel-by-HyperText Home Page @ marxists.org  —

Newest Articles

• The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring the Interplay between Religious Experience and Faith
• Exploring the Ethical Theory of Utilitarianism
• Existentialism: An Introduction
• Metaphysics
• Theory of Forms
• Epistemology
• Materialism
• Moral relativism
• Utilitarianism
• Virtue ethics
• Normative ethics
• Applied ethics
• Moral Psychology
• Philosophy of art
• Philosophy of language
• Philosophy of beauty
• Nature of Art
• Philosophy of Film
• Philosophy of Music
• Deductive reasoning
• Inductive reasoning
• Justification
• Perception and Knowledge
• Beliefs and Truth
• Modern philosophy
• Romanticism
• Analytic philosophy
• Enlightenment philosophy
• Existentialism
• Enlightenment
• Ancient philosophy
• Classical Greek philosophy
• Renaissance philosophy
• Medieval philosophy
• Pre-Socratic philosophy
• Hellenistic philosophy
• Presocratic philosophy
• Rationalism
• Scholasticism
• Jewish philosophy
• Early Islamic philosophy
• Reasoning and Argumentation
• Seeking Justice After a Tractor-Trailer Accident: Why You Need an Experienced Lawyer
• Critical Thinking
• Fallacies and logical errors
• Skepticism and doubt
• Creative Thinking
• Lateral thinking
• Thought experiments
• Argumentation and Logic
• Syllogisms and Deductive Reasoning
• Fallacies and Rebuttals
• Inductive Reasoning and Analogy
• Reasoning and Problem-Solving
• Critical Thinking and Decision Making
• Creative Thinking and Problem Solving
• Analytical Thinking and Reasoning
• Philosophical Writing and Analysis
• Argumentative Writing and Analysis
• Interpreting Philosophical Texts
• Writing Essays and Articles on Philosophy
• Philosophical Research Methods
• Qualitative Research Methods in Philosophy
• Quantitative Research Methods in Philosophy
• Research Design and Methodology
• Ethics and Morality
• Aesthetics and Beauty
• Metaphysical terms
• Ontological argument
• Ethical terms
• Aesthetic terms
• Metaphysical theories
• Kant's Categorical Imperative
• Aristotle's Four Causes
• Plato's Theory of Forms
• Hegel's Dialectic
• Ethical theories
• Aesthetic theories
• John Dewey's aesthetic theory
• Immanuel Kant's aesthetic theory
• Modern philosophical texts
• Foucault's The Order of Things
• Descartes' Meditations
• Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil
• Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
• Ancient philosophical texts
• Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
• Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
• Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
• Plato's Republic
• Ancient philosophers
• Modern philosophers
• Modern philosophical schools
• German Idealism
• British Empiricism
• Ancient philosophical schools
• The Skeptic school
• The Cynic school
• The Stoic school
• The Epicurean school
• The Socratic school
• Philosophy of Language
• Semantics and Pragmatics of Language Usage
• Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
• Meaning of Words and Phrases
• Philosophy of Science
• Scientific Realism and Rationalism
• Induction and the Hypothetico-Deductive Model
• Theory-Ladenness and Underdetermination
• Philosophy of Mind
• Mind-Body Dualism and Emergentism
• Materialism and Physicalism
• Identity Theory and Personal Identity
• Philosophy of Religion
• Religious Pluralism and Exclusivism
• The Problem of Evil and Suffering
• Religious Experience and Faith
• Metaphysical Theories
• Idealism and Realism
• Determinism, Fatalism, and Libertarianism
• Phenomenalism and Nominalism
• Epistemological Theories
• Intuitionism, Skepticism, and Agnosticism
• Rationalism and Empiricism
• Foundationalism and Coherentism
• Aesthetic Theories
• Formalist Aesthetics, Emotional Aesthetics, Experiential Aesthetics
• Relational Aesthetics, Sociological Aesthetics, Historical Aesthetics
• Naturalistic Aesthetics, Immanent Aesthetics, Transcendental Aesthetics
• Ethical Theories
• Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, Deontology
• Subjectivism, Egoism, Hedonism
• Social Contract Theory, Natural Law Theory, Care Ethics
• Metaphysical Terms
• Cause, Necessity, Possibility, Impossibility
• Identity, Persistence, Time, Space
• Substance, Attribute, Essence, Accident
• Logic and Argumentation Terms
• Analogy, Syllogism, Deduction, Induction
• Inference, Validity, Soundness, Refutation
• Premise, Conclusion, Entailment, Contradiction
• Epistemological Terms
• Perception and Knowledge Claims
• Infallibility, Verifiability, Coherence Theory of Truth
• Justification, Beliefs and Truths
• Ethical Terms
• Modern Texts
• A Vindication of the Rights of Woman by Mary Wollstonecraft
• Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Friedrich Nietzsche
• The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant
• Medieval Texts
• The Guide for the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides
• The Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas
• The Incoherence of the Incoherence by Averroes
• Ancient Texts
• The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle
• The Art of Rhetoric by Cicero
• The Republic by Plato
• Hegel's Dialectic: A Comprehensive Overview
• Philosophical theories

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectic is one of the most influential philosophical theories of the modern era. It has been studied and debated for centuries, and its influence can be seen in many aspects of modern thought. Hegel's dialectic has been used to explain a wide range of topics from politics to art, from science to religion. In this comprehensive overview, we will explore the major tenets of Hegel's dialectic and its implications for our understanding of the world. Hegel's dialectic is based on the premise that all things have an inherent contradiction between their opposites.

It follows that any idea or concept can be understood through a synthesis of the two opposing forces. This synthesis creates a new and higher understanding, which then leads to further progress and development. Hegel's dialectic has been used in many different fields, from philosophy to economics, and it provides an important framework for understanding how our world works. In this article, we will explore the historical origins and development of Hegel's dialectic. We will also examine its application in various fields, from politics to art, from science to religion.

Finally, we will consider the implications of Hegel's dialectic for our understanding of the world today. Hegel's dialectic is a philosophical theory developed by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the early 19th century. It is based on the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis , which are steps in the process of progress. The thesis is an idea or statement that is the starting point of an argument. The antithesis is a statement that contradicts or negates the thesis.

The synthesis is a combination of the two opposing ideas, which produces a new idea or statement. This process can be repeated multiple times, leading to an evolution of ideas. Hegel's dialectic has been used in many fields, such as politics and economics . It has been used to explain how ideas progress through debate and discussion.

In politics, it has been used to explain how different points of view can lead to compromise or resolution. In economics, it has been used to explain how different economic theories can lead to new solutions and strategies. Hegel's dialectic can also be applied to everyday life. For example, it can be used to resolve conflicts between people or groups.

Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis

Thesis and antithesis are two conflicting ideas, while synthesis is the result of their interaction. The dialectic process is a way of understanding how the world works, as it helps to explain the constant flux of ideas and events. It also helps to explain how change and progress are possible. Thesis and antithesis can be thought of as two sides of a coin. One side represents an idea or opinion, while the other side represents its opposite.

When the two sides come together, they create a synthesis that incorporates both sides. This synthesis can then be used to create new ideas or opinions. The dialectic process can be applied in various contexts, such as politics and economics. In politics, it can be used to explain how different factions come together to create policies that are beneficial to all parties. In economics, it can be used to explain how supply and demand interact to create a stable market. Hegel's dialectic can also be used in everyday life.

Applications of Hegel's Dialectic

For example, in the political sphere, it can be used to explore how different ideologies can be reconciled or how compromises can be reached. In economics, Hegel's dialectic has been used to explain the process of economic growth and development. It can be seen as a way of understanding how different economic systems interact with each other and how different economic actors are affected by changes in the marketplace. For example, it can help to explain how different economic policies can lead to different outcomes. Hegel's dialectic has also been applied to other social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology. In particular, it has been used to explore how different social systems interact with each other and how different social groups are affected by changes in their environment.

Using Hegel's Dialectic in Everyday Life

This process can be used to explain how various aspects of life, such as career or relationships, evolve over time. Thesis represents an idea or concept, while antithesis represents the opposite of that idea or concept. Synthesis is the resolution between the two opposing forces. This process is repeated until a conclusion is reached.

For example, in a career conflict between two people, one might present an idea while the other presents the opposite idea. Through discussion and negotiation, the two parties can come to a synthesis that meets both their needs. Hegel's dialectic can also be used to resolve conflicts between groups of people. It involves each party presenting their ideas and opinions, then engaging in dialogue to reach a compromise or agreement.

This process can be applied to any area of life, from politics and economics to relationships and personal growth. It helps to create understanding and respect between different perspectives, allowing everyone to come together in a meaningful way. By understanding and applying Hegel's dialectic in everyday life, we can better navigate our relationships and interactions with others. Through dialogue, negotiation, and compromise we can work towards resolutions that benefit all parties involved.

In economics, it has been used to explain how market forces interact with each other and how different economic theories can be used to explain the same phenomenon. The dialectic has also been used in other fields such as philosophy, science, and psychology. In philosophy, it has been used to explain the relationship between theory and practice and how theories evolve over time. In science, it has been used to explain the relationship between empirical evidence and logical reasoning.

This theory can be applied to any area of life, from career to relationships. The core of Hegel's dialectic involves the concept of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which is a way of understanding how ideas evolve over time. In this way, the dialectic helps to identify contradictions in a situation and find a resolution through synthesis. In terms of its application to everyday life, the dialectic can be used to find common ground between two opposing sides. For example, if two people are in disagreement, the dialectic can help them identify the underlying issues and then work to resolve them.

Additionally, it can help individuals and groups identify areas where they have common interests, which can lead to more productive conversations and outcomes. The dialectic is also useful in understanding how different perspectives can lead to different solutions. By recognizing different points of view, individuals and groups can gain insight into why certain solutions may not work for everyone involved. This can help to create a more productive environment for collaboration. Finally, the dialectic can be used as a tool for self-reflection. By understanding how different ideas evolve over time and how different perspectives interact, individuals can gain insight into their own views and values.

For example, it can be used to explain the development of a new policy proposal or a new form of government. In economics, Hegel's dialectic can be used to explain the dynamics of supply and demand, or the emergence of a new economic system. In addition, Hegel's dialectic has been applied in other areas, such as education and religion. In education, this theory can be used to explain the process of learning and understanding new concepts. In religion, it can be used to explain the evolution of religious beliefs and practices over time.

This is followed by a synthesis of the two, which creates a new, higher form of understanding. This new understanding then forms the basis for further analysis, which can lead to further synthesis and resolution. Hegel's dialectic can be applied to any area of life, such as career or relationships. For example, if two people have different approaches to a problem, they can use the dialectic to work together to find a solution that works for both of them.

This could involve identifying their respective points of view and then looking for common ground where they can agree. As the synthesis forms, it can provide a basis for further discussion, which may eventually lead to a resolution. The same process can be used to resolve conflicts between groups, such as political parties or countries. By recognizing each side's point of view and then looking for common ground, it is possible to find ways to bridge the divide between them.

This can help create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect, which can lead to constructive dialogue and positive outcomes. Hegel's dialectic is a valuable tool for helping people and groups come to agreement and harmony despite their differences. By recognizing both sides' points of view and then looking for common ground, it is possible to create a synthesis that can provide a basis for further discussion and resolution. Hegel's dialectic is a powerful philosophical tool that helps to explain how ideas evolve over time. Through the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, it provides a framework for understanding how opposing forces interact and ultimately create new ideas and solutions.

This theory has been applied to many areas, such as politics and economics, and can be used in everyday life. The article has provided a comprehensive overview of Hegel's dialectic and its various applications.

Top Articles

• Philosophy of Art: Exploring Aesthetics and Beauty

• Exploring Plato's Republic

• Understanding Inductive Reasoning and Analogy

• Exploring Expression: A Philosophical and Aesthetic Overview
• Exploring the Theory of Forms: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring Moral Relativism: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring the Philosophy of Art

Classical Greek Philosophy: A Comprehensive Overview

• Understanding Utilitarianism: A Guide
• Exploring Pragmatism: A Modern Philosophy
• Analytic Philosophy: A Comprehensive Overview

Medieval Philosophy: An Overview

• Epistemology: Understanding the Nature of Knowledge
• Exploring the Ideas of Enlightenment Philosophy
• Exploring Idealism: The History and Concepts of a Modern Philosophy
• Exploring Pre-Socratic Philosophy: An Overview
• Exploring Ontology: A Comprehensive Overview
• Understanding Inference: A Comprehensive Overview

