assignment in land law

assignments basic law

Assignments: The Basic Law

The assignment of a right or obligation is a common contractual event under the law and the right to assign (or prohibition against assignments) is found in the majority of agreements, leases and business structural documents created in the United States.

As with many terms commonly used, people are familiar with the term but often are not aware or fully aware of what the terms entail. The concept of assignment of rights and obligations is one of those simple concepts with wide ranging ramifications in the contractual and business context and the law imposes severe restrictions on the validity and effect of assignment in many instances. Clear contractual provisions concerning assignments and rights should be in every document and structure created and this article will outline why such drafting is essential for the creation of appropriate and effective contracts and structures.

The reader should first read the article on Limited Liability Entities in the United States and Contracts since the information in those articles will be assumed in this article.

Basic Definitions and Concepts:

An assignment is the transfer of rights held by one party called the “assignor” to another party called the “assignee.” The legal nature of the assignment and the contractual terms of the agreement between the parties determines some additional rights and liabilities that accompany the assignment. The assignment of rights under a contract usually completely transfers the rights to the assignee to receive the benefits accruing under the contract. Ordinarily, the term assignment is limited to the transfer of rights that are intangible, like contractual rights and rights connected with property. Merchants Service Co. v. Small Claims Court , 35 Cal. 2d 109, 113-114 (Cal. 1950).

An assignment will generally be permitted under the law unless there is an express prohibition against assignment in the underlying contract or lease. Where assignments are permitted, the assignor need not consult the other party to the contract but may merely assign the rights at that time. However, an assignment cannot have any adverse effect on the duties of the other party to the contract, nor can it diminish the chance of the other party receiving complete performance. The assignor normally remains liable unless there is an agreement to the contrary by the other party to the contract.

The effect of a valid assignment is to remove privity between the assignor and the obligor and create privity between the obligor and the assignee. Privity is usually defined as a direct and immediate contractual relationship. See Merchants case above.

Further, for the assignment to be effective in most jurisdictions, it must occur in the present. One does not normally assign a future right; the assignment vests immediate rights and obligations.

No specific language is required to create an assignment so long as the assignor makes clear his/her intent to assign identified contractual rights to the assignee. Since expensive litigation can erupt from ambiguous or vague language, obtaining the correct verbiage is vital. An agreement must manifest the intent to transfer rights and can either be oral or in writing and the rights assigned must be certain.

Note that an assignment of an interest is the transfer of some identifiable property, claim, or right from the assignor to the assignee. The assignment operates to transfer to the assignee all of the rights, title, or interest of the assignor in the thing assigned. A transfer of all rights, title, and interests conveys everything that the assignor owned in the thing assigned and the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. Knott v. McDonald’s Corp ., 985 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

The parties must intend to effectuate an assignment at the time of the transfer, although no particular language or procedure is necessary. As long ago as the case of National Reserve Co. v. Metropolitan Trust Co ., 17 Cal. 2d 827 (Cal. 1941), the court held that in determining what rights or interests pass under an assignment, the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is controlling.

The intent of the parties to an assignment is a question of fact to be derived not only from the instrument executed by the parties but also from the surrounding circumstances. When there is no writing to evidence the intention to transfer some identifiable property, claim, or right, it is necessary to scrutinize the surrounding circumstances and parties’ acts to ascertain their intentions. Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998)

The general rule applicable to assignments of choses in action is that an assignment, unless there is a contract to the contrary, carries with it all securities held by the assignor as collateral to the claim and all rights incidental thereto and vests in the assignee the equitable title to such collateral securities and incidental rights. An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in action, however, with no indication of the intent of the parties, vests in the assignee the assigned contract or chose and all rights and remedies incidental thereto.

More examples: In Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs ., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998), the court held that the assignee of a party to a subordination agreement is entitled to the benefits and is subject to the burdens of the agreement. In Florida E. C. R. Co. v. Eno , 99 Fla. 887 (Fla. 1930), the court held that the mere assignment of all sums due in and of itself creates no different or other liability of the owner to the assignee than that which existed from the owner to the assignor.

And note that even though an assignment vests in the assignee all rights, remedies, and contingent benefits which are incidental to the thing assigned, those which are personal to the assignor and for his sole benefit are not assigned. Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc ., 519 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Thus, if the underlying agreement provides that a service can only be provided to X, X cannot assign that right to Y.

Novation Compared to Assignment:

Although the difference between a novation and an assignment may appear narrow, it is an essential one. “Novation is a act whereby one party transfers all its obligations and benefits under a contract to a third party.” In a novation, a third party successfully substitutes the original party as a party to the contract. “When a contract is novated, the other contracting party must be left in the same position he was in prior to the novation being made.”

A sublease is the transfer when a tenant retains some right of reentry onto the leased premises. However, if the tenant transfers the entire leasehold estate, retaining no right of reentry or other reversionary interest, then the transfer is an assignment. The assignor is normally also removed from liability to the landlord only if the landlord consents or allowed that right in the lease. In a sublease, the original tenant is not released from the obligations of the original lease.

Equitable Assignments:

An equitable assignment is one in which one has a future interest and is not valid at law but valid in a court of equity. In National Bank of Republic v. United Sec. Life Ins. & Trust Co. , 17 App. D.C. 112 (D.C. Cir. 1900), the court held that to constitute an equitable assignment of a chose in action, the following has to occur generally: anything said written or done, in pursuance of an agreement and for valuable consideration, or in consideration of an antecedent debt, to place a chose in action or fund out of the control of the owner, and appropriate it to or in favor of another person, amounts to an equitable assignment. Thus, an agreement, between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt shall be paid out of a specific fund going to the debtor may operate as an equitable assignment.

In Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Baker Invs. Corp. , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30804 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008), the court stated that an equitable assignment occurs under English law when an assignor, with an intent to transfer his/her right to a chose in action, informs the assignee about the right so transferred.

An executory agreement or a declaration of trust are also equitable assignments if unenforceable as assignments by a court of law but enforceable by a court of equity exercising sound discretion according to the circumstances of the case. Since California combines courts of equity and courts of law, the same court would hear arguments as to whether an equitable assignment had occurred. Quite often, such relief is granted to avoid fraud or unjust enrichment.

Note that obtaining an assignment through fraudulent means invalidates the assignment. Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters. It vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. Walker v. Rich , 79 Cal. App. 139 (Cal. App. 1926). If an assignment is made with the fraudulent intent to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, then it is void as fraudulent in fact. See our article on Transfers to Defraud Creditors .

But note that the motives that prompted an assignor to make the transfer will be considered as immaterial and will constitute no defense to an action by the assignee, if an assignment is considered as valid in all other respects.

Enforceability of Assignments:

Whether a right under a contract is capable of being transferred is determined by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. The validity and effect of an assignment is determined by the law of the place of assignment. The validity of an assignment of a contractual right is governed by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the assignment and the parties.

In some jurisdictions, the traditional conflict of laws rules governing assignments has been rejected and the law of the place having the most significant contacts with the assignment applies. In Downs v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co ., 14 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1964), a wife and her husband separated and the wife obtained a judgment of separation from the husband in New York. The judgment required the husband to pay a certain yearly sum to the wife. The husband assigned 50 percent of his future salary, wages, and earnings to the wife. The agreement authorized the employer to make such payments to the wife.

After the husband moved from New York, the wife learned that he was employed by an employer in Massachusetts. She sent the proper notice and demanded payment under the agreement. The employer refused and the wife brought an action for enforcement. The court observed that Massachusetts did not prohibit assignment of the husband’s wages. Moreover, Massachusetts law was not controlling because New York had the most significant relationship with the assignment. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the wife.

Therefore, the validity of an assignment is determined by looking to the law of the forum with the most significant relationship to the assignment itself. To determine the applicable law of assignments, the court must look to the law of the state which is most significantly related to the principal issue before it.

Assignment of Contractual Rights:

Generally, the law allows the assignment of a contractual right unless the substitution of rights would materially change the duty of the obligor, materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the obligor by the contract, materially impair the chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce the value of the performance to the obligor. Restat 2d of Contracts, § 317(2)(a). This presumes that the underlying agreement is silent on the right to assign.

If the contract specifically precludes assignment, the contractual right is not assignable. Whether a contract is assignable is a matter of contractual intent and one must look to the language used by the parties to discern that intent.

In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the rights and duties under a bilateral executory contract that does not involve personal skill, trust, or confidence may be assigned without the consent of the other party. But note that an assignment is invalid if it would materially alter the other party’s duties and responsibilities. Once an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of assignor’s rights. Hence, after a valid assignment, the assignor’s right to performance is extinguished, transferred to assignee, and the assignee possesses the same rights, benefits, and remedies assignor once possessed. Robert Lamb Hart Planners & Architects v. Evergreen, Ltd. , 787 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1992).

On the other hand, an assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to “all of the limitations of the assignor’s right, all defenses thereto, and all set-offs and counterclaims which would have been available against the assignor had there been no assignment, provided that these defenses and set-offs are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment.” See Robert Lamb , case, above.

The power of the contract to restrict assignment is broad. Usually, contractual provisions that restrict assignment of the contract without the consent of the obligor are valid and enforceable, even when there is statutory authorization for the assignment. The restriction of the power to assign is often ineffective unless the restriction is expressly and precisely stated. Anti-assignment clauses are effective only if they contain clear, unambiguous language of prohibition. Anti-assignment clauses protect only the obligor and do not affect the transaction between the assignee and assignor.

Usually, a prohibition against the assignment of a contract does not prevent an assignment of the right to receive payments due, unless circumstances indicate the contrary. Moreover, the contracting parties cannot, by a mere non-assignment provision, prevent the effectual alienation of the right to money which becomes due under the contract.

A contract provision prohibiting or restricting an assignment may be waived, or a party may so act as to be estopped from objecting to the assignment, such as by effectively ratifying the assignment. The power to void an assignment made in violation of an anti-assignment clause may be waived either before or after the assignment. See our article on Contracts.

Noncompete Clauses and Assignments:

Of critical import to most buyers of businesses is the ability to ensure that key employees of the business being purchased cannot start a competing company. Some states strictly limit such clauses, some do allow them. California does restrict noncompete clauses, only allowing them under certain circumstances. A common question in those states that do allow them is whether such rights can be assigned to a new party, such as the buyer of the buyer.

A covenant not to compete, also called a non-competitive clause, is a formal agreement prohibiting one party from performing similar work or business within a designated area for a specified amount of time. This type of clause is generally included in contracts between employer and employee and contracts between buyer and seller of a business.

Many workers sign a covenant not to compete as part of the paperwork required for employment. It may be a separate document similar to a non-disclosure agreement, or buried within a number of other clauses in a contract. A covenant not to compete is generally legal and enforceable, although there are some exceptions and restrictions.

Whenever a company recruits skilled employees, it invests a significant amount of time and training. For example, it often takes years before a research chemist or a design engineer develops a workable knowledge of a company’s product line, including trade secrets and highly sensitive information. Once an employee gains this knowledge and experience, however, all sorts of things can happen. The employee could work for the company until retirement, accept a better offer from a competing company or start up his or her own business.

A covenant not to compete may cover a number of potential issues between employers and former employees. Many companies spend years developing a local base of customers or clients. It is important that this customer base not fall into the hands of local competitors. When an employee signs a covenant not to compete, he or she usually agrees not to use insider knowledge of the company’s customer base to disadvantage the company. The covenant not to compete often defines a broad geographical area considered off-limits to former employees, possibly tens or hundreds of miles.

Another area of concern covered by a covenant not to compete is a potential ‘brain drain’. Some high-level former employees may seek to recruit others from the same company to create new competition. Retention of employees, especially those with unique skills or proprietary knowledge, is vital for most companies, so a covenant not to compete may spell out definite restrictions on the hiring or recruiting of employees.

A covenant not to compete may also define a specific amount of time before a former employee can seek employment in a similar field. Many companies offer a substantial severance package to make sure former employees are financially solvent until the terms of the covenant not to compete have been met.

Because the use of a covenant not to compete can be controversial, a handful of states, including California, have largely banned this type of contractual language. The legal enforcement of these agreements falls on individual states, and many have sided with the employee during arbitration or litigation. A covenant not to compete must be reasonable and specific, with defined time periods and coverage areas. If the agreement gives the company too much power over former employees or is ambiguous, state courts may declare it to be overbroad and therefore unenforceable. In such case, the employee would be free to pursue any employment opportunity, including working for a direct competitor or starting up a new company of his or her own.

It has been held that an employee’s covenant not to compete is assignable where one business is transferred to another, that a merger does not constitute an assignment of a covenant not to compete, and that a covenant not to compete is enforceable by a successor to the employer where the assignment does not create an added burden of employment or other disadvantage to the employee. However, in some states such as Hawaii, it has also been held that a covenant not to compete is not assignable and under various statutes for various reasons that such covenants are not enforceable against an employee by a successor to the employer. Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp. , 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 1999)

It is vital to obtain the relevant law of the applicable state before drafting or attempting to enforce assignment rights in this particular area.

Conclusion:

In the current business world of fast changing structures, agreements, employees and projects, the ability to assign rights and obligations is essential to allow flexibility and adjustment to new situations. Conversely, the ability to hold a contracting party into the deal may be essential for the future of a party. Thus, the law of assignments and the restriction on same is a critical aspect of every agreement and every structure. This basic provision is often glanced at by the contracting parties, or scribbled into the deal at the last minute but can easily become the most vital part of the transaction.

As an example, one client of ours came into the office outraged that his co venturer on a sizable exporting agreement, who had excellent connections in Brazil, had elected to pursue another venture instead and assigned the agreement to a party unknown to our client and without the business contacts our client considered vital. When we examined the handwritten agreement our client had drafted in a restaurant in Sao Paolo, we discovered there was no restriction on assignment whatsoever…our client had not even considered that right when drafting the agreement after a full day of work.

One choses who one does business with carefully…to ensure that one’s choice remains the party on the other side of the contract, one must master the ability to negotiate proper assignment provisions.

