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The supremacy of European law

This is one of the most fundamental principles of EU law and it goes to the heart of much of the debate surrounding the intergovernmental / supranational nature of the EU. It also has significant importance for the concept of European governance.

The Court of Justice has, through several decisions, ruled that EU law has priority over national law both at the European and national levels . In particular, the case of Costa vs. ENEL (1964) was instrumental in defining this legal principle.

In this case, Mr Costa, an Italian citizen, refused to pay an electricity bill as he objected to a company that he had shares in, ENEL, being nationalised. He took the Italian government to the ECJ claiming that by nationalising ENEL they were ‘distorting the market’, something than ran counter to European law. The Italian government felt that only the Commission could challenge them in the European Courts and that Mr Costa had no recourse to challenge them using European law.

The EU ruled that in the European Courts Mr Costa did in fact have no legal recourse, as the Commission was the only body that could challenge the Italian Government at a European level.

However . . .

The ECJ also ruled that Mr Costa should be able to challenge the Italian Government in the Italian courts on a point of European law . In this situation, European law would have to take precedent over national law.

The ruling stated…

By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.

It went on to say…

The law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question .

In essence, this ruling said that unless EU law superseded national law the whole European legal system would be undermined and therefore decreed that when the two are in conflict EU law overrides national law.

It is important to remember that this is only in areas where states have chosen to give up sovereignty to the EU (in areas such as the single market, environment etc). You must remember that in nearly all non-community areas (defence, taxation, social policy etc) national courts remain sovereign.

You may like to revisit module two to remind yourself more of the policy areas where states have given up some sovereignty and those where sovereignty is still retained.

Why EU Law Claims Supremacy

Article contents
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Justin Lindeboom, Why EU Law Claims Supremacy, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , Volume 38, Issue 2, Summer 2018, Pages 328–356, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqy008

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This article explores the conception of law that underlies the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), building on Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a topical example. Joxerramon Bengoetxea’s metaphor of the CJEU being a ‘Dworkinian court’ fails to explain fundamental aspects of the Court’s case law which are incompatible with Dworkin’s theory of law. Instead, the CJEU is committed to an EU legal system which conforms to Joseph Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions for legal systems: comprehensiveness, openness and a claim of supremacy. Within this paradigm, the supremacy claim of EU law is in need of demystification because it is inherent to any legal system. Paradoxically, while Opinion 2/13 suggests that the EU should be given special treatment in its accession to the ECHR, the Court’s underlying conception of the EU legal system is essentially mimetic of the typical characteristics of national legal systems. This mimetic nature of the EU legal system entails a dissociation between the political and the legal nature of the EU: while the EU is certainly not a state, its legal system is no different from national legal systems.

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Law Notes European Law Notes

Supremacy Of Eu Law Notes

Updated supremacy of eu law notes notes.

European Law

European Law notes fully updated for recent exams at Oxford and Cambridge. These notes cover all the LLB EU law cases and so are perfect for anyone doing an LLB in the UK or a great supplement for those doing LLBs abroad, whether that be in Ireland, Hong Kong or Malaysia (University of London).

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][Supremacy of EU Law Notes

What is supremacy?

The doctrine of supremacy is stated in Declaration 17 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon:

“In accordance with the well settled case law of the CJEU, t he Treaties and the law adopted by the Union … have primacy over the law of member States , under the conditions laid down by said case law”

NOTE: declarations are not legally binding. However, this does not seem to matter – an annex to the Declaration provided an opinion of the Council Legal Service which states that “The fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court of Justice”

Dashwood has described the principle of supremacy as being a manifestation of the principle of sincere cooperation ( Article 4(3) TFEU).

The principle does not render contrary national provision to be invalid, but rather requires them to be “ disapplied ” so far as they are incompatible with EU law ( IN.CO.GE )

De Witte has said that there are two possible interpretations of primacy:

It merely requires national courts to find a way to recognise the principles and achieve the result imposed by the CJEU

National courts have no choice and cannot resist the authority of EU law

This latter interpretation implies that national Courts are exercising a jurisdiction attributed to them by EU law, and not a jurisdiction granted by their own constitution.

