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Kodak’s Downfall Wasn’t About Technology

• Scott D. Anthony

What it missed was the business model.

A generation ago, a “Kodak moment” meant something that was worth saving and savoring. Today, the term increasingly serves as a corporate bogeyman that warns executives of the need to stand up and respond when disruptive developments encroach on their market. Unfortunately, as time marches on the subtleties of what actually happened to Eastman Kodak are being forgotten, leading executives to draw the wrong conclusions from its struggles.

• Scott D. Anthony is a clinical professor at Dartmouth College’s Tuck School of Business, a senior partner at Innosight , and the lead author of Eat, Sleep, Innovate (2020) and Dual Transformation (2017). ScottDAnthony

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The rise and fall of Kodak's moment

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On a shelf in his office in Cambridge Judge Business School, Dr Kamal Munir keeps a Kodak Brownie 127. Manufactured in the 1950s, the small Bakelite camera is a powerful reminder of the rise and fall of a global brand – and of lessons other businesses would do well to learn.

Whenever I ask why a certain company that has fallen on hard times is doing badly, I always start by asking why it was successful in the first place. That is where the answer lies. Kamal Munir.

Earlier this year, Kodak filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. But when Kamal's camera was made, the company bestrode the world of amateur photography – a world Kodak itself had created.

Established by George Eastman in the 1880s, by the 1950s Kodak had the lion's share of the US amateur film market. “Kodak was a company at the top of its game,” says Kamal, who has studied the Rochester-based business for more than a decade.

“Kodak controlled almost 70% of the highly lucrative US film market. Gross margins on film ran close to 70%, and its success was further underpinned by a massive distribution network and one of the strongest brands in the world. The company completely dominated its industry,” he says. “And then, in 1981, along came digital.”

Thousands of words have been written recently seeking to explain Kodak's failure. The company, all agree, was slow to adapt to digital, its executives suffered from a mentality of “perfect products”, its venture-capital arm never made big enough bets to create breakthroughs, and its leadership lacked vision and consistency.

None of this analysis, however, fully explains why digital – a technology Kodak pioneered – did for the company. Understanding that, Kamal argues, requires a deeper historical and social approach.

“Photography is very much a social activity. You can't really understand how people relate to their pictures – why people take pictures – unless you do a social analysis which is more anthropological or sociological,” he explains.

“Whenever I ask why a certain company that has fallen on hard times is doing badly, I always start by asking why it was successful in the first place. That is where the answer lies.”

For three-quarters of the twentieth century, Kodak's supreme success was not only developing a new technology – the film camera – but creating a completely new mass market.

During the nineteenth century, photography had been the exclusive preserve of a small number of professionals, with their large-format cameras and glass plates. So when Kodak invented the film camera, it needed to teach people how and what to photograph, as well as persuading them why they needed to do so.

“Kodak is the company that made photography a popular pastime around the world. It made a tremendous contribution to how we see things,” Kamal says.

The Kodak moment

Kodak's high-profile advertising campaigns established the need to preserve 'significant' occasions such as family events and holidays. These were labelled 'Kodak moments', a concept that became part of everyday life.

And it was women Kodak cast in the leading role. In its advertisements, women held the cameras, busy preserving moments of domestic bliss for posterity: “Kodak knew how to market to women. If you wanted to be seen as a caring mother and responsible housewife, then you needed to record your family's evolution and growth,” he says.

But women were only part of the story. It was they who took the photographs, but the other half of the Kodak moment required a subject – birthday parties, sporting success and, crucially, family holidays.

“Kodak also played a big role in converting travel to tourism. The idea was that if you hadn't brought back pictures from your vacation you might as well not have gone,” says Kamal. “For them, photography was all about preserving memories for posterity, photography was all about sentiment, and it was women who were doing this.”

By the 1970s, more than 60% of pictures in the US – the world's largest photography market – were being taken by women. And it was partly how men – rather than women – responded to the digital revolution that Kodak couldn't cope with.

Digital disrupted the company's equilibrium in two crucial respects. Firstly, it shifted meaning associated with cameras and secondly, digital devices allowed newcomers such as Sony to bypass one of Kodak's huge strengths – its distribution network.

The knock-on effects of this shift were enormous. Digital cameras came to be viewed as electronic gadgets, rather than pieces of purely photographic equipment. As a result, he explains: “The identification of cameras as gadgets brought about another significant change: women were no longer the main customers, men were.”

The gender shift led to the third source of disruption for the photographic industry in general, and for Kodak in particular. With digital cameras, images could be viewed on cameras, mobile phones or computers without the need for hard prints. And with women giving way to men as primary users of cameras, printing plummeted.

According to Kamal: “The people taking pictures suddenly changed, from 60% women to 70% men. Kodak didn't know how to market to men. But even if they could get them to buy, they didn't want to, because men don't print. Unlike women, they hadn't been socialised in the role of family archivist.”

Faced with such an enormous threat to its business, Kodak did what many companies do in similar circumstances – ignore the problem in the hope it goes away, and when it doesn't, deride the new-comer.