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Assign is the act of transferring rights , property , or other benefits to another party (the assignee ) from the party who holds such benefits under contract (the assignor). This concept is used in both contract and property law .

Contract Law

Under contract law, when one party assigns a contract , the assignment represents both: (1) an assignment of rights; and (2) a delegation of duties .

For example, if A contracts with B to teach B guitar for $50, A can assign this contract to C.
Here, A has both: (1) assigned A’s rights under the contract to the $50; and (2) delegated A’s duty to teach guitar, to C.
In this example, A is both the “assignor” and the “delegee” who delegates the duties to another (C), C is known as the “ obligor ” who must perform the obligations to the assignee , and B is the assignee who is owed duties and is liable to the obligor.

Assigning of Rights/Duties Under Contract Law

There are a few notable rules regarding assignments under contract law.

First, if an individual has not yet secured the contract to perform duties to another, they cannot assign their future right to an assignee.

That is, if A has not yet contracted with B to teach B guitar, A cannot assign their rights to C.

Second, rights cannot be assigned when they materially change the obligor’s duty and rights.

Third, the obligor can sue the assignee directly if the assignee does not pay them.

Following the previous example, this means that C ( obligor ) can sue B ( assignee ) if C teaches guitar to B, but B does not pay C $50 in return.

Delegation of Duties

If the promised performance requires a rare genius or skill, then the delegee cannot delegate it to the obligor. It can only be delegated if the promised performance is more commonplace. Further, an obligee can sue if the assignee does not perform. However, the delegee is secondarily liable unless there has been an express release of the delegee.

Meaning if B does want C to teach guitar but C refuses to, then B can sue C. If C still refuses to perform, then B can compel A to fulfill the duties under secondary liability.

Lastly, a related concept is novation , which is when a new obligor substitutes and releases an old obligor. If novation occurs, then the original obligor’s duties are wiped out. Novation requires an original obligee’s consent .

Property Law

Under property law , assignment typically arises in landlord-tenant situations.

For example, A might be renting from landlord B but wants another party (C) to take over the property.
In this scenario, A might choose between assigning and subleasing the property to C.
If assigning , A would give C the entire balance of the term , with no reversion to anyone; whereas if subleasing , A would give C the property for a limited period of the remaining term.
Under assignment, C would have privity of estate with the landlord while under a sublease, C would not.

[Last updated in June of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team ]

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Small Estates: How Does Assignment of Property Work?

When a person dies, they are called a decedent. A decedent leaves property behind. That property needs to be passed on to those who will inherit it. If a person has a small estate, then a shortened process, called assignment of property, can be used instead of the probate administration process.

Read this article to learn about how to use the assignment of property process. You can use our Do-It-Yourself Settling a Small Estate tool to create the forms you will need for this process. Read the article An Overview of Small Estate Processes to learn more about the other ways a small estate can be distributed.

What is In an Estate?

The property a decedent leaves behind that can be distributed through the assignment process could include:

Real estate (houses and other buildings, land and the things attached to it)
Personal property (furniture, cars, and other things not attached to land)
Bank accounts and cash
Stocks and bonds
Debts owed to the person

Some of the property is not part of the estate, which means it cannot be distributed through the assignment process. The estate does not usually include:

Jointly owned property,
Insurance policies,
Retirement accounts, or
Trusts that are not established by a will

Jointly Owned Property

Jointly owned property is property owned by more than one person. It is generally not included in an estate. Examples of jointly owned personal property are if you and the decedent are both listed on the title of a car or if you have joint bank accounts. When the decedent died, you automatically have full ownership of that property, so it is not part of the estate. You may want to take a copy of the decedent’s death certificate to the bank or Secretary of State (SOS) to remove the decedent’s name from the account or car title.

However, sometimes joint ownership is more complex. If you own real property with the decedent, or if you own any type of property with the decedent and someone else, ownership can be hard to understand after a death. Read the article Jointly Owned Property to learn more about this, or use the Guide to Legal Help to find a lawyer or legal services in your area.

Small Estates

In order to use the assignment process, a decedent’s estate must be small. Whether an estate is small depends on the value of the property in it. The dollar limit can change each year. If a person dies on or after February 21, 2024, an estate must be valued at $28,000 or less to be small. If a person died in 2023 through and including February 20, 2024 an estate must be valued at $27,000 or less. If a person died in 2022, an estate must be valued at $25,000 or less. If a person died in 2020 or 2021, an estate must be valued at $24,000 or less. If a person died in 2019 or 2018, an estate must be valued at $23,000 or less.

Assignment of Property

Assignment of property is the small estate process you must use if the decedent had real property. However, even if there was no real property, you may choose to use assignment of property if an estate is small. This is the only small estate process where a Probate Judge reviews and approves the division of property.

To use this process, you must know all the property and the heirs the decedent had, and have information about the funeral or burial expenses. You must also be an heir or the person who paid the funeral bill.

You must list all real property and personal property with the value of each. You can estimate real property’s market value by doubling its State Equalized Value (SEV). You can find the SEV on property tax bills or assessments for the property. You can also find it on most county or municipality websites.

The value of the property in the estate is its market value. Any liens or loans on property will not be deducted when determining if the estate falls into the small estates amount. There is a separate calculation to determine the fees that the court will charge to file the petition. This is called the inventory fee. You are allowed to deduct the value of the mortgage or other liens on real property when you determine the inventory value. You are not allowed to make any deductions from the value of personal property.

To estimate the value of personal property, think about how much you would ask for it at a yard sale or if you were selling it online.

Who Will Inherit?

After funeral and burial expenses have been paid, the court will order any remaining property to be divided among the heirs. The inheritance formula determines which heirs inherit property, and how much of the property each person will get. If there is a surviving spouse, that person inherits all the property.

If there is no surviving spouse, any property will be given or paid to direct descendants of the decedent, starting with the decedent’s children. If all of the decedent’s children are still alive, they will split the property equally. If a child died before the decedent, that person’s children will split the share equally. If the decedent had a grandchild who should inherit, but they died before the decedent, the grandchild's children will split the shares equally. If inheriting children or grandchildren die before the decedent with no living children of their own, the line of inheritance stops there. Their share will be divided between the remaining descendants.

If there are no living descendants of the decedent, the property will be split between the decedent’s parents equally. If only one parent is still living, that parent inherits all the property. If both parents died before the decedent, the property will go to their descendants, starting with the decedent’s siblings. The same rules of representation mentioned above apply.

If an inheriting sibling died before the decedent, that person’s child(ren) will split their share of the property equally. The same is true if an inheriting niece or nephew died before the decedent. If inheriting siblings, nieces, or nephews die before the decedent with no living children of their own, the line of inheritance stops there. Their share will be divided between the remaining heirs.

If no descendants of the decedent’s parents are living, the property is divided among the decedent’s grandparents. Half of the property will go to the decedent’s paternal grandparents, and the other half will go to the maternal grandparents. If only one maternal or paternal grandparent is living, they will take the full half of the property. If both grandparents on one side died before the decedent, their half of the property goes to their descendants, starting with the decedent’s aunts and uncles. The same rules of representation mentioned above apply.

If an inheriting aunt or uncle died before the decedent did, that person’s children will split the share of the property equally. The same is true if an inheriting cousin died before the decedent. If inheriting aunts, uncles, or cousins die before the decedent with no living children of their own, the line of inheritance stops there. Their share will be divided between the remaining heirs.

There are other rules too, including special rules if an heir dies after the decedent does. You can use our Do-It-Yourself Settling a Small Estate tool to help you figure out who will inherit and what share each heir will receive. You may also want to talk to a lawyer if you have questions about this. You can use the Guide to Legal Help to find legal services in your area.

Survivorship and the 120-Hour Rule

Survivorship affects inheritance rights of heirs and devisees. In Michigan, a person must live more than 120 hours after a decedent dies for that person’s survivorship rights to take effect. Generally, anyone who dies during the first 120 hours after a decedent’s death is considered to have predeceased (died before) the decedent and they lose their interest in the decedent’s property. The 120-hour rule is not followed if:

A will, deed, title, or trust addresses simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster;
A will, deed, title, or trust states a person is not required to survive for a certain amount of time or it specifies a different survival period;
The rule would affect interests protected by Michigan law; or
The rule would cause a failure or duplication in distributing property.

Notice to Decedent’s Creditors

This process does not include any notice to creditors . If a creditor tries to collect a debt within 63 days of when the order is issued by the court, the person who got the property will have to pay the debt, up to the amount or value of the property the person got. This does not apply if the decedent’s spouse or minor children got the property. For example, if the decedent’s brother got $1,000, a creditor the decedent owed $500 could get the $500 from him. If the decedent had owed the creditor $1,500, the brother wouldn’t have to pay more than $1,000 to the creditor. If the decedent’s spouse or minor child got the property, they would not have to pay the creditor anything.

The Process

To start this process, file a Petition for Assignment with the probate court in the county where the decedent lived. If the decedent lived outside Michigan, file the Petition for Assignment in the county where the decedent had real property. You can use our Do-It-Yourself Settling a Small Estate tool to create this petition.

After you complete the form, print two copies. Date and sign both copies. The Do-It-Yourself Settling a Small Estate tool will prepare a Testimony to Identify Heirs, but not all courts require it. Not all courts require a certified copy of the death certificate. You might want to check the probate court’s website or call and ask before you go to court to file the documents. You can find contact information for the court on the right side of this page if you have selected a county.

You will need to file the following documents with the probate court:

Both copies of the petition
The Testimony to Identify Heirs (if your court requires it)
A copy of the death certificate
Proof that the funeral and burial expenses have been paid or a bill showing the amount owed

There is a $25 filing fee. There is also an inventory fee. It is based on the value of property in the estate. If the property in the estate has no value, the inventory fee is $5. For example, if the decedent had a house that was worth less than the amount of the mortgage, the value of the estate could be zero. You can use the inventory fee calculator on the Michigan One Court of Justice website to see how much the inventory fee will be.

The petition is reviewed by a probate court judge. If everything is correct when you file the Petition and Order, the judge will sign it. You may be able to get your certified copy of the Order Assigning Assets on the day you file it. You need the Order Assigning Assets to distribute the property in the estate.

There is a fee to get a certified copy of the Order Assigning Assets. The fee to get a certified copy varies, but it is usually $15 to $20. You need a certified copy of the order to transfer the property in the estate. You may want to get more than one certified copy when you file the petition. Some courts charge less for extra certified copies if you get them at the same time.

The court will order the funeral and burial expenses be paid or reimbursed to whoever paid them. This means all paid and unpaid funeral expenses will be deducted from the value of the estate when determining if it is a small estate. If there is no cash available, something may have to be sold to pay those expenses.

Distributing the Property

Once the judge has signed the Order Assigning Assets, you will be able to distribute the property in the estate to the heirs. The Do-It-Yourself Settling a Small Estate tool will tell you the shares each person is entitled to, but some things (like cars) cannot easily be divided. Decide how to divide the existing property so everyone gets the share they deserve.

Transferring Money from Bank or Credit Union Accounts

If the decedent had bank or credit union accounts that were not jointly owned with another person, take the certified copy of the order to the bank to close the account. The bank should release the money to the heir or heirs by writing a check or money order.

Transferring a Vehicle

If the decedent had a vehicle, the surviving spouse or heir must complete a Certification from the Heir to a Vehicle . If you use our Do-It-Yourself Settling a Small Estate tool, you will get a completed certification form for each vehicle you are transferring.

Take it to the Office of the SOS with a copy of the death certificate. If you have a copy of the vehicle title, take that, too.

Transferring Real Property

If the decedent had real property, you will need to record a certified copy of the order to transfer the property. Take the order to the register of deeds for the county where the property is. Check the county’s website or call the local register of deeds office to find out how much the filing fee is.

You should not have to pay a transfer tax. Transfer tax is based on how much is paid for the property. Nothing was paid for this property when it transferred because the decedent died.

When the property is transferred, its value may “uncap.” The amount property tax can increase in a year is limited while the property is owned by the same person. When the property is transferred to another person, the property tax will be adjusted to the property’s current market value. You can learn more about property taxes on the State of Michigan’s Treasury Department website .

If the property was the decedent’s principal residence, it probably had a Homestead Tax Exemption attached to it. Under Michigan law, if you own your home you do not have to pay certain taxes on it.

If the person inheriting the property will be living there, they need to fill out a Principal Residence Exemption Affidavit . If whoever is getting the property is not going to live there but plans to continue owning it, they need to fill out a Request to Rescind a Principal Residence Exemption .

One of these forms must be filed with the city or township where the property is located within 90 days after the decedent’s death. If it is not filed, additional taxes and fees will be charged.

You may not have to file the Request to Rescind a Principal Residence Exemption for up to three years if the property is listed for sale during that time. If you are selling real estate in this situation, you may want to talk to a real estate agent or a lawyer.

If you have a low income, you may qualify for free legal services. Whether you have a low income or not, you can use the Guide to Legal Help to find lawyers in your area. If you are not able to get free legal services but can’t afford high legal fees, consider hiring a lawyer for part of your case instead of the whole thing. This is called limited scope representation. To learn more, read Limited Scope Representation (LSR): A More Affordable Way to Hire a Lawyer . To find a limited scope lawyer, follow this link to the State Bar of Michigan lawyer directory . This link lists lawyers who offer limited scope representation. You can narrow the results to lawyers in your area by typing in your county, city, or zip code at the top of the page. You can also narrow the results by topic by entering the kind of lawyer you need (divorce, estate, etc.) at the top of the page.

Legal Assignment: Everything You Need to Know

A legal assignment occurs when a party assigns their contractual rights to a third party. 3 min read updated on February 01, 2023

A legal assignment occurs when a party assigns their contractual rights to a third party. The benefit that the issuing party would have received from the contract is now assigned to the third party. The party appointing their rights is referred to as the assignor, while the party obtaining the rights is the assignee.

Assignment of Contract

A legal assignment occurs when:

The rights in personal or real property are transferred from one party to another
The transfer also gives the new owner the rights to the property that the prior owner held prior to the transfer occurring

In the Purman Estate case, the court stated that a legal assignment is a transfer of property, or of some right or interest, from one person to another. It also stated that it must be the proper transfer of one whole interest in that property.