Philosophy of Language: Exploring the Ways We Communicate

• Understanding Fallacies and Logical Errors
• Exploring the Philosophy of Beauty
• Understanding Inductive Reasoning
• Understanding Deontology: Ethics and Principles
• Lateral Thinking: An Overview
• Thought Experiments: Exploring Creative and Philosophical Thinking
• Exploring Skepticism and Doubt: A Philosophical and Critical Thinking Perspective
• Exploring Hellenistic Philosophy: An Introduction
• Exploring Deductive Reasoning
• A Comprehensive Look at Causality
• Exploring the Ontological Argument
• Exploring Egoism: What It Is and What It Means
• Exploring Aristotle's Four Causes
• Exploring Plato's Theory of Forms
• Deontology: An Introduction to an Ethical Theory
• Exploring Virtue Ethics: The Philosophical Theory
• Descartes' Meditations: An Introduction for None
• Aristotle: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
• Exploring Noumenon: A Philosophical and Metaphysical Overview
• Exploring the Life and Legacy of Cicero: An Introduction
• Exploring Taste: A Philosophical and Aesthetic Guide
• Exploring Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil
• Exploring Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
• Descartes: A Comprehensive Overview
• Sublime: An Introduction to Aesthetic and Philosophical Terms
• Understanding Existentialism: A Brief Introduction
• Exploring Friedrich Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Major Modern Philosopher
• Exploring Pragmatism: A Modern Philosophical School
• Exploring the Life and Work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
• German Idealism: A Comprehensive Overview
• Explore The Epicurean School of Ancient Philosophy
• Analytic Philosophy: A Primer
• Exploring Jewish Philosophy
• Exploring the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
• Exploring British Empiricism
• Justification: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring the History and Impact of Empiricism
• Enlightenment: A History of Philosophy
• Perception and Knowledge: An Overview
• Understanding Fallacies and Rebuttals
• Exploring Applied Ethics
• Exploring Critical Thinking and Decision Making
• Exploring Theology: A Comprehensive Overview
• Exploring the Rationalism of Renaissance Philosophy
• Exploring Moral Psychology: A Closer Look
• Exploring Identity Theory and Personal Identity
• Exploring Quantitative Research Methods in Philosophy
• Exploring the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction in Philosophy of Language
• Exploring the Role of Research Design and Methodology
• Understanding the Meaning of Words and Phrases
• The Problem of Evil and Suffering: A Philosophical Exploration
• Exploring the Concepts of Cause, Necessity, Possibility, and Impossibility
• Comparing Analogy, Syllogism, Deduction and Induction
• Exploring Aesthetic Theories: Formalism, Emotionalism and Experientialism
• Understanding Inference, Validity, Soundness, and Refutation
• Exploring Relational Aesthetics, Sociological Aesthetics, and Historical Aesthetics
• Exploring Naturalistic, Immanent and Transcendental Aesthetics
• Exploring Rationalism and Empiricism
• Understanding Determinism, Fatalism, and Libertarianism
• Exploring Identity, Persistence, Time, and Space
• Understanding Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism and Deontology
• Exploring Phenomenalism and Nominalism
• Ethical Theories: Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, and Deontology
• Exploring Justification, Beliefs and Truths
• Foundationalism and Coherentism: An Overview
• Exploring Social Contract Theory, Natural Law Theory, and Care Ethics
• An Overview of Friedrich Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra
• Exploring Subjectivism, Egoism and Hedonism
• The Art of Rhetoric by Cicero: A Comprehensive Overview

New Articles

Which cookies do you want to accept?

• Corrections

What Is Hegel’s Dialectic Method?

A brief presentation of Hegel’s metaphysical doctrine, while exploring his conception of logic and dialectic method.

When considering Hegel’s contribution to logic, nothing is more significant than his dialectic method. The method is prevalent in almost all of his works, the most notable being Logic , Philosophy of History , and Phenomenology of Spirit . He describes it as “the only true method” and the basic principle of all his theories. Thanks to his dialectics, we get the peculiar kind of philosophy that he comes up with. But what does the dialectic method consist of? And, more importantly, how did it shape his philosophy?

Hegel’s Conception of Logic

First, let’s look at Hegel’s conception of logic to understand his dialectic method in its entirety. In the introduction to his Science of Logic , Hegel tells us that the goal of logic is truth. However, he is not referring to the traditional understanding of logic, analyzing the statement purely by its form and not diving into the content of it. Because, after all, the content can be anything. Logic usually studies forms of argument such as follows:

Everything that is A is B

Therefore, x is B

Get the latest articles delivered to your inbox

Please check your inbox to activate your subscription.

Here, we have a form without content. We could write ‘human’, ‘mortal’, and ‘Socrates’ for A, B, or x. The argument would be valid in either case but not necessarily true. That’s why logicians conclude that logic tells us nothing about the actual world. Hegel takes this stance as well. And when he says that the goal of logic is truth, he is certainly not referring to the formal logic we mentioned here but to something else. Logic, he says, is the study of thought. But in his Phenomenology of Spirit, he shows that there is no objective reality independent of thought. Thought is objective reality, and objective reality is thought. Therefore, when logic studies thought, it must also be studying reality.

So, in saying that logic is not about the world of nature, Hegel accepts part of the traditional view. However, he goes further with the idea that reality, or truth, can be found only in the world of nature and people. Ultimate reality is to be found in what is mental or intellectual, not in what is material. It is to be found in rational thought. Logic is the study of this ultimate reality in its pure form, abstracted from the particular forms it takes in the finite minds of human beings or the natural world.

The Dialectic Method

Now, let’s see the connection between logic and the dialectic method to determine precisely what the method consists of. Hegel describes the dialectic method as “the only true method” of scholarly and scientific exposition. He uses this method in Logic to uncover the form of pure thought.

Let’s explain his dialectic with an example from his Philosophy of History . Here, Hegel tells us that one immense dialectical movement has dominated world history from the Greek world to the present. Greece was a society based on customary morality, a harmonious society in which citizens identified themselves with the community and had no thought of acting in opposition. This customary community forms the starting point of the dialectical movement known as the thesis .

The next stage is for the thesis to show itself to be inadequate or inconsistent. In ancient Greece, this inadequacy is revealed through the life and death of Socrates. Socrates was the one who initiated the citizens of the community to think for themselves, and thus, intellectual thought was born. As a result, the community based on custom collapsed in the name of the principle of independent thought. This reformation brings acceptance of the supreme right of individual conscience. The harmony of the Greek community has been lost, but freedom is triumphant. This is the second stage of the dialectical movement. It is the opposite or negation of the first stage, known as antithesis .

The second stage then also shows itself to be inadequate. Freedom, taken by itself, turns out to be too abstract and barren to serve as the basis of society. When put into practice, the principle of absolute freedom turns into the terror of the French Revolution . We can then see that individuals’ customary harmony and abstract freedom are one-sided. They must be brought together and unified in a manner that preserves them and avoids their different forms of one-sidedness. This results in a third and more adequate stage, the synthesis .

In the Philosophy of History, the synthesis in the overall dialectic movement is the German society of Hegel’s time. He saw it as harmonious because it was an organic community yet preserved individual freedom because it was rationally organized. To summarize, every dialectical movement takes the following path:

thesis – antithesis – synthesis 

Every dialectical movement terminates with a synthesis, but not every synthesis stops the dialectic process. The synthesis, though adequately reconciling the previous thesis and antithesis, will be one-sided in some other aspect. It will then serve as the thesis for a new dialectical movement, so the process will continue.

In Logic, the same method is applied to the abstract categories in which we think. Hegel starts with the most indeterminate concept: being, or bare existence. Pure being, he says, is pure indeterminateness. Pure being has in it no object for thought to grasp. It is entirely empty. In fact, it is nothing. From this beginning, the dialectic of his Logic moves forward. The first thesis, being , has turned into its antithesis, nothing . Being and nothing are opposite and the same – their truth, therefore, is that movement into and apart from each other. In other words, it is becoming . So, the dialectic leads on and on (Peter Singer, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, 103).

For Hegel, dialectics is a method of exposition, and it works because the world works dialectically.

The Absolute Idea

The dialectic method has its end in the absolute idea. It is the ending point for the method – from the thesis to the antithesis, then with the synthesis, we try to overcome the one-sidedness until we reach “the absolute idea.”

It seems as though the Logic parallels the Phenomenology of Spirit , except that it moves in the realm of concepts instead of in the realm of consciousness. Accordingly, it has as its goal not absolute knowledge but the absolute idea itself. But what is the absolute idea? Well, it is everything. Although that may seem like we’re explaining too much with just one word, it literally means everything. Hegel says that the absolute idea “contains every determinate-ness.” By that, he means that it includes within itself every determinate or distinct thing – every human being, every tree, every star, every flower, every grain of sand. Nature and mind, he says, are different ways in which their existence is manifested – they are different forms of the absolute idea.

It is the essence of the absolute idea to manifest itself in distinct, limited forms and then return to itself. Self-comprehension is the form in which it returns to itself. This is the process we observed in his Logic , Philosophy of History, and the Phenomenology of Spirit .

The End of Transcendental Idealism

Hegel’s dialectic approach, known as Absolute Idealism or Absolute Spirit, can be seen as a response to Kant’s dualism between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. Hegel rejected the notion of a fixed and unknowable realm of things-in-themselves and instead proposed that reality is fundamentally a dynamic and interconnected process.

According to Hegel, reality unfolds through a dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. He argued that the development of consciousness and knowledge occurs through the clash and reconciliation of opposing concepts or categories. Hegel believed that an inherent impulse toward self-realization and self-understanding drives the movement of thought, history, and spirit.

In Hegel’s view, the Absolute Spirit is the ultimate reality that encompasses and transcends all particular manifestations of thought and existence. It is a dynamic and evolving process that includes reality’s subjective and objective dimensions. By embracing the dialectical method and expanding the scope of inquiry beyond the limits of Kant’s dualism, Hegel aimed to reconcile the subjective and objective aspects of reality and provide a comprehensive account of knowledge and existence. In this sense, he transcends Kant’s transcendental idealism by presenting a more expansive and holistic understanding of reality.

What is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Political Philosophy?

By Antonio Panovski BA Philosophy Antonio holds a BA in Philosophy from SS. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, North Macedonia. His main areas of interest are contemporary, as well as analytic philosophy, with a special focus on the epistemological aspect of them, although he’s currently thoroughly examining the philosophy of science. Besides writing, he loves cinema, music, and traveling.

Frequently Read Together

Where Was Ancient Greece Located?

What Were the City States of Ancient Greece?

The French Revolution in 5 Iconic Paintings

• Scholarly Community Encyclopedia
• Log in/Sign up

Video Upload Options

• MDPI and ACS Style
• Chicago Style

In philosophy, the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese; originally: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis) is a progression of three ideas or propositions. The first idea, the thesis, is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis, that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis, resolves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. It is often used to explain the dialectical method of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but Hegel never used the terms himself; instead his triad was concrete, abstract, absolute. The thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad actually originated with Johann Fichte.

1. History of the Idea

Thomas McFarland (2002), in his Prolegomena to Coleridge's Opus Maximum , [ 1 ] identifies Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as the genesis of the thesis/antithesis dyad. Kant concretises his ideas into:

• Thesis: "The world has a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space."
• Antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space."

Inasmuch as conjectures like these can be said to be resolvable, Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations of the Science of Knowledge , 1794) resolved Kant's dyad by synthesis, posing the question thus: [ 1 ]

• No synthesis is possible without a preceding antithesis. As little as antithesis without synthesis, or synthesis without antithesis, is possible; just as little possible are both without thesis.

Fichte employed the triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" as a formula for the explanation of change. [ 2 ] Fichte was the first to use the trilogy of words together, [ 3 ] in his Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (1795, Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty ): "Die jetzt aufgezeigte Handlung ist thetisch, antithetisch und synthetisch zugleich." ["The action here described is simultaneously thetic, antithetic, and synthetic." [ 4 ] ]

Still according to McFarland, Schelling then, in his Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), arranged the terms schematically in pyramidal form.

According to Walter Kaufmann (1966), although the triad is often thought to form part of an analysis of historical and philosophical progress called the Hegelian dialectic, the assumption is erroneous: [ 5 ]

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Gustav E. Mueller (1958) concurs that Hegel was not a proponent of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and clarifies what the concept of dialectic might have meant in Hegel's thought. [ 6 ]

"Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".

According to Mueller, the attribution of this tripartite dialectic to Hegel is the result of "inept reading" and simplistic translations which do not take into account the genesis of Hegel's terms:

Hegel's greatness is as indisputable as his obscurity. The matter is due to his peculiar terminology and style; they are undoubtedly involved and complicated, and seem excessively abstract. These linguistic troubles, in turn, have given rise to legends which are like perverse and magic spectacles – once you wear them, the text simply vanishes. Theodor Haering's monumental and standard work has for the first time cleared up the linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved – though it was complete when he began to publish. Hegel's contemporaries were immediately baffled, because what was clear to him was not clear to his readers, who were not initiated into the genesis of his terms. An example of how a legend can grow on inept reading is this: Translate "Begriff" by "concept," "Vernunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science" – and they are all good dictionary translations – and you have transformed the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd pan-logistic rationalism and scientism. The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." [ 7 ]

Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) adopted and extended the triad, especially in Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). Here, in Chapter 2, Marx is obsessed by the word "thesis"; [ 8 ] it forms an important part of the basis for the Marxist theory of history. [ 9 ]

2. Writing Pedagogy

In modern times, the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been implemented across the world as a strategy for organizing expositional writing. For example, this technique is taught as a basic organizing principle in French schools: [ 10 ]

The French learn to value and practice eloquence from a young age. Almost from day one, students are taught to produce plans for their compositions, and are graded on them. The structures change with fashions. Youngsters were once taught to express a progression of ideas. Now they follow a dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. If you listen carefully to the French arguing about any topic they all follow this model closely: they present an idea, explain possible objections to it, and then sum up their conclusions. ... This analytical mode of reasoning is integrated into the entire school corpus.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis has also been used as a basic scheme to organize writing in the English language. For example, the website WikiPreMed.com advocates the use of this scheme in writing timed essays for the MCAT standardized test: [ 11 ]

For the purposes of writing MCAT essays, the dialectic describes the progression of ideas in a critical thought process that is the force driving your argument. A good dialectical progression propels your arguments in a way that is satisfying to the reader. The thesis is an intellectual proposition. The antithesis is a critical perspective on the thesis. The synthesis solves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis by reconciling their common truths, and forming a new proposition.

• Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Opus Maximum. Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 89.
• Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History. Greenwood Publishing Group (1986), p.114
• Williams, Robert R. (1992). Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. SUNY Press. p. 46, note 37. 
• Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Breazeale, Daniel (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. p. 249. 
• Walter Kaufmann (1966). "§ 37". Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-268-01068-3. OCLC 3168016. https://archive.org/details/hegelreinterpret00kauf. 
• Mueller, Gustav (1958). "The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (4): 411–414. doi:10.2307/2708045.  https://dx.doi.org/10.2307%2F2708045
• Mueller 1958, p. 411.
• marxists.org: Chapter 2 of "The Poverty of Philosophy", by Karl Marx https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm
• Shrimp, Kaleb (2009). "The Validity of Karl Marx's Theory of Historical Materialism". Major Themes in Economics 11 (1): 35–56. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol11/iss1/5/. Retrieved 13 September 2018. 
• Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French. Sourcebooks, Inc.. p. 62. https://archive.org/details/sixtymillionfren00nade_041. 
• "The MCAT writing assignment.". Wisebridge Learning Systems, LLC. http://www.wikipremed.com/mcat_essay.php. Retrieved 1 November 2015. 