“Some things do go away – not all technology gets diffused,” he says. “When that fails, the second reaction is usually derision – it'll never take off, it's too expensive, it's too difficult, the print quality is too bad, people will never part with hard prints. When I talked to Kodak executives they would always cite the same example – if someone's house catches fire, the first thing they rescue is their photographs.”

From preserving memories to sharing experiences

Having played such a central role in creating meaning for photography, the company failed to believe that meaning had changed, from memories printed on paper to transient images shared by email or on Facebook.

“The change from preserving memories to sharing experiences, and from women to men – these were things Kodak simply couldn't handle,” says Kamal, who saw the writing on the wall when he visited the company's senior management in Rochester a decade ago. “By the end of the day I was convinced the company was not going to be around much longer.”

In 2006, Kamal sent a letter to the Financial Times , pointing out that Kodak's strategy was fundamentally flawed. “Kodak is better off taking a leaf out of Lou Gerstner’s strategy for re-inventing IBM – from a manufacturer to a service-provider,” he wrote.

“Kodak needs to disassociate itself from its traditional strengths and come to terms with the fact that this technology will be commoditised sooner or later. What they need is a new business model for an environment in which people do not ‘preserve memories’ but ‘share experiences’ ... I am afraid Mr Perez's [Kodak CEO] strategy of engulfing the consumer in the Kodak universe has a low likelihood of success."

But rather than a new business model, what Kamal had seen in Rochester was a digital imaging division under pressure from its consumer imaging counterpart, and a company unable to shake-off a corporate mindset that had developed over more than a century.

“Its focus on retail printing, investing in inkjet printing research and development, and selling sensors to mobile manufacturers – altogether, these never added up to a coherent, sustainable business model. And the digital guys were always under pressure because they were seen to be cannibalising sales of much more lucrative products,” says Kamal, who thinks Kodak should have cut the digital business loose and freed it from the Rochester mindset.

Learning from history

In his view, Kodak needed to let a new generation of users and entrepreneurs take charge – people who could embrace uncertainty and were prepared to be driven in unforeseen directions – a far cry from how the company had spent its life.

“It's important for companies to reinvent themselves. Kodak had tremendous market power – one of the things that allowed it to survive thus far. But for this kind of reinvention, where you're faced with a technological discontinuity which has little in common with what you've been doing, you need to radically alter your mindset or world-view and emerge as a completely different company. IBM is a good example of this kind of reinvention, which was a huge cultural shift and took several years. But Kodak wasn't willing to part with their legacy.”

The challenges Kodak faced are not unique, so what can other businesses learn from its failure? Clearly companies that derive a large proportion of their profit from a single product – in Kodak's case film – are more vulnerable. But having a corporate mindset open to new ideas and able to embrace uncertainty is essential.

According to Kamal: “The important things are not to tie the weight of legacy assets onto new ventures; to refrain from prolonging the life of existing product lines, while trying to create false synergies between the old and the new; and, most of all, to base strategy around users, rather than the existing business model.”

As the company approaches its 130 th birthday, what will be its legacy? Those precious family albums, perhaps, and our enduring passion for photography. But its impact could have been even greater, and longer-lasting.

“There was a time when photography was known as 'kodaking',” he concludes. “I don't think Kodak will survive. Someone might buy the brand and its assets, but Kodak is never going to be Kodak again.”

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Licence . If you use this content on your site please link back to this page.

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The Real Lessons From Kodak’s Decline

Eastman Kodak is often mischaracterized as a company whose managers didn’t recognize soon enough that digital technology would decimate its traditional business. However, what really happened at Kodak is much more complicated — and instructive.

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Eastman Kodak Co. is often cited as an iconic example of a company that failed to grasp the significance of a technological transition that threatened its business. After decades of being an undisputed world leader in film photography, Kodak built the first digital camera back in 1975. But then, the story goes, the company couldn’t see the fundamental shift (in its particular case, from analog to digital technology) that was happening right under its nose.

The big problem with this version of events is that it’s wrong. Moreover, it obscures some important lessons that other companies can learn from. To begin with, senior leaders at Kodak were acutely aware of the approaching storm. I know because I arrived at Kodak from Silicon Valley in mid-1997, just as digital photography was taking off. Management was constantly tracking the rate at which digital media was replacing film. But several factors made it exceedingly difficult for Kodak to shift gears and emerge with a consumer franchise that would be sustainable over the long term. Not only was a major technological change upending our competitive landscape; challenges were also affecting the ecosystem we operated in and our organizational model. Ultimately, refocusing the business with so many forces in motion proved to be impossible.

A Difficult Technology Transition

Kodak’s first challenge had to do with technology. Over the course of more than a century, Kodak and a small number of its competitors had developed and refined manufacturing processes that enabled consumers to capture and preserve images for a lifetime. Color film was an extremely complex product to manufacture. The 60-inch “wide rolls” of plastic base material had to be coated with as many as 24 layers of sophisticated chemicals: photosensitizers, dyes, couplers, and other materials deposited at precise thicknesses while traveling at 300 feet per minute. Wide rolls had to be changed over and spliced continuously in real time; the coated film had to be cut to size and packaged — all in the dark. With film, the entry barriers were high. Only two competitors — Fujifilm and Agfa-Gevaert — had enough expertise and production scale to challenge Kodak seriously.