An assignment of rights occurs when an assignor gives up or transfers their rights of a future benefit to another party. In other words, an assignment is the act of one party transferring, vesting, or causing to vest their interest in a property to another party. A valid legal assignment only occurs when all underlying elements of a lawfully binding contract are included in it, including intent. A trial court can determine if an assignment has occurred. To prevent disputes or miscommunications, it's important that the subject matter is clearly identified in the assignment.

A contract assignment occurs when a party assigns their contractual rights to a third party. The benefit the issuing party would have received from the contract is now assigned to the third party. The party appointing their rights is referred to as the assignor, while the party obtaining the rights is the assignee. Essentially, the assignor prefers that the assignee reverses roles and assumes the contractual rights and obligations as stated in the contract. Before this can occur, all parties to the original contract must be notified.

How Assignments Work

The specific language used in the contract will determine how the assignment plays out. For example , one contract may prohibit assignment, while another contract may require that all parties involved agree to it before proceeding. Remember, an assignment of contract does not necessarily alleviate an assignor from all liability. Many contracts include an assurance clause guaranteeing performance. In other words, the initial parties to the contract guarantee that the assignee will achieve the desired goal.

When Assignments Will Not Be Enforced

The following situations indicate when an assignment of a contract is not enforced:

The contract specifically prohibits assignment
The assignment drastically changes the expected outcome
The assignment is against public policy or illegal

Delegation vs. Assignment

Occasionally, one party in a contract will desire to pass on or delegate their responsibility to a third party without creating an assignment contract. Some duties are so specific in nature that they cannot be delegated. Adding a clause in the contract to prevent a party from delegating their responsibilities and duties is highly recommended.

Three Steps to Follow if You Want to Assign a Contract

There are three main steps to take if you're looking to assign a contract:

Make sure the current contract does not contain an anti-assignment clause
Officially execute the assignment by transferring the parties' obligations and rights
Notify the obligor of the changes made

Once the obligor is notified, the assignor will effectively be relieved of liability.

Anti-Assignment Clauses

If you'd prefer not to allow the party you're doing business with to assign a contract, you may be able to prevent this from occurring by clearly stating anti-assignment clauses in the original contract. The three most common anti-assignment clauses are:

Consent required for assignment
Consent not needed for new owners or affiliates
Consent not unreasonably withheld

Based on these three clauses, no party in the contract is allowed to delegate or assign any obligations or rights without prior written consent from the other parties. Any delegation or assignment in violation of this passage shall be deemed void. It is not possible to write an anti-assignment clause that goes against an assignment that is issued or ordered by a court.

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Assignment Law
Assignment Contract Law
Assignment of Rights and Obligations Under a Contract
Assignment of Rights Example
Consent to Assignment
Assignment Legal Definition
What Is the Definition of Assigns
Delegation vs Assignment
Assignment Of Contracts
Assignment of Contract Rights

The Law Dictionary

Your Free Online Legal Dictionary • Featuring Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed.

ASSIGNMENT Definition & Legal Meaning

Definition & citations:.

In contracts. 1. The act by which one person transfers to another, or causes to vest in that other, the whole of the right, interest, or property which he has in any realty or personalty, in possession or in action, or any share, interest, or subsidiary estate therein. Seventh Nat. Bank v. Iron Co. (C. C.) 35 Fed. 440; Haug v. Riley, 101 Ga. 372, 29 S. E. 44, 40 L It A. 244. More particularly, a written transfer of property, as distinguished from a transfer by mere delivery. 2. In a narrower sense, the transfer or making over of the estate, right, or title which one has in lands and tenements; and, in an especially technical sense, the transfer of the unexpired residue of a term or estate for life or years. Assignment does not include testamentary transfers. The idea of an assignment is essentially that of a transfer by one existing party to another existing party of some species of property or valuable interest, except in the case of an executor. Ilight v. Sackett, 34 N. Y. 447. 3. A transfer or making over by a debtor of all his property and effects to one or more assignees in trust for the benefit of his creditors. 2 Story, Eq. Jur.

This article contains general legal information but does not constitute professional legal advice for your particular situation. The Law Dictionary is not a law firm, and this page does not create an attorney-client or legal adviser relationship. If you have specific questions, please consult a qualified attorney licensed in your jurisdiction.

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Understanding an assignment and assumption agreement

Need to assign your rights and duties under a contract? Learn more about the basics of an assignment and assumption agreement.

Find more Legal Forms and Templates

by Belle Wong, J.D.

Belle Wong, is a freelance writer specializing in small business, personal finance, banking, and tech/SAAS. She ...

The assignment and assumption agreement

The basics of assignment and assumption, filling in the assignment and assumption agreement.

While every business should try its best to meet its contractual obligations, changes in circumstance can happen that could necessitate transferring your rights and duties under a contract to another party who would be better able to meet those obligations.

Person presenting documents to another person who is signing them

If you find yourself in such a situation, and your contract provides for the possibility of assignment, an assignment and assumption agreement can be a good option for preserving your relationship with the party you initially contracted with, while at the same time enabling you to pass on your contractual rights and duties to a third party.

An assignment and assumption agreement is used after a contract is signed, in order to transfer one of the contracting party's rights and obligations to a third party who was not originally a party to the contract. The party making the assignment is called the assignor, while the third party accepting the assignment is known as the assignee.

In order for an assignment and assumption agreement to be valid, the following criteria need to be met:

The initial contract must provide for the possibility of assignment by one of the initial contracting parties.
The assignor must agree to assign their rights and duties under the contract to the assignee.
The assignee must agree to accept, or "assume," those contractual rights and duties.
The other party to the initial contract must consent to the transfer of rights and obligations to the assignee.

A standard assignment and assumption contract is often a good starting point if you need to enter into an assignment and assumption agreement. However, for more complex situations, such as an assignment and amendment agreement in which several of the initial contract terms will be modified, or where only some, but not all, rights and duties will be assigned, it's a good idea to retain the services of an attorney who can help you draft an agreement that will meet all your needs.

When you're ready to enter into an assignment and assumption agreement, it's a good idea to have a firm grasp of the basics of assignment:

First, carefully read and understand the assignment and assumption provision in the initial contract. Contracts vary widely in their language on this topic, and each contract will have specific criteria that must be met in order for a valid assignment of rights to take place.
All parties to the agreement should carefully review the document to make sure they each know what they're agreeing to, and to help ensure that all important terms and conditions have been addressed in the agreement.
Until the agreement is signed by all the parties involved, the assignor will still be obligated for all responsibilities stated in the initial contract. If you are the assignor, you need to ensure that you continue with business as usual until the assignment and assumption agreement has been properly executed.

Unless you're dealing with a complex assignment situation, working with a template often is a good way to begin drafting an assignment and assumption agreement that will meet your needs. Generally speaking, your agreement should include the following information:

Identification of the existing agreement, including details such as the date it was signed and the parties involved, and the parties' rights to assign under this initial agreement
The effective date of the assignment and assumption agreement
Identification of the party making the assignment (the assignor), and a statement of their desire to assign their rights under the initial contract
Identification of the third party accepting the assignment (the assignee), and a statement of their acceptance of the assignment
Identification of the other initial party to the contract, and a statement of their consent to the assignment and assumption agreement
A section stating that the initial contract is continued; meaning, that, other than the change to the parties involved, all terms and conditions in the original contract stay the same

In addition to these sections that are specific to an assignment and assumption agreement, your contract should also include standard contract language, such as clauses about indemnification, future amendments, and governing law.

Sometimes circumstances change, and as a business owner you may find yourself needing to assign your rights and duties under a contract to another party. A properly drafted assignment and assumption agreement can help you make the transfer smoothly while, at the same time, preserving the cordiality of your initial business relationship under the original contract.

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Assignment of Rents – What, Why, and How?

Article by:

Madelaine prescott, esq., share this post:.

November 29, 2023

These days, almost all commercial loans include an Assignment of Rents as part of the Deed of Trust or Mortgage. But what is an Assignment of Rents, why is this such an important tool, and how are they enforced?

An Assignment of Rents (“AOR”) is used to grant the lender on a transaction a security interest in existing and future leases, rents, issues, or profits generated by the secured property, including cash proceeds, in the event a borrower defaults on their loan. The lender can use the AOR to step in and directly collect rental payments made by the tenant. For an AOR to be effective, the lender’s interest must be perfected, which has a few fairly simple requirements. The AOR must be in writing, executed by the borrower, and recorded with the county where the property is located. Including an AOR in the recorded Deed of Trust or Mortgage is the easiest and most common way to ensure the AOR meets these requirements should it ever need to be utilized.

When a borrower defaults, lenders can take advantage of AORs as an alternative to foreclosure to recoup their investment. With a shorter timeline and significantly lower costs, it is certainly an attractive option for lenders looking to get defaulted borrowers back on track with payments, without the potential of having to take back a property and attempting to either manage it or sell it in hopes of getting your money back out of the property. AORs can be a quick and easy way for the lender to get profits generated by the property with the goal of bringing the borrower out of default. But lenders should carefully monitor how much is owed versus how much has been collected. If the AOR generates enough funds so that the borrower is no longer in default, the lender must stop collecting rents generated by the property.

Enforcement of an AOR can also incentivize borrowers to work with the lender to formulate a plan, as many borrowers rely on rental income to cover expenses related to the property or their businesses. Borrowers are generally more willing to come to the table and negotiate a mutual, amicable resolution with the lender in order to protect their own investment. A word of warning to lenders though: since rental income is frequently used to pay expenses on the property, such as the property manager, maintenance, taxes, and other expenses, the lender needs to ensure they do not unintentionally hurt the value of the property by letting these important expenses fall behind. This may hurt the lender’s investment as well, as the property value could suffer, liens could be placed on the property, or the property may fall into disrepair if not properly maintained. It is also important for lenders to be aware of the statutes surrounding the payment of these expenses when an AOR is being used, as some state’s statutes require the lender to pay certain property expenses out of the collected rents if requested by the borrower.

In addition to being shorter and cheaper than foreclosure, AORs can be much easier to enforce. In California, the enforcement of an AOR is governed by California Civil Code §2938. This statute specifies enforcement methods lenders can use and restrictions on use of these funds by the lender, among other things. Under CA Civil Code §2938(c), there are 4 ways to enforce an AOR:

The appointment of a receiver;
Obtaining possession of the rents, issues, profits;
Delivery to tenant of a written demand for turnover of rents, issues, and profits in the correct form; or
Delivery to assignor of a written demand for the rents, issues, or profits.

One or more of these methods can be used to enforce an AOR. First, a receiver can be appointed by the court, and granted specific powers related to the AOR such as managing the property and collecting rents. They can have additional powers though; it just depends on what the court orders. This is not the simplest or easiest option as it requires court involvement, but this is used to enforce an AOR, especially when borrowers or tenants are uncooperative. Next is obtaining possession of the rents, issues, profits, which is exactly as it seems; lenders can simply obtain actual possession of these and apply the funds to the loan under their AOR.

The third and fourth options each require delivery of a written demand to certain parties, directing them to pay rent to the lender instead of to the landlord. Once the demand is made, the tenant pays their rent directly to the lender, who then applies the funds to the defaulted loan. These are both great pre-litigation options, with advantages over the first two enforcement methods since actual possession can be difficult to obtain and courts move slowly with high costs to litigate. The written demands require a specific form to follow called the “Demand To Pay Rent to Party Other Than Landlord”, as found at CA Civil Code §2938(k). There are other notice requirements to be followed here, so it is essential to consult with an experienced attorney if you are considering either of these options. California Civil Code §2938 specifically provides that none of the four enforcement methods violate California’s One Action Rule nor the Anti-Deficiency Rule, so lenders can confidently enforce their AORs using the above methods with peace of mind that they are not violating other California laws.

Whether you are looking to originate a new loan, or you are facing a default by your borrower, understanding what an Assignment of Rents is and how it operates can be extremely beneficial. Enforcing an AOR can be an easier option than foreclosure and can help promote a good relationship with your borrower when handled correctly. If you have any questions about AORs, or need further details on how to enforce them, Geraci is here to help.

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Balance of Interests as a Principle of Civil Law: Some Aspects of Legal Consciousness

Yury Alexandrovich SVIRIN Department Civil Procedural Law and Bailiff Organization Department, All-Russian State University of Justice, Moscow, Russian Federation
Vladimir Viktorovich KULAKOV Department of Civil Law, Russian State University of Justice, Moscow, Russia Federation
Alexandr Anatolievich MOKHOV Kutafin Moscow State Law University, Moscov, Russian Federation
Sergej Nikolaevich SHESTOV Institute of Economics and Law, Academy of Labor and Social Relations, Sevastopol, Russian Federation
Vladislav Petrovich SOROKIN Department of Civil Law and Process Ows, Academy of Labour and Social Relations, Moscow, Russian Federation

The research considers the category of reasonable balance of interests in the context of civil relations. The authors of the article highlight the need to restrict permissibility as a method of civil regulation aimed at protecting the rights and interests of the weaker party in some legal relations. A reasonable balance of interests is ensured by laws and agreements, whose conditions become the subject of a judicial dispute in the absence of a mandatory rule. The authors have analyzed judicial acts conditioned by the need to maintain a reasonable balance of interests. As a result, they have determined that the first condition for applying the fair balance principle is the equivalence of counter-performance in the absence of both excessive benefits and excessive losses for the parties. The second condition is the party-related division in some civil relations. The authors have concluded that the risks of negative consequences should not be borne only by the weaker party if the latter could not reasonably foresee the consequences upon concluding the relevant agreement. Methods. The study is based on the comparative analysis of the Russian scientific doctrine and judicial practice. The main approach to the analysis of the legal tools in question is the method of system analysis. In addition, the authors used the structural-functional method and general scientific methods of cognition. The study aims at determining the principle of a reasonable balance of interests in civil law, its essence, necessity and expediency in the system of law enforcement. The authors aim to define conditions for applying legal norms to achieve a reasonable balance of interests among all parties in disputed legal relations. Results. The study results let the authors claim that the risks of negative consequences should not be borne only by the weaker party if it could not reasonably foresee such consequences upon concluding the agreement and the imbalance of interests among parties in civil-legal relations is caused by the violation by one or another party of the principles of fair practice and reasonableness . Although a reasonable balance of interests is a counterweight to the principles of contractual freedom and free will, courts should apply it to ensure the right of justice.