Many EU law scholars adopted the latter view, whilst national courts (with the possible exception of the Netherlands) adopted the former view

Limitations

It is important to note that, supremacy is not totally unconditional . There are two important limitations on its operation:

CJEU Case Law

Under the CJEU’s own case law, it can be seen that supremacy is limited – sometimes it must be balanced against equally fundamental principles of the EU legal order (for instance, legal certainty or legitimate expectations.

EU law therefore constitutes a limit to primacy

Kuhne and Heitz

Facts: The question was asked whether or not supremacy might require national authorities to reopen decisions that have become final where it becomes apparent from a subsequent CJEU judgement that the national cases were decided on the basis of a misinterpretation of EU law

Held: Legal certainty is one of the general principles of EU law and implies that there is no general requirement in principle to reopen a decision even where it is incompatible with certain provisions of EU law

Asda Stores

Held: The CJEU refused to sanction the enforcement against individuals of (valid) EU legislation which had not been adequately published

Held: the CJEU limited the effects of its judgement to the future in order to preserve legal certainty

Member State Courts

Member State courts have, for the most part, had difficult accommodating the CJEU’s vision of supremacy into their domestic constitutional structures

s2 ECA 1972 is a clear attempt to give legislative force to supremacy, but it clashes with fundamental principles of British constitutional law

In particular, it conflicts with parliamentary sovereignty which prevents Parliament from curtailing the fullest legislative prerogatives of a subsequent Parliament

In Factortame (No 2) the House of Lords accepted a compromised through the implied supremacy clause which was inserted in to all pieces of subsequent legislation

Whilst this gave practical force to the principle of supremacy, its source and justification remained in Parliamentary sovereignty

The consequences of the implied supremacy clause is that if Parliament expressly derogated from s2 ECA 1972, then English courts would be obliged to give effect to that subsequent provision over supremacy

In Thoburn , Laws LJ said that “the fundamental basis of the UK’s relations with the EU rests with the domestic, not the European, legal powers ”

Whilst German judges remain open and friendly to the process of European integration, the principle of supremacy is condition and its continued enforcement with Germany should not be taken for granted

Solange I – it was suggested that in the event of a conflict between EU rights and rights contained in the German constitution, the latter would prevail

Solange II – as long as the EU generally ensures an effective protection of fundamental rights, substantially similar to the level guaranteed under German law, the na tional courts should refrain from exercising their jurisdiction to review the legality of EU acts according to the German constitution

Brunner – supremacy is not unconditional within the German legal system.

The BVerfG has the ultimate jurisdiction to police the compatibility of EU law with the German constitution with regards to fundamental rights but also with regards to ultra vires review

Bananas – the BVerfG refused to exercise is reserved jurisdiction to review because Solange II and Brunner had been respected

NOTE : the German administrative and tax courts had declared the bananas regulation unlawful and inapplicable in German territory

Lisbon – even after Lisbon, the EU remains an association of sovereign states founded upon international law, whereby Member States continue to provided the primary focus of democratic expression for their own citizens

The BVerfG warned that this “union of national states” must be taken seriously by reasserting its ultimate right of review

Honeywell – this developed the terms on which ultra vires review would be conducted – it will apply in relation to a “sufficiently serious” violation

The position of supremacy in relation to national courts has been met with mixed views

MacCormick argues that it encourages a constructive dialogue

BUT: Reich question the legitimacy of a dialogue where domestic courts unilaterally reject Treaty obligations entered into by elected bodies

How have the EU courts developed the...

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Chapter 2 Outline answers to essay questions

Trace the development of the principles of direct effect, indirect effect, and state liability by the Court of Justice, evaluating their significance for individual claimants.

Your answer should address direct effect, indirect effect, and state liability in turn, ensuring relevant analysis and evaluation as you go along. As all three doctrines were created by the Court of Justice, the case law will feature strongly, as the question itself indicates. You should begin by reference to the doctrine of supremacy, which forms the basis of the three principles.

Supremacy of EU law

Sovereignty of the European Union (previously Community) legal order: 'The Community constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose benefits the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields . . .' ( Van Gend ) '. . . the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States . . .' ( Costa v ENEL ).
The corollary of EU sovereignty is the supremacy of EU law: EU law takes precedence over national law ( Costa v ENEL , Internationale Handelsgesellschaft , Simmenthal , Factortame II ).