The transition from analog to digital imaging brought several challenges. First, digital imaging was based on a general-purpose semiconductor technology platform that had nothing to do with film manufacturing — it had its own scale and learning curves.

About the Author

Willy Shih is the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Management Practice in Business Administration at Harvard Business School. From 1997 to 2003 he was a senior vice president at Eastman Kodak Co. and served as president of the company’s consumer digital business.

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Craig mcgowan, stephen waybright, giovanbattista testolin, karl schubert, arthur weiss, julian koor, victor yodaiken, john krienke, jeffrey hardy, butch cunnings, charles h. green.

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How kodak failed.

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(Update 1-19-2012 — Kodak has filed for bankruptcy protection .)

There are few corporate blunders as staggering as Kodak’s missed opportunities in digital photography, a technology that it invented. This strategic failure was the direct cause of Kodak’s decades-long decline as digital photography destroyed its film-based business model.

A new book by my Devil’s Advocate Group colleague, Vince Barabba , a former Kodak executive, offers insight on the choices that set Kodak on the path to bankruptcy. Barabba’s book, “ The Decision Loom: A Design for Interactive Decision-Making in Organizations ,” also offers sage advice for how other organizations grappling with disruptive technologies might avoid their own Kodak moments.

Steve Sasson, the Kodak engineer who invented the first digital camera in 1975, characterized the initial corporate response to his invention this way:

But it was filmless photography, so management’s reaction was, ‘that’s cute—but don’t tell anyone about it.’ via The New York Times (5/2/2008)

Kodak management’s inability to see digital photography as a disruptive technology, even as its researchers extended the boundaries of the technology, would continue for decades. As late as 2007, a Kodak marketing video felt the need to trumpet that “Kodak is back “ and that Kodak “wasn’t going to play grab ass anymore” with digital.

To understand how Kodak could stay in denial for so long, let me go back to a story that Vince Barabba recounts from 1981, when he was Kodak’s head of market intelligence. Around the time that Sony introduced the first electronic camera, one of Kodak’s largest retailer photo finishers asked him whether they should be concerned about digital photography. With the support of Kodak’s CEO, Barabba conducted a very extensive research effort that looked at the core technologies and likely adoption curves around silver halide film versus digital photography.

The results of the study produced both “bad” and “good” news. The “bad” news was that digital photography had the potential capability to replace Kodak’s established film based business. The “good” news was that it would take some time for that to occur and that Kodak had roughly ten years to prepare for the transition.

Gado via Getty Images

The study’s projections were based on numerous factors, including: the cost of digital photography equipment; the quality of images and prints; and the interoperability of various components, such as cameras, displays, and printers. All pointed to the conclusion that adoption of digital photography would be minimal and non-threatening for a time. History proved the study’s conclusions to be remarkably accurate, both in the short and long term.

The problem is that, during its 10-year window of opportunity, Kodak did little to prepare for the later disruption. In fact, Kodak made exactly the mistake that George Eastman, its founder, avoided twice before, when he gave up a profitable dry-plate business to move to film and when he invested in color film even though it was demonstrably inferior to black and white film (which Kodak dominated).

Barabba left Kodak in 1985 but remained close to its senior management. Thus he got a close look at the fact that, rather than prepare for the time when digital photography would replace film, as Eastman had with prior disruptive technologies, Kodak choose to use digital to improve the quality of film.

This strategy continued even though, in 1986, Kodak’s research labs developed the first mega-pixel camera, one of the milestones that Barabba’s study had forecasted as a tipping point in terms of the viability of standalone digital photography.

The choice to use digital as a prop for the film business culminated in the 1996 introduction of the Advantix Preview film and camera system, which Kodak spent more than $500M to develop and launch. One of the key features of the Advantix system was that it allowed users to preview their shots and indicate how many prints they wanted. The Advantix Preview could do that because it was a digital camera. Yet it still used film and emphasized print because Kodak was in the photo film, chemical and paper business. Advantix flopped. Why buy a digital camera and still pay for film and prints? Kodak wrote off almost the entire cost of development.

As Paul Carroll and I describe in " Billion-Dollar Lessons: What You Can Learn From The Most Inexcusable Business Failures of the Last 25 Years ," Kodak also suffered several other significant, self-inflicted wounds in those pivotal years:

In 1988, Kodak bought Sterling Drug for $5.1B, deciding that it was really a chemical business, with a part of that business being a photography company. Kodak soon learned that chemically treated photo paper isn’t really all that similar to hormonal agents and cardiovascular drugs, and it sold Sterling in pieces, for about half of the original purchase price.

In 1989, the Kodak board of directors had a chance to take make a course change when Colby Chandler, the CEO, retired. The choices came down to Phil Samper and Kay R. Whitmore. Whitmore represented the traditional film business, where he had moved up the rank for three decades. Samper had a deep appreciation for digital technology. The board chose Whitmore. As the New York Times reported at the time,

Mr. Whitmore said he would make sure Kodak stayed closer to its core businesses in film and photographic chemicals. via The New York Times (12/9/1989)

Samper resigned and would demonstrate his grasp of the digital world in later roles as president of Sun Microsystems and then CEO of Cray Research. Whitmore lasted a little more than three years, before the board fired him in 1993.