• Terms and Conditions
• Privacy Policy
• Advisory Board

Your complimentary articles

You’ve read one of your four complimentary articles for this month.

You can read four articles free per month. To have complete access to the thousands of philosophy articles on this site, please

Hegel & History

Hegel’s understanding of history, jack fox-williams outlines the basics of how history works for hegel..

One of Hegel’s most interesting but misunderstood areas of enquiry concerns history, particularly his so-called ‘dialectical’ approach to understanding the development of human society. This article aims to provide a brief but useful outline of Hegel’s historical theory, and demonstrate its relevance to the modern age.

Hegel’s Classification of History

In his Introduction to Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1837), Hegel argues that there are three ways of doing history.

The first of these is original history. Original history refers to first-hand accounts of events, actions and situations, collected or verified by the historian himself. It includes the historian’s own experiences as part of the history he’s recording. Hegel says that the purpose of original history is to create a ‘mental representation’ of phenomena. Contemporary historians aim to record recent and current events with precision and accuracy, explaining and summarising it simply.

However, as Duncan Forbes writes in his introduction to the Introduction , “the first, most primitive (that is logically primitive) kind of history, ‘original’ history, is barely history at all in so far as it represents an immediate unity between the historian’s consciousness; this sort of contemporary history is necessarily limited.” Forbes argues that it is impossible for the original historian to provide much theory on, or even reflect very comprehensively on, events he has only just witnessed. As Hegel notes, original history constitutes a ‘portrait of a time’ rather than an academic analysis of past events. Hegel cites Thucydides and Herodotus as prime examples of original historians, since their accounts constitute a “history whose spirit the historian has shared in.” Consequently, their accounts express “the maxims of their nation and their own personality, their consciousness of their political position and of their moral spiritual nature, and the principles which underlie their designs and conflict.” So by examining this sort of history, we can acquire a greater understanding of a culture’s customs, beliefs, and practices, and so penetrate into the essence of a specific period. Speeches recorded in historical accounts are uniquely valuable in this regard, since they embody a particular time and place; they constitute ‘effective actions in their very essence’, and provide us with a sense of history as it unfolded at the time. They cannot be regarded as disinterested reflections on the historical process, but as ‘integral components of history’ recorded by historians who embody the cultural consciousness of the speaker. As Hegel observes in his Introduction , “speeches are actions among human beings; indeed, they are extremely important momentous actions… Speeches on a national or international plane, issuing from nations themselves or from their sovereigns, are actions and, as such, are an essential object of history (and particularly of earlier history).”

According to Hegel, it is possible to distinguish three stages of original history. In antiquity, it was primarily statesmen (or their scribes) who recorded history. During the Middle Ages, monks assumed the role, since they had the time and education to record the world around them. Hegel observes that in his own time “all this has changed… Our culture immediately converts all events into reports for intellectual representation.”

A second type of history discussed by Hegel is reflective history . Unlike original history, reflective history is not limited to a particular timeframe. It transcends the present culture. It attempts to provide a summary of histories or historical events that have already occurred – in other words, records of a particular culture, country, or period.

Hegel separates reflective history into universal history, pragmatic history, critical history, and specialised history. Universal history aims to provide an entire history of, say, a people, or even of the world. In the case of world histories, significant events must be condensed into brief statements, and the author’s own opinions are integral to the account. Pragmatic history, on the other hand, has a theory or ideology behind it; events are “connected into one pattern in their universal and inner meaning.” The pragmatic account also has more to do with reflections on the historical process, and is not merely about reporting what occurred during a specific period.

Critical reflective history is based on research into the accuracy of historical accounts, and presents alternative explanations and narratives. Hegel is himself critical of this particular type of history, which apparently ‘extorts’ new discourse from existing accounts. He believes that this is a crude and futile way to achieve ‘reality’, that is, understanding, in history, since it replaces facts with subjective impressions and call these impressions reality.

The last type of reflective history that Hegel mentions is ‘specialised history’. Specialised history focuses on a specific historical topic, such as the history of art, law, or religion.

History & Reason

Hegel’s third way of doing history, philosophical history , prioritises thought above event-commentary, synthesising philosophical concepts and ideas with historical information. Hegel himself is doing this kind of activity when he famously argues that the process of human history is a process of self-recognition guided by ‘the principle of reason’.

For Hegel, nature is the embodiment of reason. In the same way that nature strives towards increasing complexity and harmony, so does the world spirit through the historical process. The Presocratic philosopher Anaxagoras (c.500-428 BC) was the first person to argue that nous (meaning reason, or maybe understanding in general) ultimately governs the world – not as an intelligence, but like a fundamental essence of being. Hegel stresses the importance of this distinction, using the solar system as an example. He writes:

“The motion of the solar system proceeds according to immutable laws; these laws are its reason. But neither the sun nor the planets which according to these laws rotate around it, have any consciousness of it. Thus, the thought that there is reason in nature, that nature is ruled by universal, unchangeable laws, does not surprise us; we are used to it and make very little of it…” ( Reason in History ).

Moreover, Hegel argues that evidence of reason is revealed through religious truth, which demonstrates that the world is governed not by chance but by a Providence. During profound moments of spiritual epiphany, we come to the realisation that a divine order presides over the world. Providence is wisdom endowed with an infinite power, which realises its own purpose, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world; reason is “thought determining itself in absolute freedom.” Hegel suggests that many stages of human history appear irrational and regressive because society is made up of individuals guided by passions, impulses and external forces. However, behind the seeming irregularity of human history lies a divine plan that is hidden from view and yet actualises itself through the historical process. As a result of the many conflicts, revolutions and revolts that society endures, humanity attains a greater glimpse of reason.

Hegel goes even further in the development of his argument and suggests that the realisation of reason in history also serves as a justification for belief in God. He acknowledges that history reveals the cruelty and sadism of human nature, but urges “recognition of the positive elements in which the negative element disappears as something subordinate and vanquished.” Through the consciousness of reason, we recognise that the ultimate purpose of the world is incrementally actualised through those occasional historical events which bring about positive transformation and change. In this sense, Hegel presents a highly progressive view of history, perceiving the development of human society as a dynamic process by which our rational faculties become ever more refined and cultivated. Although, there is evil in the world, reason ultimately triumphs.

History as a Manifestation of Spirit

Hegel’s providence is not the providence of the Judeo-Christian God. Rather, Hegel argues that universal history is itself the divine Spirit or Geist manifesting or working.

Hegel claims that “all will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is endowed with Freedom… Freedom is the soul truth of Spirit” ( Introduction ). For Hegel, history unfolds as the self-actualisation of Spirit, eventually resolving itself into the manifestation of true human liberty through the freest form of government. He further argues that self-consciousness is synonymous with the freedom of Spirit – freedom is self-consciousness – since self-consciousness depends on its own being to come into actuality, so must create itself in absolute freedom. And in regards to history, Hegel argues that universal history is the ultimate exhibition of Spirit “in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially” ( Introduction ). And that which it potentially is, in essence, is freedom. This is why the culmination of the process of history which is the Spirit’s developing knowledge of itself is a knowledge of absolute freedom, through the freest possible political state.

Hegel uses historical examples to demonstrate the process by which the freedom of Spirit becomes actualised through human history. First, he asserts that the origin of the state is not through a ‘social contract’ freely entered into by people, as philosophers such as Hobbes had argued. Rather, to be human means to inhabit a society with other human beings, following basic codes, laws, rules and norms. In other words, it is impossible that humanity existed in a pre-political condition, because politics is a fundamental part of our nature.

According to Hegel’s understanding, politics passes through three stages: from that of the family (or tribe) to civil society, to the state. The state is the ultimate manifestation of Spirit since its development marks an increasing human autonomy. As Hegel writes, “the freedom of nature… is not anything real; for the state is the first realisation of freedom” ( Introduction ). This is due to the fact that members of a state give up their individualism to support the freedom of the community as a whole, and for Hegel, true freedom is communal. We might explain this by saying that without the state, the rights of the individual would become paramount, compromising the greater good of humanity, and so the greater freedom of the Spirit.

Hegel states that original historical cultures, which he calls ‘Oriental’ cultures, including for instance ancient Persia and China, did not attain knowledge of Spirit since they believed that man is not ultimately free. He thought that the Oriental mind-set was instead towards tyranny: to think that people should be governed by a divine ruler or absolute king. This is freedom for only one person: the ruler! The Greeks were aware of freedom, and rejected tyranny for democracy, which is political freedom for the voting set. Their freedom was maintained under conditions of slavery – a fact that made “liberty on the one hand only an accidental, transient and limited growth; on the other hand, it constituted a rigorous thraldom of our common nature of the Human.” So according to Hegel, the German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to come to the realisation that man possesses free will. And even while slavery still occurred under Christianity and subsequent political systems, the notion of individual freedom has become central to states, governments, and constitutions, first in the West, then elsewhere.

Hegel’s Dialectic

For Hegel, historical development proceeds not in a straight line “but in a spiral and leading upwards to growth and progress. This is where action follows reaction; from the opposition of action and reaction a harmony or synthesis results” (‘The Individual, The State and Political Freedom in Hegel’, Uchenna Osigwe, 2014). Whereas many other political thinkers have postulated that political history goes through absolute monarchy to despotism to democracy, Hegel believed that it goes from despotism to democracy, to constitutional monarchy, which combines the features of both despotism and democracy while transcending both. So Hegel uses a ‘dialectical’ approach to examine the course of human history. The dialectic is frequently described in terms of a thesis giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis , which contradicts or negates the thesis; and then the tension between the two is resolved by means of a synthesis of them. Then the synthesis becomes the new thesis… However, Hegel never used this specific terminology (which was originally ascribed to Kant).

The notion that history follows a dialectical pattern can be observed in a more modern context. Communist (socialist) ideologies were a reaction against capitalism, but failed to create sustainable social, political and economic systems, and resulted in the deaths of millions of people around the world. But after the end of the two World Wars, European nations adopted the liberal democratic system – a synthesis of socialism and capitalism. While the state is charged with the responsibility of governing certain aspects of society, such as the law or the military, and other key services, it also promotes business and free-trade. In terms of Hegel’s dialectic, the contradiction of views between socialism and capitalism resulted in a liberal democratic synthesis.

Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man famously argued for the Hegelian concept of the end of History. According to Fukuyama, history has already reached its final stage, in which dialectical ideological conflict is finally eradicated and replaced by a single, universal ideology. Thus, when Communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe and those countries looked towards the West, this demonstrated the victory of liberalism.

European countries have not engaged in any major conflict with each other since the Second World War, and Europe has since flourished under the principles of liberal democracy, socially, economically and politically. In this sense, Hegel’s vision of history as a progressive development of political freedom is partially supported by recent historical events.

© Jack Fox-Williams 2020

Jack Fox-Williams graduated from Goldsmiths University with a BA (Hons) in History and History of Ideas, then took a Masters in Law at the Open University. He is currently a doctoral student at the University of Portsmouth and is writing a book on the works of Nietzsche.

Hegel’s Dialectic in a Coffee Cup

Hegel’s theory of dialectics constitutes the last great philosophical system. History is a process that includes everything and everyone, a process in which we all participate. Hegel’s fundamental idea is that history is not a matter of dates and battles and events, but of ‘logic’. It is about how ideas and beliefs interact and develop out of one another, because ideas rule everything else.

Since we are all part of this process, philosophers can think only within the confines of their own historical horizon. This means that philosophy itself is tied to history. To Hegel, philosophy is “its time grasped in thought”. We cannot step outside time, and there is no eternal realm of reason. History and thought emerge together! So, what we try to understand is a complex organic structure, and it is vital to grasp how its parts, which Hegel calls ‘categories’, are connected.

The link between the categories is called the ‘dialectic’. This is an objective order, inherent in the deep structure of things, and characterised by contradiction. Note that therefore to Hegel the dialectic is not simply a method that we apply to understand history. It is the way things actually work in the world. It is not something we make up but something we discover.

Hegel says the dialectic has a three-step structure. Let’s take the example of a historical development involving three categories, from A to B to C. Hegel calls A ‘the immediate’, a self-contained state of affairs. As soon as you spell out A, you must refer to its opposite, B, which is what Hegel calls the ‘first negative’. You realise that A is necessarily connected with its opposite. B is the negation of A, but it is also a modified A: it contains elements of its opposite. But that brings us to a third category, C, which he calls the ‘second negative’. Why? Well, in trying to spell out what B is you realise you must refer back to the previously modified A. C is therefore the negation of B. It constitutes a ‘simple calm unit’: You can imagine this process like dropping a piece of sugar into a glass of water. Once the sugar has dissolved, there is only a homogenous whole. It is inherent in the nature of categories that they contradict each other. Contradiction is characteristic of the nature of reality.

Hegel has a speculative word that describes what happens during a dialectic movement: ‘sublation’. It has three meanings all of which are important to the dialectic:

1. to lift up (every movement, A to B or B to C, means a progression to a higher, more sophisticated level);

2. to preserve (in B something of A is preserved, in C something of A and B is preserved);

3. to negate (B negates A, C negates B).

This sound technical, but Hegel thought sublation to be a normal part of the unfolding of historical events. Indeed, it doesn’t just describe the clashing of ideologies on a grand historical scale, but is a part of everyday human life. Let’s take a look at an example.