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Basic Information about Faculties

The Faculty of Law prepares specialists in specialty 021100 �"JURISPRUDENCE," Level of proficiency � "JURIST"

The way to the world of intellect and erudition is opened with the juridical education that is given in the Moscow Financial-Juridical Academy (MFJA) by the Faculty of Law. Not by chance is the motto of the faculty "Knowledge and Intellect." The faculty of law of the MFJA prepares of specialists in the field of law and gives state diplomas. The graduates receive qualification of "Jurist" in the "Jurisprudence" specialty � 021100. The faculty is located in a separate educational building with developed area and a comfortable student yard near the "Warshavskaya" metro station. All educational processes are organized in a single building with lecture halls and laboratories equipped for practical and seminar lessons. Now more than 2,000 students are studying at the faculty.

The faculty prepares jurists � broad specialists � as is evidenced by an educational plan which corresponds fully to the government standard. Our students are studying the disciplines provided for by the Government Standard of the higher professional education. After the 3 rd year students study a specialty they have selected: civil-legal, state-legal, criminal-legal, legal regulation of property-land relations.

Lectures in the faculty are given in well-equipped auditoria. Lessons in such disciplines as criminalistics and forensic medicine are carried out in a specially equipped criminalistics laboratory.

Educational programs provide obligatory familiarization of students with computer techniques, therefore many lessons are carried out in laboratories of the Center of Information Technology .

The system of combining theoretical and practical training has become traditional in the faculty. Students of the faculty of law attend regularly inter-municipal courts of Moscow , are present at criminal and civil cases with follow-up analysis of trials in seminars.

Practical and pre-graduation training is a component part of the educational process. Practical training is the basis for the study of general-scientific principal legal disciplines.

During pre-graduation training, students firm up and extend the theoretical knowledge received during study of principal disciplines, obtain practical skills using the knowledge imparted. Besides carrying out tasks provided by the program, they collect material for their degree work. For practical work, students are directed to courts, the Ministry of Justice, organs of prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Military Prosecutor's Office, legal departments of enterprises and firms, committees of the Council of Federation and State Duma of Russia, and structural divisions of the Moscow Government.

Testimonials of experts tutoring students in work conditions show that during an education period students receive good modern knowledge and prove themselves skillful during performance of specific practical work. The main direction of student-jurists to practical training is a special form of assignment and employment assistance for future specialists. The experience of the faculty of law has shown that our graduates after graduation from the Academy find jobs as a rule in locations doing practical work.

Terms of training

Terms of training in the faculty of law are:

schedule of intramural education � 5 years; intramural-correspondence schedule � 6 years; correspondence schedule � 6 years; second higher education � 3 years; graduates of colleges and technical schools are taught according to a short program. Students of intramural division receive a deferment for the period of their education. After completion of education the graduates receive governmental diplomas in higher professional education.

Cost of Education

Specializations

The faculty of law of the Moscow Financial-Juridical Academy , founded 10 years ago, has prepared specialists in the field of law and given governmental diplomas. The graduates acquire the JURIST qualification in the "Jurisprudence" specialization.

Since the 3 rd year students have been studying disciplines in accordance with a chosen specialty.

"Civil-legal" specialization

Disciplines of the specialization: Housing law, Insurance law, Corporate law, Legal problems of privatization, Bankruptcy, Securities, Legal regulation of bank activities, Customs law, Legal regulation of foreign-economic activity, Law of inheritance, Executive law, Legal regulation of audit activity, Legal regulation of intellectual property.

Students having become familiar with the basic educational program in specialty 21100 "Jurisprudence" with civil-law specialization have a wide opportunity to engage in labor activity: in courts of arbitrage; as city executives; at notary organizations; at specialized organizations (realtor, legal, shipping, etc.); to take part in civil commodity circulation as middlemen in preparation and realization of contracts with different kinds of interests including exclusive rights of intellectual property; as jurists and heads of legal services of juridical persons of different organizational forms; as officers at organizations of governmental management and in organs of local control including housing and communal organizations, housing inspections, etc.

"State-legal" specialization

Disciplines of the specialization: Housing law, Insurance law, Budgetary law, Constitutional fundamentals of taxes and fees in the Russian Federation, Suffrage and electoral process in the Russian Federation, Problems in modern Russian nationhood, Public service in the Russian Federation, Customs law, Executive law, Human rights and civics, Fundamentals of constitutional and statute law of the subjects of the Russian Federation, Administrative process in the Russian Federation, Parliamentary law. Jurists of this specialization work in structural divisions of Moscow Government, organs of executive power of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation , and organs of social protection.

"Criminal-legal" specialization

Disciplines of the specialization: Forensic medicine, Forensic psychiatry, Governmental prosecution, Psychology of operation-research activity ( �� -ORA), Crimes against public safety, Branch records management, Performing a preliminary inquest, Crimes against state power, Crimes in the sphere of economy, Crimes against personality, Crimes against justice and administrative procedures, Operation-research activity ( �� -ORA), Procedure in jury trial. Jurists of this specialization work for law-enforcement and judicial organs: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Office of Prosecutor, Federal Service of Security (FSS), courts of general jurisdiction, arbitration tribunals � inquest, investigation.

"Legal regulation of property-land relationship" specialization

Disciplines of the specialization: Scientific fundamentals of property-land relationship, Regulation of legal relationship among proprietors of property-land complex, Legal regulation of privatization of property-land complex, Informatization of legal regulation of property-land relationship, Economic regulation of property-land relationship, Intraeconomic land-utilization of property-land complex, Cadastre of property-land complex, Territorial land-utilization of property-land complex, Ecological regulation of property-land relationship, Control of property-land complex, Urban land-utilization of property-land complex, Licensing in property-land complex system, State control of property-land complex regulation.

Jurist of this specialization work in such structural divisions of Moscow Government as: Committee of management of Moscow property, Department of support and development of small business, Fund of Moscow property, Moscow committee of land-usage (Moscomzem), Moscow land chamber, Technical inventory bureau, Moscow license chamber, Moscow registration chamber, Department of analysis and control of economic policy realization, Department of property-land relationship coordination, State urban inspection (Gosgorinspectsiya) and others.

Disciplines Studied in the Faculty of Law

in specialty 021100 "Jurisprudence"

I. General humanities and social-economic disciplines: Foreign languages, Physical culture, Domestic history, Logic, Philosophy, Economics, Political science, Sociology, Culturology, Latin, Oratory, Russian language and standard of speech, Psychology and pedagogy, Ethics and aesthetics, Philosophy of law, Conflictology.

II. General mathematical and natural-scientific disciplines: Conceptions of modern natural science, Informatics and mathematics, Legal informational systems, Modern facilities of computers and telecommunications, Legal statistics.

III. General-professional disciplines: Theory of state and law, History of legal and political doctrines, History of state and law of foreign countries, History of domestic state and law of Russia, Constitutional (public) law of the Russian Federation, Constitutional (public) law of foreign countries, Civil law, Civil procedure, Administrative law, Employment law, Criminal law, Criminal procedure, Criminalistics, International law, Ecological law, Land law, Roman law, International private law, Financial law, Municipal law of RF, Family law, Criminology, Law-enforcement authorities, Juridical psychology, Criminal-executive law, Prosecutor's supervision, Russian entrepreneurial law, Commercial law, Arbitrage procedure, Fiscal law of RF.

IV. Special disciplines

V. Disciplines of specializations

State-legal : Documentation, Procedural documentation, Advocacy, Notariate, Legal regulation of state property control, Suffrage and electoral procedure, Customs law, Administrative procedure, Housing law, Parliamentary law, Fundamentals of constitutional and constituent law of subjects of the Russian Federation, Migratory law, Problems of modern Russian nationhood, Executive law.

Civil-legal : Documentation, Procedural documentation, Advocacy, Notariate, Banking law, Legal regulation of security market, Copyright and patent law, Corporate law, Legislation about consumer rights, Insurance law, Customs law, Housing law, Succession law, Problems of civil law and civil procedure, Executive law.

Criminal-legal : Documentation, Procedural documentation, Advocacy, Legal fundamentals of operation-research activity, Legal regulation of fight against organized crime, Legal regulation of private security detective activity, Evidence in legal procedure, Preventive measures against crimes and incidents, International cooperation in fight against crime, Legal accounting, Forensic medicine, Forensic psychiatry, Procedure in jury trials, Problems of criminal law and criminal procedure, Executive law.

Legal regulation of property-land relationship : Documentation, Procedural documentation, Advocacy, Notariate, Scientific fundamentals of property-land relationship regulation, Legal support of economic regulation of property-land relationship, Legal regulation of property-land complex privatization, Cadastre of property-land complex, Ecological-legal regulation of property-land relationship, Legal methods in controlling property-land complex, Urban land management of property-land complex, Public control of property-land relationship regulation, Problems of civil-legal regulation of land proprietary and problems of land law, Executive law.

Financial-legal specialization : Documentation, Procedural documentation, Advocacy, Notariate, Banking law, Legal regulation of security market, Currency law, Corporate law, Legislation about consumers' rights in financial sphere, Investment law, Legislation about bankruptcy, Insurance law, Succession law, Problems of civil-legal regulation of physical and juridical persons' activities in the sphere of finances, Executive law.

Ecological-legal specialization : Documentation, Procedural documentation, Advocacy, Legal aspects of nature management economics, Legal regulation of environmental protection, Water and forest legislation, Legislation about protection of subsoil, atmosphere, wild life, Legal measures of protection of people's health against environmental hazard, Ecological law-enforcement system, responsibilities of state authorities of providing for ecological safety of the country and population protection, International cooperation in the field of environmental protection, Ecological assessment, Ecological auditing, Problems of legislation in the sphere of ecological safety, Executive law.

Departments

The department of civil-legal disciplines

The department graduates specialists in the civil-legal specialization, the content of which is disclosed with the specialization disciplines: Housing law, Insurance law, Corporate law, Legal problems of privatization, Bankruptcy, Securities, Legal regulation of banking activity, Customs law, Legal regulation of foreign-economic activity, Succession law, Execution law, Legal regulation of auditing activity, Legal regulation of intellectual property.

The faculty staff trains students in accordance with the main educational program of specialist training in the "Jurisprudence" specialty and with civil-legal specialization as well as bachelor's and magister's degrees in "Jurisprudence."

The department conducts research activity in the development of fundamental and applied sciences, scientific-methodological investigations with the aim of increasing effectiveness and improving quality of education and teaching. The department staff actively involves students in these kinds of activities through a learned-student society of the faculty, conducting scientific conferences, and developing term projects on problems of perfecting civil legislation of the Russian Federation .

The faculty staff consists of qualified teachers on the staff as well as of teachers the best Moscow higher institutions hired by the department to give lectures and to carry out group lessons with students of the faculty of law of the Moscow Financial-Juridical Academy .

The department is headed by a candidate of jurisprudence, assistant professor Vladimir Nikolaevitch Tulaev.

The department of criminal-legal disciplines

The department prepares students in the criminal-legal field and has the following disciplines: Forensic medicine; Forensic psychiatry; State prosecution; Psychology of operation-research activity ( �� ORA); Crimes against public safety; Industry record management; Holding preliminary inquests; Crime against the state power; Crime in the sphere of economy; Crime against the person; Crime against justice and administrative procedures; Operation-research activities; Jury procedures.

The department of criminal-legal disciplines was founded in 2000. Teachers have rich experience in the judicial system and other law-enforcement agencies. The department is staffed with experienced experts, high-qualified methodologists, and well-known scientists.

Teachers of the department give courses of criminal law and procedure, criminalistics and criminology, criminal-executive law, law-enforcement authorities, prosecutor's supervision, juridical psychology and psychology of operation-research activity and operation-research activity.

From the foundation of the department they have continuously improved methods of educational work, carried out large educational-methodological work in courses assigned to the department.

A laboratory of criminalistics technique and a photo-laboratory have been created. Work on computerization of educational process continues on the basis of the Center of Informational Technologies .

The department is headed by Professor Makhtay Shopievitch Makhtaev.

The department of state-legal disciplines

These disciplines of state-legal specialization are the responsibility of the department: Budget law; Constitutional fundamentals of taxes and fees in the Russian Federation; Election law and electoral procedures in the Russian Federation; Problems of modern Russian nationhood; Government service in the Russian Federation; Customs law; Executive law; Human rights and citizen rights; Fundamentals of constitutional and constituent law of the subjects of the Russian Federation; Administrative procedures in the Russian Federation; Parliamentary law; Conflict of laws; Problems of state and legal theory.

The department is headed by Vitaly Gavrilovitch Pakhomov, doctor of history, Professor, specializing in problems of history of political and juridical sciences. He is the author of 50 publications (with a total volume of 150 printer's sheets) on the history of state and law, the history of political and juridical sciences, culturology and geopolitics. In the last five years he has published two monographs and eight tutorials.

Doctor of law Alexander Vasilievitch Karpov, the head of the research laboratory, works in four research institutes of the Ministry of Defense of Russia .

The department of property-land relationship

The department of property-land relationship is staffed with high-qualified specialists and has a significant experience and creative potential. The main motto of the department is practical orientation of education, i.e., maximum correspondence of theoretical training of students to knowledge and skills of specialists working in the field. The following special disciplines are the responsibility of the department: Scientific fundamentals of property-land relationship; Regulation of legal relationships among owners of property-land complex; Legal regulation of privatization of property-land complex; Informatization of legal regulation of property-land relationship; Economic regulation of property-land relationship; Intraeconomic land utilization of property-land complex; Cadastre of property-land complex; Territorial land utilization of property-land complex; Ecological regulation of property-land relationship; Management of property-land complex; Urban land utilization of property-land complex; Licensing in system of property-land complex; State control of property-land complex regulation.

