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The US-China relations Essay

Today it is rather difficult to discuss the US-China relations from one point of view with accentuating only positive aspects of the countries’ relationship which can lead to the effective cooperation or with focusing only on the misunderstandings between the countries which contribute to the development of the competition between the US and China.

The problem of the character of the relations between the US and China is one of the key questions which are actively discussed on the threshold of the election of 2012. Is China a strategic partner or a strategic competitor of the US?

Although the US and China do not base their relations on the principles of the open confrontation and seek for the effective cooperation in dealing with many international and domestic questions, there are a lot of aspects according to which the countries cannot reach the mutual understanding under the influence of the rapid growth of China and determining its strong position at the global arena.

That is why it is possible to speak about the US-China relations as tending to a kind of competition or rather suspicious relations as opposite to the situation of the possible partnership. Moreover, the state of affairs can change tomorrow with references to the changes in the world policy and economy.

The relations between the US and China have a long history and can be discussed as difficult with accentuating the peculiarities of the policies provided by the US and Chinese governments during different periods of time. The US as the most powerful country in the world was always inclined to control the situation in the globe economy and policy referring to establishing the international relations with the other countries.

Analysts also observe the tendencies of the US to control the situation in relations with China. However, today to control the peculiarities of China’s strategy is difficult because of the country’s rapid economic progress (Sutter, 2010). Politicians from the both countries do not concentrate on the possible conflict in the relations and accentuate the aspects for the further cooperation.

Nevertheless, the pressure in the US-China relations is obvious, and it is explained by the misunderstandings in providing the policy connected with such issues as trade questions, energy problem, human rights, and Taiwan problem (Sutter, 2010).

If the competition in the field of the economic powerfulness can be considered as rather questionable because of the quite different positions of the countries, the issues mentioned earlier can be discussed as influential for the development of the US-China relations on the principles contradicting to the mutual cooperation.

Analyzing the character of the relations between the US and China, it is important to determine the factors which contribute to the development of the relations between the countries as potential partners or as potential competitors.

Thus, both countries are inclined to develop the effective partnership in the field of fighting with terrorism and providing the cooperation on the global environmental issues and the questions of the peace and stability. These problems are not connected directly with the economic issues and allow solving the questions favorably for the both countries.

However, such factors as the rapid economic growth of China which results in the increase of the country’s influence on the foreign states, and particularly on the US, is crucial for complicating the relations. “China’s rise is having a large and complex impact on the United States and Asia, and on various global issues” (Lieberthal & Pollack, 2012).

Moreover, the expanding military potential of China and misunderstandings on Taiwan problem and the role of the US in the conflict contribute to the development of the countries’ mutual suspicions (Garrett, 2006).

The difficulties in the US-China relations can be also explained by the countries’ lack of knowledge on the question of their strategic intentions. Thus, today the US makes accents on the fact that it is necessary to develop the dialogue between the countries in order to determine the priorities in their relations and focus on the establishment of the long-term cooperation in order to avoid the possible conflicts and misunderstandings.

The US and China are interested in the development of these relations and state that they are strategically important (Sutter, 2010). Nevertheless, a number of controversial questions according to which the views of the governments in both countries are different can prevent the US and China from implementing the healthy relations based on the principles of cooperation.

To establish the effective long-term relations, it is significant to achieve the successful solution of the economic and military questions which contribute to forming the disbalance in the countries’ relations.

Having analyzed the character of the relations between the US and China, it is possible to note that in spite of the active positions of the countries in relation to the development of the cooperative relations or partnership between them, the situation can be discussed as rather competitive with references to a range of economic factors which influence the peculiarities of the countries’ relations.

The countries cannot be considered as open competitors depending on their global positions, but their relations also do not tend to the partnership. However, both countries are inclined to contribute to their further cooperation.

Garrett, B. (2006). US-China relations in the era of globalization and terror: A framework for analysis. Journal of Contemporary China, 15 (48), 389-415.

Lieberthal, K. G. & Pollack, J. D. (2012). Establishing credibility and trust the next President must manage America’s most important relationship . Web.