The immediate : You wake up and you think that coffee is the best drink in the world and definitely what you want now. Immediately! So you drink four cups with your breakfast.

First negative : Then you feel really sick. Your new position is that you will never drink coffee again.

Second negative : In reaction to the other two categories, a further category develops which preserves something of both of them, but represents a more sophisticated level. You decide that coffee is great in moderation and that you will only ever drink one cup of coffee a day in future.

Anja Steinbauer

This site uses cookies to recognize users and allow us to analyse site usage. By continuing to browse the site with cookies enabled in your browser, you consent to the use of cookies in accordance with our privacy policy . X

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Hegel’s Social and Political Philosophy

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) developed a philosophy based on freedom within a wider philosophical system offering novel views on topics ranging from property and punishment to morality and the state.

Hegel’s main work was the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (“ PR ”) first published in 1821. Many of his other major works include discussions or analyses connected to his social and political philosophy. He also wrote various political essays during his career, many of which have been translated (Hegel 1999). His work has been a major influence on significant figures from Karl Marx to Charles Taylor and beyond.

This entry provides an overview about how Hegel’s ideas have been debated and the core contributions from his PR followed by further readings.

1.1 Conservativism and Progressive Readings

1.2 metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings, 1.3 systematic and non-systematic readings, 1.4 the philosophy of right, 2. freedom and right, 3. property, 4. punishment, 5. morality, 6. ethical life, 8. civil society, 10. the state, 11. war and international relations, primary literature, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the place of hegel’s social and political thought.

Hegel’s social and political thought has been a subject of several debates in terms of its form and content.

One such debate concerned whether or not his views endorsed a dangerous conservativism, sometimes described as quietest or reactionary. His double-saying ( Doppelsatz ) in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that “the rational is actual and actual is rational” was read by some as saying that the absolutist Prussia that Hegel lived under was somehow rational and so justified (Haym 1857). Yet, the more detailed comments found in the main body of the Philosophy of Right consistently favour the aims of the Prussian Reform era which were opposed by the newly ascendant reactionaries after 1819 making it difficult to situate this work politically at that time.

This position was taken even further to some extremes by Karl Popper (1966) who claimed that Hegel was “the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism.” This view looked selectively at different remarks we can find in the PR about how the state is “the march of God in the world” found not in Hegel’s own text, but in the published lecture note “Additions” (or Zusätze) by his students included in most editions of the PR today (§258 Addition). Moreover, it was motivated by a philosophical and political stance that had little, if anything, to do with what is actually found in Hegel’s work.

This “conservative” reading of Hegel was challenged later by a more “liberal” interpretation that highlighted the reforms and divergences both cultural and political between Prussia and the PR that make clear that Hegel did not support an authoritarian government, but a new form of democratic institutions complete with jury trials that was more progressive (Avineri 1972, Knox 1970). Hegel held a lifelong admiration for the French Revolution toasting the fall of the Bastille throughout his adult life.

Today, most commentators agree that Popper and others were wrong to claim Hegel endorsed some view of authoritarianism. At the same time, Hegel’s social and political philosophy is more ideologically moderate than the conservativism versus progressivism debate had often admitted. While he did advocate for more democratic and progressive elements than a reality at his time, Hegel did also defend the traditional family and constitutional monarchy. Perhaps purposefully, Hegel’s thought is notoriously difficult to categorize given his interest to overcome and transform ordinary distinctions with a virtual consensus today that his work resists tidy classification as conservative, progressive or anything else.

A second long-standing debate among Anglo-American commentators has concerned the relation of Hegel’s social and political thought to his logic and wider philosophical system. For many decades, the non-metaphysical reading has been the dominant approach. The central position was summed up by Z. A. Pelczynski (1964: 136–37) who said: “Hegel’s political thought can be read, understood, and appreciated without having to come to terms with his metaphysics … some intellectual curiosity may be unsatisfied when metaphysics is left out; a solid volume of political theory and political thinking will still remain.” The non-metaphysical reading follows a broadly analytic philosophical post-Kantian interpretation which sees Hegel as accepting, and even extending, Kant’s critical philosophy (Neuhouser 2000, Pinkard 1994, Pippin 2012). This work is notable for typical focusing attention on the PR grasping it philosophically separately from other parts of Hegel’s system which are sometimes deemed to be overly dark with avoidable metaphysical commitments (Knowles 2002, Wood 1990).

In contrast, the metaphysical reading counters that anti-metaphysical interpretations take a one-sided approach to Hegel’s work (Beiser 2005, Rosen 1984, Taylor 1975). Hegel conceived his PR to be a part of a wider system. Isolating any one text from its wider context may appear to inoculate any such reading from metaphysical claims elsewhere in Hegel’s system. However, only a reading that grasps the full metaphysical foundations of his thought will do justice to his self-understanding (Houlgate 2005).

More recently, scholars have focused on a core contention between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings about what relation, if any, Hegel’s PR has to his wider philosophical system. Most non-metaphysical readings interpret the PR independently of Hegel’s system whereas all metaphysical readings attempt to situate the PR within Hegel’s system. Viewing the debate from this perspective, the core contention is not about the place of metaphysics but the interpretive place of any work within the system.

A non-systematic reading interprets Hegel’s PR explicitly separately from his wider system. This view has few adherents. It runs clearly against Hegel’s own self-understanding stated in the PR ’s Preface where he says the PR “is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic, exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences ” ( PR , p. 9). The PR is explicit that it serves as an elaboration of the section “Objective Spirit” within his philosophical system, and so a part of it.

The now orthodox view is the systematic reading which accepts that Hegel’s logic and system have explanatory force in interpreting the PR (Brooks 2013). There is no denying their connection, only its character and strength. There remain differences about how much the system does or should figure as well as related metaphysical issues (Wood 2017). For example, there is a consensus that Hegel’s political philosophy should be understood within its systematic context, but there remains disagreement about whether we need to accept his arguments for the wider philosophical system in order to accept his contributions to political philosophy. This entry will broadly follow the dominant systematic reading, but acknowledges there is not a consensus on how strongly a justificatory role the system plays for his political thought.

Hegel’s main work of social and political thought was the PR . It was published in 1821 when Hegel taught in Berlin. This entry surveys his primary contributions in this work, but with reference to his other texts and political writings.

Hegel says the PR “is a more extensive” exposition of “Objective Spirit,” a section within his philosophical system called his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (see PM ). The relevant sections of the Encyclopaedia were intended to accompany the lectures that became published as the Philosophy of Right . The full Encyclopaedia begins with an examination of logic and then applies itself to an understanding of nature and the human spirit, where the latter incorporates analyses of psychology, art, history, religion and philosophy in addition to social and political thought.

His approach to form and content is unique. The PR is mostly divided into numbered sections (§). These are occasionally supplemented by later Remarks (R) where Hegel elaborated further in a later edition or Additions (A) which took the form of edited lecture notes of what Hegel had said by his students when teaching the PR . Hegel argues his positions in a dialectical way that is not linear and designed to show how seemingly different perspectives can have their opposition somehow dissolve within a new and higher perspective.

For example, our first apperception of some thing or object of thought might be as a pure being. As it is pure, it may appear to lack determinations – and so be nothing. In this way, Hegel holds that our thought has moved from pure being to pure nothingness. But yet what we apperceive is a something and so this is seen as helping overcome the false opposition of pure being and nothingness to a new, higher category of becoming as what is before is taking further shape as we sharpen our grasp of it. This dialectical method is infused throughout the PR and Hegel says he has “presupposed a familiarity” with his approach found in his logic and wider system ( PR , p. 10, see SL , EL ).

Similarly, the PR moves from basic building blocks that have a somewhat “pure” nature not yet grounded in reality to their negation and then brought together in a higher, concrete reality. After an introduction establishing the PR as primarily a work concerned with freedom, the PR is divided into three parts. The first pure part is Abstract Right covering property and punishment followed by an opposite in Morality covering issues of conscience and moral responsibility. They become unified in a final part Ethical Life providing a more concrete reality that examines the family, civil society, law, the state and ending with war and international relations. Each part shall be discussed in turn.

Hegel conceives the PR primarily as a philosophy of freedom. This is made clear in the PR ’s Introduction, which starts by declaring that “the subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right – the concept of right [ Recht ] and its actualization” ( PR §1). The PR ’s aim to provide a philosophical account of “right” and its realization in the world.

Hegel admits the existence of right is presupposed from his philosophical system, of which the PR elaborates one part ( PR §2). The PR ’s Introduction proceeds to summarise the dialectical argument for the free will discussed at greater length elsewhere in Hegel’s philosophical system. Our will “determines itself” ( PR §4 Addition). The challenge is determining whether or not its content is a product of freedom or mere arbitrariness. We must be able to discern the bare pursuit of being a slave to our passions like, for Hegel, the animal world from the rational world of human beings. Hegel sees the PR as an examination into how “the free will which wills the free will” can be known in form and content ( PR §27).

Hegel defines “right” [ Recht ] as the existence of the free will in the world ( PR §29). So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions.

Following his dialectical method, Hegel approaches the development of our comprehension of right through these stages: Abstract Right, Morality and Ethical Life. We progress from one stage to the next in a distinctive way where apparent contradictions arising in each stage are dissolved through attaining a higher stage, where this cycle is repeated and progress made since the beginning remains present where what was abstract and opaque at first becomes more concrete as we advance to the end of this work. This multi-layered, dialectical nature of Hegel’s argument does give his philosophical work an added complexity, but also a richness that close study rewards – while this entry only focuses on the broad outlines of his arguments.

The first substantive stage is Abstract Right. Somewhat misleading its sections are entitled “Property,” “Contract” and “Wrong” giving the false impression that Hegel is discussing actual possession of property, its sale or punishment for breach of contract. Typically for Hegel, he uses common terminology in uncommon ways.

We must recall the main aim of Hegel’s project is to understand how the free will wills the free will, and not mere arbitrariness. This requires Hegel to find some ground for helping decide when the free will wills freely, versus when it does not. Hegel first turns to taking possession of property. It is noticeable that Hegel’s account is aimed at using property possession as a first step towards finding this ground rather than for building an economic system. For example, Hegel says that “what and how much I possess is…purely contingent as far as right is concerned” ( PR §49). This is because Hegel does not intend to develop a full theory of property yet, but rather to locate a ground for the free will’s freedom.

The importance of property at this stage is its development of our self-consciousness (Benhabib 1984). For Hegel, I give my free will an external existence that others can engage with. My ownership of property is not determined by me alone, but something determined “within the context of a common will” shared between two persons ( PR §71).

Hegel calls the mutual recognition between two persons about property ownership a “contract” ( PR §71–75). This is no ordinary contract. The context in Abstract Right is a hypothetical space of two persons. There is no money or sale of goods. The “contract” is not a written agreement. All common terminology, but given different usages.

The key point, for Hegel, is that only the free will of an individual can ground the free will of another (Stillman 1980). Something is mine when mutually recognized as my possession by another. This is the first appearance of right where the activity of my free will in taking possession is free, and not mere arbitrariness. It is this agreement between two individuals forming a kind of contract which is so important for Hegel. This is because mutual recognition becomes a vehicle for how we can develop further a more concrete understanding of freedom as right in the world. If such recognition was under threat, this would unsettle how we can ground our free will in a free will of another.

This failure of mutual recognition is taken up next at the end of Abstract Right in a section entitled “Wrong” [ Unrecht ]. This section has been widely interpreted by many scholars to offer a clear retributivist theory of crime and punishment (Cooper 1971, Primoratz 1989). At first glance, it is easy to see why.

Hegel distinguishes three kinds of wrongs. The first is unintentional ( PR §84–86). This is where both individuals are adhering to what they believe has been mutually recognized, but one is unwittingly incorrect. This kind of wrong is thought to be unpunishable – and the reason is because both sides see “the recognition of right as the universal and deciding factor” ( PR §85). One side is in error, but there is a strict appeal to the proper recognition of right.

The second kind of wrong is deception ( PR §87–89). This is more serious than unintentional wrongs because while both parties claim to each other that they appeal to right, one side does so insincerely. Thus deception has a different and more serious character than unintentional wrongs.

The third and final kind of wrong is described as “crime” ( PR §90). This is where one party makes no appeal at all to right. The wrong [ Unrecht ] that they seek is to deny an appeal to right. This is a direct and tangible threat to mutual recognition as one party is not merely insincere, but acts regardless of right – and to that extent acts arbitrarily, and so unfreely.

Hegel describes crime as an infringement of right, of mutual recognition ( PR §95 Remark). This requires what Hegel calls punishment as “the restoration of right” whereby what was infringed is reasserted and reaffirmed ( PR §99). For example, the punishment of theft sends a message to the thief and wider community that this crime should not have happened – and in punishing the crime Hegel believes it can help to restore the right violated.

His theory of punishment is widely characterized as retributivist and it is easy to see why. In this section, Hegel is critical of deterrence and rehabilitation approaches claiming “they take it for granted that punishment in and for itself is just” ( PR §99 Remark). Indeed, Hegel says the cancellation of crime “is retribution” ( PR §101).

But this commonly held view is controversial for several reasons. Hegel may call this third kind of wrong “crime,” but this view of crime is understood in a specific way (Nicholson 1982). There is no state or laws, no police or judiciary (Stillman 1976). A hypothetical scenario lacking prisons is hardly any complete theory of punishment. In fact, there is neither judge nor jury in Abstract Right to say who is right or wrong. This is because, when we view this section in its systematic context, Hegel is drawing attention to certain foundational ideas about wrongs more generally (e.g., that they are of three kinds) and how we should respond (e.g., that crimes can deserve punishment) without yet giving his full view at this point in the PR .

