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Case Studies

Case study: bhopal gas tragedy (1983-84).

Dr. Rhyddhi Chakraborty Programme Leader (Health and Social Care), London Churchill College, UK Email: [email protected]

What follows is a synopsis of the full article found in featured articles.

Please read the featured article Lesson from Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1983-84) By Dr. Rhyddhi Chakraborty Programme Leader (Health and Social Care), London Churchill College, UK describes in detail the elements of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL)

In 1970, in the North adjacent to the slums and railway station, a pesticide plant was set up by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). From late 1977, the plant started manufacturing Sevin (Carbaryl) by importing primary raw materials, viz. alpha-naphtol and methyl isocyanate (MIC) in stainless steel drums from the Union Carbide's MIC plant in USA. However, from early 1980, the Bhopal plant itself started manufacturing MIC using the know-how and basic designs supplied by Union Carbide Corporation, USA (UCC). The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000 liters liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619 and were claimed to ensure all safety from leakage.

Time Line of Occupational Hazards of the Union Carbide India Limited Plant Leading Before the Disaster

• 1976: Local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant. • 1980: A worker was reported to have accidentally been splashed with phosgene while carrying out a regular maintenance job of the plant's pipes. • 1982 (January): A phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. Investigation revealed that none of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. • 1982 (February): An MIC leak affected 18 workers. • 1982 (August): A chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body. • 1982 (October): In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. • 1983-1984: There were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.

In early December 1984, most of the Bhopal plant's MIC related safety systems were not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes. For the major maintenance work, the MIC production and Sevin were stalled in Bhopal plant since Oct. 22, 1984 and major regular maintenance was ordered to be done during the weekdays’ day shifts.

The Sevin plant, after having been shut down for some time, had been started up again during November but was still running at far below normal capacity. To make the pesticide, carbon tetrachloride is mixed with methyl isocyanate (MIC) and alpha-naphthol, a coffee-colored powder that smells like mothballs. The methyl isocyanate, or MIC, was stored in the three partly buried tanks, each with a 15,000-gallon capacity.

During the late evening hours of December 2, 1984, whilst trying to unclog, water was believed to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 containing 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October. Introduction of water into the tank began a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.

A Three Hour Time Line of the Disaster

December 3, 1984 12:40 am: A worker, while investigating a leak, stood on a concrete slab above three large, partly buried storage tanks holding the chemical MIC. The slab suddenly began to vibrate beneath him and he witnessed at least a 6 inche thick crack on the slab and heard a loud hissing sound. As he prepared to escape from the leaking gas, he saw gas shoot out of a tall stack connected to the tank, forming a white cloud that drifted over the plant and toward nearby neighborhoods where thousands of residents were sleeping. In short span of time, the leak went out of control.

December 3, 1984 12:45 am: The workers were aware of the enormity of the accident. They began to panic both because of the choking fumes, they said, and because of their realization that things were out of control; the concrete over the tanks cracked as MIC turned from liquid to gas and shot out the stack, forming a white cloud. Part of it hung over the factory, the rest began to drift toward the sleeping neighborhoods nearby.

December 3, 1984 12:50 am: The public siren briefly sounded and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks. Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant. The control room operator then turned on the vent gas scrubber, a device designed to neutralize escaping toxic gas. The scrubber had been under maintenance; the flow meter indicated there was no caustic soda flowing into the device. It was not clear to him whether there was actually no caustic soda in the system or whether the meter was broken. Broken gauges were not unusual at the factory. In fact, the gas was not being neutralized but was shooting out the vent scrubber stack and settling over the plant. December 3, 1984 1: 15- 1:30 am: At Bhopal’s 1,200-bed Hamidia Hospital, the first patient with eye trouble reported. Within five minutes, there were a thousand patients. Calls to the UCIL plant by police were twice assured that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir". In the plant, meanwhile, MIC began to engulf the control room and the adjoining offices.

December 3, 1984 3:00 am: The factory manager, arrived at the plant and sent a man to tell the police about the accident because the phones were out of order. The police were not told earlier because the company management had an informal policy of not involving the local authorities in gas leaks. Meanwhile, people were dying by the hundreds outside the factory. Some died in their sleep. Others ran into the cloud, breathing in more and more gas and dropping dead in their tracks.

Immediate Consequences

With the lack of timely information exchange between Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. They were then told that it was methyl isocyanate (MIC), which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information about. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities. Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself.

Subsequent Actions

Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims.

Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster, leading to the beginning of legal proceedings.

Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system in April 1985. Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster. The amount was immediately paid.

Post-settlement activity

UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was taken to UCC's house after which he was released six hours later on $2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. Anderson, eight other executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges were required to appear in Indian court.

In response, Union Carbide said the company is not under Indian jurisdiction. In 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. From 2014, Dow is a named respondent in a number of ongoing cases arising from Union Carbide’s business in Bhopal.

A US Federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, had been filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against humanity." It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and subsequent appeal denied. Anderson died in 2014.

Long-term Health Effects

A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected," affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release. Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.

Ethical Negligence

The Corporate Negligence Argument: This point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working environment to develop.

Safety audits: In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the USA revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same.

The Disgruntled Employee Sabotage Argument:  Now owned by Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide maintains a website dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the result of sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and operative to prevent the intrusion of water.

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• Ind Psychiatry J
• v.23(2); Jul-Dec 2014

Mental health of survivors of 1984 Bhopal disaster: A continuing challenge

R. srinivasa murthy.

Mental Health Department, The Association for the Mentally Challenged, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India

Bhopal disaster is an important milestone in Indian Industrial Psychiatry. The disaster was not only the biggest industrial disaster but also one in which complex forces have joined hands to demy the mental health needs of the population. Though the biggest general population epidemiological study over 5 years was carried out to understand the mental health impact of the disaster, the findings of this study did not get reflected in mental health care for the population. Furthermore, the needed longitudinal studies and evaluation of the interventions were not undertaken. There was no sharing of information with the survivors about the impact of the disaster on their health and well-being and sharing of skills for self-care. A result of these factors is the extreme degree of dissatisfaction in the population. Looking back, it would have met the needs of the Bhopal population, if the mental health services were community based and reaching the population, rather than the clinic-based approaches, there was a wide range of services, especially rehabilitation, continuous research into the changing mental health needs of the population and the effectiveness of interventions and most importantly, there was a continuous dialogue with the population and sharing of information with the general population. These are the tasks for the immediate future to reorganize the focus of mental health initiatives in Bhopal. Many lessons can be learnt from the Bhopal disaster and the continuing tragedy for the population.

Bhopal disaster is an important milestone in Indian Industrial Psychiatry. 2014 is an important year in the calendar of disaster mental health. It marks the centenary of the World War 1, the 30 years of the Bhopal disaster in Madhya Pradesh, 30 years after the Sikh riots in Delhi, two decades after the Killari earthquake of Maharashtra, 19 years after the Dabwali fire in Haryana, 15 years after the Orissa supercyclone, 13 years after the Kutch earthquake in Gujarat, 12 years after the Gujarat riots, and 10 years after the tsunami. All of these disasters, man-made and natural, have influenced the understanding of mental health of the populations and the development of mental health care for the surviving populations.

The current review focuses on the Bhopal gas disaster of December 1984 and identifies the lessons learnt during the last three decades. The scope of the review is to cover the four phases of research/service delivery (December 1984–February 1985, March 1985–1994, 1995–2010, and 2010-), and identify the continuing mental health needs of the population and the lessons learnt during the last three decades.

THE DISASTER

Bhopal gas leak disaster is the biggest industrial disaster in human history. On the night of 2/3 December 1984, about 40 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) from tank 610 of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) factory at Bhopal, in Central India, leaked into the surrounding environment. This leak of an “extremely hazardous chemical” which occurred over a short span of few hours killing >2000 people, covered the city of Bhopal in a cloud of poisonous gas. The Union Carbide factory at Bhopal was part of India's response to the severe food shortages in 1960’s. In 1969, Union Carbide set up the pesticide plant at Bhopal (UCIL). Bhopal city is located in the central part of India. Bhopal is the capital city of the state of Madhya Pradesh. In 1984, the population of Bhopal was about 700,000. The city was chosen, for setting up of the pesticide plant, on the basis of its central location in the country, railway services connecting the city to rest of India and the availability of a large natural lake to provide adequate water supply. The chemical plant was located only about 2 km from the railway station and not far from the residential quarters. Until 1979, the factory was importing MIC from the parent company. After 1979, MIC was manufactured at the Bhopal factory. MIC is one of the many intermediates used in the production of the powerful pesticide Sevin. MIC is a dangerous chemical. It is lighter than water and very hygroscopic. It is also twice as heavy as air and as a result, in a free environment, it remains close to the ground. The factory employed about 800 workers. Ironically, only in 1983, the Indian Government had (1-year prior to the disaster) extended the plant's license for 7 years after a promise that the plant would secure from its parent company the technology to handle “emergency situations like toxic gas release, sometimes accompanied with fire, endangering the safety of the community.”[ 1 , 2 ] There are reports that 4 months before the tragedy, the US multinational had decided to dismantle its Bhopal installations to relocate in Brazil and Indonesia.[ 3 ]

On the night of December 2/3 1984, about 40 tons of MIC in tank number 610 leaked into the atmosphere. The gas spread and covered about 7 km radius of the plant and directly affected about 200,000 population. More than 2000 (about 1% of directly exposed) died on the night of the disaster. The disaster was the result of a combination of factors. The cause is thought to be due to the entry of water into tank with MIC or the spontaneous polymerization (in the absence of inhibitors) of the liquid of MIC, which had been in storage for over a month, a longer period than normal.[ 2 ] In addition to this, (i) The gauges measuring the temperature and pressures were not functioning properly; (ii) the refrigeration unit for keeping the tank of MIC cool had been shut off for sometime; (iii) the gas scrubber had been shut off for maintenance; and (iv) the flare tower, which could have burned off the escaping MIC, was not functional.[ 4 , 5 ] Thus, the disaster was the result of a combination of a number of factors of negligence and poor operational procedures. Though the estimated number of persons who died immediately was around 2000, in the following years it is estimated to have killed >25,000 persons. In addition, at least 200,000 population who were exposed to the gas leak and survived are experiencing a wide variety of health problems and disabilities.

The major milestones in the legal responsibility were the passing of the Bhopal Gas Relief Act in 1985 and the settlement of government of India and the company for the 1-time compensation of $470 million. However, the legal battles for the rights and relief to the survivors continued to occupy public space.[ 6 , 7 , 8 ] In addition, the issues of the health damage to the population, legal liability of the company and the continuing need of the affected population continued to be active issues in India and internationally.[ 9 , 10 ] August 2012, Supreme Court judgment relating to health needs of the population is a milestone. This judgment both recognized the rights of the survivors and directed for implementation of specific measures to provide health care to the survivors.

The 30 anniversary, in December 2014, focused on all aspects of the disaster as reflected in the 13 part series of articles in the Statesman newspaper[ 11 ] covering deficiencies in response with regard to law, health, factory regulation, rehabilitation, compensation, and human rights.

MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH

The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) New Delhi, responded immediately to the disaster by giving importance to understand the health effects on a priority basis. The council brought together a large group of health researchers from different parts of India to study a wide variety of health effects-ranging from the immediate effects on the eye, the lungs, the gastrointestinal system, the gynecological problems and mental health effects. These research efforts were part of a larger national initiative to understand the various aspects of the Bhopal disaster on the people, the environment, and the legal aspects of the chemical industry.

Bhopal disaster is the first disaster in India to be studied systematically for the mental health effects. Earlier reports on the mental health impact of disasters were descriptive and related to the cyclones in Andhra Pradesh and circus tragedy in Bengaluru.[ 12 ] Rao and Zubair[ 13 ] reported that the majority (77.5%) of the studied patients affected from cyclone in Andhra Pradesh were suffering from neurotic disorder. The mental health research of the Bhopal disaster can be considered under four periods of time.

First period (December 1984–February 1985)

The direct involvement of the psychiatrists/neurologists at the field level did not occur till about 8 weeks after the disaster. This delay was in spite of the recognition of the importance of mental health effects of the disaster within the first fortnight of the disaster. By coincidence, the Fourth Advisory Committee on Mental Health of ICMR was meeting on December 12–14, 1984. The experts in the meeting recognized the need of the affected population as follows:

“The recent developments at Bhopal involving the exposure of “normal” human beings to substances toxic to all the exposed and fatal to many, raises a number of mental health needs. The service needs and research can be viewed both in the short-term and long-term perspectives. The acute needs are the understanding and provision of care for confusional states, reactive psychoses, anxiety-depression reactions and grief reactions. Long-term needs arise from the following areas, namely: (i) Psychological reactions to the acute and chronic disabilities, (ii) psychological problems of the exposed subjects, currently not affected, to the uncertainties of the future, (iii) effects of broken social units on children and adults, and (iv) psychological problems related to rehabilitation.”[ 14 ]

However, in spite of this early recognition of the need for mental health interventions there was a delay of 8 weeks before mental health professionals were involved. An important reason for this was the absence of mental health professionals in the state of Madhya Pradesh and the city of Bhopal in 1984. At that point of time, none of the five medical colleges had a psychiatrist on the staff.