Sutter, R. G. (2010). U.S. – Chinese relations: Perilous past, pragmatic present . USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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Central Questions in U.S.-China Relations amid Global Turbulence

Photo: WANG ZHAO/AFP/Getty Images

Commentary by Ryan Hass and Jude Blanchette

Published July 21, 2022

Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine is only the latest in a series of events that have shaken the global order and raised profound questions about the nature and frequency of state-to-state military conflict, the trajectory of globalization and technological innovation, and the utility of legacy multilateral institutions. The U.S.-China relationship, arguably the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship, has been impacted by these recent shocks, but has also itself been the cause of much of the uncertainty surrounding the international order.

To help make sense of recent developments and their impacts on the trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship, the Brookings Institution and CSIS convened a group of 10 regional and functional experts with varied backgrounds and opinions for a two-day closed-door workshop on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. The resulting discussion raised more questions than it answered.

In order to help give direction to future policy research, the Freeman Chair in China Studies summarizes four key questions that emerged in the course of the workshop, and that the authors believe the foreign policy community should directly grapple with in order to orient U.S. grand strategy on a more sustainable and effective path.

The Sustainability of the Current International Order

While the United States continues to declare support for the existing international order, U.S. action indicates a much more ambivalent, and at times hostile, attitude towards the web of multilateral bodies, organizations, and institutions that have shaped the post-WWII period. True, U.S. leaders broadly believe that this order has been universally beneficial in preventing great power conflict and improving livelihoods across the world since World War II, but frustrations with the slowness with which these organizations often work, and the compromises needed to sustain widespread buy-in, have eroded U.S. enthusiasm for the day-to-day work of global governance.

Chinese leaders are similarly dissatisfied with the existing international order, but for different reasons. For Beijing, the current order is ill-equipped to address twenty-first-century challenges on terms it agrees with, in large part because it views the status quo as overweighted to views and voices from the West. To address these perceived inequities, China strives to shape global governance institutions from within, while simultaneously creating its own set of parallel and overlapping initiatives.

There is a fundamental question underlying how the United States responds to China’s ambition to alter and in places revise the existing order: Which, if any, of China’s preferences and expectations for global governance can be addressed? Will the United States be more competitive and influential by holding the line and rallying efforts to resist all Chinese attempts to adjust the existing order? Or will the United States gain attraction and influence by demonstrating itself to be open to adjustments that give greater voice to developing countries and emerging powers, including potentially through reform to the structure of the UN Security Council? Pushing back against all of China’s actions might prove unrealistic, or at least unacceptably costly, both in terms of scare resources and strategic bandwidth. Additionally, the ability of the United States to assert its will on the international order has been diminished by power shifts in the international order well outside of U.S. control. Pure acceptance of China’s preferences, on the other hand, is not a realistic option. There is no purchase for such an approach in the United States, given that it would undoubtedly undermine U.S. leadership and erode core normative elements of the broadly liberal and rules-based order. Where should the balance be struck?

How experts approach this question is often informed by how they conceptualize U.S.-China rivalry—either as a struggle to preserve power preeminence on the world stage, or as a more fluid and global competition to attract partners and gain support for defined priorities. Regardless of which side of the debate analysts come down on, ambivalence is not an option. The international order is fluid. Without guiding principles about which elements of the existing order are most crucial for protecting U.S. interests and values, the United States will find itself backfooted and reactive to initiatives emanating from Beijing and elsewhere.

The Future of the China-Russia Relationship

It is broadly accepted in the U.S. expert community that Sino-Russian relations are likely to deepen in the coming years, assuming both President Putin and President Xi remain in power. Both leaders nurture similar grievances about the distribution of power in the international system and share a common perception that the West harbors ideological hostility toward them.

At the same time, important questions exist about the precise contours of the Sino-Russian relationship in the coming years and decades. How will their military partnership evolve now that Russia has proven itself far less adept at combat than previously expected? How will the growing power gap between Beijing and Moscow impact bilateral trust? What happens if Putin or Xi unexpectedly leave office?