Direct effect

Meaning of 'direct effect: set out a definition – if a provision of EU law is directly effective, it can be invoked by individuals in the national court.
The principle is not contained in the Treaty. Trace its development by the Court of Justice, discussing Treaty articles, regulations, directives.

Treaty articles

Van Gend : Creation of the principle. Treaty articles capable of direct effect. The Treaty is not only an agreement creating obligations between Member States. EU law imposes obligations upon individuals and confers on them legal rights.
Direct effect of Treaty articles: subject to the conditions first formulated in Van Gend (measure must be sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional and its implementation must not be dependent upon any implementing measure), then subsequently reworked and loosened, for instance in Defrenne (the measure must be sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional).
Van Gend : Treaty articles capable of vertical direct effect (explain) but the question of their horizontal direct effect (explain) was left unresolved.
Defrenne : Treaty articles can be invoked horizontally.
Since Van Gend and Defrenne : numerous Treaty articles held to be vertically and horizontally directly effective, including the internal market provisions.
Significance for individuals: ability to invoke, in the national court, Treaty rights against the state and other individuals.

Regulations

Regulations: capable of vertical and horizontal direct effect, subject to the same conditions as are applied to Treaty articles ( Politi , Leonesio ).
Article 288 TFEU: directives must be implemented into national law.
Originally not thought to be capable of direct effect: not intended to operate as law within national systems, since that is the role envisaged for the relevant national implementing measures; addressed to Member States and do not appear to affect individuals directly; seen as giving Member States a broad discretion in implementation, being binding only as to the result to be achieved, and therefore considered to be insufficiently precise to fulfil the Van Gend criteria.
Van Duyn : directives can be directly effective, provided clear, precise, and unconditional.
Ratti : additionally, the implementation deadline must have passed. Rationale: it would be unfair to permit a directive to be invoked against a Member State until its obligation to implement had become absolute. By the same token, it would be unfair to allow a Member State to rely on its failure to implement a directive to escape obligations arising under it.
Van Duyn did not address the possible horizontal direct effect of directives.
Marshall : directives can only be invoked vertically against the state or a public authority, but not horizontally. Reiterated in Faccini Dori .
Court of Justice's refusal to permit directives to be invoked horizontally frequently criticized as anomalous and unfair. In the employment context, for instance, individuals employed by the state or a public body can invoke rights under a directive against their employer, whilst those working for private employers cannot.
In response, Court of Justice refers to the Community (now EU) legal order: rights under directives must be enshrined in national implementing measures, upon which claimants can rely in national courts. Only Member States, not individuals, should be held accountable for a state's failure to implement directives.
Mitigation of this approach: indirect effect and state liability and broad interpretation of 'public body'.
Public body: Foster '. . . a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the state and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals'.
Application of Foster test ( NUT, Becker , Fratelli Costanzo , Johnston, Farrell ).
Doctrines of direct effect and supremacy immensely significant. Require national courts to apply EU law at the suit of individuals in priority over any conflicting provisions of national law. National courts must disapply national measures that conflict with directly effective provisions of EU law.
Direct effect is especially important where a Member State has failed to meet its obligation to implement EU law or where implementation is partial or defective. Direct effect provides a mechanism for the enforcement of individuals' EU rights but also an additional means of supervision of Member States' compliance with EU obligations.

Indirect effect

Especially significant: overcoming the shortcomings of direct effect in 'horizontal' situations or where a provision is not sufficiently clear.
Von Colson : the principle established. Set out the definition of indirect effect .
Applies to pre-dating and post-dating legislation – Marleasing, Webb v EMO Air Cargo
Marleasing : all national law must be interpreted in line with Union law, but only 'so far as possible'. It may not always be possible ( Wagner Miret ) so the principle has its limitations.

State liability in damages

A means to overcome the limitations of direct and indirect effect.
Francovich : damages for loss incurred as a result of a state's failure to implement a directive. Conditions for liability: the directive entails the grant of rights to individuals; it is possible to identify the content of those rights; a causal link between the state's failure and the loss.
Factortame III : damages for other kinds of breach. Set out the conditions.
‘Sufficiently serious breach’ - ‘Manifest and grave disregard of the limits on its discretion’ – factors to be considered (see Para 56 of Factortame III) – clarity, excusable etc.
Application of Factortame III : legislation infringing EU law ( Factortame III ); incorrect implementation of a directive ( BT ); administrative breaches ( Hedley Lomas ); incorrect interpretation of EU law by a national court of last instance ( Köbler ).