Second period (March 2015–1994)

During this period of 10 years, there were a large number of studies, both as part of the general health surveys and specific mental health studies.[ 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 ]

As part of the general health studies, Andersson et al .[ 20 ] reported the first community survey within 2 weeks of the disaster, in eight exposed areas and two nonexposed clusters of households with a 2 months follow-up. Though the focus of the survey was eye and lung problems, the study authors noted that the pupillary reflex was normal and they conclude “the fact that this reflex was normal in all groups cannot be taken as evidence that neurotoxicity did not occur.” Misra and Misra et al .[ 21 , 22 ] report on 33 adult patients treated during the acute phase at the medical college hospital. They found that symptoms of severe cough and dyspnea were followed by fainting in 55% of the patients. The duration of unconsciousness ranged from 30 min to 3 days. One patient, who had suffered from prolonged unconsciousness, had myoclonic jerks localized to the right upper extremity and generalized hyperreflexia, suggestive of encephalopathy. Three patients who had prolonged unconsciousness and brisk deep tendon jerks and extensor plantar response. Mild to moderate headache (55%), giddiness (46%), burning sensation in hands and feet (9%) and hypoanesthesia (3%) were also reported. At the 3 months follow-up of this group of patients, depression and irritability were the commonly reported symptoms. Gupta et al .[ 23 ] studied systematically 687 affected persons of various age groups and from different affected areas, 2 months after the disaster and an another 592 persons after the 4 months period. These studies included “behavioral studies.” The behavioral studies were carried out in 350 adults.

“The gas exposed groups, especially the females had poor scores in the auditory memory tests. The exposed male group showed significant low visual memory as compared to controls and females.”

Cullinan et al .[ 24 ] carried out an epidemiological study of a representative gas-exposed population, 9 years after the disaster, in January 1994. They studied 474 subjects and a control group. Of this sample, 76 were subjected to detailed neurological testing which included vestibular and peripheral sensory function and tests for short-term memory. In this study, a high proportion of subjects reported a wide variety of neuropsychiatric symptoms such as abnormal smell, abnormal taste, faintness, headache, difficulty to stay awake and abnormal balance. Headache was reported by 80% of the subjects when compared to 50% in the control population. Neurological examination showed that a high proportion was judged to have clinical evidence of central, peripheral or vestibular neurological disease. The mean short-term memory scores were lowest among those heavily exposed (1.0 vs. 3.0). There was some evidence of impaired extrapyramidal functions. There was also abnormal vertical drawing test among the exposed. In this group, the psychological symptoms reported were fatigue (88%), anxiety (65%), difficulty in concentration (64%). Difficulty in decision-making was reported in 80% as compared to 35% in the control population. Irritability was reported by 33% when compared to none in the control group. There was a consistent gradient across the separate exposure groups for all symptoms except depression. Approximately, 25% reported symptoms of depression.

Specific mental health studies started following the initial 1-week exploratory visit of, in the 1 st week of February 1985, by Dr. Srinivasa Murthy, of the National Institute of Mental Health and NeuroSciences (NIMHANS), Bengaluru, and Professor Sethi, of K.G. Medical College (KGMC), Lucknow. The team visited Bhopal and examined the general population and patients attending the general health facilities. They also interacted with the medical personnel to understand the magnitude and nature of the mental health problems in the affected population. Their observations, following a week's work, were based on clinical and unstructured interviews. These initial observations led to an estimate of the magnitude of mental health needs of the population at 50% of those in the community and of about 20-30% of those attending medical facilities.[ 25 ]

Immediately following these observations, during February-April 1985, a psychiatric team from KGMC, Lucknow carried out systematic studies. As a first step, 10 general medical clinics in the disaster-affected area were chosen. A team consisting of a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, and a social worker visited one clinic a day, by rotation in a randomized fashion, on three occasions and screened all the newly registered adult patients with the help of a psychiatric screening questionnaire namely, self-reporting questionnaire (SRQ). Subjects identified as probable psychiatric patients were then evaluated in detail by the psychiatrist with the help of a standardized psychiatric interview, the Present State Examination (PSE). Clinical diagnosis was based on the International Classification of Diseases (9 th revision) (ICD-9) (WHO, 1975). During a period of 3 months (February–May 1985), of the 855 patients screened at the 10 clinics, on the basis of their SRQ scores, 259 were identified as having a potential mental disorder. Of these potentially mentally ill people, 44 could not be evaluated, and 215 were assessed using the PSE. The confirmed number of psychiatric patients was 193, yielding a prevalence rate of 22.6%. Most of the patients were females (8.11%) under 45 years of age (74%). The main diagnostic categories were anxiety neurosis (25%), depressive neurosis (37%), adjustment reaction with prolonged depression (20%), and adjustment reaction with predominant disturbance of emotions (16%). Cases of psychosis were rare, and they were not related to the disaster.[ 26 ]

During the same period, in the 3 rd month of the postdisaster period, neurological studies were carried out.[ 27 ] This was a survey of the gas-affected patients admitted to the various hospitals in the Bhopal city. A total of 129 adults and 47 children were studied for neurological problems. Evidence of involvement of the central nervous system was present in three patients in the form of stroke, encephalopathy and cerebellar ataxia. Involvement of the peripheral nervous system was observed in six patients. Vertigo and hearing loss occurred in four patients. Many patients reported transitory symptoms like loss of consciousness (50%), muscle weakness, tremors, vertigo, ataxia and easy fatigability. Most of these symptoms cleared up after varying periods of time. Of the 47 gas affected children, loss of consciousness at some time or other occurred in half of the patients. Fits occurred during the course of the illness in three children. Mental regression was observed in one child who had commenced speaking in sentences but stopped talking after the disaster. There were no abnormalities in the neurological examination in all of the children. An important observation by the doctors who had examined the children during the early phase of illness was generalized hypotonia and weakness. Two children were noted to be “floppy” with weakness of limb movements and had difficulty in getting up from the ground. Of the 3 patients who had central nervous system involvement, the patient with stroke died. His autopsy showed intense congestion and petechial hemorrhages of the gray and white matter with frank hemorrhage in the circle of Willis area, perhaps indicating the sustained microvascular damage by the circulating MIC.

General population “longitudinal epidemiological study of mental health effects” was initiated by the ICMR, New Delhi.[ 18 ] This was part of the total medical research involving the Bhopal gas affected population, the Bhopal Gas Disaster Research Centre. Two mental health studies and one training intervention were taken up, during 1985–1994 period. The objectives of the epidemiological study was to (i) Study the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in MIC exposed and nonexposed areas; (ii) study the factors associated with psychiatric disorders; (iii) study the course and outcome of disease in identified cases (at first survey) and (iv) carry out annual (2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th and 5 th year) prevalence surveys on independently drawn samples. Verghese et al .[ 28 ] screening tool was used for initial screening, followed by psychiatrists/psychologists administering PSE to arrive at the diagnosis.[ 29 ] A random sample of 700 families from each area, that is, severely exposed area, mildly exposed area and control area, were surveyed, for each rotational survey independently. The mental health item sheet of Verghese et al .[ 28 ] was administered to the head of the family as well as information on the same schedule, regarding other adult member of the family (aged 16+) was collected. If any member of the family was rated positive on three or more items, that individual was further was examined in detail. A semi-structured proforma regarding psychiatric history, personal history, premorbid personality etc., was also completed. Subjects diagnosed as having psychiatric problems were assessed using the PSE and they were referred to psychiatrist of Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal for further medical care. The prevalence rate of psychiatric morbidity was about 4 times higher in the exposed area in comparison to nonexposed area. The result showed that exposure to MIC gas was an important factor for the emergence of psychiatric disorders. Prevalence rate of psychiatric disorders was higher among those persons who were present in their houses in the night of gas leakage. The prevalence rate in the severely exposed area was 139.2/1000 and in the mildly exposed area 80.8/1000, whereas, in nonexposed area it was 26.8/1000. Similarly, the people, who were sleeping outside their houses, had higher prevalence rate of psychiatric morbidity (145.8/1000) in comparison to those people who were inside the house (108.5/1000).

Among the demographic variables income, was an important factor. It was observed that in the initial survey people belonging to lower income group (per capita income less than Rs. 50/-/month) had highest prevalence rate of psychiatric disorders (269.2/1000), whereas, prevalence rate in the middle-income group was comparatively lower (122.9/1000).

The psychiatric morbidity in relation to religion it was found that the prevalence rate was higher among the Muslim community in comparison to Hindus. The prevalence rate of psychiatric disorders during almost every rotational survey has been higher among Muslims than Hindus. This trend was also appeared in the nonexposed area. Prevalence of psychiatric disorders was higher in the females compared to males. The similar condition has been observed in exposed and nonexposed areas and also during the rotational surveys.

All the persons diagnosed with psychiatric disorders were yearly followed-up to ascertain, any change in the mental status of patients (whether the patient had a remission of symptoms for a period of at least 30 days since the initial evaluation? Treatment status and pattern of course?). There were 474 cases of psychiatric disorders identified during the initial survey. Among them 279 cases in the severely exposed area, 148 in the mildly exposed area and 47 in the nonexposed area. In the first follow-up, there were 230 patients actually followed-up, remaining 47 patients had either migrated of died. Majority of these patients (89.6%) were still in episode of illness. 3.9% patients were also in the episode of symptom, but they were not in a continuous state. About 6.5% patients were not in the episode of symptoms. Seven patients out of 230 were rated symptom-free. During first, second, third and fourth follow-up the percentage of patients in continuous illness were 89.6, 66.8, 56.8 and 47.4 respectively. On the other hand, rate of recovery gradually increased from 3.04% to 38.9%. Remission of symptoms were not present in the majority of patients during the first follow-up, and it gradually comes down in the fourth follow-up. It is interesting to mention here that the majority of patients (58.3%) took treatment for psychiatric disorders from the general physician during the first follow-up. Whereas 37.4% patients did not take treatment from any source at the time of follow-up. During second, third and fourth follow-up, it was 51.7%, 49.5%, 53.1% respectively. The rate of recovery also increased gradually in the mildly exposed area and in nonexposed area. In the mildly exposed area, it increases from 7.6% to 44.4% and in nonexposed area it is from 14.3% to 36.6%. Significantly point to note is the nearly half of the patients, continuing to be ill at the end of 5 years of follow-up.

A “pilot psychiatric study of children (0–15 years) affected by MIC in Bhopal,” with aim to compare the frequency and types of psychiatric disorders and intellectual levels of children (0–16 years) of 100 families (having at least one child between 0 and 16 years) randomly selected from one area severely affected by MIC in Bhopal and 100 families (having at least one child between 0 and 16 years) from the control area was carried out. The rate of psychiatric disorders in exposed area was 12.66% when compared to 2.4% in the control area.

Another activity of this period was the “training of medical officers in mental health care in the Bhopal city” to address the need for urgent mental health care in the city. One of the challenges faced by the team of psychiatrists was the provision of psychiatric services to the affected population. For a total population of 700,000 and the affected population of about 200,000, there was no psychiatric help available in the city. The basic aim of the training was to enhance the sensitivity of the medical officers to the emotional needs of individuals and to provide the skills to recognize, diagnose, treat and refer (when required) the mental health problems.[ 30 ] The period of initial training was 6 working days. The training was practical utilizing case studies and group discussions, along with audio-visual, audio taped material of the affected population with maximum learner involvement. A manual was prepared for this training on the basis of experience of training on the basis of experience of training primary care physicians medical officers at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The manual in its draft form was used for the training. A revised manual incorporating the experience of the training and the needs of the medical officers was prepared subsequently and distributed to all the doctors working with the gas affected population.[ 14 ] The comments of the participants in the posttraining evaluation supported the usefulness of the training. Most of them felt that with the training, they were more capable of treating psychiatric illness and other patients having medical problems as well. Some doctors expressed that earlier, they used to give the patients only symptomatic treatment, but after the training they were able to think and diagnosed the condition in terms of a psychological approach. Some doctors mentioned that earlier to the training, they were not aware of any psychiatric problems and were of the opinion that the patients were malingering and giving vague symptoms to evoke a sympathetic response and get more medicines.

Third period (1995–2010)

This period was a period of limited mental health studies and mental health interventions. The important development of this period was the setting up of the Department of Psychiatry, as part of the Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) in 2000, providing mental health care to survivors. One qualitative study of the mental health needs of the population was also carried our during this period.[ 31 ] This study explored qualitatively the state of mental health of survivors in 2003 and the adequacy of mental health services provided to them. Twenty-six people suffering from various mental health needs were the subject of detailed interviews. The salient findings of this study were the following:

“Based on the interviews with victims (survivors) themselves, as well as with professionals, it highlights the fact that despite the continuing suffering of the victims, no systematic effort has been made to tackle the mental health problems that were generated as an impact of the gas leak.”

Fourth period (2010–2014)

Following the court judgment of June 2010, and the high dissatisfaction expressed by the survivors, there was a revival of the health care and research. There was a higher level of compensation to survivor family members of the dead persons, to those with chronic kidney diseases and cancer diagnoses. The National Institute for Research in Environmental Health (NIREH) was set up in Bhopal. The mental health studies of NIREH, focused on understanding of the continuing mental health needs of the population and developing a training program and manual for training in mental health for the general medical officers of Bhopal.

The first effort was a follow-up assessment for the health status of the psychiatric patients of the 1985–1994 was completed that showed the chronicity of the mental disorders in the majority of the patients and the limited mental health care patients had received. In an another study of treatment utilization of the psychiatric patients, cared for during 2010 at BMHRC. This analysis of the routine clinical records pointed to the limited utilization of the available mental health care, and the problems patients had in utilizing the services.[ 32 ] The third effort, was with 500 families in one area, to understand the prevalence of mental disorders in 2012. This study was a two-stage screening for mental disorders and showed about 20% had potential mental disorders and the rates were much higher in those living in socioeconomically difficult life situations and with medical conditions.[ 33 ] The fourth activity was to develop a mental health manual for the medical officers involving the psychiatrists of Bhopal city. The final activity, during this period, was to carry our five training programs of 3 days each (for groups of 6–15 medical officers) of the Gas Rahat Health Department and the doctors working in the mini units of BMHRC. A revised mental health manual to address the continuing mental health needs has been developed.