For more than another decade, a series of new Kodak CEOs would bemoan his predecessor’s failure to transform the organization to digital, declare his own intention to do so, and proceed to fail at the transition, as well. George Fisher, who was lured from his position as CEO of Motorola to succeed Whitmore in 1993, captured the core issue when he told the New York Times that Kodak

regarded digital photography as the enemy, an evil juggernaut that would kill the chemical-based film and paper business that fueled Kodak’s sales and profits for decades. via The New York Times (12/25/1999)

Fisher oversaw the flop of Advantix and was gone by 1999. As the 2007 Kodak video acknowledges, the story did not change for another decade. Kodak now has a market value of $140m and teeters on bankruptcy. Its prospects seem reduced to suing   Apple and others for infringing on patents that it was never able to turn into winning products.

Addressing strategic decision-making quandaries such as those faced by Kodak is one of the prime questions addressed in Vince Barabba’s book, “ The Decision Loom .” Kodak management not only presided over the creation technological breakthroughs but was also presented with an accurate market assessment about the risks and opportunities of such capabilities. Yet Kodak failed in making the right strategic choices.

This isn’t an academic question for Vince Barabba but rather the culmination of his life’s work. He has spent much of his career delivering market intelligence to senior management. In addition to his experiences at Kodak, his career includes being director of the U.S. Census Bureau (twice), head of market research at Xerox , head of strategy at General Motors (during some of its best recent years), and inclusion in the market research hall of fame.

Vince Barabba

“ The Decision Loom ” explores how to ensure that management uses market intelligence properly. The book encapsulates Barabba’s prescription of how senior management might turn all the data, information and knowledge that market researchers deliver to them into the wisdom to make the right decisions. It is a prescription well worth considering.

Barabba argues that four interrelated capabilities are necessary to enable effective enterprise-wide decision-making—none of which were particularly well-represented during pivotal decisions at Kodak:

1.  Having an enterprise mindset that is open to change. Unless those at the top are sufficiently open and willing to consider all options, the decision-making process soon gets distorted. Unlike its founder, George Eastman, who twice adopted disruptive photographic technology, Kodak’s management in the 80’s and 90’s were unwilling to consider digital as a replacement for film. This limited them to a fundamentally flawed path.

2. Thinking and acting holistically. Separating out and then optimizing different functions usually reduces the effectiveness of the whole. In Kodak’s case, management did a reasonable job of understanding how the parts of the enterprise (including its photo finishing partners) interacted within the framework of the existing technology. There was, however, little appreciation for the effort being conducted in the Kodak Research Labs with digital technology.

3. Being able to adapt the business design to changing conditions. Barabba offers three different business designs along a mechanistic to organismic continuum—make-and-sell, sense-and-respond and anticipate-and-lead. The right design depends on the predictability of the market. Kodak’s unwillingness to change its large and highly efficient ability to make-and-sell film in the face of developing digital technologies lost it the chance to adopt an anticipate-and-lead design that could have secured the it a leading position in digital image processing.

4. Making decisions interactively using a variety of methods . This refers to the ability to incorporate a range of sophisticated decision supporttools when tackling complex business problems. Kodak had a very effect decision support process in place but failed to use that information effectively.

While “ The Decision Loom ” goes a long way to explaining Kodak’s slow reaction to digital photography, its real value is as a guidepost for today’s managers dealing with ever-more disruptive changes. Given that there are few industries not grappling with disruptive change, it is a valuable book for any senior (or aspiring) manager to read.

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Eastman Kodak Company’s Intended and Actual Organization Research Paper

Introduction, intended organization, actual organization, closing the gap, reference list.

The selected organization for this analysis is Eastman Kodak Company, simply called Kodak. The company has been in operation for a century now and has its headquarters in New York, United States. Within the past decade, Kodak has been experiencing various organizational challenges that might affect its future performance and sustainability. This discussion begins by identifying Kodak’s “intended organization”, the actual organization, and the best suggestions to help the managers close the recorded gap.

To learn more about the anticipated organization, interviews targeting one of the departmental managers and a salesperson at Kodak were completed. Such exercises were done via Skype and video conferencing since the company was not operating fully in Saudi Arabia. The completed exercise presented unique observations and views about the intended goals. The respondents revealed that Kodak was strategizing and focusing on the best approaches to become a leader and competitor in the imaging industry (Anthony, 2016). The leaders were keen to establish a results-oriented structure that would support a superior culture, provide experiences to more customers, and guide them on the best ways to process capture and even store pictures that contributed to their memories.

The organization was also keen to consider solutions that were cost-effective while maximizing the quality of its products. Workers were empowered to deliver world-class skills and competencies while focusing on the changing goals and expectations of the targeted customers. These aspects form the ideal Kodak Company that is capable of maximizing profits and meeting the demands of all customers across the globe. The organization fosters a superior culture, structure, and hierarchy that resonate with the demands of customers and workers in different regions (Grant, 2016). The intended company would have a unique team of workers and innovators who take the concept of innovation seriously to meet the demands of different customers and take digital imaging to the next level.