Similar questions remain on what the appropriate U.S. response to this growing strategic alignment should be. Few analysts recommend that the United States attempt to actively drive a wedge between the two countries, as few think the United States would have the ability to do this with any degree of control. A hardening domestic view of both Russia and China likewise forecloses this as a realistic option.

Some see the Sino-Russian relationship as part of a broader strategic challenge to the United States, one that is best conceptualized as an emerging strategic front of autocracies. Here, the United States cannot afford to think of these two countries as discrete challenges, but rather “two-front” strategic competition. While trust between Beijing and Moscow may fluctuate, and even erode given Beijing’s growing power differential, a shared antagonism for the United States and the U.S.-led order is sufficient to sustain a meaningful relationship for the foreseeable future.

A countervailing view is that such framing risks generating self-fulfilling momentum for Sino-Russian relations and creates complications for the United States’ relationships elsewhere, given that few other countries outside of Europe support such ideological framing. While lumping the two powers together might comport with U.S. domestic politics, it narrows the United States’ options in the rest of the world, to say nothing of the narrowed path this would force the U.S.-China relationship.

Downplaying the geometry of the U.S.-China-Russia triangle might also expose opportunities for the United States to make progress in other aspects of its diplomatic portfolio. For example, China’s active embrace of Russia following its invasion of Ukraine has created fertile ground for greater transatlantic coordination to address challenges posed by Chinese behavior. Similarly, countries that previously had hoped to play China and Russia off each other may be losing bargaining leverage to do so, thereby opening opportunities for the United States to make inroads. This could present openings for the United States to strengthen its influence with Vietnam, in central Asia, and elsewhere.

Regardless of how one comes down on the issue, the Russia-China strategic alignment poses important questions for the direction and contours of U.S. foreign policy that cannot effectively be answered with previous frameworks, historical analogies, or simplistic heuristics.

China: Peaking or Ascending?

Participants in this workshop were evenly split on whether China is ascending or peaking in overall national power. The results were similar when asked whether China’s power is peaking or ascending relative to the United States. While acknowledging the limits of insight into Chinese leaders’ thinking on these questions, all participants felt that China’s leaders believe their country is ascending in overall national power and in relative national strength vis-à-vis the United States.

No participant in the workshop forecast any scenario of precipitous Chinese decline in overall power. There was broad consensus, however, that the increasingly ideological bent of Chinese policymaking, including in greater state involvement in the economy, was limiting opportunities for self-correction and economic growth. This dynamic is weakening the economic underpinnings of China’s global power. China’s increasingly nationalistic diplomacy also is limiting its appeal abroad.

On the other hand, China’s military strength is growing in absolute terms. The country remains capable of mobilizing vast resources and concentrating them on national priorities. China is world leader in a growing number of fields, e.g., 5G telecommunication technologies, facial and voice recognition, commercial drones, solar cells, and mobile payments. With one-fifth of humanity and a central position in many global value chains, China will remain a formidable power for the foreseeable future. China also employs different tools to build influence overseas. It promises policy continuity and focuses on cultivating relations with elite actors in other countries. Beijing’s capacity to build influence overseas should not be underestimated, even if metrics such as public opinion polls and Belt and Road Initiative project funds are trending downward.

How U.S. policymakers and analysts conceptualize the directionality of power capabilities is of incredible significance. If time and momentum are on China’s side, as Xi Jinping frequently asserts, then Beijing might be willing to adopt a more farsighted and patient foreign policy. If, on the other hand, the Chinese leadership sees its window of opportunity on issues ranging from Taiwan to its ability to deliver breakthrough technologies as shrinking or even collapsing, then Beijing might act out of forced urgency.

Given the importance of these assessments, more work needs to be done to understand the strengths and weaknesses of China’s political and economic system, as well as how perceptions of power are often driving analysis more than the measured calculation of national capabilities.