A striking positive development in the mental health care situation in the city, during the last three decades, have been the increase in the mental health professionals both in the Government and private sectors along with in-patient care facilities at Gandhi Medical College, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Bhopal, all the three private medical colleges in the city, BMHRC, Bhopal, BEML and in the private sector.

Continuing mental health needs of the population, in 2014, are: (i) People with postdisaster anxiety-depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, adjustment disorder conditions, directly related to the disaster of 1984; (ii) people with psychiatric disorders, attributable to the various life changes, family and occupational status, resulting directly (e.g., unemployment due to poor health condition) and indirectly (e.g., loss of head of the family in disaster) from the disaster experiences; (iii) people with chronic physical conditions like chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, hypertension, cancer, with associated psychiatric disorders such as depression, adjustment disorders; and (iv) people with psychiatric disorders, not directly related to the disaster.

During the last three decades, in the country, there have been many positive developments in the area of disaster mental health. The most important is the way in which mental health care has become an essential part of the disaster interventions. Unlike in Bhopal, where mental health was thought of after 8 weeks, now the mental health team reach the disaster populations along with relief teams. The interventions developed during the Marathwada earthquake,[ 34 , 35 , 36 ] (1993), the Orissa Supercyclone[ 37 , 38 ] (1999), the Gujarat-Kutch earthquake[ 39 , 40 ] (2001), the Gujarat riots[ 41 ] (2002), tsunami[ 42 ] (2004), Uttarakhand (2013) in terms of manuals, evaluation reports have been very important contributions.[ 43 , 44 , 45 ]

The National Disaster Management Authority[ 46 ] has outlined psycho-social care as follows:

“Psycho-social support in the context of disasters refers to comprehensive interventions aimed at addressing a wide range of psycho-social problems arising in the aftermath of a disaster. Psycho-social support and mental health services should be considered as a continuum of the interventions in disaster situations. Psycho-social support will comprise of general interventions related to the larger issues of relief work needs, social relationships and harmony to promote or protect psycho-social well-being of the survivors. Mental health services will comprise of interventions aimed at prevention or treatment of psychological symptoms or disorders. These interventions help individuals, families and groups to restore social cohesion and infrastructure along with maintaining their independence and dignity.”

The Bhopal disaster is of importance from mental health point for a number of reasons. First, it is one of the largest man-made disasters in a developing country. Second, the disaster effects were a combination of both the substances inhaled and the psychological effects of living through a disaster experience. Third, no formal mental health infrastructure was available to provide postdisaster mental health care. Fourthly, a number of innovative approaches were developed to provide mental health care, especially suitable for use in developing countries. Fifthly, this disaster was the subject of intensive health research in a prospective manner for the first 5 years. This research included mental health aspects of the disaster on the population.

During the last three decades, there have been many lapses in the assessment of disability, compensation provided (coverage, amount), and the rehabilitation activities, leaving majority of the population dissatisfied. There has been no continuous research to understand the changing morbidity, adequacy of the care provided and efficacy of the different interventions.

In the area of services, inadequacy of the programs to provide longitudinal mental health care to all people with mental disorders, not linking of primary health care with mental health care, lack of rehabilitation, no public mental health education, self-care, use of psycho-social interventions. Poor coordination with voluntary organizations has resulted in significant mistrust.

Looking back, it would have met the needs of the Bhopal population, if the mental health services were community based and reaching the population, rather than the clinic-based approaches, there was a wide range of services, especially rehabilitation, continuous research into the changing mental health needs of the population and the effectiveness of interventions and most importantly, there was a continuous dialog with the population and sharing of information with the general population. These are the tasks for the immediate future to reorganize the focus of mental health initiatives in Bhopal.

The following lessons can be drawn from the last three decades of mental health initiatives in Bhopal:

• Firstly, disaster is a risk to the surviving population as populations exposed to disasters develop higher rates of mental disorders
• Secondly, the disaster situation provides an opportunity to enhance the recognition of mental health needs of the population and stimulate mental health services
• Thirdly, there is a need for the full range of mental health care, both hospital-based care and community-based mental health care, with good linkages of the two for continuous, coordinated care
• Fourthly, there is a need for integrating mental health care as part of general medical care and specialist medical care
• Fifthly, the complex needs of the survivors of disasters require linkage of mental health care with other sectors like welfare, labor, law to meet the full needs of the population
• Sixthly, there is a need for continuous dialog with the survivors, to both understand their perceptions and needs, as well as for wide use of “self-care” measures for mental health
• Seventhly, there is need for rebuilding of the community, towards strengthening of the community supports and minimize the polarization of the population by compensation, migration and thus decrease the community support to the chronically ill persons, the disabled, the elderly and other vulnerable groups
• Eighthly, there is a need for continuous research to understand the distribution of the psychiatric problems and to evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions.

Disasters are a challenge in every country, for the affected populations as well as the mental health professionals. However, they represent special challenges and opportunities in developing countries. Bhopal disaster is a milestone in understanding the mental health aspects of disasters. The research has shown the high physical and mental morbidity in the general population and the continuing need for longitudinal health studies. Using a public health approach in priority setting, identification of interventions and training of existing personnel, utilizing the community resources the needs of the population can be addressed. Such situations offer industrial psychiatry both challenges and opportunities for innovation.

Source of Support: Nil.

Conflict of Interest: None declared.

The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still Unfolding

In Bhopal, residents who survived the massive gas leak and those who arrived later continue to deal with the consequences.

I n old Bhopal , not far from the small Indian city’s glitzy new shops and gorgeous lakes, is the abandoned Union Carbide factory. Here, in one ramshackle building, are hundreds of broken brown bottles crusted with the white residue of unknown chemicals. Below the corroding skeleton of another, drops of mercury glitter in the sun. In the far corner of the site is the company’s toxic-waste dump, shrouded in a sickly green moss. Not 15 feet away, a scrawny boy of about 6 tries to join a game of cricket. A few skinny cows graze next to a large, murky puddle. Strewn on the ground are torn plastic bags, yellowed newspapers, stained paper cups. And in the air, the pungent fumes of chlorinated hydrocarbons.

On December 3, 1984, 40 tons of a toxic gas spewed from the factory and scorched the throats, eyes, and lives of thousands of people outside these walls. It was—still is—the world’s deadliest industrial disaster. For a brief time, the Bhopal gas tragedy, as it became known, raised urgent questions about how multinational companies and governments should respond when the unthinkable happens. But it didn’t take long for the world’s attention to shift, beginning with the Chernobyl nuclear accident a little more than a year later.

In the decades since, many other sites of industrial waste—in New Jersey , Missouri , Ohio —have been cleaned up. But this 70-acre site in Bhopal has, apart from the riotous jungle basil, remained mostly unchanged. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC); its former Indian subsidiary; its current owner, DowDuPont; the state government of Madhya Pradesh; and the central Indian government have all played an endless game of pass the buck. While this charade plays on, and people continue to think of Bhopal’s tragedy as one horrific night in 1984, the site still hosts hundreds of tons of contaminated waste. The Bhopal disaster is, in fact, still unfolding.

From the wooden bed outside her two-room house, Munni bi, the grande dame of Annu Nagar, has a wide lens on the devastation. Munni bi’s bed is less than 200 feet from a massive pit that UCC filled with toxic sludge, close enough to witness the damage the ganda pani —dirty water—has wrought.

Right next door is 15-year-old Fiza, who didn’t speak for the first five years of her life, and still has heart palpitations, dizzy spells, and headaches. The young woman who grew up two doors down, Tabassum, now has a toddler who doesn’t eat much or speak or cry and has seizures. Down the street is Obais, a spindly legged 13-year-old with black pustules all over his body—so painful and grotesque that he rarely leaves the house. Across the street from him is 12-year-old Tauseeb, who is intellectually disabled. And there’s Najma, the sweet, young woman who lost her mother to tongue cancer and now sits in front of her house all day, smiling and occasionally shouting out guttural gibberish to passersby. And then there is the house where one daughter has fused bones in her legs, and another has a hole in her heart.

If people were to paint a red cross on every door that harbors illness, as they did during the bubonic plague in England, few doors in Annu Nagar, a small slum in Bhopal, would remain unmarked. The houses of Munni bi’s two sons would each display a cross—in the house behind her bed is Bushra, her 14-year-old granddaughter, who is “not quite right” and whose “eyes hurt.” Across the street, her grandson, Anees, was born with skin that looked burned and limbs that lay flaccid and useless; he died five years ago at age 4, never having spoken a word. Three years ago, Munni bi was diagnosed with bladder cancer, a common complaint in these parts. When I visit her on a blisteringly hot day in March of last year, her cancer is temporarily under control, but the diabetic sores on her thighs keep her in bed, where she can do little but lie still, rail against fate, and survey the desolation.

“This is all because of the water,” Munni bi told me that day. “They have made us drink poison.”

Annu Nagar is one of 22 communities where the groundwater has been known for nearly 20 years to contain toxic levels of chlorinated solvents. Six years ago, responding to relentless efforts from activists, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the city to install pipes that bring in clean water from the Narmada River. But the pipes coming into some houses run right through sewers, and on rainy days, filth and feces mingle with the clean water. In the meantime, each monsoon may be carrying this toxic plume farther. The most recent survey suggests there are 20 more communities where the water is contaminated. In March of this year, the Supreme Court ordered that the city ensure clean water to these areas, too—and that it undertake a project to lay down sewage and drainage networks for the entire city.

These are reactive solutions to an enduring—and expanding—problem, but the bigger question is: What would it take to clean up the waste?

When I posed this question to Vishvas Sarang, the state minister charged with caring for these communities, he told me plans for the cleanup are underway. He said he had written to the Central Pollution Control Board, India’s equivalent of the EPA, and that he was confident it would be finished quickly. “It’s just a matter of two, three months. It will get done, it’s not a big job.”

That was more than a year ago.

T he factory in Bhopal launched at a time when India was facing severe food shortages. The country launched its Green Revolution in the early 1960s in an urgent bid to feed its growing population. UCC was one of the early beneficiaries of this new commitment to technology, and began marketing its pesticides with the slogan “Science helps build a new India.” In 1969, UCC built a plant in Bhopal to manufacture carbaryl (sold under the brand name Sevin) and alidcarb (Temik). At first, the company imported methyl isocyanate, the toxic gas required to make the pesticides, but by 1980, it had begun manufacturing the gas on site. MIC is colorless and heavier than air, is extremely toxic, and irritates the skin, eyes, and mucous membranes of the respiratory tract.

The company proceeded carefully, ensuring that the Bhopal plant had all the same modern technologies as its sister plant in West Virginia. The staff held rigorous training sessions for the workers, and installed a sophisticated, computerized system, just like the one in West Virginia, to alert workers to a leak. They set up loud alarm systems that could be heard for miles, distributed fact sheets about MIC to all the local hospitals, and held seminars for medical personnel on treating MIC exposure. By 1984, even as sales of Sevin tanked and the plant was operating at a loss, the company retained the full number of skilled workers and kept up its safety systems.

At least, that would have been the responsible way to run a plant producing a highly toxic substance. But UCC didn’t do any of this.

In fact, says Kumkum Modwel, a physician based in Connecticut who was a medical officer at the factory from 1975 to 1982, UCC’s operation “was a case study in how not to do things.” (When reached for comment, the company’s current owner, DowDuPont, directed me to previous statements on their website .) Modwel (née Saxena) joined the company as a starry-eyed youngster, excited to be a part of this booming American company in her sleepy hometown. Things were sunny at first, but then small accidents and safety lapses began niggling at her. She was troubled by the company’s cutbacks on safety as profit margins plunged and truckloads of unsold pesticide returned to the factory. Her turning point came in 1981, when a worker she knew well, Ashraf Mohammed Khan, died horribly after being drenched in phosgene, a precursor to MIC. Shaken, Modwel says she tried to get her superiors to improve the safety procedures, but to no avail. “I left because no one would listen to me. I left in utter disgust,” she says. “This is not the way you run a huge corporate plant handling lethal chemicals. This is how not to do things.”

Even more damning is the account of T. R. Chouhan, an MIC plant operator at the time of the disaster and a vocal critic of UCC. Chouhan and others told government investigators that months before the leak, managers shut down a refrigeration unit that was intended to keep the MIC tank cool enough to prevent accidents. One of the three safety systems in place had been out of service for weeks; the other had broken down days before the accident. Small leaks of MIC had become so commonplace that on December 2, a supervisor discovered a leak of MIC around 11:30 p.m., and put off dealing with it till after his tea break. The alarm that did sound was the same one the workers heard many times a week for other reasons, so they paid it no heed. Within an hour, the runaway reaction had generated enough pressure to break open the safety valve and release 40 tons of MIC and other chemicals into the air.

The swift wind that blew that night delivered the lethal fumes to an area of 40 square kilometers near the site. Those who didn’t choke to death woke gasping for breath, their eyes burning from the toxic gas and their mouths frothing. If only they had known, all they had needed to do was climb to a higher spot. Or covered their faces with a wet cloth. As it was, because MIC is twice as heavy as air, children were affected most. With no training and no knowledge of what they were treating, the doctors could do little to help. Overnight, the city turned into a mausoleum.