However, Hegel does foreshadow his later and more substantive discussion of punishment with a non-retributivist character at this point (Brooks 2017a). He highlights how determinations of crimes “such as danger to public security” have relevance in determining what punishment is ultimately justified ( PR §96 Remark). While he says crimes “more dangerous in itself” are a more serious infringement of right, Hegel is clear from the start that consequentialist factors are relevant to the determination of punishment related to crime’s impact on society although he says little more at this point ( PR §96 Remark). Hegel also rejects the view he is offering a full theory of punishment at this point claiming – in the absence of laws and courtrooms – any action taken by an individual against another to punish takes the form of “revenge” which “becomes a new infringement” creating new problems ( PR §102). It is important to note at this point that these sections discussing commonly used concepts like property and contract as well as crime and punishment in uncommon ways all reappear when Hegel turns his attention to the final part of Ethical Life.

When Hegel concludes Abstract Right, he seeks to resolve a tension. Abstract Right had been focused purely on the external appearance of right through taking possession and forming a contract through mutual recognition. In reasserting and restoring right through “punishment,” we do not merely honour the universality of right for us all but this move “is also at the same time a further advance in the inner determination of the will by its concept” ( PR §104). While we have discussed taking ownership and wrongs in relation to the mutual recognition of external property, this points us forward to our having to grasp the particularity of our inner ownership of right. This perspective leads Hegel to open a new, second stage he calls Morality, but again using common terms in uncommon ways.

The main point about Hegel’s theory of morality is he redefines it in an unusual way. For Hegel, “the moral point of view” is a purely abstract and hypothetical exercise that is logically prior and separate to how morality is related to the world ( PR §105). Hegel focuses on the individual’s power of choice. To this end, Hegel is a champion, not an enemy, of individual liberty as he is clear that there must be space for subjective freedom.

The problem with our individual power of choice is that we may well be mistaken about what we choose ( PR §140 Remark). Recalling our separateness from others in Morality, he says we may intend good but our only guide is our individual conception of the good ( PR §140 Addition). A more substantive guide awaits reflecting about ourselves acting in relation to others concretely in Ethical Life.

Otherwise, the danger arising from such pure, inward abstraction is that morality is an “abstract universality … without content” ( PR §135). Thus, for Hegel, moral philosophy of any kind is by its nature empty.

Perhaps no area of the PR has attracted more controversy than Hegel’s so-called “emptiness charge” against Kant: Kant is accused of offering no more than an empty formula of “duty for duty’s sake” where our task is to avoid contradicting a set formula ( PR §135, see Hoy 1989, Freyenhagen 2012, Stern 2012). Hegel’s criticisms centre on Kant’s Formula of Universal Law stating we should “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant 1997, 4:421). Undoubtedly, Kant does offer Hegel some ammunition for this criticism. For example, Kant says “All I need for morality is that freedom does not contradict itself and hence can at least be thought; I do not need to have any further insight into it” (Kant 1996, B xxix). At first glance, it might appear Kantian morality is about following a formula and no more.

But, of course, as Kant’s defenders are correct to point out, Hegel’s criticism is unfair and misses its mark (Wood 1989). In fact, Kant purposefully offers multiple versions of his formula to help draw our considerations of morality away from a purely rationalist exercise and bring it “nearer to feeling” (note 15). Our anthropology matters for Kant and he does not see our living ethically as merely living without contradiction.

We should recall that Hegel’s emptiness charge might be made against moral philosophy. This is because Hegel has redefined morality as a purely hypothetical armchair exercise that by itself is “without content” ( PR §135). Of course, this is not how the targets of Hegel’s criticism conceive of morality – and, to some degree, Hegel is using his own redefinition of morality to critique how others understand the same term defined differently.

A more appropriate comparison might be drawn in relating Kant’s principled approach with Hegel’s comments about the relation of religion to the state ( PR §270 Remark). Hegel claims a religious point of view can help furnish individuals with ethical principles and help us lead a more ethical life ( PR §270 Addition). This kind of formulaic thinking in PR to help guide individuals to ethical, law abiding behaviour is perhaps closer to the kind of moral project that Kant was engaged in where there are clearer areas of commonality than in Hegel’s critique in Morality (Brooks 2013).

As should be clear, Morality can only make so much progress in individual abstraction. What is required is a transition bringing together the universality of Abstract Right enveloping us all and providing a foundation in mutual recognition with the particularity of Morality where we both outwardly and inwardly grasp the development of right. This bridge is to the concrete individuality found in comprehending right – not in abstraction – but now in the world and its institutions.

Hegel’s concept of ‘Ethical Life’ [ Sittlichkeit ] plays a pivotal role in his political and legal thought. It is here that Hegel takes other concepts considered earlier found in Abstract Right (such as contract, property and punishment) and Morality to grasp them anew but now in their social – and more “concrete” context. The following discussion retains an abstract character insofar as Hegel discusses institutions that existed at his time – like the family, civil society and the state – but in ways meant to bring out the rational within the actual (and actual within the rational) (see Stern 2006). For example, core ideas about what constitutes a wrong from his discussion of punishment return, but with a deeper and evolved understanding of their place in a social context that brings out a different character and complexity to his views – which is intended to unpack the character and complexity of the inner rationality that Hegel believes we can discern in the world.

Ethical Life is divided into three parts where each builds off of the analysis thus far into the nature of Abstract Right and Morality, but where each part, in turn, develops after the other. This ordering is not chronological, but dialectical. We are not a member of civil society or the state after we join a family, but the concepts of the former are further developments from the latter as the following sections bear out.

Hegel begins his discussion of the first emergence of right embodied in the world through the sphere of Family. As we should expect, Hegel uses common terminology in uncommon ways again.

In Abstract Right, separate abstract individuals connect together through mutual recognition by acknowledging the ownership of property. In Ethical Life, the Family is a sphere where concrete individuals come together bound in a love for each other ( PR §158). This connection is not purely arbitrary, like animals seeking only to satisfy their needs and then seek another. For Hegel, the Family is a connection that, at least in principle, aims at a permanence he calls “marriage” ( PR §161).

These marriages are not defined in contractual terms, but ethical. A contract is an agreement that different parties can enter or exit on mutual consent. Any shared commitment or unity has a temporary character. This is little better than the kind of mutual recognition we saw in Abstract Right.

However, in marriage, a more substantive unity is created that is a permanent bond unlike most contracts. This does not mean that Hegel forbids divorce. The termination of a marriage is seen as an unfortunate possibility born from marriage’s foundation in our feelings, like love, which can be unstable over time ( PR §163 Addition).

While divorce is permitted, arranged marriages are not ( PR §162). This is because marriage is a further development of our freedom – and it requires our being able to choose a life partner. In this way, marriage is an advance of our mutual recognition from a contract where we agree ownership of some thing to where we choose to create a unity with another longer term.

For Hegel, the Family achieves unity through its creation of children ( PR §173 Addition). To this extent, he plainly endorses the traditional family model (see Haldane 2006). However, this is done on very non-traditional grounds. What guides Hegel’s thinking is his logic which brings together opposites in a creative unity producing some new, higher concept ( PR §165). Likewise, Hegel saw men and women as embodying different features with their sexual union able to create children, not unlike the universal and particular giving birth to the concrete individual ( PR §165).

These views have rightly been subjected to widespread criticism by feminists and others (Halper 2001, Knowles 2002, Ravven 1988, Stone 2002). A common argument is that Hegel’s justification of the Family is a poor defence of privileging men over women on the basis of his controversial dialectical method. Only men have the opportunity to engage outside the home in civil society and fully participate in the state. These critics claim that such a privilege should not be reserved for men alone for many, often obvious, reasons. It is also argued that his broad views about the essence of marriage as a permanent bond built on love can be achieved by non-traditional families, too. It is worth pointing out that Hegel’s talk of the Family is of an ideal. Hegel fathered a child outside of wedlock who he supported throughout his life. He sees himself as revealing the full development of right wherever it may take us, and what it requires from us or our institutions may be different from how we find them.

Hegel’s civil society is primarily the place of work, as well as where he situates law and the legal system (see Sect. 5). Whereas the Family is ideally a relation of unity from a natural law for each other, this gives way to the pursuit of the particular individual within the system of needs ( PR §182). The Family is a sphere where it is all for one and one for all. In civil society, the needs of all are met where I make my particular contribution in a pro-market economic vision accepting a natural division of labour ( PR §189, 198).

Hegel sees the world of work as a home away from home, or “second family” ( PR §252). Instead of familial love, there is a kind of brotherly love fostered through an individual’s connection to a corporation, grouped by the kind of trade all are engaged in which educates and supports its member.

Interestingly, Hegel sees market relations in modern society as a foundation for the acquisition by free individuals of social identities including social solidarity. We develop our sense of selves through our economic activities and the myriad of interconnections we forge with others in an extra-familial but non-political way.

A key problem is the problem of poverty. If possession of property is essential for the development of my sense of right and satisfaction of needs, a capitalist economic system which, Hegel accepts, makes poverty for at least some unavoidable raises a serious concern about whether Hegel’s ideal social and political philosophy is ideal for all its citizens.

The problem of poverty is more than a concern about material needs. Hegel describes those in poverty as forming a “rabble” saying “poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc” ( PR §244, Addition). Thus we can understand the rabble as having a conviction about their alienation that may be more likely to find among those who are poorer, but not exclusively them. To be in poverty is to be alienated and see one’s state as a separate, unfriendly other (Brooks 2020). While Hegel was a strong believer that through work we could develop our freedom to become reconciled to our social and political work, he lacks any convincing solution to how the problem of poverty might be overcome short of changing the economic system (Plant 1972).

Part of Hegel’s examination of civil society concerns law and the administration of justice. Hegel’s theory of law has been notoriously difficult to characterize. This is likely, in part, because Hegel uses common terms in an uncommon ways.

Hegel clearly accepts a strong link between morality and law suggesting he endorses some variety of natural law. Like other natural lawyers, Hegel claims “what is law [ Gesetz ] may differ in content from what is right in itself” ( PR §212). Something can be lawful yet unjust – and this having a higher standard of justice by which he can assess posited law is a common feature of natural law jurisprudence.

But what is different is that, traditionally, natural lawyers have developed their understanding of the standard of moral justice to be applied to an assessment of law prior to that assessment. For example, the moral standard would be worked out first and then applied afterwards. This leads some critics of natural law to claim that this approach uses extralegal standards and reasoning to assess law and so really engaging in moral philosophy rather than legal thought.

Hegel’s perspective is unique (Brudner 2017). He accepts the positivist view that our understanding of law must be centred on the law itself rather than extralegal considerations. He says “what is legal [ gesetzmāßig ] is … the source of cognition of what is right [ Recht ], or more precisely, of what is lawful [ Rechtens ]” ( PR §212 Remark). So we start first from a close look at the law before us – whatever it is – and not develop some normative standard separately beforehand. For Hegel, we do not comprehend this standard separately from the law, but immanently within it.

He says: “the scope of the law [ Gesetz ] ought on the one hand to be that of a complete and self-contained whole, but on the other hand, there is a constant need for new legal determinations [ gesetzlicher Bestimmungen ]” ( PR §216). Hegel is claiming the law aspires to be a complete whole and, where we find gaps or inconsistencies, our task is to work out how these can be addressed within the law as a self-contained whole in language echoing Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) use of legal principles a century later. Thus, Hegel looks to the law for the ethical principles that can be used to continually reform our legal system into the complete whole it aspires to be. This “natural law internalism” discerns its principles from within the law rather than from outside it (Brooks 2017b).

The development of law is crucially not a project for professionals alone. Hegel makes a powerful case for the right to trial by jury ( PR §228 Remark). His argument is that without a jury of ordinary citizens there is no guarantee that a citizen would have a reasonable chance of understanding the charges, evidence and outcome, especially if convicted and punished. This is because the law is a technical language which risks becoming the exclusive property of a professional class. The best guarantee of law’s publicity and connection to a public view of right is to ensure a jury is convinced – if they can understand the trial and come to a view, then Hegel finds it reasonable to expect the defendant on trial can, too.

It is here that Hegel revisits the justification of punishment. We now consider crime and punishment not in abstraction, but their concrete reality. Hegel begins by noting that the “outward existence” of a crime and its impact may not change the nature of a crime in its concept, but it does impact how we respond. This suggests that the same kind of crime can be punished more or less severely based, at least in part, on the circumstances. Such a view is starkly at odds with most retributivists where punishment should only be considered in relation to what an offender deserved on account of his moral responsibility for an offence.

Hegel makes clear that a crime’s “danger to civil society is a determination of its magnitude” where circumstances impact in how we determine whether to punish, how much to punish and what form this might take. He notes “a penal code is therefore primarily a product of its time and of the current condition of civil society” ( PR §218 Remark). He adds that “punishments are not unjust in and for themselves, but are proportionate to the conditions of their time” ( PR §218 Addition). So the same crime committed in different circumstances would be punished differently. For example, a crime committed during civil war poses a greater threat to civil society than when at peace – and so the former would see the crimes punished more harshly. There is no difference in the offender or her responsibility. While desert matters, it is not the only factor which does.

These comments make clear a non-retributivist picture. This is consistent with a passage in his Science of Logic ( SL ), the text Hegel claims is presupposed as the foundation for the PR :

Punishment, for example, has various determinations: it is retributive, a deterrent example as well, a threat used by the law as a deterrent, and also it brings the criminal to his senses and reforms him. Each of these different determinations has been considered the ground of punishment , because each is an essential determination, and therefore the others, as distinct from it, are determined as merely contingent relatively to it. But the one which is taken as ground is still not the whole punishment itself ( SL , p. 465)

Hegel’s argument is clearer here. Desert grounds punishment: only the deserving can be liable to be punished. But it does not have a monopoly on the amount or form that punishment can take. This picture is consistent with Hegel’s comments in the PR where the outward existence of punishment may be different depending on circumstances. It should be unsurprising to find that Hegel, who repeatedly defends various groupings of three in his work would seek to combine retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation in a new format – taking common concepts in uncommon ways. This was not lost on his earliest interpreters in the UK, as British Idealists like Green, Bradley and others held similar three-in-one views on punishment and rejected traditional accounts of retributivism (Brooks 2003, 2011). This view has been called the “unified theory of punishment” (Brooks 2017a).