Direct effect, indirect effect and state liability all play a crucially important role in the protection of individuals' EU law rights in national courts.

Select your Country

Political Reflection

The Primacy or Supremacy Principle of the European Union Law: A Comparative Overview of British, German and French Courts’ Responses

Dr Sharifullah Dorani* | [email protected]

*South Asia and the Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International

Introduction

An Overview of the UK, Germany, and France’s Approaches to the Principle of the Supremacy of EU Law

Although the UK has already left the EU, the British courts’ reaction to the doctrine of EU law primacy is still relevant since it has been an essential part of EU Law modules at universities and will continue to have relevance. [ii] The ECJ was asking the UK courts something that they were not constitutionally competent to offer. As seen in the essay on UK’s response to EU law superiority (Dorani, 2020b), the UK courts did not have the power to question the validity of an Act of Parliament due to the sovereign nature of Parliament (Loveland, 2003: 21).As seen in the first essay, the ECJ made it clear that the Member States must give primacy to EU law regardless of whether the national law was passed before or after the EU law, irrespective of the nature of the national law ( Costa , 1964; Dorani, 2020a). The ECJ reasoned that by joining the EU, the Member States accepted the supremacy of EU law under Article 288 (ex 249 TEC) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union signed in 1957 (Dorani, 2020a). Therefore, it was vital to preserve this supremacy so that the uniformity and efficacy of EU law was ensured, even if it was at the cost of the national constitutional law of the Member States. Not only the higher courts of Member States were under the obligations to immediately give precedence to EU law over national law in a case of conflict, but also the lower courts ( Simmenthal , 1978).

However, though reluctant at first, the UK courts got around the constitutional difficulty by adopting the rule of construction on the basis of section 2 (4) of the European Communities Act 1972 and gave precedence to EU law by accepting the direct effect of directives ( Macarthys Ltd , 1979; Garland , 1983; Pickstone , 1989; Webb , 1995; Dorani, 2020b). These cases suggested that the British courts accepted the ECJ’s rulings on the direct effect of directives. The rulings of Factortame (1991) and EOC (1995) were additional indications that the courts went further to accept the ECJ’s judgments in Simmenthal and Costa, namely that EU law took precedence over national law regardless of when the national law was passed (Dorani, 2020a).

However, the courts argued that they relied on section 2 (4) for their judgment in Factortame , suggesting that Parliament was still sovereign. This was not a convincing claim as the Parliament of 1972 was not constitutionally competent to bind the Parliament of 1988, and the courts were well aware of this fact ( Ellen Street Estates Ltd , 1934; Dorani, 2020a). The court, however, did not accept the earlier incompatible Act and held it to have been impliedly repealed. Therefore, one could argue that it was the ruling of Simmenthal that was relied on by the Supreme Court in Factortame . However, whatever the authority for Factortame might have been, the UK courts, practically speaking, accepted the supremacy of EU law without, unlike the German Courts, any threats or conditions.

Unlike the UK and French Courts, the German courts were quick – particularly the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) – to recognise the independent nature of the EU law ( Re Tax , 1963). Re Tax demonstrated that the FCC accepted the supremacy of directly effective EU law. It also made clear to the lower German courts that the ECJ’s rulings were binding inside Germany (Dorani, 2021a). Thus, the FCC was one of the first supreme courts of the Member States discussed to accept the superiority of EU law. However, the Solange I (1970) decision indicated that it was not the case any longer, as the FCC claimed that it would review the EU law like any other German law if it was in breach of the German Basic Rights.

Unlike the Supreme Court in the UK, the FCC is constitutionally competent to do so, and it was, therefore, considered a significant threat to the supremacy of EU law. But Solange II (1987) indicated that the FCC modified its Solange I jurisprudence by holding that the European level of protection for human rights now measured up to that of the German Constitution. Although it claimed that the European level of protection for human rights was similar to that of the German one, it constantly held it would use its Solange I jurisprudence if the EU institutions acted ultra vires (that is, beyond the competence that the Member States have given to the EU) or if the protection for human rights fell below the German standards ( Brunner , 1994; The Banana Litigation , 2000). This suggests that the FCC regarded itself as the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality and the German Constitution superior to EU law. However, as seen in my essay on Germany’s reaction to EU law primacy (Dorani, 2021a), except for one case, the FCC, in practice, has never disregarded a provision of EU law; the one case has been, as I explained in detail in my one of my previous essays, ‘a special one and can be confined to its own facts’ (Dorani, 2021a). One could naturally conclude that the FCC, too, has (though conditionally) accepted the supremacy of EU law. The same conclusion could be even truer for the French Courts.