No one knows exactly how many people died that night. The official government estimates began around 3,000 and have since been revised to 5,295. (Officials from India’s Central Pollution Control Board did not respond to numerous requests for interviews.) But other sources, including Amnesty International, say at least 7,000 people died just within the first three days, and about 25,000 people overall have succumbed to MIC exposure. Another 500,000 have lingering health problems.

The government’s estimates for deaths makes no sense, notes Rachna Dhingra, who has been an activist in Bhopal since 2003. “Look at it this way,” she says: The government has approved pensions for 5,000 widows. “If you are giving pensions to 5,000 widows, then how can the figure of deaths be only 5,295 overall? It’s not just that only men died, yeah? Women too must have died, young children would have died.”

Against this chaotic backdrop, UCC settled in 1989 for $470 million in damages, with each gas-exposed person getting 25,000 Indian rupees (roughly $2,200 at the time). Under the terms of the settlement, UCC continued to deny liability for the incident. Dhingra and others have been trying ever since to get more compensation for those affected, to get the site cleaned up, and to prevent the devastation from spreading.

So far, they’ve had little luck. Dow Chemical Company acquired UCC in 2001. But Dow, which in September 2017 merged with DuPont to form a $130 billion behemoth, says its purchase of UCC excludes liabilities from Bhopal. In a series of statements addressing the disaster, Dow says responsibility for the cleanup really lies with UCC’s Indian partner at the time of the leak, Union Carbide India. That company, now called Eveready Industries India, places the blame squarely at UCC’s feet, saying, “The obligation and liability of the cleanup, if any, should be that of the erstwhile owners of UCIL, viz, UCC U.S. ” UCC, for its part, says UCIL really owned and managed the factory (even though UCC owned 50.9 percent of UCIL), and that the state of Madhya Pradesh, which owns the land, is responsible for cleaning up the site. The state of Madhya Pradesh says it is unequipped for cleanup and defers to the federal government. The federal government has named Dow in a “curative petition” intended to make up for the inadequate 1989 settlement, and is asking for $1.2 billion (compared with the $8 billion the activists are demanding). And around it goes.

Every few years, a new character enters this theater of the absurd. Two years ago, that was Sarang, the now-46-year-old minister of gas-tragedy relief and rehabilitation—that’s really his title, though most people drop the tragedy when talking about him—and a native Bhopali. His job is to make sure that people exposed to the gas, and those still affected by the disaster, are taken care of. (Most people who live in Annu Nagar and thereabouts are Muslim, and Sarang’s group, an ardent champion of Hindus, is often vehemently anti-Muslim.) Sarang is not the first gas-relief minister, but unlike his predecessors, he tweets, holds frequent press conferences, and loves to engage with the public. “Sarang is a different creature altogether,” says Dhingra. “He is very concerned about his image—very, very … and he has big political aspirations.”

When I asked for a meeting with Sarang, he summoned me to his house. Raj Sarma, the photographer I was traveling with, and I arrived at Sarang’s house on a balmy evening to find a horde of people waiting to speak to him. An aide showed us into a spacious room with bright-pink seats. When Sarang joined us about 20 minutes later, he was polite and charming: He insisted I have some food and tea, worried the snacks were too spicy for me, and complimented me on my Hindi—my protestations that I was not hungry, am no stranger to spicy food, and am fluent in Hindi because I grew up in India seemed to make no difference.

Every Bhopali older than 33 has a story about the leak, so I wasn’t surprised when Sarang told me his: He and his parents escaped to safer grounds in one car, but a mob hijacked the car his sisters were in, leaving them exposed to the gas; they survived. (In India, in those days especially, only wealthy families could afford two cars.) Because he is also a gas victim, Sarang said, he understands the plight of the people in the affected communities, and is committed to bettering their lives. He has made many promises along these lines: to introduce “smart cards” for everyone so that the local hospitals can track and coordinate their care; to renew the widows’ pensions, which stopped arriving around the time he began, then restarted for a limited number of widows this January; to build roads and parks in the neighborhoods and improve their quality of life; to offer better jobs and economic opportunities.

I told Sarang about Munni bi’s problems with getting medicines she needed from the hospital intended to serve that community. He immediately called an aide, threatened to fire whoever was in charge at the hospital, and told me Munni bi would get her meds. (When I went back to Annu Nagar the next day, her neighbor Sakina had been able to pick up the medicines.)

Not all of Sarang’s promises come true, however. In a follow-up phone interview in December, Sarang told me that the pensions were starting up again, that parks were under construction, and that gas-exposed people who needed bone-marrow transplants would soon be able to get them for free at private hospitals in Bhopal. When I asked Dhingra about this, she laughed outright. “What lies he’s spreading,” she said. The hospitals are nowhere near sophisticated enough to offer bone-marrow transplants, she said, and apart from the inaugural “prayers” offered at the sites of construction, nothing new had sprung up. When Sarang first became minister, she said, she and other activists were optimistic that this savvy, energetic young man could shake up the status quo. “We were fooled for many months, too” she says. “It’s all a big facade he puts up.” When I asked Sarang about skepticism about these projects from locals, he insisted that the initiatives were all moving forward.

At his house that evening in March 2017, every time I probed why the site hasn’t been cleaned up yet or what his plans are for remediation, Sarang asked me to turn off my recorder. On the record, he told me his main goal is to establish a Hiroshima-like memorial on the factory site—because, he said, that would first require a cleanup. He lamented how difficult it can be to get things done in India. But he also told me I have a responsibility to make India look good in the world press. He said the cleanup could be dealt with quickly, but also that it’s extremely complicated. Like a skilled politician, he supplied different answers at different junctures, and seemed to believe himself each time. But he became visibly agitated when I questioned his sincerity. “Do you know who I am? You don’t know who I am,” he said. “I am a man of the land.”

T he gas leak and its aftermath have split Bhopal’s residents: those who could afford to get away, either that night or later; and those who stay bound to the soil by their financial circumstances. At the boutique inn we stayed in, about a 20-minute drive from the factory, the air was fresh and there was mineral water aplenty. The proprietor’s daughter-in-law, a fashionable young woman in her 20s, laughingly told us she had never been to the site and wasn’t sure where it was.

Munni bi is the richest of her neighbors, but that’s not saying much. The houses her sons built are small and dark, with an inescapable stench of sewage and sickness. Like many of Annu Nagar’s residents, Munni bi was never exposed to the gas. Her family moved in years after UCC decamped, lured by the cheap land. At first they lived in makeshift homes of corrugated metal and tarps. But several years ago, they saved enough money to build pukka homes of cement and concrete.

She and her neighbors quickly realized that the soil around the solar evaporation pond is dangerous: People who tried to make stoves from the mud broke out in horrific rashes and spiked fevers. “If you dig there in the evening, you’ll be sick at night, you’ll get fevers; there’s that much poison in the mud,” says Sakina, 38, who lives three doors down from Munni bi. “Some kids died in that pond, too, so our kids don’t go there.”

Sakina, her husband, and her three children live in a small shack with walls painted purple and white, and a bright-purple door that’s always open. The family moved to the neighborhood about a decade ago, when their daughters Sana and Shamaiya were 5 and 3. A year later, Sakina gave birth to a son. From the start, the boy seemed ill and threw up constantly; he died before he was a year old. The following year, she had another boy, Aris. This child, too, developed “brain fever” two days after birth and, although he recovered, is still often sick. Soon after the family moved to Annu Nagar, little Sana had slowly begun losing her voice. She spoke softer and softer, until one day, when she was 8, her parents found her with big blisters all over; she had been scalded, but hadn’t been able to cry out.

With help from Munni bi and other neighbors, Sakina gathered money to take her daughter by train to New Delhi. Doctors there diagnosed Sana with respiratory papillomatosis—a rare condition in which a virus infects the voice box—and inserted a tube through a hole in her neck to help her breathe.

Like Munni bi, Sakina is convinced that the water she and her children drank for many years is to blame for all these ills. “When we brought normal kids here who had no problems before, and then we drank the water and this happened, of course we think it’s because of the water,” she says.

Munni bi’s relative affluence and age may have given her pole position in the neighborhood, but Sakina’s physical stamina and fearlessness make her formidable. In 2008, Sakina was one of the women who, along with Dhingra, marched 700 kilometers (about 435 miles) to New Delhi. The women fasted outside the prime minister’s house until he listened to their demands. It took the government many more years to take action. In 2014, in response to an order from the Supreme Court, the city finally installed pipes that bring clean water to these communities.

“The water before was really dirty,” says Nasreen, 38, who lives down an alley across from Munni bi’s house. After Nasreen moved to Annu Nagar about 15 years ago, she had one child who was stillborn; the other, 12-year-old Tauseeb, has a low IQ and attends a special school. Nasreen recalls that the water was often yellow, sometimes red, and smelled foul. It looks and smells better now, but comes for only an hour a day. “Sometimes it’s 2 p.m., sometimes 12, sometimes in the evening … the tap has no time,” she says. “We have to sit and wait.”

On days when the pipes don’t sing at all, people still boil the contaminated water from the hand pumps to bathe and wash clothes—as they were doing on one of the days I visited Annu Nagar. “The clean water hasn’t come for three days,” Mohammed Akhtar, 56, told me. “We drink this because we have no choice.”

When I asked Sarang about this, he flatly denied any problems with the water supply. “Pipes break sometimes,” he said. “That happens even in my house. This is not America.” He also told me he does not believe any of the reports of water contamination, and has asked the Central Pollution Control Board to conduct a fresh analysis. As of late May, they had yet to respond.

There’s also little official attention to the health effects of the gas or water. The only large epidemiological project on people exposed to the gas was abandoned for 15 years. The project changed hands several times and so the scientists lost track of 88 percent of the initial cohort. Activists were able to prove that some of the people who were sent out to conduct government health surveys never did so, and instead filled out the forms with bogus answers.

There is one rigorous study underway that might provide some answers. Over the past five years, the Canadian researcher Shree Mulay and volunteers working with Sambhavana, a nonprofit clinic set up by activists, have been collecting data on mortality, birth defects, fertility, cancer, and many other aspects of people’s health. The study includes data from people exposed to the gas who then moved away and did not drink the water; those who, like Munni bi and Sakina, moved into the neighborhoods after the leak and so were only ever exposed to the water; those who were exposed to both; and those who were exposed to neither. The researchers also tried to include controls matched by socioeconomic class, income, level of education, and family size. With about 5,000 families in each group, the study includes 100,000 people in all. Mulay’s team is still analyzing the data, but preliminary results indicate that people exposed to the gas or the water or both have a higher incidence of cancer, tuberculosis, and paralysis than those exposed to neither. They also suggest that gas-exposed people have 10 times the rate of cancer, particularly liver, lung, abdominal, throat, and oral cancers, compared to the other groups.

Mulay declined to discuss these results because they are being submitted for publication—and because she first wants to make sure the analysis accounts for all the confounds that may skew the data. “One has to be able to say, ‘What is due to the general poverty of the entire population and what is specifically due to the gas or the water that they have been exposed to?’” Mulay says. “That’s why it is such a complicated study.”

For example, Mulay notes that in the heart of Bhopal is a metalworks factory that likely spews toxic gases. It might be difficult—if not impossible—to tease out how much exposures like that contribute to the illnesses in Annu Nagar.

Still, it’s hard to ignore the most obvious possibility—the cesspool of toxic sludge right next to the neighborhood.

I n the early years of the factory, UCC dumped its waste into 21 unlined pits within the site. This was not, at the time, an unusual practice, although companies in the United States had begun to move away from it. In 1977, UCC built three solar evaporation ponds about 400 meters north of the factory, and piped untreated waste directly into the ponds. Thin liners were put in to keep the chemicals from seeping into the ground, and the strong Bhopal sun was supposed to take care of the rest. But the liners quickly fell apart. Memos in 1982 from the Bhopal plant to the company’s headquarters warned that the ponds were leaking, and might contaminate the groundwater. And local farmers lodged complaints that the company’s runoff was killing their cattle and their crops. The 1984 disaster derailed the conversations. After the tragedy, UCC closed down the factory. The tanks and vats on the site were finally emptied in 1989, and about 360 tons of the most hazardous waste was locked up in 2005. But the rest—corroding pipes, bottles of unnamed chemicals, and the massive waste pit—have remained untouched.

Today the factory is guarded by a staff of 14, although they only see a few visitors a month—except in December, around the anniversary of the disaster. When Sarma and I visited the site in March 2017, two guards accompanied us on the tour. For 200 rupees (about $3), they looked the other way as we took photos. Chouhan, who gave us a tour of the site, pointed out the drops of mercury sparkling in the soil. He gestured at the brush all around and said: “If you cut down this grass, you’ll find a pond of mercury.”

As we approached the farthest corner of the site from its entrance, we discovered several visitors—men and cattle—who were smarter than us and had simply walked in through gaping holes in the wall. One of the young men playing cricket was 22-year-old Zubaid, who said he has been sneaking into the site since he was a child. “There isn’t really anywhere else for us to go,” he said. His parents had both been exposed to the gas. His father died years ago of respiratory problems; his mother still struggles to catch her breath. I asked him whether he knew that the soil and water might be dangerous. He shrugged and said, “We’re all fine.”

Everyone knows that the gas left a lasting mark on people’s health. But it took years for people to acknowledge that the water may be contaminated. In the mid-1990s, the solar ponds were once again covered with a plastic liner and topped with soil in an attempt to convert them into primitive landfills. But the liner is visibly torn in multiple spots, and they turn into cesspits with every monsoon.