Hegel’s final section of “Ethical Life” is the state. The love for others based on feeling in the family and then on the satisfaction of needs in civil society is transformed to a patriotic love for fellow citizens in support of a shared community, embodied by the modern state (see PR §268). Moreover, the individual pursuit of the satisfaction of needs leads to the development of the state.

For Hegel, it is only in the state that the family develops into civil society and where civil society gains greater “actuality” ( PR §256–57). The state is where our “concrete freedom” is realized as we conceive of ourselves in our full social and political reality ( PR §260). It is only here that the individual is conceived at once as a member of a family, as a part of civil society and as a citizen of a state. While the stage where our freedom is realized most concretely, it is not the case that individual freedom is somehow a problem – our individual freedom has greatest actuality when mutually recognized by others in law. Hegel reflects that “it has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends are not satisfied, and if they do not find that the state as such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself stands on an insecure footing” ( PR §265 Addition). Hegel’s state is a community where individuals and their individuality are meant to flourish.

Hegel’s conception of the state’s composition is controversial. He seeks to unify the three traditional models of government – aristocracy, democracy and monarchy – under a new form of representative government with a constitutional monarch (Deranty 2001). Hegel proposes an Estates Assembly with the natural aristocracy of the agrarian class in one chamber and representatives from different trades in another. Hegel believed that representing a locality based on geography was arbitrary and lacking substance. He claimed a stronger ethical relation could be formed through representation of people through their work.

Hegel’s state is headed by a hereditary monarch (§273 Remark, Brudner 1981, Redding 1994). He claims the state requires someone to provide unity as an individual to the individual state, a someone to declare the state confirms a law as its law or agrees treaties with foreign countries. An elected monarch or president as head of state is objectionable because such a person would represent the interests of supporters. This would create a barrier for the monarch to truly speak with one voice on behalf of the country – and so the monarch should be above such partisanship. A hereditary monarch would provide some basis for there being a head of state that could represent all and provide the unity required.

While virtually no commentator is convinced by Hegel’s justification of constitutional monarch, the orthodox view is that the monarch is a rubber stamp (Yack 1980). Hegel remarks that “in a fully organized state … all that is required in a monarch is someone to say ‘yes’ and to dot the ‘I’; for the supreme office should be such that the particular character of its occupant is of no significance” ( PR §280 Addition). Some have drawn comparisons with the UK’s constitutional monarchy, where laws require the Assent of Her Majesty The Queen but where this is automatically done when requested by Parliament for example (Findlay 1958).

The real power is behind the throne and held by an educated governing cabinet [ Ministerium ], often referred to as the bureaucracy. It is these advisors to the monarch who propose new laws, via the responsible cabinet minister. These ministers, and not the monarch, are answerable to the legislature whose role is to consider proposals and either enact or reject them.

There is reason to doubt this picture (Brooks 2007). The monarch cannot act arbitrarily. In being “bound by the concrete content of the advice he receives,” he must be able to discern this content ( PR §279 Addition). And Hegel is critical of the UK’s constitutional monarchy post-Civil War noting that “since 1692 there has never been a case of the king’s vetoing a parliamentary decree” with the consequence that it “reduces him virtually to a cipher” and he should be more active on state matters – and, presumably, making his own judgements whether to support proposed legislation or not in recommending it for approval to the legislature ( LNR §133 Remark ) . While the ministers advising him should be of rough equality making little difference who is in which role, the monarch has full discretion to hire and fire anyone at will from an eligible pool. Moreover, it is the monarch advised by his relevant minister who agree treaties and decide all matters of war and peace ( PR §329). Given the monarch cannot be removed from office, this gives him considerable powers in foreign affairs raising questions about how relatively powerless, if at all, he really is.

The state has an “immediate actuality” in terms of its internal organization as discussed above, but it further determines itself internationally in relation to other states ( PR §259). This part of the PR is the least worked out and detailed.

Hegel accepts a broadly Westphalian and realist view of international relations whereby the primary actors are states each prioritizing the pursuit of their individual welfare ( PR §336, Smith 1983). States interact with each other like individuals in an anarchic global space. Without any governing global authority, states can come into conflict with each other. He says “wars must be regarded as necessary because independent peoples exist alongside one another” ( LNR §160 Remark). This is not a justification or glorification of war, but a recognition that states are in a state of nature where war is occasionally unavoidable (see LNR §162 Remark). States should aim to enable other states “to live at peace with it” and “war is that of something which ought to come to an end” ( PR §338).

But it is also the case that Hegel saw war as testing the relative health of states where those most rationally organized should triumph over less well ethically structured states. Combined with his rejection of Kant’s proposals for perpetual peace, it has led some to question whether or not war plays a positive, and troubling, role in his philosophy (Avineri 1961, Black 1973, Shelton 2000, Walt 1989). Hegel also comments that “modern wars are accordingly waged in a humane manner, and all persons do not confront each other in hatred” which can give the impression that modern wars are of an improved ethical quality than past wars – when the opposite appears true ( PR §338 Addition).

The only judge of relative rights and wrongs in the international sphere is “world history as the world’s court of judgement” ( PR §340). The PR then transitions to the start of an account of the philosophy of history in the next part of his system, which presupposes all parts preceding it not least the PR itself.

English Translations of Key Texts

• [EL], The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze , translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
• [LNR], Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818 with Additions from the Lectures of 1818–1819 , translated by J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
• [PW], Political Writings , edited by Laurence Dickey and H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
• [PM], Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind , translated from the 1830 Edition, together with the Zusätze by William Wallace and A.V. Miller, with Revisions and Commentary by M. J Inwood, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
• [PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right , edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
• [SL], Science of Logic , trans. A. V. Miller. Amherst: Humanity Books, 1969.
• Avineri, Shlomo, 1961, “The Problem of War in Hegel’s Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas , 22: 463–74.
• –––, 1972, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Beiser, Frederick, 2005, Hegel , London: Routledge.
• Benhabib, Seyla, 1984, “Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance of Hegel’s Abstract Right,” in Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 159–77.
• Black, Edward, 1973, “Hegel on War,” The Monist , 57: 570–83.
• Brooks, Thom, 2003, “T. H. Green’s Theory of Punishment,” History of Political Thought , 24: 685–701.
• –––, 2007, “No Rubber Stamp: Hegel’s Constitutional Monarch,” History of Political Thought , 28: 91–119.
• –––, 2011, “Is Bradley a Retributivist?” History of Political Thought , 32: 83–95.
• –––, 2013, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right , 2nd edition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• –––, 2017a, “Hegel on Crime and Punishment,” in T. Brooks and S. Stein (eds.) 2017, pp. 202–21.
• –––, 2017b, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” in Dean Moyar (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 453–74.
• –––, 2020, “More than Recognition: Why Stakeholding Matters for Reconciliation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Owl of Minerva , 51: 59–86.
• Brooks, Thom and Sebastian Stein (eds.), 2017, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: On the Normative Significance of Method and System , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Brudner, Alan, 1981, “Constitutional Monarchy as the Divine Regime: Hegel’s Theory of the Just State,” History of Political Thought , 2: 119–40.
• –––, 2017, The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Political Science , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Cooper, David E., 1971, “Hegel’s Theory of Punishment,” in Z. Pelczynski (ed.), Hegel’s Political Philosophy: Problems and Prospects , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 151–67.
• Deranty, Jean-Philippe, 2001, “Hegel’s Parliamentarianism: A New Perspective on Hegel’s Theory of Political Institutions,” Owl of Minerva , 32: 107–33.
• Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Freyenhagen, Fabian, 2012, “The Empty Formalism Objection Revisited: §135R and Recent Kantian Responses,” in Thom Brooks (ed.), Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 43–72.
• Haldane, John, 2006, “Family Matters,” Philosophy , 81: 581–93.
• Halper, Edward C., 2001, “Hegel’s Family Values,” Review of Metaphysics , 54: 815–58.
• Haym, Rudolf, 1857, Hegel und seine Zeit . Berlin.
• Houlgate, Stephen, 2005, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity , West Lafeyette: Purdue University Press.
• Hoy, David, 1989, “Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Morality,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 6: 207–32.
• Kant, Immanuel, 1996, Critique of Pure Reason , Werner S. Pluhar (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett.
• –––, 1997, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Mary Gregor (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Knowles, Dudley, 2002, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right , London: Routledge.
• Knox, T. M., 1970, “Hegel and Prussianism,” in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Hegel’s Political Philosophy , New York: Atherton Press, pp. 13–29.
• Neuhouser, Frederick, 2000, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Nicholson, Peter P., 1982, “Hegel on Crime,” History of Political Thought , 3: 103–21.
• Pelczynski, Z. A., 1964, “An Introductory Essay,” in ed., Hegel’s Political Writings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 5–137.
• Pinkard, Terry, 1994, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Pippin, Robert, 2012, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Plant, Raymond, 1972, Hegel , London: George Allen & Unwin.
• Primoratz, Igor, 1989, Justifying Legal Punishment , Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
• Popper, Karl, 1966, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath), 5th edition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Ravven, Heidi, 1988, “Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?” Owl of Minerva , 19: 149–68.
• Redding, Paul, 1994, “Philosophical Republicanism and Monarchism – and Republican and Monarchical Philosophy – in Kant and Hegel,” Owl of Minerva , 26: 35–46.
• Rosen, Michael, 1984, Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Shelton, Mark, 2000, “The Morality of Peace: Kant and Hegel on the Grounds for Ethical Ideals,” Review of Metaphysics , 54: 379–408.
• Smith, Steven, 1983, “Hegel’s Views on War, the State and International Relations,” American Political Science Review , 77: 624–32.
• Stone, Alison, 2002, “Feminist Criticism and Reinterpretations of Hegel,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain , 45–46: 93–109.
• Stern, Robert, 2006, “Hegel’s Doppelsatz : A Neutral Reading,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 44: 235–66.
• –––, 2012, “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics: Beyond the Empty Formalism Objection,” in Thom Brooks (ed.), Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 73–99.
• Stillman, Peter G., 1976, “Hegel’s Idea of Punishment,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 14: 169–82.
• –––, 1980, “Property, Freedom and Individuality in Hegel’s and Marx’s Political Thought,” in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Property , New York: New York University Press, pp. 130–67.
• Taylor, Charles, 1975, Hegel , Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.
• Walt, Steven, 1989, “Hegel on War: Another Look,” History of Political Thought , 10: 113–24.
• Wood, Allen, 1989, “The Emptiness of the Moral Will,” Monist , 72: 454–83.
• –––, 1990, Hegel’s Ethical Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2017, “Method and System in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ,” in T. Brooks and S. Stein (eds.) 2017, pp. 82–102.
• Yack, Bernard, 1980, “The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept of Monarchy,” American Political Science Review , 74: 709–20.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Hegel Society of America homepage
• Hegel Society of Great Britain homepage

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: dialectics | Kant, Immanuel

Copyright © 2021 by Thom Brooks < thom . brooks @ durham . ac . uk >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2024 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Hegel’s “Objective Spirit”, extended mind, and the institutional nature of economic action

• Published: 09 December 2012
• Volume 12 , pages 177–202, ( 2013 )

Cite this article

• Ivan A. Boldyrev 1 &
• Carsten Herrmann-Pillath 2  

1124 Accesses

8 Citations

Explore all metrics

This paper explores the implications of the recent revival of Hegel studies for the philosophy of economics. We argue that Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit anticipates many elements of modern approaches in cognitive sciences and of the philosophy of mind, which adopt an externalist framework. In particular, Hegel pre-empts the theories of social and distributed cognition. The pivotal elements of Hegelian social ontology are the continuity thesis, the performativity thesis, and the recognition thesis, which, when taken together, imply that all mental processes are essentially dependent on externalizations, with the underlying pattern of actions being performative. In turn, performative action is impossible without mutual recognition in an intersubjective domain. We demonstrate the implications for economic theory in sketching an externalist approach to institutions and preferences.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price includes VAT (Russian Federation)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Rent this article via DeepDyve

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

It Takes Two to Tango: We-Intentionality and the Dynamics of Social Norms

Teleological Reasoning in Economics

Integrating rationality and spiritedness to correct a misleading dichotomy

Sarah Moore & Richard E. Wagner

One remark concerning Hegel’s definitions is in order. One has to keep in mind that they are not to be understood in a conventional meaning of a simple identity (A is B), but should be thought of in conformity with Hegel’s theory of ‘speculative sentence’ that blurs strict differences between the subject and the predicate. In other words, ‘A is B’ means that A becomes B and that we can demonstrate a process of identification and of A’s transformation into B. To say that the mind is institutional is, therefore, to say that the mind in its development towards freedom takes up sociality as its essential determination.

This is the essential reason why Hegel’s naturalism counts as idealism. This is rooted in Hegel’s conception of the Begriff as something that straddles subject and object. Important statements include Enz. §381 and §384:.

This is based on principled conceptual analysis which we cannot pursue in the current context. Essential thoughts are in Philosophy of Right §21 and §27: “The truth […] of this formal universality [of education applied to human drives and aspirations] is self - determining universality, the will, or freedom ” (…) “The absolute determination or […] the absolute drive, of the free spirit […] is to make its freedom into its object […]—to make it objective both in the sense that it becomes the rational system of the spirit itself, and in the sense that this system becomes immediate actuality” […]. This enables the spirit to be for itself, as Idea, what the will is in itself. The abstract concept of the Idea of the will is in general the free will which wills the free will (Hegel 1991 , p. 52, 57). On this, compare Enz. §§481, 484. This generic status of the state as an expression of more fundamental principles can also be found even with reference to ontological basics, see Enz. §198.