Beijing’s Evolving Strategy toward Taiwan

There appears to be a cognitive gap in how members of the U.S. policy expert community evaluate Beijing’s actions toward Taiwan. One group views Beijing as opportunistic and impatient in its pursuit of cross-strait unification. Another group sees Beijing as disinclined to wager China’s future on a cross-strait conflict unless its back is up against the wall and Beijing sees no options other than war to protect or advance its interests. Where one sits on this starting point assumption colors how they interpret Chinese actions relating to Taiwan.

For those inclined to see China as an opportunistic actor, China’s investments in new military capabilities signal future intent to employ force to compel unification. Each air incursion into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone or naval operation around Taiwan is part of a rehearsal for a future military operation. For those inclined to see Beijing as remaining committed to seeking to “win without fighting,” China’s military maneuvers around Taiwan are designed more so as deterrent signals to Taiwan and the United States and shows of strength to China’s domestic audience.

The documentary evidence does little to decisively clarify Beijing’s actual intentions. Authoritative statements from Xi Jinping on a timeline for unification are vague or sufficiently long-term that they lose any precise utility. On the other hand, official statements declaring that China seeks a “peaceful reunification” do not square with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) frequent and aggressive saber-rattling.

Beyond these cognitive gaps, four other issues were raised in the dialogue. First, Beijing does not appear to have a sellable approach for generating support from the Taiwan public for unification. Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework has lost political viability following Beijing’s trampling of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Without a viable strategy, Beijing could grow dangerously reactive to events. Second, there is a bias in U.S. debates on Taiwan toward presentism. Thinking is underdeveloped for how the United States will navigate cross-strait relations post-2024, when China will have completed its leadership transition, Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen will be term-limited out of office, and the United States will have completed its presidential election. Third, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened alertness to Chinese military campaign preparations. This heightened alertness could limit Beijing’s ability to pursue incremental upticks in pressure because any uptick could become viewed as a precursor to another Ukraine. Given how normalized Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has become, there is need for fresh thinking on thresholds that, if crossed, would signal the start of a Taiwan Strait crisis. Fourth, China has ample capacity to impose pain on Taiwan, but has few options for doing so without harming itself in the process. Even in scenarios short of conflict, such as restricting naval passage through the Taiwan Strait, Beijing would risk causing maritime insurers to withdraw coverage for commercial cargo. China’s export-dependent economy would be the first casualty of any such scenario.

As the questions raised in this analysis illustrate, the U.S.-China relationship presently is navigating a period of profound fluidity. While there are few indicators of any foreseeable lowering of tensions on the horizon, the situation is not so bad that it cannot get worse. These four fundamental questions reinforce the imperative for policymakers and members of the policy community to interrogate assumptions and build durable, empirically driven models for understanding events inside China and interpreting Chinese activities abroad. The more precise an understanding policymakers and the policy community can develop around these questions, the higher the likelihood that the United States will prove capable of pursuing effective policies for protecting itself and its allies and promoting its interests on the world stage.

Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Ryan Hass is a senior fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair at the Brookings Institution.

This commentary was made possible with support from the Ford Foundation.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Jude Blanchette

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Understanding changes in Sino-U.S. relations from a historical perspective

• Original Paper
• Published: 05 August 2020
• Volume 2 , pages 1–13, ( 2020 )

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This paper analyzes the development of China–US relations through an exploration of history. It contains three parts. The first part reviews the evolution of China–US relations from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, discussing how the differences in the two countries’ social systems, values, geography, and international status have influenced the bilateral relationship. The second part sums up the historical experience of China–US exchanges, exploring how China–US relations affect the world at large, how the US has responded to changes within China and the dynamics of rivalry and mutual trust between the two countries. The third part uses historical comparison to analyze current disputes between China and the US, suggesting that it is still possible for them to avoid a zero-sum game and to reshape China–US relations through rationality, patience, wisdom, and creativity.

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1 Introduction

It was not until the most recent decade that the relationship between China and the United States became regarded as the most important bilateral relationship in the world. As such, its future not only affects the respective development of the two countries but also has a bearing on the future of the world. The state of the world’s most important bilateral relationship can be hugely consequential both in positive and negative terms. For instance, the Cold War stemmed from a confrontation between two major superpowers, the US and the USSR.