Since 1990, multiple organizations have documented unsafe levels of pesticides and chlorinated solvents in the soil and water. Unfortunately, none of the reports validates the others; each sampled different locations at different times.

The lack of consensus even within the government agencies stalled all talk of the key problem: who should clean up the site, how, and when. The government’s response to the disaster has been slow, inept, and crippled by corruption—predictably so for this country. But administration after administration has also been bafflingly resistant to offers of help from international groups.

Experts in waste management are flabbergasted to learn that the site of the world’s largest industrial disaster has yet to be decontaminated. “Hoo boy, it sounds like somebody with some money and some understanding has to come in there and clean the place up,” says Robert Chinery, who served as acting director of the Center for Environmental Health at the New York State Department of Health.

At least some of the problems have clear solutions, based on experiences at other sites. In 2004, Greenpeace commissioned waste-management experts based in Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, who came back with a plan for cleaning up the soil.

One possible solution is simply to move the waste to a secure landfill, but no such location exists in India. Another is to incinerate the waste in a plant set up to handle this sort of material—a plan under discussion for the Bhopal waste for more than a decade. Done right, the waste would need to be burned at an extremely high temperature, say 800 degrees Celsius, then the gases given enough time to decompose, mostly into carbon dioxide. An air-pollution control system would trap particulates that are given off during the process. And the air would be closely monitored afterward for hazardous emissions.

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This was a common way to deal with industrial waste until the 1990s, but the fear of hazardous emissions has almost put a stop to it in the United States, says Jurgen Exner, a waste-management expert and one of the authors of the Greenpeace report. There are only a few such plants remaining in the United States and elsewhere. Over the years, many plans have been proposed and halted: shipping the waste to Germany or to a site in the neighboring state of Gujarat, neither of which happened because of protests in those areas.

In 2015, the government conducted a test run of incineration with 10 tons of the locked-up waste at a plant in Pithampur, about a three-hour drive from Bhopal. There are serious concerns about the plant’s ability to handle this waste, and the report from that test is not public (similar tests in the United States usually are)—but Sarang says it was a success. In fact, he told me in March 2017, the rest of the waste would also be incinerated in a matter of two to three months. “That’s not an issue,” he said. “It’s not a big job.” As of December, there had been no progress on this front.

Sarang was speaking about the 360 tons of locked-up waste. There’s still the matter of all of the soil, not to mention the groundwater.

To assess the scale of the groundwater contamination, what’s required is a geological study. The way to do that is to sink several wells around the site and sample the wells both vertically and laterally to analyze the water and the toxic plume. “If you just go out and take random samples from existing wells, maybe even drinking-water wells, then that doesn’t necessarily tell you what’s going in the groundwater,” Chinery says. “It’s usually the job of the government to make sure that’s done correctly.”

Chinery and Exner both say it would not be at all surprising if, as the activists say, the chemicals have traveled as far as three kilometers from the site. If there are fissures in the ground under the surface, chlorinated solvents would collect in those fissures and slowly dissolve into the groundwater. Exner says he once saw chlorinated solvents three miles from where they had been dumped at a site in Missouri. “That’s why chlorinated solvents in groundwater are such a big problem,” he says. “It takes years and years for it all to dissolve out of there.” For example, he says, a small amount of carbon tetrachloride can contaminate millions of gallons of water.

Cleaning up the water is a daunting task. These chemicals would be difficult to treat in the ground, so the solution—once the source and the direction of the plume are known—would be to pump it all out and treat it, says Chinery. That process could take many years and run up to millions of dollars. But “if the source is still there, and the plume is still there, it’s just going to keep moving.”

All told, the Greenpeace report estimated that it would cost $30 million over four years. DowDuPont’s revenue for 2017 was $62 billion.

The people of Annu Nagar, meanwhile, stay rooted to their homes, unable to muster the money or resources to move their families out of the danger zone. With help from Dhingra and other activists, Sakina and the other women and children are learning how to fight for their rights—either by calling bureaucrats repeatedly, protesting on the streets, or talking to the press.

For Munni bi, however, it is all already too late.

“What will you do for me? You won't come back; 50 people have come and gone,” she told me last year. “From drinking the water, the public is dying, that’s what’s happening. Our suffering is slowly killing us. And I don’t want to die.”

Munni bi died five months later.

This article was supported by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.

  This newscast is updated weekdays at 6am, 9am, noon, 3pm, and 6pm.  

How the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy in India has hurt multiple generations

AILSA CHANG, HOST:

Nearly 39 years ago, the central Indian city of Bhopal was hit with what's still considered the world's worst industrial accident. Toxic gas leaked out of a pesticide factory run by the Indian subsidiary of an American company called Union Carbide. Thousands died immediately after that accident, and tens of thousands more have died since. Now a new study finds that the impacts of that horrific accident span generations. Researchers show that the disaster has burdened people who were born in the year after the accident with cancer, disabilities and poverty. NPR's Rhitu Chatterjee joins us now to explain these new findings. Hi, Rhitu.

RHITU CHATTERJEE, BYLINE: Hi, Ailsa.

CHANG: So can you just first tell us a little more about what happened back in 1984? And before you do, I just want to warn listeners that the details here are intense and devastating.

CHATTERJEE: Yeah. So this was on the night of December 3, 1984. The gas leak started shortly after midnight, when everyone was fast asleep. The gas was methyl isocyanate, an extremely toxic chemical used as an intermediary to make pesticides. And an estimated 40 tons of it leaked out and spread through Bhopal, exposing half a million residents. And, you know, people started waking up with their eyes and throats burning. And, you know, there was panic on the streets. And I spoke with this woman named Rehana Bi on the phone, who was only 16 at the time and lived very close to the factory - still does. And she told me that she remembers waking up that night to the sounds of neighbors banging on their door, calling her father's name.

REHANA BI: (Speaking Hindi).

CHATTERJEE: She says when they opened the door, they saw lots of people outside, all coughing and blinded by the gas. She says the air felt as if someone was burning tons of chilis. And so Rehana Bi and her family joined their neighbors on the street, trying to run away from the gas, but they couldn't escape it. Also, her mother was eight months pregnant, so they couldn't really run very fast. And a few hours after daybreak, she says, her 3-year-old brother died.

BI: (Speaking Hindi).

CHATTERJEE: And by that evening, her father had died, as had her pregnant mother. And this next thing, Ailsa, is really hard to hear. It kept me up at night after I talked to Rehana Bi. She told me that several of her family members saw the baby in her dead mother's womb moving until the following day, and then it died, too.

CHANG: Oh, my God, how devastating. Her family, though - they were just, you know, among thousands of people who lost loved ones - right? - immediately after.

CHATTERJEE: Exactly. And, you know, even the people who survived, people like Rehana Bi, have continued to struggle with a host of chronic health issues and are still struggling today.

CHANG: Right. Let's talk about that. I want to get into this new study. It shows that this tragedy, this disaster, had long-term effects on the following generations as well. Tell us more about what this study found.

CHATTERJEE: So the study used data from India's National Family Health Survey to try and get a sense of whether the generation that was in utero at the time of the accident - whether that generation was affected by the accident as well. And the study finds that indeed it was. In fact, that generation is doing worse than those who lived through the disaster, even. Here's study author Gordon McCord of the University of California San Diego.

GORDON MCCORD: All the way out to 100 kilometers from Bhopal, that 1985 birth cohort was very strange.

CHATTERJEE: Firstly, he says that there were fewer male babies born that year compared to previous years and later years. And he told me that that's not totally surprising because we know that male fetuses are more vulnerable to any kind of harmful exposure in utero.

CHANG: Oh, really? I had no idea. Well, what about the babies who were born that very year and who are now adults? How are they faring?

CHATTERJEE: So McCord says that the generation of men born in 1985 in Bhopal is worse off in terms of health, education and employment compared to those who were born before and after.

MCCORD: They have a higher likelihood of reporting to have cancer. They have a higher likelihood of reporting to have a disability that prevents them from being employed, and they on average have two years less of education.

CHATTERJEE: And that, you know, means that this generation was more likely to remain trapped in poverty because of the disaster, and the findings after this ongoing global discussion about what do we as a society owe future generations for damages caused by disasters.

CHANG: Yeah. Well, what do you think, Rhitu? Do you think these findings are likely to help the survivors of this accident or their children in any way?

CHATTERJEE: So it's too early to say anything about that. Now, those who lived through the disaster themselves have received very little compensation so far, and not a single person born after the disaster has received anything. But one advocate for Bhopal survivors that I spoke to recently told me that India hasn't yet shut the door on compensating the next generation. So she is hopeful that this study will, in time, help make a difference on that front.

CHANG: That is NPR's Rhitu Chatterjee. Thank you, Rhitu.

CHATTERJEE: Thank you, Ailsa.

(SOUNDBITE OF IMAN OMARI SONG, "MOVE TOO FAST (FEAT. ANNA WISE)") Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.

NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.

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Timeline Of Events In The Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case

In december 1984, the first leakage of toxic methyl isocyanate (mic) gas from the union carbide plant in bhopal was reported..

On December 6, the case transferred to CBI. (Getty Images)

Following is the timeline of events in the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy case. Over 3,000 people were killed in the incident that also caused huge environmental damage.

Dec 2-3, 1984: Leakage of toxic Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) gas from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal reported.

Dec 3, 1984 : Police register FIR. Arrests Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) employees, including Jai Mukund (Works Manager), Satya Prakash Chaudhary (Assistant Works Manager), K V Shetty (Plant Superintendent), R B Roy Chaudhary (Assistant Works Manager), Shakeel Ibrahim Qureshi (Production Assistant).

Dec 6, 1984: Case transferred to CBI.

Dec 7, 1984: Police arrest Chairman of Union Carbide Corporation Warren M Anderson, Chairman of UCIL Keshub Mahindra and Managing Director of UCIL Vijay Prabhakar Gokhle.

Dec 7, 1984: Warren Anderson released on bail of USD 2,000, upon a promise to return.

Dec 9, 1984: CBI takes over the case and starts investigation.

Feb 1985: Indian government files claim for USD 3.3 billion from Union Carbide in a US court.

Mar 29, 1985: The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 passed authorising the Centre to represent the victims exclusively.

Aug 8, 1985: Centre institutes action against the UCC in United States District Court for award of compensation for the damage caused by the disaster.

May 12, 1986: US District Court Judge Keenan transfers all Bhopal litigations to India.

Nov 30, 1987: CBI files charge sheet in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Bhopal, charging the accused under section 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder)/326 (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means), 324 (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means) and 429 (mischief by injury to works of irrigation or by wrongfully diverting water) read with section 35 of IPC.

Dec 1987: CBI files charge sheet against Anderson and other accused, including UCC (USA), Union Carbide (Eastern) Hong Kong, and UCIL. Summons served on Anderson and UCC on charges of culpable homicide.

Dec 1, 1987: CJM, Bhopal issues summons against Anderson.

Dec 17, 1987: District court makes an interim order directing payment of Rs 350 crore as interim compensation.

Apr 4, 1988: UCC challenges this award before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which reduces the quantum of interim compensation to Rs 250 crore.

July 7, 1988: CJM, Bhopal issues fresh summons against Anderson.

Sept 20, 1988:  Letter received from Embassy of India in Washington that summons had been served on Anderson.

Nov 15, 1988: CJM, Bhopal issues bailable warrants against Anderson.

1988: Special Leave Petitions were filed by the Centre as well as the UCC.

Feb 14, 1989: SC directs overall settlement of the claims for USD 470 million. Directs consequential termination of all civil and criminal proceedings.

1992: Part of USD 470 million is disbursed by the government among Bhopal gas victims.

February 1992: Anderson declared fugitive by court.

Apr 10, 1992: Bhopal court issues Non-Bailable Warrant against Anderson for arranging extradition proceedings against him.

Apr 13, 1992: Centre lays down guidelines for determination of compensation with Rs 1-3 lakh for death.

May 25, 1992: CJM Bhopal separates the trial of Anderson, Union Carbide Corporation (USA) and Union Carbide Eastern Inc. (Hong Kong) from that of the other accused persons.

June 22, 1992: Bhopal CJM commits the case to the Sessions court against the rest of the nine accused persons.

Nov 1994: Despite numerous petitions by survivors' groups, the Supreme Court allows Union Carbide to sell its stake in UCIL to McLeod Russell (India) Ltd of Calcutta.

Sept 13, 1996: SC on plea of accused dilutes the charges framed against them by the trial court and upheld by Madhya Pradesh High Court. The top court said the accused will be tried under section 304 (A) (causing death by negligence), 336 (act endangering life or personal safety of others), 337 (causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others) and other sections of IPC.

Mar 10, 1997: SC dismissed the petition filed by an NGO, Bhopal Gas Peedith Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti, seeking a review of its 1996 judgment diluting the charges.

Nov 1999: Victims' organisations file a suit against Union Carbide and Anderson in federal court of New York for violating international human rights law, environmental law.

Feb 2001: Union Carbide refuses to take responsibility for UCIL's liabilities in india.

-Aug 2002: Charges of culpable homicide are maintained against Anderson by Bhopal court, which demands his extradition to stand trial.

Oct 11, 2002: CJM, Bhopal issued a fresh arrest warrant under section 304, 324 and 429 read with section 35 of IPC. The arrest warrant was not executed by the US authorities and returned.

May 2003: Indian government formally conveys to the US its request for extradition of Anderson.

Mar 2004: A US court says it could order Dow Chemicals to clean soil and ground water in the abandoned factory site if the Indian government provides a no objection certificate. The Indian government forwards the certificate to the United States.

June 2004: The US rejects request for Anderson's extradition.