While Kodak is an organization positioning itself to become a leader in modern digital imaging, numerous gaps and challenges exist that affect the anticipated goals. In reality, Kodak has been facing financial problems since it filed for bankruptcy in 2012. Towards the end of the 20th century, the organization began to innovate and experiment with emerging digital cameras. This strategy made it a leader and provider of such devices. However, the leaders were not keen to focus on this interruptive technology that would eventually redefine photography in the future (Anthony, 2016). Most of the leaders were keen to capitalize on photography film paper that had delivered profits for decades. The professionals would agree that digital cameras were not going to change or transform the company’s profitability.

Compared with the intended organization described above, it is agreeable that the workers are becoming disenfranchised and unmotivated. The company is unable to compete directly with the existing company in some of the sectors it operates in. The current culture is unreflective of the recorded experiences (Gluckman, 2016). The key similarities include the presence of superior products and a focus on the best strategies to achieve organizational goals. The ideal company is also focusing on the best approaches to maximize profits and transform customers’ experiences. However, things appear to be different in reality since the company is fighting constant competition, lacks an effective organizational strategy, and has poor business outcomes.

The current situation at Kodak reveals that the organization might take longer to achieve the anticipated goals and regain its original position as a leader in imaging. The company is facing financial problems and is incapable of identifying the right sectors to invest in and maximize profits (Grant, 2016). While the managers have set and defined the right mission, goals, and vision, the reality is that the recorded organizational culture and model affect the confidence of most of the employees and partners. Such gaps have the potential to affect profitability in the long term. However, several proposals are worth considering turning operations around and maximizing performance.

First, the time has come for the managers to present a different mindset. These professionals will begin by setting the most appropriate attitudes and consider the best ways to approach or address situations. This strategy will make it easier for all partners to collaborate, identify the current gaps, and consider the best approaches to change the current culture. A superior leadership presence will help all stakeholders think together and focus on the gaps affecting overall performance (Gluckman, 2016). The professionals will go further to identify some of the best practices from different companies and emulate them to improve performance.

The second approach to take Kodak closer to its “ideal organization” is that of effective problem-solving. The reality is that this company is facing the challenges and aftermath of bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the leaders failed to consider some of the best approaches that could have redefined the situation. Through the proposed concept, the managers will embrace the power of creativity and envision the best future (Hussain et al., 2014). They will provide the right culture, structure, and resources that can innovation to the next level. The workers will get additional guidelines for experimenting and analyzing some of the best practices from its immediate competitors. This model will make t possible for the company to avoid making some of the mistakes that led to its demise.

Third, the adoption and application of a better leadership approach will make it possible for more employees to promote a better organizational culture. Workers will find a reason to solve their differences, engage one another, and become more productive. The professionals will offer a sense of direction and solve internal disputes (Gluckman, 2016). The leaders can provide a wider picture of the intended goals, offer the right support, and promote a sense of direction. Constant evaluation, analysis, and experimentation are powerful approaches that can help Kodak transform its current position and eventually become more profitable.

Finally, the use of an effective change theory is essential to help transform the situation at Kodak. Such an approach will help the leaders identify the current problems, cultural issues, and performance gaps existing at the company. The organizational leaders will embrace the model to introduce new concepts that can take performance to the next level, including cultural transformation, innovation, research and development (R&D), customer satisfaction, and sustainability. These attributes will change the current situation and eventually make this company more successful and competitive.

The completed discussion has identified Kodak as an international organization struggling to succeed in the imaging industry. The ideal organization is currently unattainable due to the existing inefficiencies, culture, structure, and leadership. The proposed approaches will transform managerial practices, present a superior structure and culture, and guide the workers to become more innovative. The final products and services will eventually meet the demands of the company’s customers and maximize the recorded profits.

Anthony, S.D. (2016) ‘ Kodak’s downfall wasn’t about technology ’, Harvard Business Review . Web.

Hussain, N. et al. (2014) ‘Kodak stunning journey of fortune to misfortune (a case study –financial analysis)’, Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(17), pp. 127-140.

Gluckman, R. (2016) ‘Management lessons from a Kodak career’, Journal of Business & Economic Policy, 3(4), pp. 9-12.

Grant, R.M. (2016) Contemporary strategy analysis. New York: Wiley.

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IvyPanda. (2022, August 30). Eastman Kodak Company's Intended and Actual Organization. https://ivypanda.com/essays/eastman-kodak-companys-intended-and-actual-organization/

"Eastman Kodak Company's Intended and Actual Organization." IvyPanda , 30 Aug. 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/eastman-kodak-companys-intended-and-actual-organization/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'Eastman Kodak Company's Intended and Actual Organization'. 30 August.

IvyPanda . 2022. "Eastman Kodak Company's Intended and Actual Organization." August 30, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/eastman-kodak-companys-intended-and-actual-organization/.

1. IvyPanda . "Eastman Kodak Company's Intended and Actual Organization." August 30, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/eastman-kodak-companys-intended-and-actual-organization/.