Like the UK courts, the French courts were reluctant to give priority to EU law as they regarded themselves constitutionally incompetent. However, the Cour de Cassation’s Vabre (1975) decision suggested that the Cour de Cassation did not see itself as incompetent and, therefore, gave superiority to EU law over the French law. At first, both the Constitutional Court and the Conseil d’Etat were not prepared to accept the superiority of EU law over French law and even on some occasions did not apply the EU provisions before them ( Semoules , 1970), which neither the Supreme Court in the UK nor the FCC in Germany ever did so. However, eventually they changed their positions and held that Article 55 of the French Constitution empowered them to give supremacy to EU law over French law, but not over the French Constitution (Dorani, 2021b; Richards, 2000: 192).

Thus, Germany and France, to a certain extent, have the same position, that is, they have accepted the supremacy of EU law as long as the EU institutions do not encroach on the German and French Constitutions. Great Britain, though it has not got a written constitution, evidently accepted the supremacy of EU law over an Act of Parliament ( Factotame , 1991; EOC , 1995). Needless to say, though, the EU law is no longer supreme in the UK, owing to Great Britain’s exit from the EU.

In theory, there have been some conflicting constitutional issues between the ECJ and the Member States studied. However, in practice, it could be concluded that the national courts have accepted the supremacy of EU law.

Some of the tension between the EU and the Member States has been over the authority for the supremacy of EU law over their national law. For example, the Member States concerned claim that they derived the authority from their own constitutional rules, whereas the ECJ want them to rely on its jurisprudence. Another contentious issue is the ultra vir e s doctrine; it is possible in the future that the national courts disregard EU law if they deem the ECJ to have acted ultra vir e s . But that possibility is remote for the reasons explained in my essays on Germany and France’s approaches to the supremacy of EU law (Dorani, 2021a; Dorani, 2021b). The UK courts did not make much of the doctrine of ultra vir e s , but, obviously, that is no longer important after the UK withdrew from the EU following the 2016 EU Referendum.

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Weatherill, S (1st ed) (1993) EC Law, The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings of the European Community, Blackstone.

Weiss, K (2019) Beware the EU’s attempts to grab tax powers from member states. CAPX, 11 January.

Wulf-Henning, R (1991) The Application of Community Law in West Germany: 1980- 1990. CML REV.

Cases and Treaties

Alcan decision Bverf, 17 Feb. 2000, (2000) EuZW, 445.

Arrighi decision, Conseil d’Etat decision of 6 Nov 1936, [1936] Recuei Lebon 966.

Banana Litigation decision 7/6/00.

Blackburn v Attorney General [1971] 2 ALL ER 1380. Bulmer (HP) Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401.

Brasserie du Pecheur [1997] 1 CMLR 971.

Brunner v REU [1994] 1 CMLR 57.

BVerfG decision, 1 BvR 248/63, 1 BvR 216/67 of 18 Oct. 1967, [1968] 1 EuR 134.

Case 6, 9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357.

Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.

Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.

14/83 Von Colson v Land Northern – Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891.

Case 26/62, NV. Algemene Transport- en Expedities Ondeneming Vand Gend en Loss v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1936] ECR 1.

C- 32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [1992] ECR 1.

Case 41/47 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337.

Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 532.

Case 77/63 Re Tax on Malt Barley [1963] Eur 10 130, [1964] 10 CMLR 130.

Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629.

C- 106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internactional de Alimentaccion SA [1990] ECR 1.

CE, (Ass) (1998) Sarran et Levacher, conclusions Ch mauggue, Revue francaise de droit administrative, October 30, n, 14, 1081.

Confederation nationale des societies de protection des anima de France et des pays d’ expression francaise case. administrative (1984).

Conseil Constitutionnel decision 74-71 DC of 29/30 Dec. 1976, [1976] Recueil des Decisions du Conseil Costitutionnel 15.