July 19, 2004: SC orders the Central Bank to pay out more than 15 billion rupees, part of the original USD 470 million received as compensation kept in the account since 1992.

Oct 25, 2004: Bhopal gas victims protest the failure of the government to pay victim's compensation.

Oct 26, 2004: SC sets deadline of November 15 to pay out the rest of USD 470 million paid by Union Carbide as compensation.

July 22, 2009: Bhopal CJM issued fresh NBW against Anderson.

June 7, 2010: After more than 25 years, Bhopal CJM holds guilty all the eight accused persons and sentences them to two years of jail term along with fine (under section 304A IPC). However, all the eight convicts were granted bail.

Aug 31, 2010: CBI files a curative petition before the Supreme Court to re-examine its September 1996 judgement, which had ruled in favour of the trial of various Bhopal gas tragedy accused on charges of causing death due to negligence rather than the harsher penal provision of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Dec 3, 2010: Centre files curative petition for enhancement of compensation for victims from Rs 750 Crore to Rs 7,844 crore.

Feb 28, 2011: A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court decides to hear on day-to-day basis from April 13 the Centre's plea for restoration of the stringent charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder against the accused and enhancement of compensation for the victims.

Mar 22, 2011: CBI moves Delhi court to obtain a Letter Rogatory to extradite Anderson from the US to face trial in India.

Mar 23, 2011: Delhi court allows CBI plea seeking to extradite Anderson from the US.

Apr 7, 2011: Madhya Pradesh government moves SC seeking permission to intervene in the petition filed by CBI.

Apr 13, 2011: SC questions delay in filing the curative petition.

May 11, 2011: SC dismisses CBI's curative petition but leaves it to Sessions court to consider strict charges against accused.

Jan 12, 2023: SC reserves verdict on Centre's curative petition seeking enhancement of compensation to victims.

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Mar 14, 2023: SC dismisses Centre's curative petition seeking enhancement of compensation to victims. 

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy – Case Study And Legal Consequences

Introduction:.

The industrial manufacturing sector is pivotal for the buoyancy of the Indian economy. Since this production sector extended its hands to facilitate economic sustainability, it has branched with diversified industries indulged and engaged in manufacturing automobiles, pieces of machinery, equipment, mental and electric appliance, mineral-extractions, so on. To utilize our demographic dividend, Indian is supposed to alleviate unemployment. The attainment of such an object necessitates the growth of the industrial sector, which is capable to create large-scale employment opportunities for youths. Consequently, millions of families will move out of poverty and fulfill their economic needs.

On the other hand, every single thing has its highlights and challenges. With having an eye on accomplishing economic and technological culmination, the human community is resting in a vain attempt to bring back or keep up the ecological footprint. The status quo industrial societies are pervaded with noxious or hazardous substances; indeed without the same nothing could be processed and produced. Negligence in treatment, usage, or disposal of such kinds of stuff has its ramifications in all walks of human life; even history tells us the same. India has witnessed countless industrial accidents; one of the notable incidents which have still deeply-rooted in the minds of Indians is the Bhopal gas leak tragedy.

Brief About the Incident:

To produce the pesticide named  Sevin  comprises the reagents, Methyl Isocyanate and Alpha Naphthol;   the American enterprises entitled the Union Cambridge Corporation has established its subsidiary in Bhopal as qua the central place with excellent transport links. Later, the established Indian subsidiary was named The Union Cambridge India Limited (UCIL) since the Indian public had owned the ownership, nearly 40.1% share in the corporation.

The incident happened on the night of December 2 to 3, 1984, when the forty tons of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) was massively escaped from the Tank E106 at the UCC’s Indian subsidiary laid on at Bhopal. Since the plant has established in a crowded and inhabited area, within less than an hour, a great number of people and animals were befallen as victims and consequently died due to the toxicity of the leaked MIC. The estimated number of immediate death was 3500+, and the critical injury was 6+ lakh. Approximately, over the past decades since the incident, the death count has reached 20000. As per the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) estimation, 62.58% of the Bhopal population had suffered from inhalational toxicity, withal having survivors might have experienced and developed bodily morbidities.

Concerning the treatment and Medicare, due to lack of information about the gas ebullition, the doctors did not play an efficient role. One of the causes for such a ramification is that the UCC’s refusal to disclose the precise proportion of the escaped gas by relying on the trade secrecy as a reasonable exemption.

Following the mishap, the victims have gone on an endless travel quest for justice, who have either lost their lives or sustained permanent disability. The two-fold question presented before the law for consideration is that, on what basis, the parameters for quantifying the liabilities of the corporation engaged in processing such a dangerous substance with nullified safety standards will be fixed? And the further aspect was how the government is going to tackle and prevent future damages by the installation of necessary safety protocols.

Legal Consequences of Bhopal Gas Tragedy:

The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985:

Soon after the man-disaster, noticing the multitude of the suits arising out of the incident, the Indian parliament has passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act on 29th March 1985. This Act confers the government to file suit for damages in place as a representative of the victims (either survived or deceased). For the purpose of effective enforcement of the Act, Section 9 authorizes the central government to frame a scheme; amounts to the introduction of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme in 1985. The aforementioned government’s power to represent the affected party, both within and outside of India [1] , was predicated by the doctrine of  parens patriae.  However, the government has heavily criticized as, by enacting the Bhopal Act, it is attempting to smother the claimant from taking actions against the UCIL, since the government qua stakeholder at UCIL, is eligible to hold partially liable. Per contra, the government has managed to substantiate such enactment as, its  quo animo  is to secure the claims arising out of, or connected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster, are dealt with speedily, effectively, equitably, and to the best advantage of the claimants and for matters incidental thereto . [2]

Does the Bhopal Act ultra vires the constitution:

Indeed, few allegations were brought before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Bhopal Act in relation to Article 14 , 19 and 21. It was confronted that Sections 3, 4 and 11 of the Bhopal Act violated the right of Indian citizens under the Constitution of India to choose their own counsel, and alleging a conflict of interest by the Indian government, for it could not represent the victims because of its shared responsibility for the disaster by failing to enforce safety regulations. [3]  However, the Apex court rejected the appeal and upheld its constitutionality [4] .

Initial litigation:

Following the Act’s promulgation, in April 1985, the Indian government filed a suit against the UCC (the parent company of UCIL) in the Federal District Court of the southern district of New York, claiming 3.3 billion US dollars i.e. Rs. 3900 Crores. The skepticisms are that, why the Indian government does propose the American judiciary on behalf of the claimants, despite preferring the Indian judiciary system? Whether India has mistrusted its own judicature, or perhaps, it is strategically a ligation, which desires a significant sum of damages that the American judiciary could award? Nevertheless, the UCC fruitfully availed of the aforementioned issues under discussion and requested for the case dismissal on the grounds of  forum non-conveniens. Withal, they pleaded that, since the accident was taken place in India (Bhopal), it might be more convenient to be tried in India. 

Thus the litigation seeking both damages and punitive damages, invoking UCC’s liabilities such as absolute liability, strict liability, multinational enterprises liability theories, misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of warranty, was dismissed by the federal District Court after accepting the plea of UCC on May 12, 1986.

Rejection of settlement offers:

Since the parent company is responsible for the tortuous acts of the subsidiary company abroad, several efforts were taken by the UCC for outside court settlement but it went vain attempt after rejection by the Indian government. The negotiated settlement initiated by Union Carbide stood ready to provide 350 million dollars, which was accepted by the private lawyers representing the injured (both victims and the deceased) but dismissed by the Indian government.

Justice combats in Indian courts:

After getting rejected by the American Court, the suit pursued battle in India. In 1986 the Indian union brought this issue before the Bhopal District Court to recover 3.5 billion rupees damages. Subsequently, the same was reduced by 30% to 2.5 billion rupees by the high court of Madhya Pradesh. Later on, the Indian government appealed against the reduced interim award, rendered by the Madhya Pradesh high court before the apex court.

The five-judge bench heard the case, concerning the condition and status of victims, who were filled with hopelessness and experiencing the agony of despair. After four years of the chronicle’s worst industrial catastrophe, to end the wild goose chase and provide the immediate remedy, the Apex court rendered its judgment on 14th February 1989.

The matter of fact is that the people have lacked credibility since their collective thought was that the wrongdoer might get them self out of liabilities by invoking the exceptions of the doctrine of strict liability. Per contra, relying on the absolute liability Doctrine, the Apex Court [5]  upheld the liabilities of UCC and ordered them to pay the sum of 470 million USD (approximately Rs. 700 crores) as compensation.

Although the Indian government has brought the golden justice by fixing the liability of the company to pay $470 million, it is deemed to be a bad move qua the fixed damages is hardly 15% of the original claim for $3.3 million. Lucidly, it is not a sufficient sum to compensate for all the damage caused in relation to the tragedy.

Concerning the distribution of the awarded compensation, Rs. 1 lakh was provided to the deceased person’s family, Rs. 50000 for persons suffering lasting damage and Rs. 25,000 for the temporarily injured.

Criticisms on the settlement:

As mentioned, firstly, it was assailed for the total sum of the compensation amount, as being the full and final settlement of all claims, rights, and liabilities arising out of that disaster, [6] the fixed amount leads to inadequacy of sum to compensate. Secondly, in terms of the final payment, vide its judgment ‘ this settlement shall finally dispose of all past, present and future claims, causes of action and civil and criminal proceedings (of any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by all Indian citizens’. Comprehensibly, it quashed the criminal proceedings and concluded all the civil proceedings, further limited the liabilities for the claims which were filed later.

Considering the aforesaid criticisms,  in 1989, the Apex Court clubbed several petitions and revived the criminal proceedings, and held that if there is any shortage in the amount of compensation the state is bound to bridge the gap [7] .

In 1990, the Indian government sanctioned Rs. 258 crores funds to aid the victims for economic, social, environmental, and medical rehabilitation. Later in 2010, former UCIL chairman and other 6 Ex-employees were convicted for the term of 2 years with a 2000 USD fine for the offense of causing death by negligence.

Employed principle:

Absolute liability:.

The trite English principle of strict liability was laid by the case of Ryland v. Fletcher [8]  in 1868. The said principle states that the person will be held responsible for the leakage of any hazardous substance from his premises. Withal, it is noteworthy that, even though there is no negligence on his part, he will be held accountable for the act of keeping the dangerous things in his premises.  Vide  this case’s judgment; it elucidates the ingredients that are essential to invoke strict liability viz. there should be the possession of dangerous substances, it must be escaped from defendant’s premises, and it has been kept for non-natural use of the land. In addition, there are certain exceptions to this rule, which are as follows,

• The fault of the plaintiff
• Act of the third party
• Consent of the party

Till the date of the  MC Mehta v Union of India case, [9] the rule of strict liability has governed the Indian judicature in relation to the matter of fact in issue. But then, the rule of absolute liability was introduced in the said oleum gas leak case, wherein the oleum gas was escaped from the fertilizer plant of Shriram foods and fertilizers enterprises. Since the enterprises had engaged in an ultra-hazardous activity, it is their absolute and non-delegable duty to safeguard others from getting injured out of their industrial process. In the case of any failure in discharging the obliged duties, the enterprises will be held liable to pay damages under tort law regardless of the cited strict liability exceptions. Indeed, the same was held in this oleum gas leak gas. Thus, in simple words, the concept of absolute liability is the strict liability without any exceptions, which means under no grounds a person could escape the liabilities.

Conclusion and Analysis:

After analyzing the given circumstance, it is pretty evident that the legislative lacunae lasted at the time of tragedy. Though the factories Act, 1948 was propounded even before the Bhopal catastrophe, it prioritizes the welfare of the workers employed in industries and factories and there is no first place law to deal with the concerned situation. This incident led to breakthroughs in the Indian legislature, the catena of legislations related to the environmental safeguard and determination of penalties were enacted. The status quo is that any similar incident that occurs now will be tried before the National Green tribunal and fall under the ambit of the Environmental protection Act, 1986. Even though, under the provisions of the Public liability Act, 1991, the injured could claim damages for the caused injury because of the leaked hazardous chemicals. In addition, the said Act of 1991 out on the basis of the concept of ‘no-fault liability.

Concerning the disposal of hazardous wastes from industry, we have Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling, and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008, to govern the storage and disposal of such toxic substances with the aid of the pollution control board. Further, In the case of Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource policy v. Union of India, [10] the Apex court upholds the constitutionality of the Hazardous wastes (Management & Handling) Rules, 1989, and the applicability of directions provided in the BASEL Convention. Prior to this, Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response) Rules, 1996 was legislated to address gas leaks and to monitor the industries handling those deadly chemicals .

Thus, the aftermath of the Bhopal gas leak tragedy has substantially informed us about the importance of environmental protection and the concept of sustainable development . The wider array of Article 21 of the Indian constitution in relation to the r ight to a clean and healthy environment [11] has also been obtained only after the catena of judicial decisions interpreted the same. Besides, the Indian constitution prescribes the state as well as citizens to protect the environment under its Article, 39(b), 47, 48, 49, 48 A, and 51 A (g).

Even we have sufficient legislations to address the gas leaks issue; it is an absolute challenge to measure the injuries sustained by a person. However, the injured will receive damages in the light of law (Ubi jus ibi remidium). But then, how far it recompenses their loss? What about the people who lost their lives or happened to suffer the morbidities. Their psychological and physiological distresses are immeasurable. Hence, prevention is always better than cure by the mean, the government, industries, and citizens are obliged to take reasonable care because, ultimately, this is our environment.