China–US relations have been deteriorating for some time (Wang and Hu 2019 ). Many observers believe that the relationship between the two countries has been permanently damaged over the past decade. Footnote 1 Increasing tension between the two nations, in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, seems to have further exacerbated the divide. In light of these and other major changes, it is necessary to take a look at the history of China–US relations, which may provide insight for handling present and future situations.

This paper explores three issues: first, it places China–US relations and the differences between the countries in historical context; second, it discusses the lessons learned as China–US relations have evolved over time; and third, it develops proposed methods for handling China–US relations going forward with wisdom and creativity by incorporating these lessons from the past.

2 Placing China–US relations and the differences between the two countries in historical context

Viewed from a historical or realist perspective, China and the United States are two vastly different countries. To put it simply, China is an old and emerging modernizing country, while the United States is a young and established modernized country. All kinds of differences affect their mutual understanding, their policies toward each other, and the development of bilateral relations. Looking back at the history of China–US relations and objectively understanding the differences between the two countries is a prerequisite for rationally navigating the bilateral relationship going forward.

2.1 A brief history of China–US relations

The history of China–US relations is full of dramatic changes, as its impact on the world has grown slowly with twists and turns. With a brief review, we can see how the story of this bilateral relationship has changed with each new era.

For many years the China–US relationship was of much less relative importance in the scope of modern international relations. Only when the great powers were fighting each other in the Far East did scholars and others begin to take notice of China–US relations. Although the US joined other Western powers in their invasion of China in the second half of the nineteenth century, the US did not seek to divide Chinese territory, and instead focused on seizing “most-favored-nation” status. The US proposed the “Open Door Policy” at the end of the nineteenth century, which was less a China policy and more an exhortation to its allies. Nevertheless, in an era when jungle justice prevailed, the difference between the US and other powers won some favor from the Chinese people. Relations between the two countries remained distant until the 1930s, with each country on the margin of the other’s foreign policy. The most critical feature of the China–US relationship back then was that both countries tried to preserve certain opportunities for the future.

The two countries became allies soon after the Pacific War broke out at the end of 1941. They both had great enthusiasm and expectations for each other. However, the alliance, with continued disputes and frictions, lasted only four years. After the end of World War II, the US-supported China as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. But soon it turned to Japan as its main ally in Asia, which became an important topic of dispute between the US and China. In the late 1940s, a series of incidents resulted in long-term hostility and isolation between the two countries. These included: the beginning of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, the end of the Chinese civil war with the victory of the Communist Party of China over the Kuomintang, the US policy of containing and isolating the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the outbreak of the Korean War, and the support of the US for the Kuomintang to defend Taiwan, which ultimately interrupted China’s reunification process.

A historic turning point occurred in the early 1970s. With the start of the normalization of China–US relations, China restored its lawful seat at the United Nations and established diplomatic relations with most countries in the world. On January 1, 1979, China and the United States officially established diplomatic relations. China also embarked on the journey of reform and opening up. For more than 30 years since then, China–US relations have continued to develop, witnessing rapidly expanding economic and trade exchanges, frequent scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges, and cooperation on security and major global issues. China put its relationship with the US at the top of its agenda. The US implemented an engagement strategy toward China, believing that China’s entry into the international system designed and dominated by the US would not only facilitate the balance of global power and the stability of the world but also would foster changes within China. Most of the friction arising between the two countries was resolved through negotiation. As for some longstanding issues, such as the controversy regarding the political status of Taiwan, the US was clear about China’s position and bottom line and was acting cautiously. China also demonstrated its sincerity and patience in seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. In general, the time period from 1979 to 2009 saw the most stable China–US relations in history and as a result the two countries received the greatest benefits from the bilateral relationship. Reform and opening up relationships with the West helped accelerate China’s integration into the world.

In 2010, China became the second-largest economy in the world. Since then, although the countries began to drift apart, they maintained cooperation on some major global issues throughout the remainder of the Obama Administration.