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IvyPanda . "Eastman Kodak Company's Intended and Actual Organization." August 30, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/eastman-kodak-companys-intended-and-actual-organization/.

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When Kodak Accidentally Discovered A-Bomb Testing

Two thousand miles away from the U.S. A-bomb tests in 1945, something weird was happening to Kodak's film.

More than 1,900 miles away from Alamogordo, at the Rochester, NY headquarters of Eastman Kodak, a flood of complaints came in from business customers who had recently purchased sensitive X-ray film from the company. Black exposed spots on the film, or "fogging," had rendered it unusable. This perplexed many Kodak scientists, who had gone to great lengths to prevent contaminations like this.

Julian H. Webb , a physicist in Kodak's research department, took it upon himself to dig deeper and test the destroyed film. What he uncovered was shocking. The fogging of Kodak's film and the Trinity test in New Mexico were eerily connected, revealing some chilling secrets about the nuclear age.

It all started when Kodak had a problem with its packaging. Even today, X-ray film is highly sensitive (much more so than regular photographic film) and subject to ruin due to dirt, scratches and even minimal light exposure. Proper packaging and protection is essential to make sure the film gets from manufacturing to shipping to the customer's place of business safely. According to an article Webb would write in 1949 for the American Physical Society , the paper and cardboard used for packaging in the '40s were often salvaged from wartime manufacturing plants where radium-based instruments were also produced. Radium is a naturally occurring radioactive element that can cause flecks of spots or fogging when "in intimate contact with (sensitive film) for a period several weeks." During wartime, Kodak took precautions to avoid radium contamination. It moved packaging manufacturing to mills where Kodak had full control over the raw materials.

One of these mills was located along the Wabash River in Vincennes, Indiana; it specialized in producing strawboard, used as a stiffener board between sheets of film. When Webb investigated the mysterious fogging in 1945, he found that it originated not from the X-ray film itself but the packaging, which he tracked to this particular mill, and specifically, the production run of strawboard from August 6, 1945. After testing the radioactive material on the strawboard, he discovered—rather alarmingly—that the spots on the film were not caused by radium nor any other naturally occurring radioactive material, but "a new type radioactive containment not hitherto encountered." What was this unknown radioactive material, he must have wondered, and what was it doing in southwest Indiana?

"Prolific Fission Products"

In January 1942, less than four years after Berlin chemists first split the uranium atom , the United States government secretly launched the Manhattan Project . Spurred by a letter from Albert Einstein saying that the Germans were pursuing the bomb, President Franklin Roosevelt approved federal funding for uranium research in 1939. Later that year, reports indicated it was possible to create an " extremely powerful bomb" from enriched uranium (later plutonium was discovered to have similar destructive properties). Eminent scientist Vannevar Bush hastily compiled a list of resources, including materials, equipment, money, and scientists, needed to make the bomb a physical reality. A month after Pearl Harbor pushed the U.S. into the war, FDR approves Bush's list with one simple handwritten note , "V.B. OK-returned-I think you had best keep this in your own safe FDR." Three days after Christmas in 1942, the "Manhattan Project" was officially authorized.

By 1945, the United States had a plutonium-based atomic bomb ready for testing. Called "Gadget," the experiment was set for the Trinity test site, so named by Manhattan Project leader Robert J. Oppenheimer in homage to the work of English poet John Donne . At 5:30 a.m. on a hot desert morning, the atomic age began. The bomb exploded and released 18.6 kilotons of unimaginable power. In a nanosecond, an orange fireball reached the heavens, followed by a column that quickly flattened into now-iconic image of the mushroom cloud . The test was a tremendous success —at least in the eyes of those hoping to use it as a weapon. It far exceeded expectations in terms of power as the blast released as much as three times more force than anticipated. It was reported that the fireball could be seen as far as 250 miles away. Soon, Julian Webb would discover the impact was felt much further.

While he was studying the Indiana samples, Webb got word that a particular production run of strawboard from a plant in Tama, Iowa was also contaminated and fogging the Kodak film it carried. While Tama was 450 miles from Vincennes, there were striking similarities. The two production runs of strawboard had been completed within a month of each other. Tama's radioactive spots also failed the radium test, meaning the cause was something else. Most telling, however, was that both mills sat next to rivers, with Vincennes on the Wabash River and the Iowa River cutting through Tama.

Webb found that the strawboard from both mills had a significant concentration of beta-particle radiation activity but little to no alpha-activity . (Beta-particle radiation can penetrate paper, human skin and are sometimes considered dangerous. Alpha-particle radiation is stopped by paper, easily absorbed and generally considered safe if not ingested). Additionally, photographic evidence allowed Webb to estimate the half-life of the artificial radioactive material he was seeking at approximately 30 days. The results corresponded to the presence of an artificial radioactive material he would later identify as Cerium-141, which is "one of the more prolific fission products of the atom bomb."