References:

• https://blog.ipleaders.in/bhopal-gas-tragedy-case-study/#_ednref28
• https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/bhopal-gas-tragedy/
• https://indianjudiciarynotes.com/case-study/case-study-mc-mehta-vs-union-of-india/
• https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1464&context=ncilj

[1] Section 3(1) of the Bhopal Act, 1985.

[2] THE BHOPAL GAS LEAK DISASTER (PROCESSING OF CLAIMS) ACT, 1985, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1855/1/A1985-21.pdf.

[3] Lewin,  Carbide Is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster,  N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at D2, col.4

[4] State of Madras v. V. G. Row,   AIR 1952 SC 607.

[5] Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 273.

[6] Supra note 5.

[7] Zia Modi, 10 Judgments that changed India, 44, {2013}

[8] Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330

[9] 1987 AIR 1086.

[10] AIR 2012 SC 2627.

[11] Subhash Kumar v. the State of Bihar, 1991 AIR 420, 1991 SCR (1) 5.

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Snegapriya V S

A third-year student of law at Vellore Institute of Technology (VIT School of Law), budding first-generation lawyer cum legal researcher with multiple publications in various web journals and portals on different subject matters of law in issue. Being a zealous-natured person with thoughts enrooted in epistemophilia has boosted my passion for research writings by interpreting diversified legal facets. As a perceptive observer and reader, I pay greater attention to the overlooked legal fields where divergent challenges might arise, that include cyber law, environmental law, consumer law, and several constitutional provisions. Besides, I prioritize construing legal problems with social psychology. My dream and vision are to catch myself as a skilled legal adroit.

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy: A Case Study on One of the World’s Worst Industrial Disasters

• Post published: November 17, 2023
• Post category: Environmental Engineering
• Post comments: 1 Comment

Introduction

The Bhopal gas tragedy is one of the deadliest incidents that occurred in the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India, during two nights on December 2 and 3, 1984. Unfortunately, people are still suffering its ill effects even today. Affected by this tragedy.

This incident came to light in Bhopal-based Union Carbide Private Limited Corporation. The highly poisonous chemical methyl isocyanate (MIC) present in the company leaked. The gas dispersed into the atmosphere after reacting with water, affecting residential areas around the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant. The impact was severe, with approximately, 3800 lives lost.

However, conflicting data emerges. Official reports stated a much lower figure of 1,430 during the parliamentary session in 1991. Subsequently, concerns were raised against the government for possible data manipulation or tabulation errors.

Here are the Learning Outcomes of The Case Study,

• Basic Overview OF the Tragedy
• History OF UCIL
• Why This Incident Happened, and Who Is responsible For this Tragedy
• What is the Learning Outcomes From these Incidents – As a Engineer

Background of the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) Plant

Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), founded in 1907, was an American multinational corporation, initially known for being one of the world’s largest producers of industrial chemicals, including plastics, pesticides, and gases. The company also made consumer products such as batteries and flashlights.

In 1934, UCC set up a plant in Bhopal and Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) became its subsidiary. UCIL produced a wide variety of products ranging from batteries and carbon products to welding equipment, plastics, industrial chemicals, pesticides and marine products.

One of the most significant industrial disasters, the Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984, brought UCC into the spotlight. Following an incident where 500 litters of water entered the MIC (methyl isocyanate) tank, reacting with the MIC (methyl isocyanate) and evaporating into the atmosphere, many lives were lost and people suffered from various diseases. The company faced allegations of prioritizing profits over safety and failing to adequately warn employees and residents about the dangers of MIC (methyl isocyanate) .

In 1989, UCC settled a class-action lawsuit filed by victims of the tragedy for $470 million. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL, which was renamed Eveready Industries India Limited. In 2001, UCC filed for bankruptcy, and its assets were eventually acquired by Dow Chemical Company.

Here is a timeline of major events in the history of the UCC and UCIL

1907: Union Carbide Corporation was established.

1934: Union Carbide India Limited was established.

1984: Bhopal gas tragedy occurred.

1989: UCC settled a class-action lawsuit filed by victims of the Bhopal tragedy for $470 million.

1994: UCC sold its stake in UCIL and the company was renamed Eveready Industries India Limited.

2001: UCC files for bankruptcy.

2001: Dow Chemical Company acquired the assets of UCC.

The Incident: Causes and Events Leading to the Tragedy

Security lapses and negligence

In the corporation, workers explained that sometimes, when process units encounter problems, UCC workers need to clean units. To fix the issue, they clean it with water. For ease and efficiency, there is a shortcut pipe that leads directly to the MIC (methyl isocyanate) storage area, allowing interchangeable use of equipment but permanently linking lethal chemicals and other plant operations. This pipe provides a direct path for water into the MIC (methyl isocyanate) Storage tank. But When They used The Water for the cleaning purposes There will be A Slip – line Under the pipes which can block the water, so The water will not Go Directly into the MIC (methyl isocyanate) Storage Tank, but This Safety Measures Are Missing as per the worker’s Slip Line Was not connected In the pipe that the times.

The Another Incident or Negligence on the same day was happened

On the December 2, When the cleaning work started at around 9.30 pm in Night, the Worker noticed that water was not coming from the external point. However, (or the other side Of the Pipe) , he ignored this, assuming that the water would move through the connecting pipes until it reached the MIC (methyl isocyanate) tank, which was the first malfunction that night.

Slip lines designed to stop the flow of water and create a watertight seal on the pipe were not in place. As a result, the water reached the MIC tank. Plant outlines indicate that inert nitrogen gas should be pumped into the MIC (methyl isocyanate) tank as a final barrier, providing a safe high-pressure layer. However, the plant workers said there was a glitch in the system.      

SA per the Workers said, Before the November 30 incident, workers had tried to repair the pressurized E610 but failed. The readings were incorrect, and reports were not submitted for operation for various reasons. The investigation team suspected that some trained employee had deliberately supplied water to the MIC tank.

Mistake: – If workers or individuals can notice the defects at that time, there is a chance of preventing such significant disasters and saving thousands of people’s lives. It was a carelessness at that time, not checking properly,

Challenges Faced by UCIL Management: Unravelling the Issues Beyond the Bhopal Disaster

As per the Employs or workers in the plant faced difficulties in achieving sales targets over the years. The company struggled to sell its products as expected, due to the Continuous loss of The management to cut costs. In an attempt to reduce expenses, safety measures at the plant were significantly compromised. Reports indicate that workers in the plants reported a widespread neglect of safety, with minor leaks becoming common in UCIL. Between 1981 and 1984, at least five incidents occurred, and even before the Bhopal disaster, there were reports of incidents, such as one where three people were injured and one worker died. Despite these incidents, UCIL operations continued without significant improvements in safety measures.

Reports revealed that the missing slip line triggered budget cuts and maintenance supervisors were fired to cut costs. The main flaw was in the plant’s design, which was unprepared for significant disasters, with minimal safety measures.

Multiple safety lapses and negligence on the part of the plant management and the parent company, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), were one of the main causes of the Bhopal gas tragedy. The safety procedures at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) plant were seriously compromised due to several reasons.

Most importantly, not enough attention was paid to maintaining and adhering to the stringent safety requirements. Management’s priority appeared to be generating profits and cutting costs rather than putting the well-being of employees and the local community first. Routine maintenance and safety checks were not done as thoroughly as they should have been. Gas leak detectors and emergency shut-off systems are two examples of critical safety equipment and gadgets that were either not working properly or were not maintained properly. As a result, potential hazard warning signals were either ignored or missed. Additionally, the company’s workers received insufficient training in hazardous materials handling, including industrial process use of methyl isocyanate (MIC). Enterprises dealing with toxic substances must have effective training and awareness programs in place to ensure that employees are aware of the hazards and prepared for emergencies.

In addition to lapses in security procedures, the coordination and communication between management and staff were clearly inadequate. When the gas leak happened, the staff was not well-prepared to deal with such problems. The concern was made worse by a lack of well-defined rescue procedures and a handful of training sessions. The disaster was also caused by the underlying organization, Union Carbide Corp. (UCC), which has its corporate headquarters in the United States. There were allegations that the UCIL plant did not receive adequate funding and support from the UCC as per safety norms. Although it was aware of the risks associated with handling methyl isocyanate (MIC) , it was criticized for neglecting to deliver the most contemporary security technologies and procedures to the Bhopal site.

Storage and Handling of Hazardous Chemicals

At the Bhopal plant, Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) storage facility was provided below the bunker, primarily using three tanks – E610, E611 and E619. Despite the Corporation’s stipulation that one tank should be kept on standby for emergency purposes, on that particular day, all three tanks were filled beyond their capacity.

The E610, which had a leak, was not properly calibrated, resulting in it being filled more than 75% . Contrary to corporation rules, which recommend filling only up to 50% for MIC storage, this deviation had serious consequences. About 42% of MIC evaporated into the atmosphere after reacting with water.

The Bhopal plant has three underground 68,000-litre (18,000 US gal) liquid MIC storage tanks. However, the events of that day highlighted significant discrepancies in adherence to safety guidelines.

Failure of Safety Systems

In power plants or specifically where such dangerous chemicals are stored, it is necessary to follow some guidelines and adhere to strict safety measures to save workers’ lives and prevent any operational losses. But the Basic Safety Measures are missing in Bhopal plant,

Let’s Categorized into the 3 Parts Bhopal gas Plant Safety Measures which is Necessary as per the Plant before operational

Several security systems were found not to function properly

1 st is Bent Scrubber Tower is Not working

2 nd Flyers Tower is also Not working,

3 rd Water Pipes or pumps not working up to the mark

1st is Bent Scrubber Tower is Not working

A gas scrubber is a device used to remove gases from a gas stream. It is employed to control pollution and neutralize hazardous gases, preventing them from directly flowing into the atmosphere and contributing to increased air pollution. Gas scrubbers work by passing the gas stream through a liquid or solid absorbent material. The absorbent material removes the gases from the gas stream by absorbing them or reacting with them. Gas scrubbers are used in a variety of industrial applications, including power plants, chemical plants, steel mills, and other industries.

Tech articals

The same technology was used in the Bhopal plant as the initial storage control to prevent significant disasters by not allowing the hazardous gas to flow directly into the atmosphere. The bent gas scrubbers or (putting leaked gas into the bottle-shaped tank and neutralizing it with caustic soda) were intended to neutralize the MIC gas by passing it through a solution and sodium hydroxide. However, the sodium hydroxide solution was not properly diluted, and the scrubbers were not operating at full capacity. As a result, the scrubbers were unable to effectively neutralize the methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas, leading to a gas leak into the atmosphere

A gas scrubber helps us to control OR

Removal of Pollutants: Gas scrubbers are designed to capture and remove pollutants, such as particulate matter, acidic gases, or volatile organic compounds (VOCs), from industrial emissions.

Air Quality Improvement: By removing harmful pollutants, gas scrubbers contribute to improving air quality and ensuring compliance with environmental regulations.

Typical Components and Operation or the Gernel Gas Scrubbers

Inlet Duct: Contaminated gas enters the scrubber through an inlet duct.

Scrubbing Section: The gas comes into contact with a liquid scrubbing solution (often water or a chemical solution) in this section. Pollutants are absorbed or chemically reacted with the liquid.

Mist Eliminator: A mist eliminator or demister is used to remove liquid droplets from the gas stream before it exits the scrubber.

Outlet Duct: The cleaned gas is released into the atmosphere through an outlet duct.

Note: The above operation was not working properly, but we have another option or safety measure. In the event of any issues with the scrubbers, there is the Flare Tower, which can burn the gas.”

2 nd  Flare Tower

The flare tower at the Bhopal plant was designed to burn off excess gases from the plant’s chemical processes. It served as an important safety feature, preventing the release of hazardous gases into the atmosphere. However, on that day, the tower was also not working to burn the methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas at the time of the Bhopal disaster

Flare towers have three main components:

• a flame arrestor.

The burner is responsible for igniting the gases that are released into the flare tower. The stack is responsible for venting the gases away from the plant. The flame arrestor is responsible for preventing the flame from the burner from propagating back into the plant.

In the Bhopal plant, the flare tower was not properly maintained. The burner was not working properly, and the flame arrestor was not in place. As a result, the flare tower was not able to burn off the excess gases that were released from the methyl isocyanate (MIC) tank. This allowed the gases to leak into the atmosphere, causing the Bhopal disaster.

The failure of the flare tower was another major factor in the Bhopal disaster, highlighting the mishandling of the plant and underscoring the importance of quality maintenance. This disaster underscores the crucial need for proper maintenance and operation of flare towers, especially in industrial settings where hazardous materials are being used

3 rd is Water Pipes or pumps not working properly,

After releasing the gas from the chimney, the biggest failure was the maintenance, but the methyl isocyanate (MIC) did not evaporate into the atmosphere; instead, it crawled on the ground, affecting people within a radius of 5 to 8 km. Immediate action could have been taken by workers or those responsible in the plant. They could have neutralized it through water, as water pipes were available on the plant. However, the water pipes and pump lengths were not sufficient to reach the chimney and neutralize the methyl isocyanate (MIC) . Other factors contributing to the failure of the water-cooling system include:

• The water tubes were corroded and leaking.
• The pumps were not working properly.
• The plant’s operators were not properly trained on how to use the cooling system.
• The plant’s management did not properly maintain the cooling system

Inadequate Emergency Response

When the gas leak occurred, there was no effective emergency response strategy to deal with such a critical situation. The impact on the affected population was made worse by the lack of quick and efficient emergency actions. Due to the inadequate preparation of emergency response teams to address the scope and severity of the gas leak, the prevention and mitigation of the disaster took longer than expected. Facility staff and local officials were inadequately equipped and unprepared, making it difficult for them to act quickly and effectively.