In 2017, as President Donald Trump came into office, China was ready to maintain cooperative relations with the US, but the US dramatically changed its policy toward China. The United States declared China a “strategic rival” and “competitor” (The White House 2017 ). Problems that had surfaced in the China–US relationship continued, including economic and trade frictions, disputes over intellectual property rights, technological decoupling, the Hong Kong issue, the Taiwan issue, and disputes in the South China Sea. The shift in approach was fast and unexpected, and its effects have been magnified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the beginning of 2020, China–US relations have deteriorated at a faster pace. Official relations between the two countries are almost frozen, and the mutual antipathy among the two peoples is unprecedented (Silver 2020 ). China–US relations are now in the most serious situation since the normalization of diplomatic ties in the early 1970s. What will happen next is hard to predict.

2.2 The role of cultural differences

The strained relations between China and the US cannot be entirely interpreted as a clash of their respective interests. Often, in the history of China–US exchanges, keeping a distance has led to affinity; coming too close sometimes brings disappointment.

The differences between the two countries have created a special relationship between China and the US on the one hand, but also a series of misunderstandings and conflicts on the other. Americans seem to have a “Chinese dream” and a desire to transform China to fit the US model, regarding China as a market with unlimited business opportunities and vast potential. Meanwhile, the Chinese people seem to oscillate between viewing the US as a teacher and friend, and seeing the country as their enemy. At the same time, both countries’ policies toward each other have tended to shift between idealistic and realistic. Recently, however, the US seems to have adopted an unprecedentedly negative posture toward China.

There are many reasons for the ups and downs in China–US relations, but the differences between the two countries play a role that cannot be underestimated. These differences are multi-faceted and include history, culture, religious traditions, ethnic make-up, population, geography and regional environment, as well as social, political and economic systems, their levels of development, and other dimensions (Kissinger 2011 ). In light of the history, current status, and prospects of the two countries’ exchanges, the differences in the following four aspects are most worthy of attention.

First, it is no secret that the social systems (including political and economic systems) of China and the United States are radically different. Apart from the fact that the two countries’ systems are rooted in their respective historical and cultural traditions, it is particularly important to note that China’s social system has been under constant change since the twentieth century. Driven by revolutions and reforms, the changes have been dramatic and profound. Although the current socialist system with Chinese characteristics has long been in place, it is still not mature and reforms continue. In contrast, the social system of the US is more stable and has undergone several major revisions over the 200 years since its founding. In the exchanges between the two countries, different social systems undoubtedly result in increased costs in terms of communication and mutual trust. For this reason, every diplomatic step forward in the relationship requires tremendous effort.

From a historical perspective, changes in leadership and the evolution of the social system in China pose another challenge, as they have interrupted the process of mutual understanding between the two countries. Each generation of officials in both countries have approached the relationship and challenging situations differently. The lack of coherent and systematic accumulation of knowledge and inheritance of experience has prevented bilateral exchanges from going deeper. The two countries have a superficial understanding of each other’s systems and operating mechanisms. These factors have made it difficult to resolve some otherwise resolvable disputes, resulting in a lack of foresight and effective management of potential risks. When tensions flare and mutual trust disappears, differences in social systems become the most convenient excuse for each country developing increased hostility toward the other one.

Second, differences in social values have influenced bilateral relations between the US and China. When it comes to human rights, the Chinese people, having suffered wars, natural disasters, and poverty since modern times, value the right to subsistence and development and are used to a collective mindset. Americans regard individuals as the foundation of society and value individual freedom and rights. As for the interpretation and pursuit of democracy, the Chinese people put more emphasis on reaching consensus through consultation among people with different views. Americans value the right to vote and freedom of expression. In terms of views on public power, the Chinese traditionally see public power as a force for good, respect it, and trust it with all kinds of responsibilities. Americans regard it as an indispensable evil that should be checked and restricted. The differences caused by these deep-rooted gaps can be seen everywhere in the social life of the two countries. However, with China’s modernization and social changes, these differences are narrowing, if not disappearing.