Duke v GEC Reliance [1988] 1 ALL ER 626.

Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Ministers of Health [1934] AC 765.

Federation francaise des societs de protection de la nature case administrative (1985).

Felixstowe Dock and Rly Co and European Ferries Ltd v British Docks Board (1976) 2 CMLR 655.

Finnegan v Clowney Youth Training Programme [1990] 2 AC 407.

Firma Alfons Lutticke GmbH, Koln-Deutz, BVerfG 2 BvR 225/69. [1972] 1 EuR 51, [1971] NJW 2122.

Garland v British Rail Engineering [1983] 2 AC 751.

Germany v Council (1994), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61995CJ0122.

Harris v Minister of Interior (1952) AC 526.

Lee v Bude and Torrington Junction Rly Co (1871) LR 6 CP 576.

Litster v Forth Dry Dock [1989] 1 ALL ER 1134.

Lutticke(Alfons) GmbH v Hauptzollanmt Saarlouis, ECJ Case 57/65, [1966] ECR 205.

Macarthys Ltd v Smith (1979) 3 ALL ER.

Marleasing SA v La Comecial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR 1.

Mediguard Services Ltd v Thame (unreported).

Merchant Shipping Act 1988.

Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2017] UKSC 5.

Minister of Interior v Cohn- Bendit [1980] 1 CMLR 543.

Nicolo [1990] 1 CMLR 17.

NV Algemene Transport-Expedite Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62.

Pickin [1974] BRB AC 765.

Pickstone v Freemans plc [1989] AC 68.

Prebble v Television New Zealand (1995) (access via http://web.lexis-nexis.com/prefesional ).

R v Attorney General, Ex parte ICI, Queen’s Bench Division, 60 Tax Cases 25 January 1985.

R v Secretory of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd [1989] 1 CMLR 277 (QBD).

R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 ALL ER 70.

R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) 1 AC 1.

Rathmans and Arizona Tobacco Products [1993] 1 CMLR 252.

Re a Rehabilitation Center [1992] 2 CMLR 21.

Re Boisdet [1991] 1 CMLR 3.

Re Kloppenburg [1988] 3 CMLR.

Re Vat Directives [1982] 1 CMLR 527.

Sex Discrimination Act 1972.

Steinike und Weinling v Bundesamt fur Ernabrung und Forstwirtschaft ‘Vielleicht decision. Bverfg decision 2 BvL 6/77 [1980] 2 CMLR 531.

Sun International v Sun Oil Trading Company and another Queen’s Bench Division (unreported judgment of 30 July 1986).

Syndicat General de Fabricants de Semoules de France [1970] CMLR 395.

The Colonial Validity Act 1865.

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted on 4 October 1958.

The Employment Protection Act 1978.

The European Community Act 1972.

The European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty 1957. Also known as the Rome Treaty.

The European Union Act 2011.

The European Union Withdrawal Act 2018.

The MSA 1988.

The Lisbon Treaty 2007.

The Statute Westminster 1931.

The Treaty on European Union 1992. Also known as The Maastricht Treaty.

Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] 1 CMLR 50.

Vabre [1975] 2 CMLR 336.

Vabre (Conseil Constitutionnel decision 86-216 of 3 Sep (1986).

Vauxhall Estates Ltd. V. Liverpool Corpn (1932) 1 KB 733.

Von Kempis v Geldof [1976] 2 CMLR 152, Administration des Douanes v Epuran et autres Cass. Crim., December 5, 1983.D. 1983.217.

Webb v EMO [1995].

Wunsche Handelsgesellscaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225. Also referred as Solange II .

[i] The essays are inspired by my undergraduate law dissertation. I am and will remain grateful for the support I received from the University of Northampton during my undergraduate years, especially from my brilliant EU law lecturer Sarah Willis.

[ii] See my articles for a discussion of why it is significant, Dorani 2020b; Dorani, 2019b. See my book and interview with Professor Rahman Dag for a detailed discussion of the factors that might have also played a part in causing Brexit, Dorani, 2019a; Dag, 2019.

Essays on Supremacy of EU Law

Supremacy of eu law: seminal cases of van gend en loos and costa v enel, ecj in relation to the doctrine of supremacy, ending the supremacy of eu law in the, eu supremacy and direct effect, supremacy of eu law: the case of dansk industri v estate of a (ajos).

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