.css-2l0eat{font-family:UnitedSans,UnitedSans-roboto,UnitedSans-local,Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:1.625rem;line-height:1.2;margin:0rem;padding:0.9rem 1rem 1rem;}@media(max-width: 48rem){.css-2l0eat{font-size:1.75rem;line-height:1;}}@media(min-width: 48rem){.css-2l0eat{font-size:1.875rem;line-height:1;}}@media(min-width: 64rem){.css-2l0eat{font-size:2.25rem;line-height:1;}}.css-2l0eat b,.css-2l0eat strong{font-family:inherit;font-weight:bold;}.css-2l0eat em,.css-2l0eat i{font-style:italic;font-family:inherit;} "If you are behind the curtain and sworn to secrecy.... You are not going to go there."

Furthermore, Webb concluded there was no possible way the straw could be the carrier of the containment, since it was stored in warehouses (and not outside) for a considerable amount of time prior to being used. Had the Cerium-141 gotten directly into the straw, it would have decayed by the time the straw was processed, rendering the radiation hardly detectable. This brought Webb to a frightening explanation: The contamination came from the river water. Additional evidence would fall in the rain. According to Webb, "stronger activity occurred in the strawboard" after periods of heavy precipitation, establishing that the radioactive material was being deposited via precipitation and came from a far-flung place.

While it is unclear whether Webb knew about the Trinity test when he was conducting his research in 1945, his report from 1949 is unabashedly clear: "The most likely explanation of the source of this radioactive contaminant appears to be that it consisted of wind-borne radioactive fission products derived from the atom-bomb detonation in New Mexico on July 16, 1945."

Keeping It Quiet

Webb wasn't the only one who knew fallout could travel vast distances. As the years have passed, it's become increasingly clear that the United States government knew this fact early on. Immediately following the Trinity tests, the Manhattan Project's chief of radiological safety, Stafford Warren, warned that the tests needed to be conducted at least 150 miles from civilian populations . In 1948, U.S. Air Force Meteorologist Col. B. G. Holzman recommended establishing a new nuclear test site on the East Coast , rather than in the west, because western winds carry fallout across the continental United States. Despite this recommendation, the Nevada Proving Ground (later the Nevada Test Site ) was established in 1950 only a hundred miles from Las Vegas. According to a 1997 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists entitled "Worse than we knew," the reason for this reckless choice was that weapons labs were nearby, which would accelerate "the pace of the weapons development program."

Pat Ortmeyer was the coauthor of this article in which she and Arjun Makhijani dug deep into the National Cancer Institute's report that because of the Nevada nuclear tests, a vast majority of the American public was exposed to the cancer-causing radioactive element Iodine-131. "What is so appalling was that it was the system... that it was by design, to keep the public in the dark like that," Ortmeyer tells Popular Mechanics. "This was partly because of the context... we were at war... but when you look at the history of nuclear production, that's the norm... downplaying [health risks]."

On January 27, 1951, the first atomic detonation at the new Nevada Proving Ground took place. Days later and 2,500 miles away, a Geiger counter at Kodak's headquarters in New York state measured radioactive readings 25 times above normal after a snowstorm. Declassified 1952 documents obtained by Popular Mechanics reveals that Kodak alerted the Atomic Energy Commission about this out of concern this testing would wreck its film just as had happened in 1945. The AEC responded that it would look into it, but assured Kodak there was little reason to worry, even allowing the company to issue a press release to the Associated Press stating that snow "that fell in Rochester was measurably radioactive..." but "there is no possibility of harm to humans and animals."

In March 1951, a frustrated Kodak threatened to sue the U.S. government for the "considerable amount of damage to our products resulting from the Nevada tests or from any further atomic energy tests..." Finally the company and the government came to an agreement. The AEC would provide Webb, by now the head of Kodak's physics division, with schedules and maps of future tests so that Kodak could take the necessary precautions to protect its product. In return, the people of Kodak were to keep everything they knew about the government's Nevada nuclear testing a secret.

"They were doing their jobs and perhaps simply didn't know any better."

The Cost of the Silence

Did Kodak have a responsibility to tell the American public about the fallout? Says Stephen Schwartz, an independent nuclear weapons expert and policy analyst who edited and co-wrote the book Atomic Audit for the Brookings Institution in 1998: "Did they have a moral or ethical responsibility? I think you could make a strong case that they did," he says. "But I wouldn't look at Kodak with today's eyes. They were doing their jobs and perhaps simply didn't know any better."

Ortmeyer agrees: "I think that the responsibility fell to the government...[Kodak] knew the impact it had on their film, but for them to speak out on a public health issue... that wasn't their field of expertise. I can only surmise that in the era of the Manhattan Project, if you are behind the curtain and sworn to secrecy.... You are not going to go there."

In 1997, the National Cancer Institute released findings that linked the Nevada nuclear testing to the release of Iodine-131 which can lead to thyroid cancer. In response, a Congressional hearing questioned why the government withheld such information. Led by Sen. Tom Harkin (who incorrectly said that Kodak discovered the radioactive fallout because of "corn husks," not strawboard), the hearing made clear that this was a public health crisis, and that every single American alive at the time was threatened by the radioactive fallout. Julian Webb knew this five decades earlier when he discovered traces of faraway weapons testing in America's water supply. Why no one told the American people remains a question today.