Some aspects of this general picture are recognizable, for example, in Hegel’s account of economic phenomena in civil society and the global interconnectedness of needs, where the idea of continuity (as pertaining to the nature of spirit) is emphasized: ‘Spirit attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing this limitation and finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and the continuum [ Zusammenhang ] [our emphasis] of this external necessity, and, in the very process of adapting itself to these limitations, by overcoming them and gaining its objective existence … within them’ (Hegel 1991 , p. 224).

Akerlof G, Kranton R (2000) Economics and Identity. Quart J Econ 115(3):715–753

Google Scholar  

Ariely D, Norton MI (2007) How actions create—not just reveal—preferences. Trends Cogn Sci 12(1):13–16

Article   Google Scholar  

Aunger R (2002) The electric meme. A new theory of how we think. Free Press, New York

Barsalou LW (1999) Perceptual symbol systems. Behav Brain Sci 22:577–660

Becker GS (1996) Accounting for tastes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Beiser F (ed) (2008) The Cambridge companion to Hegel and nineteenth century philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Bernheim BD (2009) The psychology and neurobiology of judgment and decision making: what’s in it for economists? In: Glimcher PW et al (eds) Neuroeconomics: decision making and the brain. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 115–126

Berridge KC (2009), Liking’ and, Wanting’ food rewards: brain substrates and roles in eating disorders. Physiol Behav 97:537–550

Bhaskar R (1989) The possibility of naturalism. A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences. Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York

Boldyrev I, Herrmann-Pillath C (2012) Moral sentiments, institutions, and civil society: exploiting family resemblances between smith and hegel to resolve some conceptual issues in sen's recent contributions to the theory of justice. Frankfurt school of finance and management, Working paper series 193. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087251

Brandom RB (1994) Making It explicit: reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Brandom RB (2011) The structure of desire and recognition: self-consciousness and self-constitution. In: Ikäheimo H, Laitinen A (eds) Recognition and social ontology. Brill, Leiden, pp 25–51

Bykova MF (2009) Spirit and concrete subjectivity in Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. In: Westphal KR (ed) The Blackwell guide to Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. Wiley, Chichester, pp 265–293

Callon M (2008) Economic markets and the rise of interactive agencements: from prosthetic agencies to habilitated agencies. In: Pinch T, Swedberg R (eds) Living in a material world: economic sociology meets science and technology studies. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 29–56

Camerer C (2006) Wanting, liking, and learning: neuroscience and paternalism. Univ Chic Law Rev 73:87–110

Carpendale JIM, Lewis C (2004) Constructing an understanding of mind: the development of children’s understanding of mind within social interaction. Behav Brain Sci 27:79–150

Clark A (2011) Supersizing the mind. Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Clark A, Chalmers DJ (1998) The extended mind. Analysis 58:10–23

Crisafi A, Gallagher S (2010) Hegel and the extended mind. AI Soc 25:123–129

Damasio A (2010) Self comes to mind. Constructing the conscious brain. Pantheon, New York

Davis JB (2003) The theory of the individual in economics. Identity and value. Routledge, London

Book   Google Scholar  

Davis JB (2007) Akerlof and Kranton on identity in economics: inverting the analysis. Camb J Econ 31(3):349–362

Davis JB (2009) Identity and individual economic agents: a narrative approach. Rev Soc Econ 67(1):71–94

Dennett DC (1991) Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Company, Boston

Dennett DC (1995) Darwin’s dangerous idea. Evolution and the meanings of life, new, simon & schuster, New York

Dennett DC (2009) Intentional systems theory. In: McLaughlin BP, Beckermann A, Walter S (eds) The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 339–350

De Vries J (2008) The industrious revolution. In: Consumer behavior and the household economy, 1650 to the present. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Fehr E (2009) Social preferences and the brain. In: Glimcher PW et al (eds) Neuroeconomics: decision making and the brain. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 215–232

Ferrini C (2009) The challenge of reason: from certainty to truth. In: Westphal KR (ed) The Blackwell guide to Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. Wiley, Chichester, pp 72–91

Fraser N (2000) Rethinking recognition. New Left Review 3 (May–June), pp 107–120

Gallese V, Lakoff G (2005) The brain’s concepts: the role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. Cogn Neuropsychol 22(3 & 4):455–479

Garbarini F, Adenzato M (2004) At the root of embodied cognition: cognitive science meets neurophysiology. Brain Cogn 56:100–106

Giere R (2002) Scientific cognition as distributed cognition. In: Carruthers P, Stitch S, Siegal M (eds) Cognitive bases of science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Glimcher PW (2011) Foundations of neuroeconomic analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Gul F, Pesendorfer W (2008) The case for mindless economics. In: Caplin A, Schotter A (eds) The foundations of positive and normative economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 3–41

Harrison GW (2008) Neuroeconomics: a critical reconsideration. Econ Philos 24(3):303–344

Hegel GWF (1978) Philosophy of subjective spirit. In: Petry MF (ed) Reidel, Dordrecht

Hegel GWF (1983) Hegel and the human spirit. A translation of the Iena lectures on the philosophy of spirit (1805–1806) with commentary by L Rauch. Wayne State University Press, Detroit

Hegel GWF (1991) Elements of the philosophy of right. In: Wood AW (ed) (trans: Nisbet HB). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Hegel GWF (2012) Phenomenology of spirit (trans Pinkard Terry). Internet version. Accessed 19 Sept 2012 https://dl.dropbox.com/u/21288399/Articles%20for%20Webpage/Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit%20in%20English%20and%20German.pdf

Heidemann DH (2008) Substance, subject, system: the justification of science in Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. In: Moyar D, Quante M (eds) Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. A critical guide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–20

Herrmann-Pillath C (2010a) A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics. J Econ Methodol 17(3):241–260

Herrmann-Pillath C (2010/2011) The economics of identity and creativity. A cultural science approach. Transactions, New Jersey and University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia

Herrmann-Pillath C (2012a) Institutions, distributed cognition and agency: rule-following as performative action. J Econ Methodol 19(1):21–42

Herrmann-Pillath C (2012b) Towards an externalist neuroeconomics: dual selves, signs, and choice. J Neurosci Psychol Econ 5(1):38–61

Hodgson GM (2004) Reclaiming habit for institutional economics. J Econ Psych 25:651–660

Honneth A (1996) The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts. MIT Press, Cambridge

Honneth A (2008) From desire to recognition: Hegel’s account of human sociality. In: Moyar D, Quante M (eds) Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. A critical guide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 76–90

Humphrey N (2007) The society of selves. Philos Trans R Soc Lond, Ser B 362:745–754

Hurley S (2008) The shared circuits model: how control, mirroring and simulation can enable imitation, deliberation, and mindreading. Behav Brain Sci 31(1):1–21

Hutchins E (1995) Cognition in the wild. MIT Press, Cambridge

Ikäheimo H, Laitinen A (eds) (2011) Recognition and social ontology. Brill, Leiden

Inwood MJ (1992) A Hegel dictionary. Blackwell, Oxford

Kirman A, Teschl M (2010) Selfish of Selfless? The role of empathy in economics. Philos Trans R Soc Lond, Ser B 365:303–317

Latour B (2005) Reassembling the social. An introduction to actor-network. Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Lewis C, Carpendale J (2002) Social cognition. In: Smith PK, Hart C (eds) Blackwell handbook of social cognition. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 375–393

Moav O, Neeman Z (2012) Saving rates and poverty: the role of conspicuous consumption and human capital. Econ J 122:933–956

North DC, Walis JJ, Weingast BR (2007) Violence and social orders. A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Pecher D, Zwaan RA (eds) (2005) Grounding cognition. The role of perception and action in memory, language and thinking. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Pinkard T (1994) Hegel’s phenomenology: the sociality of reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Pinkard T (2008) What is a „Shape of the spirit“? In: Moyar D, Quante M (eds) Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. A critical guide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–129

Pinkard T (2009) Shapes of active reason: the law of the heart, retrieved virtue, and what really matters. In: Westphal KR (ed) (2009a) The Blackwell guide to Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. Wiley, Chichester, pp 136–152

Pippin R (2000) Hegel’s practical philosophy: the realization of freedom. In: Ameriks K (ed) The Cambridge companion to German idealism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Pippin R (2001) Hegel and institutional rationality. South J Philos 39:1–25

Pippin RB (2008) Hegel’s practical philosophy. Rational agency as ethical life. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Quante M (2008) “Reason…apprehended irrationally”: Hegel’s critique of observing reason. In: Moyar D, Quante M (eds) Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. A critical guide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 91–111

Redding P (2008) The independence and dependence of self-consciousness: the dialectic of Lord and Bondsman in Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. In: Beiser F (ed) The Cambridge companion to Hegel and nineteenth century philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 94–110

Richerson PJ, Boyd R (2005) Not by genes alone. How culture transformed human evolution. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Robinson H (2009) Idealism. In: McLaughlin BP, Beckermann A, Walter S (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of mind. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 189–205

Ross D (2005) Economic theory and cognitive science: microexplanations. MIT Press, Cambridge

Ross D (2007) H. sapiens as ecologically special: what does language contribute? Lang Stud 29:710–731

Ross D (2011) Neuroeconomics and economic methodology. In: Davis JB, Hands DW (eds) The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 61–93

Ross D, Sharp C, Vuchinich RE, Spurrett D (2008) Midbrain mutiny. The picoeconomics and neuroeconomics of disordered gambling. MIT Press, Cambridge

Searle JR (1995) The construction of social reality. Free Press, New York

Searle JR (2005) What is an institution? J Inst Econ 1(1):1–22

Searle JR (2010) Making the social world. The structure of human civilization. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Sen A (2002) Rationality and freedom. Belknap, Cambridge

Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Allen Lane. London and Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Singer T, Lamm C (2009) The social neuroscience of empathy. Ann NY Acad Sci 1156:81–96

Smith VL (2003) Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. Am Econ Rev 93(3):465–508

Sobel J (2005) Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. J Econ Lit 43(2):392–436

Sommers T (2008) The illusion of freedom evolves. In: Ross D, Spurrett D, Kincaid H, Stephens GL (eds) Distributed cognition and the will individual volition and social context. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 61–76

Stahl T (2011) Institutional power, collective acceptance, and recognition. In: Ikäheimo H, Laitinen A (eds) Recognition and social ontology. Brill, Leiden, pp 349–372

Stekeler-Weithofer P (2011) Intuition, understanding, and the human form of life. In: Ikäheimo H, Laitinen A (eds) Recognition and social ontology. Brill, Leiden, pp 117–144

Strawson G (2009) The Self. In: McLaughlin BP (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of mind. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 541–564

Sugden R (2000) Team preferences. Econ Phil 16:175–204

Taylor CM (1985) Hegel’s philosophy of mind. In: Taylor CM (ed) Human agency and language. Philosophical papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 77–96

Taylor CM (1992) The politics of recognition. In: Guttman A (ed) Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 25–73

Testa I (2011) Social space and the ontology of recognition. In: Ikäheimo H, Laitinen A (eds) Recognition and social ontology. Brill, Leiden, pp 287–308

Tomasello M (2008) Origins of human communication. MIT Press, Cambridge

Tomasello M, Carpenter M (2007) Shared intentionality. Dev Sci 10(1):121–125

Tomasello M, Carpenter M, Call J, Behne T, Moll H (2005) Understanding and sharing intentions: the origin of cultural cognition. Behav Brain Sci 28:675–735

Tuomela R (2007) The philosophy of sociality: the shared point of view. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Tuomela R (2011) Searle’s new construction of social reality. Anal Rev 71(4):707–719

Wegner DM (2002) The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press, Cambridge

Westphal KR (2008) Philosophizing about nature: Hegel’s philosophical project. In: Beiser F (ed) The Cambridge companion to Hegel and nineteenth century philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 281–310

Westphal KR (ed) (2009a) The Blackwell guide to Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. Wiley, Chichester

Westphal KR (2009b) Hegel’s phenomenological method and analysis of consciousness. In: Westphal KR (ed) The Blackwell guide to Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. Wiley, Chichester, pp 1–36

Witt U (2000) Learning to consume—a theory of wants and the growth of demand. J Evol Econ 11(1):23–36

Download references

Acknowledgments

Ivan Boldyrev would like to express his gratitude to professor Oleg Ananyin, who first introduced him to the idea of the link between the social ontology of Hegel and Searle. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath pays tribute to Don Ross for his encouragement and inspiration. We would also like to thank John Davis and the participants of the 2012 meeting of the International Network for Economic Method in Saint-Petersburg for their helpful comments. Finally, two anonymous reviewers of M&S helped to improve the paper in substantial ways. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Myasnitskaya 20, 101000, Moscow, Russia

Ivan A. Boldyrev

East-West Centre for Business Studies and Cultural Science, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Carsten Herrmann-Pillath .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Boldyrev, I.A., Herrmann-Pillath, C. Hegel’s “Objective Spirit”, extended mind, and the institutional nature of economic action. Mind Soc 12 , 177–202 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0111-3

Download citation

Received : 05 June 2012

Accepted : 15 November 2012

Published : 09 December 2012

Issue Date : November 2013

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0111-3

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Performativity
• Extended mind
• Recognition
• Institutional economics
• Preferences

JEL Classification

• Find a journal
• Publish with us
• Track your research

• Anatomy & Physiology
• Astrophysics
• Earth Science
• Environmental Science
• Organic Chemistry
• Precalculus
• Trigonometry
• English Grammar
• U.S. History
• World History

... and beyond

• Socratic Meta
• Featured Answers

What is Hegel's concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, in simple terms?

• Browse by Subjects
• New Releases
• Coming Soon
• Chases's Calendar
• Browse by Course
• Instructor's Copies
• Monographs & Research
• Intelligence & Security
• Library Services
• Business & Leadership
• Museum Studies
• Pastoral Resources
• Psychotherapy

Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics

What only marx and tillich understood, leonard f. wheat, also available.