The complexity and severity of social-economic problems faced by Russia during the period of transition make it necessary to revise the principles and priorities in the field of management and use of property and land, strengthen state control and regulate property-land relationship in the economic sphere of the country.

Liberalization of the economy and institutional changes have caused fundamental changes in state policy in the field of regulation of property-land relationship, and in the essence and content of professional activities of specialists in the complex of economic policy and property-land relationship. Strengthening of the role of the state in regulation of property-land relationship forms the modern requirements for a new specialization in property-land complex.

A current need for specialists in the regulation of property-land relationship on the basis of the MFJA faculty of law is determined on the assumption of volume of use of specialists by the complex on economic policy and property-land relationship of Moscow . The complex includes such structural divisions as: Committee of management of Moscow property; Department of support and development of small business; Fund of Moscow property; Moscow committee of land-usage (Moscomzem); Moscow land chamber; Technical inventory bureau; Moscow license chamber; Moscow registration chamber; Department of analysis and control of economic policy realization; Department of property-land relationship coordination; State urban inspection (Gosgorinspectsiya); Realty organizations; Prefectures of administrative districts, and others.

The Dean of the Faculty of Law

Oksana Alexandrovna Minaeva, the dean of the faculty of law.

We call our faculty a way to the world of intellect and erudition. Not without reason the faculty motto � "Knowledge and Intellect" � has vindicated itself over the past ten years. In our faculty now about two thousand students are studying who study programs fully corresponding to state ones. Just the enumeration of them would take up the whole page. By the way, you can become familiar with the list of subjects studied in our faculty at the admission office of the Academy or during "days of open doors."

Till the third year all students study the same program. But by the third year everybody has to determine what specialization he chooses. I think two years are a sufficient period for thought.

What specializations do we offer? There are only four: civil-legal, state-legal, criminal-legal and legal regulation of property-land relationship, that we opened at the Moscow Government's request. And there are practically no juridical institutions of higher education where this specialization can be studied. So think about the future! The time is not far off when we will need jurists who will arbitrate land disputes, draw up land agreements and determine property.

Of course, I could still talk long and in detail about my favorite faculty and about our scientific student society, about student scientific conferences, about our well-equipped informational classrooms, about our criminalistics laboratory, and, certainly, about the respectable practical work and jolly rest of our students. I could tell much that is interesting about a student legal advice office recently created, which we call a legal clinic�

But, as they say, it is better to see something one time than to hear it one hundred times. Come to us to Warshavkaya. And even if you missed the "day of open doors," come all the same. We'll meet you with pleasure and show you the faculty.

You can contact the dean of the faculty of law by phone (095) 119-15-22.

Contact information

Office of the head of studies, dean's office � Telephone, fax: (095) 119-15 22.

MIA > Archive > Pashukanis

Evgeny Pashukanis

Marksistskaia teoriia gosudarstva i prava , pp.9-44 in E. B. Pashukanis (ed.), Uchenie o gosudarstve i prave (1932), Partiinoe Izd., Moscow. From Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (eds. P. Beirne & R. Sharlet), London & New York 1980, pp.273-301. Translated by Peter B. Maggs . Copyright © Peter B. Maggs. Published here by kind permission of the translator. Downloaded from home.law.uiuc.edu/~pmaggs/pashukanis.htm Marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive .

Introductory Note

In the winter of 1929-1930, during the first Five Year Plan, the national economy of the USSR underwent dramatic and violent ruptures with the inauguration of forced collectivization and rapid heavy industrialization. Concomitantly, it seemed, the Party insisted on the reconstruction and realignment of the appropriate superstructures in conformity with the effectuation of these new social relations of production. In this spirit Pashukanis was no longer criticized but now overtly attacked in the struggle on the “legal front”. In common with important figures in other intellectual disciplines, such as history, in late 1930 Pashukanis undertook a major self-criticism which was qualitatively different from the incremental changes to his work that he had produced earlier. During the following year, 1931, Pashukanis outlined this theoretical reconstruction in his speech to the first conference of Marxist jurists, a speech entitled Towards a Marxist-Leninist Theory of Law . The first results appeared a year later in a collective volume The Doctrine of State and Law .

Chapter I of this collective work is translated below, The Marxist Theory of State and Law , and was written by Pashukanis himself It should be noted that this volume exemplifies the formal transformations which occurred in Soviet legal scholarship during this heated period. Earlier, Pashukanis and other jurists had authored their own monographs; the trend was now towards a collective scholarship which promised to maximize individual safety. The source of authority for much of the work that ensued increasingly became the many expressions of Stalin’s interpretation of Bolshevik history, class struggle and revisionism, most notably his Problems of Leninism . Last, but not least, the language and vocabulary of academic discourse in the 1920s had been rich, open-ended and diverse, and varied tremendously with the personal preferences of the individual author; this gave way to a standardized and simplified style of prose devoid of nuance and ambiguity, and which was very much in keeping with the new theoretical content which comprised official textbooks on the theory of state and law. The reader will perhaps discover that The Marxist Theory of State and Law is a text imbued with these tensions. Pashukanis’ radical reconceptualization of the unity of form and content, and of the ultimate primacy of the relations of production, is without doubt to be preferred to his previous notions. But this is a preference guided by the advantages of editorial hindsight, and we feel that we cannot now distinguish between those reconceptualizations which Pashukanis may actually have intended and those which were produced by the external pressures of political opportunism.

CHAPTER I Socio-economic Formations, State, and Law

1. the doctrine of socio-economic formations as a basis for the marxist theory of state and law.

The doctrine of state and law is part of a broader whole, namely, the complex of sciences which study human society. The development of these sciences is in turn determined by the history of society itself, i.e. by the history of class struggle.

It has long since been noted that the most powerful and fruitful catalysts which foster the study of social phenomena are connected with revolutions. The English Revolution of the seventeenth century gave birth to the basic directions of bourgeois social thought, and forcibly advanced the scientific, i.e. materialist, understanding of social phenomena.

It suffices to mention such a work as Oceana – by the English writer Harrington, and which appeared soon after the English Revolution of the seventeenth century – in which changes in political structure are related to the changing distribution of landed property. It suffices to mention the work of Barnave – one of the architects of the great French Revolution – who in the same way sought explanations of political struggle and the political order in property relations. In studying bourgeois revolutions, French restorationist historians – Guizot, Mineaux and Thierry – concluded that the leitmotif of these revolutions was the class struggle between the third estate (i.e. the bourgeoisie) and the privileged estates of feudalism and their monarch. This is why Marx, in his well-known letter to Weydemeyer, indicates that the theory of the class struggle was known before him. “As far as I am concerned”, he wrote,

no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society, or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle, and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes.

What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical forms of struggle in the development of production ...; (2) that the class struggle inevitably leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and the establishment of a classless society. [1]

[ Section 2 omitted – eds. ]

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3. The class type of state and the form of government

The doctrine of socio-economic formations is particularly important to Marx’s theory of state and law, because it provides the basis for the precise and scientific delineation of the different types of state and the different systems of law.

Bourgeois political and juridical theorists attempt to establish a classification of political and legal forms without scientific criteria; not from the class essence of the forms, but from more or less external characteristics. Bourgeois theorists of the state, assiduously avoiding the question of the class nature of the state, propose every type of artificial and scholastic definition and conceptual distinction. For instance, in the past, textbooks on the state divided the state into three “elements”: territory, population and power.

Some scholars go further. Kellen – one of the most recent Swedish theorists of the state – distinguishes five elements or phenomena of the state: territory, people, economy, society and, finally, the state as the formal legal subject of power. All these definitions and distinctions of elements, or aspects of the state, are no more than a scholastic game of empty concepts since the main point is absent: the division of society into classes, and class domination. Of course, the state cannot exist without population, or territory, or economy, or society. This is an incontrovertible truth. But, at the same time, it is true that all these “elements” existed at that stage of development when there was no state. Equally, classless communist society – having territory, population and an economy – will do without the state since the necessity of class suppression will disappear.

The feature of power, or coercive power, also tells one exactly nothing. Lenin, in his polemic of the 1890s with Struve asserted that: “he most incorrectly sees the distinguishing feature of the state as coercive power. Coercive power exists in every human society – both in the tribal structure and in the family, but there was no state.” And further, Lenin concludes: “The distinguishing feature of the state is the existence of a separate class of people in whose hands power is concentrated. Obviously, no one could use the term ‘State’ in reference to a community in which the ‘organization of order’ is administered in turn by all of its members.” [2]

Struve’s position, according to which the distinguishing feature of a state is coercive power, was not without reason termed “professorial” by Lenin. Every bourgeois science of the state is full of conclusions on the essence of this coercive power. Disguising the class character of the state, bourgeois scholars interpret this coercion in a purely psychological sense. “For power and subordination”, wrote one of the Russian bourgeois jurists (Lazarevsky), “two elements are necessary: the consciousness of those exercising power that they have the right to obedience, and the consciousness of the subordinates that they must obey.”

From this, Lazarevsky and other bourgeois jurists reached the following conclusion: state power is based upon the general conviction of citizens that a specific state has the right to issue its decrees and laws. Thus, the real fact-concentration of the means of force and coercion in the hands of a particular class-is concealed and masked by the ideology of the bourgeoisie. While the feudal landowning state sanctified its power by the authority of religion, the bourgeoisie uses the fetishes of statute and law. In connection with this, we also find the theory of bourgeois jurists-which now has been adopted in its entirety by the Social Democrats whereby the state is viewed as an agency acting in the interests of the whole society. “If the source of state power derives from class”, wrote another of the bourgeois jurists (Magaziner), “then to fulfil its tasks it must stand above the class struggle. Formally, it is the arbiter of the class struggle, and even more than that: it develops the rules of this struggle.”

It is precisely this false theory of the supra-class nature of the state that is used for the justification of the treacherous policy of the Social Democrats. In the name “of the general interest”, Social Democrats deprive the unemployed of their welfare payments, help in reducing wages, and encourage shooting at workers’ demonstrations.

Not wishing to recognize the basic fact, i.e. that states differ according to their class basis, bourgeois theorists of the state concentrate all their attention on various forms of government. But this difference by itself is worthless. Thus, for instance, in ancient Greece and ancient Rome we have the most varied forms of government. But all the transitions from monarchy to republic, from aristocracy to democracy, which we observe there, do not destroy the basic fact that these states, regardless of their different forms, were slave-owning states. The apparatus of coercion, however it was organized, belong to the slave-owners and assured their mastery over the slaves with the help of armed force, assured the right of the slave-owners to dispose of the labour and personality of the slaves, to exploit them, to commit any desired act of violence against them.

Distinguishing between the form of rule and the class essence of the state is particularly important for the correct strategy of the working class in its struggle with capitalism. Proceeding from this distinction, we establish that to the extent that private property and the power of capital remain untouchable, to this extent the democratic form of government does not change the essence of the matter. Democracy with the preservation of capitalist exploitation will always be democracy for the minority, democracy for the propertied; it will always mean the exploitation and subjugation of the great mass of the working people. Therefore theorists of the Second International such as Kautsky, who contrast “democracy” in general with “dictatorship”, entirely refuse to consider their class nature. They replace Marxism with vulgar legal dogmatism, and act as the scholarly champions and lackeys of capitalism.

The different forms of rule had already arisen in slave-owning society. Basically, they consist of the following types: the monarchic state with an hereditary head, and the republic where power is elective and where there are no offices which pass by inheritance. In addition, aristocracy, or the power of a minority (i.e. a state where participation in the administration of the state is limited by law to a definite and rather narrow circle of privileged persons) is distinguished from democracy (or, literally, the rule of the people), i.e. a state where by law all take part in deciding public affairs either directly or through elected representatives. The distinction between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy had already been established by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in the fourth century. All the modern bourgeois theories of the state could add little to this classification.

Actually the significance of one form or another can be gleaned only by taking into account the concrete historical conditions under which it arose and existed, and only in the context of the class nature of a specific state. Attempts to establish any general abstract laws of the movement of state forms – with which bourgeois theorists of the state have often been occupied – have nothing in common with science.

In particular, the change of the form of government depends on concrete historical conditions, on the condition of the class struggle, and on how relationships are formed between the ruling class and the subordinate class, and also within the ruling class itself

The forms of government may change although the class nature of the state remains the same. France, in the course of the nineteenth century, and after the revolution of 1830 until the present time, was a constitutional monarchy, an empire and a republic, and the rule of the bourgeois capitalist state was maintained in all three of these forms. Conversely, the same form of government (for instance a democratic republic) which was encountered in antiquity as one of the variations of the slave-owning state, is in our time one of the forms of capitalist domination.

Therefore, in studying any state, it is very important primarily to examine not its external form but its internal class content, placing the concrete historical conditions of the class struggle at the very basis of scrutiny.

The question of the relationship between the class type of the state and the form of government is still very little developed. In the bourgeois theory of the state this question not only could not be developed, but could not even be correctly posed, because bourgeois science always tries to disguise the class nature of all states, and in particular the class nature of the capitalist state. Often therefore, bourgeois theorists of the state, without analysis, conflate characteristics relating to the form of government and characteristics relating to the class nature of the state.

As an example one may adduce the classification which is proposed in one of the newest German encyclopaedias of legal science.