Special thanks to Pat Ortmeyer for providing materials for this story.

We contacted Kodak, who chose not to comment.

Matt is a history, science, and travel writer who is always searching for the mysterious and hidden. He's written for Smithsonian Magazine, Washingtonian, Atlas Obscura, and Arlington Magazine. He calls Washington D.C. home and probably tells way too many cat jokes. 

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Distribution of Market Power, Endogenous Growth, and Monetary Policy

Yumeng Gu, Sanjay R. Singh

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2024-09 | March 28, 2024

We incorporate incumbent innovation in a Keynesian growth framework to generate an endogenous distribution of market power across firms. Existing firms increase markups over time through successful innovation. Entrant innovation disrupts the accumulation of market power by incumbents. Using this environment, we highlight a novel misallocation channel for monetary policy. A contractionary monetary policy shock causes an increase in markup dispersion across firms by discouraging entrant innovation relative to incumbent innovation. We characterize the circumstances when contractionary monetary policy may increase misallocation.

Article Citation

Gu, Yumeng, and Sanjay R. Singh. 2024. “Distribution of Market Power, Endogenous Growth, and Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2024-09. Available at https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2024-09

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Title: mapping the increasing use of llms in scientific papers.

Abstract: Scientific publishing lays the foundation of science by disseminating research findings, fostering collaboration, encouraging reproducibility, and ensuring that scientific knowledge is accessible, verifiable, and built upon over time. Recently, there has been immense speculation about how many people are using large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT in their academic writing, and to what extent this tool might have an effect on global scientific practices. However, we lack a precise measure of the proportion of academic writing substantially modified or produced by LLMs. To address this gap, we conduct the first systematic, large-scale analysis across 950,965 papers published between January 2020 and February 2024 on the arXiv, bioRxiv, and Nature portfolio journals, using a population-level statistical framework to measure the prevalence of LLM-modified content over time. Our statistical estimation operates on the corpus level and is more robust than inference on individual instances. Our findings reveal a steady increase in LLM usage, with the largest and fastest growth observed in Computer Science papers (up to 17.5%). In comparison, Mathematics papers and the Nature portfolio showed the least LLM modification (up to 6.3%). Moreover, at an aggregate level, our analysis reveals that higher levels of LLM-modification are associated with papers whose first authors post preprints more frequently, papers in more crowded research areas, and papers of shorter lengths. Our findings suggests that LLMs are being broadly used in scientific writings.

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• 27 March 2024

Tweeting your research paper boosts engagement but not citations

• Bianca Nogrady

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Even before complaints about X’s declining quality, posting a paper on the social-media platform did not lead to a boost in citations. Credit: Matt Cardy/Getty

Posting about a research paper on social-media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) doesn’t translate into a bump in citations, according to a study that looked at 550 papers.

The finding comes as scientists are moving away from the platform in the wake of changes after its 2022 purchase by entrepreneur Elon Musk.

An international group of 11 researchers, who by the end of the experiment had between them nearly 230,000 followers on X, examined whether there was evidence that posting about a paper would increase its citation rate.

“There certainly is a correlation, and that’s been found in a lot of papers. But very few people have ever looked to see whether there’s any experimental causation,” says Trevor Branch, a marine ecologist at the University of Washington in Seattle and lead author on the paper, published in PLoS ONE last week 1 .

Every month for ten months, each researcher was allocated a randomly selected primary research article or review from a journal of their choice to post about on their personal account. Four randomly chosen articles from the same edition of the journal served as controls, which the researchers did not post about. They conducted the experiment in the period before Elon Musk took ownership of what was then known as Twitter and complaints of its declining quality increased.

‘Nail in the coffin’

Three years after the initial posts, the team compared the citation rates for the 110 posted articles with those of the 440 control articles, and found no significant difference. The researchers did acknowledge that their followers might not have been numerous enough to detect a statistically significant effect on citations.

The rate of daily downloads for the posted papers was nearly fourfold higher on the day that they were shared, compared with controls. Shared papers also had significantly higher accumulated Altmetric scores both 30 days and three years after the initial post. Calculated by London-based technology company Digital Science, an Altmetric score, says Branch, is a measure of how many people have looked at a paper and are talking about it, but it’s not a reliable indicator of a paper’s scientific worth. “It’s thoroughly biased by how many people with large followings tweet about it,” he says.

The findings echo those of information scientist Stefanie Haustein at the University of Ottawa, whose 2013 study 2 found a low correlation between posts and citations.

Haustein says the problem with using posts as a metric is that, even a decade ago, there was a lot of noise in the signal.

“We actually showed that a lot of the counts on Twitter you would get were bots, it wasn’t even humans,” says Haustein, who wasn’t involved in the new study.

She says the more recent departure of scientists from the platform has been the final nail in the coffin of the idea that posting could increase citations.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-00922-y

Branch, T. A. et al. PLoS ONE 19 , e0292201 (2024).

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Haustein, S., Peters, I., Sugimoto, C. R., Thelwall, M. & Larivière, V. J. Assoc. Inf. Sci. Technol. 65, 656–669 (2014).

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