The Modern Enquirer

Understanding The Hegelian Dialectic – What it is and what it isn't

By discerning what the hegelian dialectic truly is and what it is not, we can effectively apply this method to intellectual and philosophical endeavours.

Nicholas Holt —Saturday, July 8, 2023

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the German philosopher, developed a concept called the Hegelian dialectic, which has had a significant impact on various fields of study. It's also one of the most misunderstood and misapplied philosophical concepts.

Hegel was a prominent figure in the philosophical movement known as German Idealism—a philosophical perspective that asserts the primacy of ideas, consciousness, or the mind in shaping and understanding reality.

It holds that the ultimate nature of reality is rooted in ideas, concepts, or mental constructs rather than in material substances.

In other words, Idealism suggests that our understanding of the physical world is deeply influenced by our thoughts, perceptions, and interpretations, highlighting the role of the mind in shaping our experiences and knowledge.

For Hegel, reality is not just something "out there," but it includes our thoughts and consciousness as well. He saw a close relationship between our minds and the external world, where they influence and shape each other.

Hegel believed that the physical world, including the objects and substances we can perceive with our senses, is not separate from our thoughts and consciousness. He saw a close connection between our minds and the external world, where they influence and shape each other.

This interaction happens as we continually learn and grow, gaining a better grasp of ourselves and the world around us.

One of Hegel's most well-known contributions is his concept of dialectics, which is a method of reasoning and analysis that explores how opposing ideas and contradictions interact and transform into new understandings.

Hegel's dialectical approach emphasises the dynamic nature of reality and the continuous development of thought through the resolution of conflicting ideas. In other words, Hegel believed that reality is always changing, and our understanding of it grows when we find solutions to conflicting ideas.

According to Hegel, when people have different opinions or conflicting ideas (thesis and antithesis), they can engage in a process of dialogue and discussion to find a middle ground or a new perspective (synthesis) that incorporates the best elements of both sides.

This process allows for the growth of knowledge and a deeper understanding of complex issues.

It also acknowledges that conflicts and contradictions are not obstacles but rather catalysts for intellectual progress, fostering new insights and a more profound grasp of the truth.

In essence, the Hegelian dialectic is a method for resolving disagreements and advancing knowledge by engaging in thoughtful conversations, considering opposing perspectives, and seeking common ground.

The Hegelian dialectic is frequently confused with what's colloquially known as Problem, Reaction, Solution (PRS). The term has been used in various books, articles, and discussions, particularly within the context of theories involving conspiratorial actions as well as critical analysis of political strategies.

Some authors and researchers who have discussed or mentioned this concept in their writings include David Icke, Anthony C. Sutton, and Milton William Cooper, among others. PRS refers to a concept where a problem is intentionally created or amplified to elicit a specific emotional reaction from the public, leading to the presentation of a pre-planned solution that may serve ulterior motives.

The attribution of this concept to the Hegelian dialectic is a common misinterpretation, or misunderstanding.

The confusion may arise due to similarities in the general pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis found in the Hegelian dialectic and the simplified notion of "problem, reaction, solution."

It is important, however, to clarify that the two concepts have different origins, implications, and intentions.

The misattribution may have occurred because both frameworks involve a process of change or development.

The Hegelian dialectic focuses on the dynamic and evolving nature of ideas and the pursuit of truth through dialogue and synthesis. It is a philosophical framework that encourages critical thinking, open-mindedness, and the exploration of opposing viewpoints.

On the other hand, the concept of PRS suggests that certain events or crises are intentionally orchestrated to manipulate public opinion and advance specific agendas. Here's a further expansion on this concept:

In the "problem, reaction, solution" framework, the process typically starts with the identification or creation of a problem.

This problem could be a real issue or one that is exaggerated or manufactured for the purpose of generating a particular response. The problem is carefully crafted to evoke strong emotional reactions from the public, such as fear, anger, or a sense of urgency.

Once the problem is presented, the next stage involves monitoring and manipulating the public reaction. This can be achieved through media coverage, propaganda, or other forms of communication that amplify the emotional response of the public. The intention is to ensure that the desired reaction aligns with the agenda or objectives of the orchestrators.

Finally, a pre-planned solution is offered as the apparent resolution to the problem. This solution may have been devised well in advance, and its presentation is strategically timed to take advantage of the heightened emotional state of the public.

It may involve policy changes, new laws, increased surveillance, or other measures that may serve the interests of a select group or individual, often at the expense of civil liberties, transparency, or public welfare.

Imagine the following scenario:

A powerful government clandestinely releases a harmful chemical into the water supply of a small town.

This chemical is designed to induce feelings of fear and paranoia in the population.

As the townspeople consume the contaminated water, they begin experiencing heightened anxiety, distrust, and a growing sense of insecurity.

The government closely monitors the public's reaction and exploits the growing unease to manipulate them into accepting increasingly restrictive measures.

Through controlled media narratives, they portray certain groups as scapegoats and amplify social divisions, further fuelling fear and hostility (think anti-vaxxers).

Eventually, the government presents a pre-planned solution to the crisis they orchestrated—the implementation of a pervasive surveillance system that promises enhanced security and protection.

This solution is presented as the only way to regain stability and eliminate the perceived threats.

Under the guise of protecting the population, the government uses this manufactured crisis to consolidate power, curtail civil liberties, and maintain control over the population through constant surveillance and suppression of dissent.

It is essential to differentiate between this concept and the Hegelian dialectic to avoid conflating them and to ensure a clear understanding of their respective origins and implications.

While the Hegelian dialectic has a well-established philosophical background, the attribution of "problem, reaction, solution" to Hegel or his dialectic is a misconception or misinterpretation that has emerged over time.

The Hegelian dialectic begins with a thesis, which represents a particular idea or concept. The thesis is an assertion or proposition that serves as a starting point for philosophical inquiry.

In simpler terms, you can think of a thesis in Hegelian dialectics as an initial idea or statement that gets challenged by its opposite, leading to a new and more comprehensive understanding that incorporates elements from both sides.

It's a way of exploring ideas and resolving contradictions to achieve greater knowledge and progress.

The thesis could be the existing state of cannabis prohibition, where it is considered illegal in many jurisdictions due to concerns over its potential negative effects. The existing state of cannabis prohibition is rooted in a historical and societal context that has shaped perceptions and policies surrounding the plant.

Throughout much of the 20th century, cannabis was widely stigmatized and associated with criminality, moral degradation, and public health risks. These concerns were fuelled by limited scientific understanding, cultural biases, and political influences.

Under this thesis, cannabis is viewed as a substance that poses risks to individuals and society. Adherents of this perspective argue that cannabis use can lead to various negative consequences, such as cognitive impairment, addiction, mental health issues, and an increased likelihood of engaging in risky behaviours.

They contend that maintaining its illegality is necessary to safeguard public health and maintain social order.

This thesis has resulted in the implementation of strict laws and punitive measures aimed at deterring cannabis use and distribution. Legal frameworks have criminalised possession, cultivation, and sale of cannabis, imposing penalties that range from fines to imprisonment.

Regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies have been tasked with enforcing these policies, often emphasising the need to prevent cannabis-related harms.

The Hegelian dialectic then introduces an antithesis, or the opposing idea or concept that challenges the thesis. It embodies contradictions, conflicts, or tensions in relation to the thesis. These are disagreements, counterarguments, and opposition to the idea.

The antithesis presents a strong argument against cannabis prohibition, highlighting its perceived shortcomings and unintended consequences. Critics of cannabis prohibition contend that the existing approach has failed to achieve its intended goals and has instead exacerbated various issues.

One key criticism is that cannabis prohibition perpetuates the underground market. By criminalising cannabis, the production, distribution, and sale of the plant are pushed into illicit channels.

This black market not only undermines regulatory control but also provides opportunities for organised crime to thrive. Illicit cannabis trade often involves criminal networks that engage in violence, corruption, and other illicit activities. Critics argue that by maintaining prohibition, society inadvertently supports and enriches these criminal elements.

Proponents of cannabis prohibition assert that the enforcement of cannabis laws disproportionately affects marginalised communities. The war on drugs, of which cannabis prohibition is a part, has resulted in significant racial and socioeconomic disparities in arrests and incarceration rates.

People from minority and low-income backgrounds are often more heavily targeted and face harsher penalties for cannabis-related offences. This has further deepened social inequalities and perpetuated systemic injustices within the criminal justice system.

Another point raised by critics is that cannabis prohibition hinders the exploration of the plant's potential benefits. Cannabis has shown promise in various medicinal applications, such as pain management, epilepsy treatment, and symptom relief for certain medical conditions.

However, the criminalisation of cannabis restricts research opportunities and hampers the development of evidence-based treatments. Critics argue that by maintaining prohibition, society limits access to potentially beneficial treatments for patients in need.

A synthesis in the context of cannabis prohibition involves striking a balance between addressing public health concerns, promoting social equity, and maximising the potential benefits of cannabis.

First and foremost, the synthesis would prioritise evidence-based policies that aim to mitigate potential risks associated with cannabis use. This includes implementing comprehensive education and prevention programmes that provide accurate information about the potential effects of cannabis, particularly for vulnerable populations such as youth.

Regulations could be established to ensure product safety, quality control, and appropriate dosage labelling for cannabis products. Additionally, measures can be taken to prevent impaired driving and promote responsible consumption practices.

Recognising the disproportionate impact of cannabis prohibition on marginalised communities, the synthesis would prioritise social equity. This involves expunging past cannabis-related convictions and providing opportunities for those affected by prohibition to participate in the legal cannabis industry.

Policies can be implemented to ensure fair representation and economic inclusion, particularly for individuals from communities historically impacted by cannabis enforcement. This would help rectify the systemic injustices perpetuated by prohibition.

The synthesis would emphasise the importance of research and innovation in exploring the medicinal potential of cannabis. Regulatory frameworks can be established to facilitate rigorous scientific studies, enabling the development of evidence-based treatments and expanding the medical applications of cannabis.

By fostering research partnerships between academia, industry, and healthcare providers, the synthesis can promote responsible and informed use of cannabis for therapeutic purposes.

Lastly, the synthesis would embrace the economic opportunities associated with the cannabis industry while ensuring responsible market regulation. Legalising and regulating the production, distribution, and sale of cannabis can generate tax revenue, create jobs, and stimulate economic growth.

This would require implementing effective licensing systems, taxation mechanisms, and stringent regulations to prevent excessive concentration of power and promote fair competition.

Ultimately, the synthesis seeks to create a well-regulated and inclusive cannabis framework that maximises the benefits and minimises the potential harms associated with cannabis.

By applying the Hegelian dialectic to the cannabis legalisation example, it becomes evident that the issue is not a simple dichotomy between prohibition and unrestricted access.

The dialectical approach encourages a nuanced understanding that considers the complexity of the topic.

It emphasises the importance of informed decision-making and the development of balanced policies that take into account both the potential benefits and risks associated with cannabis use.

The dialectic does not aim to eliminate contradictions completely. Rather, it recognises contradictions as essential drivers of intellectual progress.

Hegel believed that contradictions are inherent to thought and that they lead to a deeper understanding of reality.

The Hegelian dialectic can be applied in many ways within the professional world to foster critical thinking, problem-solving, and innovation.

When faced with complex decisions or conflicting perspectives, the Hegelian dialectic can help professionals explore different viewpoints, consider potential pros and cons, and seek a synthesis that incorporates the best elements from each perspective. This can lead to more well-rounded and informed decisions.

The dialectic can stimulate innovative thinking and problem-solving by encouraging professionals to challenge existing assumptions and explore alternative perspectives.

By considering different theses and antitheses, creative solutions and approaches can emerge that may not have been initially apparent. The synthesis becomes a novel solution or idea that integrates the best elements from the various perspectives.

Within a team setting, the dialectic can help address conflicts and improve team dynamics. By encouraging open dialogue, active listening, and the recognition of different viewpoints, team members can work towards a synthesis that respects individual perspectives while fostering a sense of unity and shared purpose.

It can also be applied to personal growth and self-reflection. By engaging in internal dialogue and actively exploring different perspectives within oneself, individuals can gain deeper insights into their own beliefs, values, and motivations.

Through synthesis, individuals can integrate these various aspects of themselves, fostering personal development, self-awareness, and a more balanced and holistic understanding of themselves.

The Hegelian dialectic can guide academic researchers in their pursuit of knowledge and intellectual growth. By engaging in critical dialogue, researchers can explore different theories, methods, and perspectives within their field.

Through synthesis, they can integrate diverse ideas, challenge existing paradigms, and contribute to the advancement of knowledge in their discipline.

Finally, it can be utilised to manage organisational change effectively. By recognising the diverse perspectives and concerns of employees, leaders can engage in dialogue, actively listen, and seek a synthesis that addresses the needs and aspirations of the organisation as well as its members.

This approach promotes smoother transitions, increased employee buy-in, and a more successful implementation of change initiatives.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's development of the Hegelian dialectic has had a profound impact on various fields of study, although it is often misunderstood and misapplied.

Hegel's association with German Idealism highlights the emphasis on the primacy of ideas and consciousness in shaping our understanding of reality.

This philosophical position suggests that our thoughts, perceptions, and interpretations play a fundamental role in shaping our experiences and knowledge.

The Hegelian dialectic, as a method of reasoning and analysis, explores the clash and resolution of opposing ideas to develop a deeper understanding of truth.

Through thoughtful dialogue and the synthesis of conflicting perspectives, the dialectic encourages critical thinking,open-mindedness, and the exploration of opposing viewpoints.

By discerning what the Hegelian dialectic truly is and what it is not, we can effectively apply this method to intellectual and philosophical endeavours, fostering growth, understanding, and the development of balanced solutions.

Ready for more?