The author [Kellreiter] distinguishes: (a) absolutism and dictatorship, and considers that the basic characteristic of these forms is that state powers are concentrated in the hands of one person. As an example, he mentions the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV in France, tsarist autocracy in Russia and the dictatorial power which was invested by the procedure of extraordinary powers in the one person, for instance the president of the German Republic on the basis of Art.48 of the Weimar Constitution; (b) constitutionalism, characterized by the separation of powers, their independence and their checks and balances, thereby weakening the pressure exerted by state power on the individual (examples: the German Constitution before the 1918 revolution, and the USA, where the President and Congress have independent powers); (c) democracy, whose basic premise is monism of power and a denial in principle of the difference between power and the subject of power (popular sovereignty, exemplified by the German Republic); and (d) the class-corporative state and the Soviet system where as opposed to formal democracy, the people appear not as an atomized mass of isolated citizens but as a totality of organized and discrete collectives. [3]

This classification is very typical of the confusion which bourgeois scholars consciously introduce into the question of the state. Starting with the fact that the concept of dictatorship is interpreted in the formal legal sense, deprived of all class content, the bourgeois jurist deliberately avoids the question: the dictatorship of which class and directed against whom ? He blurs the distinction between the dictatorship of a small group of exploiters and the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority of the working people; he distorts the concept of dictatorship, for he cannot avoid defining it without a relevant law or paragraph, while “the scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing less than power resting directly upon force, unlimited by laws, and unconstricted by absolute rules”. [4] Further it is sufficient to indicate, for instance, that under the latter heading the author includes: (a) a new type of state, never encountered before in history, where power belongs to the proletariat; (b) the reactionary dreams of certain professors and so-called guild socialists, about the return to the corporations and shops of the Middle Ages; and, finally (c) the fascist dictatorship of capital which Mussolini exercises in Italy.

This respected scholar consciously introduces confusion, consciously ignores the concrete historical conditions under which the working people actually can exercise administration of the state, acting as organized collectives. But such conditions are only the proletarian revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4. The class nature of law

Bourgeois science confuses the question of the essence of law no less than the question of the state. Here, Marxism-Leninism opposes the diverse majority of bourgeois, petit bourgeois and revisionist theories which, proceeding from the explanation of the historical and class nature of law, consider the state as a phenomenon essential to every human society. They thus transform law into a supra-historical category.

It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois philosophy of law serves as the main source for introducing confusion both into the concept of law and into the concept of state and society.

The bourgeois theory of the state is 90% the legal theory of the state. The unattractive class essence of the state, most often and most eagerly, is hidden by clever combinations of legal formalism, or else it is covered by a cloud of lofty philosophical legal abstractions.

The exposure of the class historical essence of law is not, therefore, an unimportant part of the Marxist-Leninist theory of society, of the state and of law.

The most widespread approach of bourgeois science to the solution of the question of the essence of law consists in the fact that it strives to embrace, through the concept of law, the existence of any consciously ordered human relationships, of any social rules, of any phenomenon of social authority or social power. Thus, bourgeois scholars easily transfer law to pre-class society, find it in the pre-state life of primitive tribes, and conclude that communism is unthinkable without law. They turn law as an empty abstraction into a universal concept devoid of historical content. Law, for bourgeois sociologists, becomes an empty form which is unconnected with concrete reality, with the relationships of production, with the antagonistic character of these relationships in class society, [and] with the presence of the state as a particular apparatus of power in the hands of the ruling class.

Representatives of idealist philosophy of law go still further. They begin with “the idea of law”, which stands above social history as something eternal, immutable and independent of space and time.

Here, for example, is the conclusion of one of the most important representatives of the ideological neo-Kantian philosophy of law – Stammler:

Through all the fates and deeds of man there extends a single unitary idea, the idea of law. All languages have a designation for this concept, and the direction of definitions and judgements expressed by it amount, upon careful study, to one and the same meaning.

Having made this discovery, it cost Stammler nothing “to prove” that regardless of the difference between the “life and activity of nations” and “the objects of legal consideration”, we observe the unity of the legal idea and its equal appearance and intervention.

This professorial rubbish is presented without the least attempt at factual proof In actuality it would be rather difficult to explain how this “unity of the legal idea and its equal appearance” gave birth to the laws of the Twelve Tablets of slave-owning Rome, the serf customs of the Middle Ages, the declarations of rights of capitalist democracies, and our Soviet Constitution.

But Stammler is not embarrassed by the scantiness of factual argument. He deals just as simply with the proof of the eternity of law. He begins from those legendary Cyclops described in the Odyssey; even these mythical wonders were the fathers of families and, according to Stammler, could not do without law. On the other hand, however, while Stammler is ready to admit that the pigmy tribes of Africa and the Eskimos did not know the state, he simply denies as deceptive all reports about peoples not knowing law. Moreover, Stammler immediately replaces the concrete historical consideration of the question with scholastic formal-logical tightrope walking, which among bourgeois professors is presented as a methodological precision. We present these conclusions, for they typify the whole trend and, moreover, are most fashionable in the West.

Stammler proposes that the concrete study of legal phenomena is entirely unable to provide anything in the understanding of the essence of law. For if we assign any phenomenon to the list of legal ones, this means that we already know that this is law and what its characteristics are. The definition of law which precedes the facts presupposes knowledge of what is law and what is not law. Accordingly, in the opinion of Stammler, in considering the concept of law, it is necessary to exclude all that is concrete and encountered in experience and to understand “that the legal idea is a purely methodological means for the ordering of spiritual life”.

This conclusion, which confronts one with its scholasticism, is nothing other than a Kantian ideological thesis embodied in the context of Stammler’s legal stupidity. It shows that the so-called forms of knowledge do not express the objective characteristics of matter, are determined a priori, and precede all human experience and its necessary conditions.

Having turned law into a methodological idea, Stammler tries to locate it not in the material world where everything is subordinate to the law of cause and effect, but in the area of goals. Law, according to Stammler, is a definition which proceeds not from the past (from cause to effect), but from the future (from goal to means). Finally, adding that law deals not with the internal procedure of thoughts as such, but with human interaction, Stammler gives this agonizing and thoroughly scholastic definition:

The concept of law is a pure form of thought. It methodically divides the endlessly differentiated material of human desires apprehended by the senses, and defines it as an inviolable and independent connecting will.

This professorial scholasticism has the attractive feature for the bourgeoisie that verbal and formalistic contrivances can hide the ugly reality of [their] exploiting society and exploiting law.

If law is “a pure form of thought”, then it is possible to avoid the ugly fact that the capitalist law of private property means the misery of unemployment, poverty and hunger for the proletarian and his family; and that in defence of this law stand police armed to the teeth, fascist bands, hangmen and prison guards; and that this law signifies a whole system of coercion, humiliation and oppression in colonies.

Such theories allow the disguising of the fact that the class interest of the bourgeoisie lies at the basis of bourgeois law. Instead of class law, philosophers such as Stammler dream up abstractions, “pure forms”, general human “ideas”, “whole and durable bonds of will” – and other entirely shameless things.

This philosophy of law is calculated to blunt the revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat, and to reconcile it with bourgeois society and capitalist exploitation.

It is not without reason that the social fascists speak out as such zealous exponents of neo-Kantianism; it is not without reason that Social Democratic theorists on questions of law largely subscribe to neo-Kantian philosophy and re-hash the same Stammler in different ways.

In our Soviet legal literature, a rather wide dissemination has been achieved by bourgeois legal theories. In particular, there have been attempts to spread the idealist teaching of Stammler in the works of Pontovich and Popov-Ladyzhensky. The criticism and unmasking of this eructation is necessary for the purpose of eradicating this bourgeois ideological infection.

Thus, we know that the state is an historical phenomenon limited by the boundaries of class society. A state is a machine for the maintenance of the domination of one class over another. It is an organization of the ruling class, having at its disposal the most powerful means of suppression and coercion. Until the appearance of classes the state did not exist. In developed communism there will be no state.

In the same way as the state, law is inseparably tied to the division of society into classes. Every law is the law of the ruling class. The basis of law is the formulation and consolidation of the relationship to the means of production, owing to which in exploitative society, one part of the people can appropriate to itself the unpaid labour of another.

The form of exploitation determines the typical features of a legal system. In accordance with the three basic socio-economic formations of class society, we have three basic types of legal superstructure: slave-owning law, feudal law and bourgeois law. This of course does not exclude concrete historical national differences between each of the systems. For instance, English law is distinguished by many peculiarities in comparison with French bourgeois law as contained in the Napoleonic Code . Likewise, we do not exclude the presence of survivals of the past – transitional or mixed forms – which complicate the concrete picture.

However, the essential and basic – that which provides the guiding theme for the study of different legal institutions – is the difference between the position of the slave, the position of the serf and the position of the wage labourer. The relationship of exploitation is the basic lynchpin, around which all other legal relationships and legal institutions are arranged. From this it follows that the nature of property has decisive significance for each system of law. According to Lenge, the brilliant and cynical reactionary of the eighteenth century, the spirit of the laws is property.

5. Law as an historical phenomenon: definition of law

The appearance and withering away of law, similar to the appearance and withering of the state, is connected with two extremely important historical limitations. Law (and the state) appears with the division of society into classes. Passing through a long path of development, full of revolutionary leaps and qualitative changes, law and the state will wither away under communism as a result of the disappearance of classes and of all survivals of class society.

Nevertheless, certain authors, who consider themselves Marxists, adopt the viewpoint that law exists in pre-class society, that in primitive communism we meet with legal forms and legal relationships. Such a point of view is adopted for instance by Reisner. Reisner gives the term “law” to a whole series of institutions and customs of tribal society: marriage taboos and blood feud, customs regulating relationships between tribes, and customs relating to the use of the means of production belonging to a tribe. Law in this manner is transformed into an eternal institution, inherent to all forms of human society. From here it is just one step to the understanding of law as an eternal idea; and Reisner in essence leans towards such an understanding.

This viewpoint of course fundamentally contradicts Marxism. The customs of a society not knowing class divisions, property inequality and exploitation, differ qualitatively from the law and the statutes of class society. To categorize them together means to introduce an unlikely confusion. Every attempt to avoid this qualitative difference inevitably leads to scholasticism, to the purely external combination of phenomena of different types, or to abstract idealist constructs in the Stammlerian spirit.

We should not be confused by the fact that Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State , uses the expression “the eternal law”; or, that he cites, without particular qualification, Morgan’s description of the member of a tribal community as having “equality of rights”, and of a person violating tribal customs as having placed himself “outside the law”.

It is clear that the terms “right” and “law” are used here not in their direct sense, but by analogy. This does not mean, however, that in classless society we will be dealing only with purely technical rules. Such an argument was put forward by Stuchka in his dispute with Reisner. To assign the customs and the norms of pre-class society to the area of technology would mean to give the concept of technology a very extended and undefined sense. Marriage prohibitions, customs relating to the organization of the tribe, the power of the elders, blood feud etc. – all this of course is not technology and not technical methods, but the customs and norms of social order. The content and character of these customs corresponded of course to the level of productive forces and the production relationships erected on it. These social forms should be considered as a superstructure upon the economic base. But the basic qualitative difference between this superstructure and the political and legal superstructures of class society, consists in the absence of property inequality, exploitation, and organized class coercion.

While Marxism strives to give a concrete historical meaning to law, the characteristic feature of bourgeois philosophers of law is, on the contrary, the conclusion that law in general is outside classes, outside any particular socio-economic formation. Instead of deriving a concept of law from the study of historical facts, bourgeois scholars are occupied with the concoction of theories and definitions from the empty concept or even the word “law”.

We already saw how Stammler, with the help of scholastic contrivances, tries to show that concrete facts have no significance for the definition of law. We, however, say the opposite. It is impossible to give a general definition of law without knowing the law of slave-owning, feudal and capitalist societies. Only by studying the law of each of these socio-economic formations can we identify those characteristics which are in fact most general and most typical. In doing so we must not forget Engels’ warning to those who tend to exaggerate the significance of these general definitions.

For example, in Chapter VI of the first part of Anti-Dühring , having given a definition of life, Engels speaks of the inadequacy of all definitions because they are necessarily limited to the most general and simplistic areas. In the preface to Anti-Dühring , Engels formulated this thought still more clearly, indicating that “the only real definition is the development of the essence of the matter, and that is not a definition”. However, Engels at once states that for ordinary practical use, definitions which indicate the most general and characteristic features of a category are very convenient. We cannot do without them. It is also wrong to demand more from a definition than it can give; it is wrong to forget the inevitability of its insufficiency.

These statements by Engels should be kept in mind in approaching any general definition, including a definition of law. It is necessary to remember that it does not replace, and cannot replace, the study of all forms and aspects of law as a concrete historical phenomenon. In identifying the most general and characteristic features we can define law as the form of regulation and consolidation of production relationships and also of other social relationships of class society; law depends on the apparatus of state power of the ruling class, and reflects the interests of the latter.

This definition characterizes the role and significance of law in class society. But it is nevertheless incomplete. In contradistinction to all normative theories – which are limited to the external and formal side of law (norms, statutes, judicial positions etc.) – Marxist-Leninist theory considers a law as a unity of form and content. The legal superstructure comprises not only the totality of norms and actions of agencies, but the unity of this formal side and its content, i.e. of the social relationships which law reflects and at the same time sanctions, formalizes and modifies. The character of formalization does not depend on the “free will of the legislator”; it is defined by economics, but on the other hand the legal superstructure, once having arisen, exerts a reflexive effect upon the economy.

This definition stresses three aspects of the matter. First is the class nature of law: every law is the law of the ruling class. Attempts to consider law as a social relationship which transcends class society, lead either to superficial categorization of diverse phenomena, or to speculative idealistic constructs in the spirit of the bourgeois philosophy of law. Second is the basic and determinant significance of production relationships in the content that is implemented by law. Class interests directly reflect their relationship to the means of production. Property relationships occupy the prominent place in the characterization of a specific legal order. Communist society, where classes disappear, where labour becomes the primary want, where the effective principle will be from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs: this does not require law. The third aspect consists of the fact that the functioning of a legal superstructure demands a coercive apparatus. When we say that social relationships have assumed a legal expression, this means inter alia that they have been given a coercive nature by the state power of the ruling class. Withering away of the law can only occur simultaneously with the withering away of the state.