Following the gas leak, a serious lapse in the emergency response was the failure by plant employees to immediately inform the public. There was lack of awareness among workers regarding appropriate measures to be taken in case of gas leakage. As a result, they failed to transmit critical information through alarms or sirens to alert the public about leaked MIC and other gas they are not well ware or not sure which gas was released. The Team was Not well Trained

This lack of communication had serious consequences, as it overwhelmed medical and emergency response teams. The medical staff was not prepared to handle the sudden influx of affected persons. People running towards hospitals in panic and chaos inadvertently inhaled poisonous gas, which increased the number of casualties.

The evacuation process was hampered by poor coordination and inadequate communication. The absence of a well-defined emergency protocol contributed to the overall chaos. Medical staff had difficulty providing timely and effective assistance to those affected due to lack of prior knowledge of the nature of the incident.

This critical phase during the gas leak highlights the importance of a strong emergency response plan and effective communication channels in preventing further damage and saving lives. 

Impact on the Community and Environment

Residents living near the factory were immediately affected by the gas discharge. and Thousands of people died within hours of being exposed to the deadly gas. Many people died due to respiratory distress and other serious health problems. Fearing the invisible and deadly gases resulting from the gas leak, people fled for their lives, which resulted in widespread panic.

Those who made it through early exposure experienced a variety of health concerns, such as respiratory distress, eye discomfort, skin conditions, and gastrointestinal problems. The health of those exposed to methyl isocyanate (MIC) was seriously and permanently affected. Additionally, the gas caused problems for pregnant mothers, resulting in birth abnormalities and developmental problems in the offspring.

Those who survived and their families suffered significant emotional trauma as a result of the disaster. Many people experience immense loss and emotional pain after losing their loved ones. Families were separated, and as a result, the social fabric of the affected towns was severely damaged.

Impacts on the environment

The leakage of toxic gas from the UCIL plant had a profound impact on the environment in and around Bhopal. Vegetation and crops dried up in the affected areas, and water sources were contaminated, posing a serious health risk to the people who depend on them for their daily needs. The soil and groundwater in the area were also severely polluted by the chemicals released during the gas leak. Environmental pollution has had long-term effects on agricultural productivity and water quality in the region, affecting the livelihoods of local communities. In addition, toxic gases emitted during the disaster contributed to air pollution, which not only affected Bhopal but also spread to neighbouring areas. The gas leak continued to affect the health and well-being of people living in the vicinity for years after the tragedy.

Legal Battles and Compensation

Following the disaster, legal proceedings were initiated to hold Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and its subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) , responsible for the tragedy. Both the Government of India and the affected individuals filed lawsuits against the UCC in the United States, seeking justice and compensation.

The legal battles were complex and lengthy, involving multiple jurisdictions and legal systems. Challenges arose due to the international nature of the case, with the parent company, UCC , being based in the United States while the disaster occurred in India. This led to jurisdictional issues and differences in the legal framework of the two countries.

When the CEO, Warren Anderson of UCC, arrived in India, he was reportedly arrested at the airport. However, according to Rajkumar Keswani, the police action was deemed more of a spectacle than a genuine arrest. Allegedly, the CEO was not detained at the lockup but instead accommodated in the guest house of UCC, a beautiful place in Bhopal. After a certain period, the CEO was released on bail and returned to his home country.

Compensation After The bhopal gas tregedy

One of the primary concerns following the tragedy was providing adequate compensation to the victims and their families. The UCC agreed to a settlement with the Indian government in 1989, amounting to $470 million. The agreement was aimed at providing compensation to the victims and assistance for their medical treatment and rehabilitation.

However, considering the scale of the tragedy and the long-term health consequences for the survivors, the amount of compensation was heavily criticized as inadequate. Many argued that the compensation provided was not sufficient to address the immense suffering and loss suffered by the affected individuals and families.

Legal battles and compensation issues continued for years as various parties sought justice and fair compensation. Efforts were made to revise and increase the amount of compensation to better address the needs of the victims.

Ultimately, legal proceedings and compensation efforts highlight the challenges of seeking justice and reparation in the aftermath of large-scale industrial disasters. The Bhopal gas tragedy case underscored the importance of a strong legal framework and international cooperation in dealing with such complex and international matters.

Despite settlement and compensation efforts, many victims and their families continue to grapple with the long-term health and social consequences of the gas leak. The tragedy is a reminder of the need for corporations to prioritize safety and responsibility in their operations and for governments to ensure stringent regulations and mechanisms to protect the well-being of their citizens.

Lessons Learned: Changes in Industrial Safety Regulations

The Bhopal gas tragedy had a profound impact on industrial safety regulations, not only in India but globally. The disaster served as a wake-up call, prompting governments, industries, and international organizations to re-evaluate and strengthen safety protocols to prevent similar incidents in the future. Several important lessons were learned from this tragedy, which led to important changes in industrial safety regulations:

Stringent Safety Standards : The Bhopal gas tragedy highlighted the critical importance of implementing stringent safety standards in industries dealing with hazardous substances. Governments began revising and strengthening safety regulations to ensure that industries followed best practices in storing, handling, and disposing of toxic chemicals.

Better Emergency Response Plans: The inadequacy of emergency response during the gas leak underscored the need for well-defined and efficient emergency response plans. Industrial facilities were required to develop comprehensive emergency protocols and conduct regular drills to ensure that workers and surrounding communities could respond quickly and effectively in the event of a disaster.

Compliance and Monitoring: This tragedy highlights the importance of strict compliance with safety regulations and the need for regular monitoring of industrial facilities. Governments and regulatory bodies increased inspections and audits to ensure that industries followed safety guidelines and took the necessary precautions to prevent accidents.

Community Awareness and Participation: Due to the gas leak in Bhopal, the nearby residents were not prepared for such a disaster. As a result, emphasis was placed on community awareness programs to educate people about the potential risks and safety measures in case of an emergency. Involving the local community in safety discussions has become an important aspect of industrial operations.

Corporate Responsibility and Accountability: The Bhopal gas tragedy raised questions about the accountability of corporations operating in developing countries. This sparked a debate about the responsibility of parent companies for the actions of their subsidiaries. As a result, there is an increasing emphasis on corporate responsibility and ethical business practices in multinational companies.

International Cooperation: The international nature of the case created challenges in seeking justice and compensation. The tragedy prompted discussion on the need for international cooperation and a standardized legal framework to deal with industrial disasters that cross national boundaries.

Focus on environmental protection : The environmental impact of the gas leak highlights the importance of protecting the environment from industrial disasters. Stringent regulations were put in place to ensure that industries follow eco-friendly practices and reduce their environmental impact.

The Bhopal gas tragedy led to significant changes in industrial safety regulations around the world. It stressed the need for strong security measures, emergency preparedness, and corporate accountability. Lessons learned from the disaster shape safety practices and regulations, ensure a safe working environment for industrial workers, and protect communities from potential industrial hazards.

Continuing Challenges and the Road to Recovery

The Bhopal Gas Tragedy’s haunting impact lingers, leaving scars on the hearts of survivors and their families. A tale of unimaginable suffering and resilience unfolds as we witness the aftermath of this catastrophic disaster. Despite efforts to bring justice and implement safety reforms, the road to recovery has been fraught with challenges.

As we reflect on the heartbreaking story of the Bhopal gas tragedy, emotions roll in like tidal waves, filling us with sadness and determination. This devastating disaster has left an indelible mark on humanity, sparking a collective desire for change and justice.

The horrifying memories of suffering and loss remind us that industrial disasters should never be forgotten but must be inscribed in our collective consciousness as a solemn pledge to safeguard life and protect the environment. We stand at a crossroads where compassion, corporate responsibility, and stringent security measures intersect.

In our search for healing, we must not waver. The survivors, the brave souls who bear the burden of unimaginable pain, deserve nothing less than a future full of hope and promise. Our duty to them is irrevocable: to ensure that they get the care, support, and justice they rightfully deserve.

Through community empowerment and participation, we create a path towards resilience and innovation. Every voice, every heart, and every hand united in healing becomes a beacon of hope, illuminating the darkest corners of tragedy.

May the legacy of the Bhopal gas tragedy constantly remind us that our world can change. Let us turn our sorrow and empathy into action, demand greater accountability from corporations, and embrace a culture of safety and compassion.

Together, we must stand firm against complacency and indifference, paving the way for stronger regulations and continuous improvement in industry practices. Only then can we create a future where such disasters become a relic of the past.

As we end this emotional journey, let us keep the stories of the Bhopal gas tragedy in our hearts, not as a burden but as a collective commitment to build a safer, more compassionate world. Through unity and perseverance, we have the power to heal wounds, rebuild hope, and shape a future where every life is cherished and protected.

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy : Causes, effects and aftermath

The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred at midnight of December 2nd- 3rd December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) pesticide facility in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. This catastrophe affected around 500,000 people along with many animals. People who were exposed are still suffering as a result of the gas leak’s long-term health impacts. Chronic eye difficulties and respiratory problems were some issues due to it. Children who have been exposed have stunted growth and cognitive impairments. 

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Bhopal gas tragedy case study, causes of bhopal gas tragedy, effects of bhopal gas tragedy, aftermath of bhopal gas tragedy.

Union Carbide was an American company that produced pesticides. MIC – methyl isocyanide, a dangerous poisonous gas began to leak at midnight on 2nd December 1984 from the Union Carbide factory. This MIC caused the Bhopal gas tragedy. The Bhopal gas tragedy was a fatal accident. It was one of the world’s worst industrial accidents. 

UCIL was a pesticide manufacturing plant that produced the insecticide carbaryl. Carbaryl was discovered by the American company Union Carbide Corporation, which owned a significant share in UCIL. As an intermediary, UCIL produced carbaryl using methyl isocyanate (MIC). Other techniques for producing the ultimate product are available, but they are more expensive. The very toxic chemical MIC is extremely dangerous to human health. Residents of Bhopal in the area of the pesticide plant began to feel irritated by the MIC and began fleeing the city.

Bhopal UCIL constructed three underground MIC storage tanks which were named E610, E611, and E619. On October 1984, E610 was not able to maintain its nitrogen gas pressure and so the liquid which is present inside the tank would not pump out, because of which 42 tons of MIC in E610 was wasted. The chemical in E610 was left unpumped as they were not able to re-establish its pressure, which later became responsible for Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

The main causes of Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

• During the buildup to the spill, the plant’s safety mechanisms for the highly toxic MIC were not working. The alarm off tanks of the plant had not worked properly.
• Many valves and lines were in disrepair, and many vent gas scrubbers were not working, as was the steam boiler that was supposed to clean the pipes.
• The MIC was stored in three tanks, with tank E610 being the source of the leak. This tank should have held no more than 30 tonnes of MIC, according to safety regulations.
• Water is believed to have entered the tank through a side pipe as technicians were attempting to clear it late that fatal night.
• This resulted in an exothermic reaction in the tank, progressively raising the pressure until the gas was ejected through the atmosphere.

The main effects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

• Thousands had died as a result of choking, pulmonary edema, and reflexogenic circulatory collapse.
• Neonatal death rates increased by 200 percent.
• A huge number of animal carcasses have been discovered in the area, indicating the impact on flora and animals. The trees died after a few days. Food supplies have grown scarce due to the fear of contamination. 
• Fishing was also prohibited.
• In March 1985, the Indian government established the Bhopal Gas Leak Accident Act, giving it legal authority to represent all victims of the accident, whether they were in India or abroad.
• At least 200,000 youngsters were exposed to the gas.
• Hospitals were overcrowded, and there was no sufficient training for medical workers to deal with MIC exposure.

In the United States, UCC was sued in federal court. In one action, the court recommended that UCC pay between $5 million and $10 million to assist the victims. UCC agreed to pay a $5 million settlement. The Indian government, however, rejected this offer and claimed $3.3 billion. In 1989, UCC agreed to pay $470 million in damages and paid the cash immediately in an out-of-court settlement.

Warren Anderson, the CEO and Chairman of UCC was charged with manslaughter by Bhopal authorities in 1991. He refused to appear in court and the Bhopal court declared him a fugitive from justice in February 1992. Despite the central government’s efforts in the United States to extradite Anderson, nothing happened. Anderson died in 2014 without ever appearing in a court of law.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy continues to be an important warning sign for industrialization, for developing countries and in particular India, with human, environmental, and economic pitfalls. The economy of India is growing at a fast rate but at the cost of environmental health as well as public safety.

Frequently Asked Questions

What were the reasons behind bhopal gas tragedy.

The reasons behind Bhopal gas tragedy was a large volume of water had been introduced into the MIC tank and has caused a chemical reaction which did force the pressure release valve, which allowed the gas to leak.

What is the name of Bhopal gas case law?

The name is Union Carbide Corporation v.

Which gas was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy?

The gas which was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy is methyl isocyanate.

Was Bhopal gas tragedy an accident or experiment?

Bhopal gas tragedy was the world’s most worst industrial accident.

How many people died in the Bhopal Gas?

A total of 3,787 deaths were registered related to the gas release in case of Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

What were the four main demands of the Bhopal Gas victims?

The 4 demands of Bhopal Gas victims include: Proper medical treatment. Adequate compensation. Fixation of criminal responsibility Steps for prevention of such disasters in future.

How was Bhopal Gas Tragedy fixed?

Bhopal Gas Tragedy was fixed with construction of a secure landfill for holding the wastes from the two on-site solar evaporation ponds.

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