Relationships which have received legal expression are qualitatively different from those relationships which have not received this expression. The form of this expression may be different, as was indicated by Engels [5] ; it may sometimes be good and sometimes be bad. It may support the progressive development of these relationships or, on the contrary, retard them. Everything depends on whether power is in the hands of a revolutionary or a reactionary class. Here the real significance of the legal superstructure appears. However, the degree of this reality is a question of fact; it can be determined only by concrete study and not by any a priori calculations. Bourgeois jurists characteristically concentrate their attention on form, and utterly ignore content. They turn their backs on life and actual history. As Engels showed, “they consider public and private law as independent areas, which have their own independent development and which must and may be subjected to independent systematic elaboration by the consistent elimination of all internal contradictions.” [6]

Bourgeois jurists usually define law as the totality of norms to which a state has given coercive power. This view of law typifies so-called legal positivism. The most consistent representatives of this trend are the English jurists: of the earliest Blackstone (eighteenth century), and thereafter Austin. In other European countries legal positivism also won itself a dominant position in the nineteenth century, because the bourgeoisie either gained state power or everywhere achieved sufficient influence in the state so as not to fear the identification of law with statute. At the same time nothing was better for legal professionals, for judges, [and] for defence counsel since this definition fully satisfied their practical needs. If law in its entirety was the complex of orders proceeding from the state, and consolidated by sanction in the case of disobedience, then the task of jurisprudence was defined with maximum clarity. The work of the jurist, according to the positivists, did not consist in justifying law from some external point of view – philosophers were occupied with this; the task of the jurists did not include explaining from where a norm emerged, and what determined its content – this was the task of political scientists and sociologists. The role of the jurist remained the logical interpretation of particular legal provisions, the establishment of an internal logical connection between them, combining them into larger systematic units in legal institutions, and finally in this way the creation of a system of law.

The definition of law as the totality of norms is the starting point for supporting the so-called dogmatic method. This consists of using formal logical conclusions in order to move from particular norms to more general concepts and back, proceeding from general positions to propose the solution of concrete legal cases or disputes. It is obvious that the practical part of this role developing especially luxuriantly in the litigious circumstances of bourgeois society – has nothing in common with a scientific theory of law. Applications of so-called legal logic are not only theoretically fruitless, they are not only incapable of revealing the essence of law and thus of showing its connection with other phenomena-with economics, with politics, with class struggle – but they are also harmful and impermissible in the practice of our Soviet courts and other state institutions. We need decisions of cases, not formally, but in their essence; the state of the working people, as distinct from the bourgeois state, does not hide either its class character or its goal – the construction of socialism. Therefore, the application of norms of Soviet law must not be based on certain formal logical considerations, but upon the consideration of all the concrete features of the given case, of the class essence of those relationships to which it becomes necessary to apply a general norm, and of the general direction on of the policy of Soviet power at the given moment. In the opposite case a result would be obtained which Lenin defined as: “Correct in form, a mockery in substance.”

The denial of formal legal logic cultivated by the bourgeoisie does not mean a denial of revolutionary legality, does not mean that judicial cases and questions of administration must be decided chaotically in the Soviet state, systematically on the basis of the random whims of individuals, or on the basis of local influences. The struggle for revolutionary legality is a struggle on two fronts: against legal formalism and the transfer to Soviet soil of bourgeois chicanery, and against those who do not understand the organizational significance of Soviet decrees as one of the methods of the uniform conduct of the policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the law is the means of formulating and consolidating the production relationships of class society and the social relationships which are connected with them. In the legal superstructure, these relationships appear as property relations and as relations of domination and subordination. They appear, in particular, as relations of an ideological nature, i.e. as relations which are formed in connection with certain views and are supported by the conscious will of the people.

We shall not touch upon the question of the degree to which the legal ideology of the exploiting classes is capable of correctly reflecting reality, and in what measure it inevitably distorts it (representing the interest of the exploiting class as the social interest in order, legality, freedom etc.). Here, we merely emphasize the fact that without the work of legislators, judges, police and prison guards (in a word, of the whole apparatus of the class state), law would become a fiction. “Law is nothing without an apparatus capable of enforcing observation of the norms of law” (Lenin).

The conscious will – towards the formulation and consolidation of production and other relationships – is the will of the ruling class which finds its expression in custom, in law, in the activity of the court and in administration. The legal superstructure exists and functions because behind it stands an organization of the ruling class, namely the apparatus of coercion and power in the form of the army, the police, court bailiffs, prison guards and hangmen. This does not mean that the ruling class has to use physical force in every case. Much is achieved by simple threat, by the knowledge of helplessness and of the futility of struggle, by economic pressure, and finally by the fact that the working classes are in the ideological captivity of the exploiters. It is sufficient to mention the narcotic of the religious ideology of humility and meekness, or the genuflection before the idol of bourgeois legality preached by the reformist.

But the ultimate argument for, and the basis of, the legal order is always the means of physical force. Only by depending on them could the slaveowner of antiquity or the modern capitalist enjoy his right.

The attempts by certain bourgeois jurists to separate law from the state, or to contrast “law” and “force”, are dictated by the attempt to hide and conceal the class essence of law.

Often these proofs that law is independent of the state bear a truly laughable character. Thus, for instance, Stammler claims that he has proved this thesis relying on the fact that on a dirigible which flies over the North Pole, i.e. outside the sphere of action of any state power, the emergence of legal relationships is possible.

By such empty dogmatic chicanery the scientific question of the relationship of state and law is decided. Can one be surprised at Lenin’s sharp reaction to Stammler when he says that: “From stupid arguments, Stammler draws equally stupid conclusions.”

The dependence of law on the state, however, does not signify that the state creates the legal superstructure by its arbitrary will. For the state itself, as Engels says, is only a more or less complex reflection of the economic needs of the dominant class in production.

The proletariat, having overthrown the bourgeoisie and consolidated its dictatorship, had to create Soviet law in conformity with the economy, in particular the existence of many millions of small and very small peasant farms. After the victory of the proletarian revolution the realization of socialism is not an instantaneous act but a long process of construction under the conditions of acute class struggle.

From the policy of limiting its exploitative tendencies and the elimination of its front ranks, we moved to the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class by widespread collectivization. A successful fulfilment of the first Five Year Plan; the creation of our own base for the technical reconstruction of the whole national economy; the transfer of the basic mass of the peasantry to collectivization; these events enabled the basic task of the second Five Year Plan to be:

the final liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general, the full elimination of the causes of class differences and exploitation, the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in the economy and the consciousness of the people, the transformation of the whole working population of the country into conscious and active builders of a classless society. [7]

At each of these stages Soviet law regulated and formulated production relationships differently.

Soviet law in each of the stages was naturally different from the law of capitalist states. For law under the proletarian dictatorship has always had the goal of protecting the interest of “the working majority, the suppression of class elements hostile to the proletariat, and the defence of socialist construction. Those individual Soviet jurists who considered law as the totality of norms (i.e. externally and formally) are not in a position to understand this. Finding identically formulated norms in the system of bourgeois and Soviet law, these jurists began to speak of the similarity between bourgeois and Soviet law, to search out “general” institutions, and to trace the development of certain “general” bases for bourgeois and Soviet law. This tendency was very strong in the first years of NEP. The identification of Soviet with bourgeois law derived from an understanding of NEP as a return to capitalism, which found expression in the Marxist ranks.

If NEP, as the Zinoviev opposition asserted at the XIVth Party Congress, is “capitalism which holds the proletarian state on a chain”, then Soviet law must be presented as bourgeois law, in which certain limitations are introduced, to the extent in the period of imperialism that the capitalist state also regulates and limits the freedom of disposition of property, contractual freedom etc.

Such a distortion in the description of NEP led directly to an alliance with bourgeois reformists in the understanding of Soviet law.

In fact, NEP “is a special policy of the proletarian state intended to permit capitalism while the commanding heights are held by the proletarian state, intended for the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements, intended for the growth of the role of the socialist elements at the expense of the capitalist elements, intended for the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, intended for the elimination of classes and for the construction of the foundation of a socialist economy.” [8]

Soviet law as a special form of policy followed by the proletariat and the proletarian state, was intended precisely for the victory of socialism. As such, it is radically different from bourgeois law despite the formal resemblance of individual statutes.

Juridicial formalism, which conceives of nothing other than the norm and reduces law to the purely logical operation of these norms, appears as a variety of reformism, as a Soviet “juridical socialism”. By confining themselves only to the norm and the purely juridical (i.e. formal ideas and concepts), they ignored the socio-economic and political essence of the matter. As a result, these jurists arrive at the conclusion that the transformation of property from an arbitrary and unrestricted right into a “social function” (i.e. a tendency which is “peculiar to the law of the advanced”, that is, capitalist, countries), finds its “fullest” expression in Soviet legislation. Making this contention, the Jurists “forgot” such a trifle as the October Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is not only important to “read” the norm, but also to know what class, what state, and what state apparatus is applying this norm.

6. Law and production relationships

Production relationships form the basis of society. It is necessary to begin with these relationships in order to comprehend the complex picture presented by the history of mankind.

To search for the basic characteristic of society and social relations in an area other than production relationships means to deprive oneself of the possibility of a scientific understanding of the laws of development of social formations. However, it by no means follows from this that, according to Marx, only relations of production and exchange are social relations. Such a concept is a caricature of Marxism. The equation of social relations with production relations in this case is understood purely mechanically. However, a number of times Lenin noted that Marx’s great service was that he did not limit himself to the description of the economic “skeleton” of capitalist society, but that:

in explaining the construction and development of a definite social formation “exclusively” by production relations, he nonetheless thoroughly and constantly studied the superstructure corresponding to these production relations, which clothed the skeleton with flesh and blood. The reason that Das Kapital had such enormous success was that this book (“by a German economist”) showed the capitalist social formation as a living thing-with its everyday aspects, with the actual social phenomena essential to the production relations between antagonistic classes, with the bourgeois political superstructure protecting the domination of the capitalist class, with the bourgeois ideas of freedom, equality etc., with bourgeois family relations. [9]

Stuchka looks differently at the matter. In his opinion, Marx considered only relations of production and exchange to be social relations. But this would mean affirming that Marx limited himself to the “skeleton” alone, as if having indicated the basic and eventually determinant in social life and social relations he then passed by that which is derivative and requires explanation. However, more than once Marx directly points out the existence of social relationships which are not production relations but which merely derive from them and correspond to them. Characterizing revolutionary proletarian socialism in France in 1848, Marx wrote:

This socialism is the proclamation of the permanence of the revolution , a proclamation of the class dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary transition toward the elimination of class differences altogether, toward the elimination of all production relations upon which these differences are based, toward the elimination of all social relationships corresponding to these production relations, toward a revolution in the entire world of ideas arising from these relationships. [10]

Nevertheless, Comrade Stuchka firmly defends his understanding of the term “social relationships”:

We proceed from social relationships; I emphasize the word “social”, for here my critics are desperately confused. I thus selected the word “social” and a whole chapter in my first book was dedicated to it only in the sense of relations of production and exchange (as Marx and every Marxist understands this). [11]

Proceeding from the equation of production and social relationships, Stuchka defined law as a “system (or order) of social relations corresponding to the interests of the ruling class and protected by its organized force”. In this definition, as he himself indicated, there was room only for the law of property and the law of obligations.

As earlier, so even now [he wrote] I consider basic law , law in general, to be civil law , understanding thereby the form of organization of social relationships in the narrow and specific sense of the word (i.e. relations of production and exchange). I consider that all the remaining areas of law are either of a subordinate or derivative character, and that only bourgeois law (subjecting to its influence all the remaining areas of law) created a legal state, or state law and criminal law, as an equivalent norm for crime and punishment, not even mentioning administrative, financial etc., and finally international law or even the law of war. [12]

The positions outlined in this excerpt contain a series of mistakes. There is no doubt that the formulation and conformation of social relationships to the means of production is basic to law. Proceeding from the economic basis, from different forms of exploitation, we differentiate slaveowning, feudal and capitalist systems of law. But, in the first place, it is incorrect to subsume the property relations of slaveowning or feudal society under the concept of civil, i.e. bourgeois, law as “law in general”. In the second place, state law may not be equated with the so-called Rechtsstaat of the bourgeoisie. If one takes this point of view then one must either deny the existence of a distinctive feudal state law, or show that despite the existence of a Soviet state we do have Soviet state law. At the same time, in other places in his textbook, Stuchka proceeds from the existence of different class systems of law: feudal, bourgeois, Soviet. Here he argues for a “general law” which is equated with the civil law of bourgeois society. At the same time state law is equated with the theory of bourgeois jurists of the so-called Rechtsstaat , and criminal law (i.e. formalized class repression) with the ideology of equivalent retribution.

The basic question – do relationships exist that enter into the content of law, which are not, however, relations of production and exchange? – is avoided by Stuchka; he cites the subsidiary, derivative etc. character of state, criminal etc. law. However, it is clear that the structure of family relationships, the formalization of class domination in the state organization, the formalization of class repression, all this is embraced by the different branches of law (family, state and criminal).

The content of this legal intermediary is the social and political relationships which, in the final analysis, are reducible to the same production relationships, but by no means correspond to them.

Stuchka’s subsequent definition of law suffers from the shortcoming that he limits the area of law merely to production relations. This definition also introduces confusion because it confuses law with economics. Proceeding from the indisputable position that not all which is stated in a norm (in a statute) is realized in fact, Stuchka has made the incorrect conclusion that law is indeed the very relation of production and exchange. Stuchka has therefore declared Marx’s teaching – that law is an ideological superstructure to be a tribute to the “volitional theory” of the old jurists.

Whoever has mastered the form of theorizing of Marx and Engels that capital, money etc., are social relationships, will at once understand my views on the system of social relationships. This will be hardest of all for a jurist for whom law is a purely technical and artificial superstructure, strangely enough, holding sway over its base. Even Karl Marx gave a small tribute to this concept when he spoke of law as an ideological superstructure. But Marx was raised on Roman law and in general on the juridic concepts of the 1830s, considering it an expression “of the general will” ( Volkswillen ), and he was [therefore] accustomed to its terminology. [13]

In conducting the struggle with the narrow, formal legal concept of law as a totality of norms, we cannot deny the real existence of the legal superstructure, i.e. of relationships formulated and consolidated by the conscious will of the ruling class. Only to the extent that this process of formulation and consolidation proceeds may one speak of law. To study law only as totality of norms means to follow the path of formalism and dogmatism. But to study law only as relationships of production and exchange means to confuse law with economics, to retard the understanding of the reciprocal action of the legal superstructure and its active role. At the same time as production relations are imposed on people regardless of their will, legal relationships are impossible without the participation of the conscious will of the ruling class. The teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin on law as an ideological superstructure needs no correction. Law cannot be understood unless we consider it as the basic form of the policy of the ruling class. In the later editions of The Revolutionary Role of State and Law , Stuchka supplemented his definition of law, developing the theory of the so-called three forms of law. The first, or in Stuchka’s words, the concrete form of law, is a legal relationship which corresponds to a production relationship and, with it, constitutes the base [or] reality. On the contrary, the two “abstract” forms – statute and legal ideology as Stuchka expresses it – are the essence of “the manifest superstructure”. [14]

This approach is also incorrect and non-dialectical. A legal relationship is a form of production relations because the active influence of the class organization of the ruling class transforms the factual relationship into a legal one, gives it a new quality, and thus includes it in the construction of the legal superstructure. This result is not achieved automatically by laissez faire , in the same way that prices are established under free competition. Even in the case of so-called customary law, the ruling class – through its special agencies, through the courts – ensures that the relations correspond to obligatory rules. This is all the more true with respect to the legislative creation of norms.

In particular, the revolutionary role of the legal superstructure is enormous in the transitional period when its active and conscious influence upon production and other social relationships assumes exceptional significance. Soviet law, like any law, will cease to exist if it is not applied. But the application of law is an active and conscious process by which the state apparatus plays the decisive role as a powerful weapon of class struggle. Would it be possible, for instance, to speak of Soviet law which did not somehow recognize the Soviet state, the Soviet agencies of power, Soviet courts etc.? It is clear that while an individual statute may be removed from the real legal order and remain a pious wish, concrete legal relationships may never be removed from the consciousness and will of the ruling class, may never be transferred from the superstructure to the base without parting from the heart of historical materialism.

From all that has been said above it is clear that the definition of law as a formal intermediary of the economy must be recognized as insufficient and incorrect. The different branches of law are connected differently with the economy; this must never be forgotten, and this is not expressed in the above-mentioned definition. On the contrary it can lead to the notion that the area of law is limited to property relationships alone. Then all the other types of law must be declared non-existent. Stuchka would, in fact, have had to reach this conclusion. But he speaks of criminal and state law, not entirely consistently with his other position, i.e. by referring to them he recognizes their existence.

There is no doubt that economics is at the base of political, familial and all other social relations. [15] But the election law of any capitalist country facilitates the economy differently from civil law or the Criminal Code. To try to force all the varied branches of law into one formula is to give preference to empty abstractions.

Law as a formal facilitation of social and (primarily) production relationships must be studied concretely. This study may not be replaced with ready citations from Hegel with respect to the “transformation of form into substance and substance into form”. The dialectical method, which teaches that every truth is concrete, becomes in this instance its own opposite-dead scholasticism, barren arguments and disputes on the theme that “form is not without content and content not without form”. However, the matter really consists of showing the role and character of law as form in specific and concrete branches of law and concrete historial conditions with a relation to concrete content. Only in this manner can the real relation of form and content be established and can one be convinced that it is far from identical in different instances. Often legal form hides economic content directly contrary to it (thus in the period when we conducted the policy of restricting the kulak, the leasing of a horse or tools by a poor peasant to a rich one often hid the sale of the first’s labour power to the second). A transaction of purchase and sale can hide the most diverse economic content. The same could be said about any other relationships within the so-called law of obligations. Here we meet with a phenomenon whose form is relatively indifferent to its content, but it is improper to conclude from this that in civil law we have a “faceless instrumentality” which must be used independently of the economic class content of the relationships which it implements. On the contrary, the significance of form is recognized only through content, through economics, through politics and through relations between classes.

Therefore, it is a flagrant error to equate law as an historical phenomenon – including various class systems – with the totality of those features of bourgeois law that derive from the exchange of commodities of equal value. [16] Such a concept of law minimizes the class coercion essential to bourgeois law, essential to feudal law and to all law. Law in bourgeois society serves not only the facilitation of exchange, but simultaneously and mainly supports and consolidates the unequal distribution of property and the monopoly of the capitalist in production. Bourgeois property is not exhausted by the relationships between commodity owners. These [owners – eds. ] are tied by exchange and the contractual relationship is the form of this exchange. Bourgeois property includes in a masked form the same relationship of domination and subordination which, in feudal property, appears chiefly as personal subordination.

This methodological mistake was related to the relegation of the class repressive role of law, and to an incorrect presentation of the relation between state and law (the state as the guarantor of exchange), and to mistakes in questions of morality (the denial of proletarian morality) and in questions of criminal law.

The attempts to distinguish between formal characteristics and abstract legal concepts expressing the relationship between commodity owners, and to proclaim this “form of law” as the subject of the Marxist theory of law, should be recognized as grossly mistaken. This paves the way to the separation of form and content, and diverts theory from the task of socialist construction to scholasticism.

The immediate relation, in practice, between the proletariat (as the ruling class) and law (as a weapon with whose help the tasks of class struggle at any given stage are decided) is in this case replaced by the abstract theoretical denial of the “narrow horizons of bourgeois law” in the name of developed communism.

From this perspective Soviet law is seen exclusively as a legacy of class society imposed on the proletariat and which haunts it until the second phase of communism. The abstract theoretical exposure of “bourgeois” law hides the task of the concrete analysis of Soviet law at different stages of the revolution. Accordingly, it gives insufficient concrete indication of the practical struggle against bourgeois influences, and against opportunist distortions of the Party’s general line on Soviet law.

The theoretical mistake of exaggerating the importance of market relations can be the basis for right opportunist conclusions about always preserving the bourgeois forms of law corresponding to private exchange. Conversely, to ignore exchange in considering the problems of Soviet law leads to “leftist” positions about the withering away of law which is now in the process of socializing the means of production, and about the withering away of economic accountability and the principle of payment according to labour, i.e. to the defence of the elimination of individual responsibility and wage egalitarianism.

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1. K. Marx, Letter to Weydemeyer (March 5, 1852), MESW , vol.1, p.528.

2. V. I. Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodnism (1895), LCW , vol.1, p.419.

3. See Kellreiter’s article The State ;, in D. Elster et al. (eds), Handwörterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft (1923), Fischer, Jena, p.599.

4. V.I. Lenin, A Contribution to the History of the Question of Dictatorship (1920), LCW , vol.31, p.353.

5. F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1888), MESW , vol.3, p.371.

6. ibid. , p.371.

7. From a resolution of the XVIIth Party Conference (1932).

8. J. Stalin, The Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (1925), Stalin: Works, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow (1954), vol.7, p.374.

9. V.I. Lenin, What the “Friends of the People” Are (1894), LCW , vol.1, pp.141-42.

10. K. Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850), MESW , vol.1, p.282.

11. P.I. Stuchka, A Course on Soviet Civil Law (1927), Communist Academy, vol.1, p.13.

12. ibid. , pp.78-79.

13. P.I. Stuchka, The Revolutionary Role of Law and State (1921), Moscow, p.15.

14. ibid. (3rd edition); and P.I. Stuchka’s article Law in Encyclopaedia of State and Law, (1925-1927), vol.3, pp.415-430.

15. “The state and law are determined by economic relations. Of course, the same must be said of civil law whose role in essence consists of the legislative clarification of the existing economic relations between individuals which are normal in the given circumstances” F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1888), op. cit. p.370.

16. This erroneous conception was developed in E.B. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism (1927), 3rd edition. See also E.B. Pashukanis, The Situation on the Legal Theory Front , Soviet State and the Revolution of Law (1930), no.11-12; and For a Marxist-Leninist Theory of State and Law (1931) Moscow, where a critique of this mistaken conception is given.

Last updated on 13.5.2004

Spatial Variations of the Activity of 137 Cs and the Contents of Heavy Metals and Petroleum Products in the Polluted Soils of the City of Elektrostal

DEGRADATION, REHABILITATION, AND CONSERVATION OF SOILS
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Published: 15 June 2022
Volume 55 , pages 840–848, ( 2022 )

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D. N. Lipatov 1 ,
V. A. Varachenkov 1 ,
D. V. Manakhov 1 ,
M. M. Karpukhin 1 &
S. V. Mamikhin 1

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The levels of specific activity of 137 Cs and the contents of mobile forms (1 M ammonium acetate extraction) of heavy metals (Zn, Cu, Ni, Co, Cr, Pb) and petroleum products were studied in the upper soil horizon of urban landscapes of the city of Elektrostal under conditions of local radioactive and chemical contamination were studied. In the soils within a short radius (0–100 m) around the heavy engineering plant, the specific activity of 137 Cs and the contents of mobile forms of Pb, Cu, and Zn were increased. The lognormal distribution law of 137 Cs was found in the upper (0–10 cm) soil layer; five years after the radiation accident, the specific activity of 137 Cs varied from 6 to 4238 Bq/kg. The coefficients of variation increased with an increase in the degree of soil contamination in the following sequence: Co < Ni < petroleum products < Cr < 137 Cs < Zn < Pb < Cu ranging from 50 to 435%. Statistically significant direct correlation was found between the specific activity of 137 Cs and the contents of mobile forms of Pb, Cu, and Zn in the upper horizon of urban soils, and this fact indicated the spatial conjugacy of local spots of radioactive and polymetallic contamination in the studied area. It was shown that the specific activity of 137 Cs, as well as the content of heavy metals and petroleum products in the upper layer (0–10 cm) of the soils disturbed in the course of decontamination, earthwork and reclamation is reduced.

Soil heavy metal pollution and ecological risk assessment in disturbed and undisturbed soil of Morigaon, Assam

Navamallika Gogoi, Arunima Sarma, … Sabreen Sadhak

Sources of Heavy Metals and Metalloids in Soils

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INTRODUCTION

Contaminants migrate and accumulate in urban ecosystems under the impact of both natural and technogenic factors. The processes of technogenic migration of 137 Cs are most pronounced in radioactively contaminated territories. It was found in urboecological studies that the intensity of sedimentation of aerosol particles containing radionuclides and heavy metals is determined by the types of the surfaces of roofs, walls, roads, lawns, and parks and by their position within the urban wind field [ 12 , 26 ]. Traffic in the cities results in significant transport of dust and associated contaminants and radionuclides [ 15 , 24 ]. During decontamination measures in the areas of Chernobyl radioactive trace, not only the decrease in the level of contamination but also the possibility of secondary radioactive contamination because of the transportation of contaminated soil particles by wind or water, or anthropogenic transfer of transferring of ground were observed [ 5 , 6 ]. Rainstorm runoff and hydrological transport of dissolved and colloidal forms of 137 Cs can result in the accumulation of this radionuclide in meso- and microdepressions, where sedimentation takes place [ 10 , 16 ]. Different spatial distribution patterns of 137 Cs in soils of particular urban landscapes were found in the city of Ozersk near the nuclear fuel cycle works [ 17 ]. Natural character of 137 Cs migration in soils of Moscow forest-parks and a decrease in its specific activity in industrial areas have been revealed [ 10 ]. Determination of the mean level and parameters of spatial variations of 137 Cs in soils is one of primary tasks of radioecological monitoring of cities, including both unpolluted (background) and contaminated territories.

Emissions and discharges from numerous sources of contamination can cause the accumulation of a wide range of toxicants in urban soils: heavy metals (HMs), oil products (OPs), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and other chemical substances. Soil contamination by several groups of toxicants is often observed in urban landscapes [ 20 , 23 ] because of the common contamination source or close pathways of the migration of different contaminants. A comprehensive analysis of contamination of urban soils by radionuclides and heavy metals has been performed in some studies [ 21 , 25 ]. The determination of possible spatial interrelationships between radioactive and chemical contaminations in urban soils is an important problem in urban ecology.

A radiation accident took place in the Elektrostal heavy engineering works (EHEW) in April 2013: a capacious source of 137 Cs entered the smelt furnace, and emission of radioactive aerosols from the aerating duct into the urban environment took place. The activity of molten source was estimated at about 1000–7000 Ci [ 14 ]. The area of contamination in the territory of the plant reached 7500 m 2 . However, radioactive aerosols affected a much larger area around the EHEW, including Krasnaya and Pervomaiskaya streets, and reached Lenin Prospect.

Geochemical evaluation of contamination of the upper soil horizon in the city of Elektrostal was carried out in 1989–1991. This survey indicated the anomalies of concentrations of wolfram, nickel, molybdenum, chromium, and other heavy metals related to accumulation of alloying constituent and impurities of non-ferrous metals in the emissions of steelmaking works [ 19 ].

The aim of our work was to determine the levels of specific activity of 137 Cs, concentrations of mobile forms of heavy metals (Zn, Cu, Ni, Co, Cr, and Pb) and oil products in the upper soil horizons in different urban landscapes of the city of Elektrostal under the conditions of local radioactive and chemical contamination.

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D. N. Lipatov, V. A. Varachenkov, D. V. Manakhov, M. M. Karpukhin & S. V. Mamikhin

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Lipatov, D.N., Varachenkov, V.A., Manakhov, D.V. et al. Spatial Variations of the Activity of 137 Cs and the Contents of Heavy Metals and Petroleum Products in the Polluted Soils of the City of Elektrostal. Eurasian Soil Sc. 55 , 840–848 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064229322060072

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Received : 21 October 2021

Revised : 22 December 2021

Accepted : 30 December 2021

Published : 15 June 2022

Issue Date : June 2022

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064229322060072

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Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics

Balance of Interests as a Principle of Civil Law: Some Aspects of Legal Consciousness

Evgeny Pashukanis

Introductory Note

CHAPTER I Socio-economic Formations, State, and Law

3. The class type of state and the form of government

4. The class nature of law

5. Law as an historical phenomenon: definition of law

6. Law and production relationships

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Spatial Variations of the Activity of 137 Cs and the Contents of Heavy Metals and Petroleum Products in the Polluted Soils of the City of Elektrostal

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