Third, although China and the United States have similarly sized territories, their national strategic security environments and approaches to foreign relations are vastly different. China has the most complicated regional environment among all the major countries in the world as it is surrounded by many neighbors in all directions. The vassal-state system established in ancient China was designed for defense rather than expansion, and the traditional way of promoting national prestige was to seek “Being Sage Inside and Being Kingly Outside” (Only when domestic governance is virtuous and orderly, can it establish prestige in the outside world). Throughout history, the Chinese have devoted much energy to handling relations with neighboring countries leaving little time to explore and understand the wider world. The invasion of Western powers forced the Chinese to get to know those distant countries. China was struggling and slow to break from its self-isolation and interact with the world. It was not until the 1990s that China established diplomatic relations with the vast majority of countries, including some of its neighbors. Today, China still has disputes with some of its neighboring countries over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, particularly in the South China Sea. In contrast, the geographic environment of the United States is very simple, with the Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean on the east and west, respectively, bordering only Mexico to the south and Canada to the north. The unique geopolitical conditions not only provide a security barrier to the continental US but also facilitate its overseas expansion in ways that are different from those of the old colonial powers. From the perspective of national strategic security, the status of China–US relations has an important impact on both countries, but geographical conditions dictate that its impact on China is more direct. What’s more, the security structure in the Asia–Pacific region is still centered on the US, and to a large extent excludes China.

Finally, the experiences of China and the US are very different in terms of the evolution of international status. Generally speaking, the change in China’s international status has been presented as a U-shape curve from the mid-eighteenth century to today, shifting from a country with strong national strength to one in decline, and then quickly gaining influence around the world. The brilliant achievements of the PRC’s independence, reform and opening up relationships with the West, have inspired national pride and patriotism among the Chinese people.

After it became independent in 1776, America’s international status continued to rise. After two world wars, the US finally became the leading power in the world by the middle of the twentieth century, leading to the reconstruction of the post-WWII international order, in spite of the Soviet rivalry. Following nearly half a century of confrontation, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made the US the only superpower in the world. Neither its “hard” power nor its “soft” power could be matched by other countries. However, the US might now be seeing for the first time in its history a decline in its international status.

The above differences strongly affect the perceptions and mindset of China and the US in the context of the bilateral relationship. Both countries judge each other based on their own experiences and values.

3 Evolution of China–US relations: historical experience

China–US relations have gone through estrangement, alliance, confrontation, stalemate, detente, cooperation, and friction. Such a rich history contains many valuable lessons. When the future of the bilateral relations is uncertain, reviewing the past experience and lessons may help the two countries to be open-minded and avoid potentially disastrous confrontations. After analyzing the ups and downs in the history of China–US relations, we find three aspects are most worthy of attention.

3.1 China–US relations in a global context

The China–US relationship has never been just about the bilateral relationship between the two countries. To understand its evolution, we must put it in the context of a multilateral framework and global perspective, with particular focus on the connection and interactions between China and the US.

History shows two different scenarios. In the first scenario, changes in China–US relations are mainly affected by third-party factors. For instance, Japanese invasion and expansion was the most important factor that brought China and the US closer from the 1930s to the 1940s. The US-Soviet Cold War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War mainly contributed to China–US confrontation and stalemate from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the US’s preparation for withdrawal from Vietnam made China–US reconciliation possible. In the second scenario, changes in China–US relations drive many changes in the world. For example, the normalization of China–US relations facilitated China’s return to the United Nations and China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with many other countries, and China–US–Soviet relations and the international landscape have also changed as a result. Most importantly, these shifts had a domino effect, as the substantial improvement of China–US relations provided an enabling external environment for China to realize peaceful development, and China’s development greatly changed the global economic landscape. Of course, multiple interactions came into play in the historical chain of events, and other scenarios existed in the same era.

We are now in a different age. The reversal of China–US relations in recent years was not just attributed to bilateral factors, but also to other changes in the world. The recent wave of economic globalization driven by high-tech and information technology has caused a series of new challenges, including the rapid flow of capital, the rapid transfer of manufacturing, the decentralization of industrial supply chains, replacement of some traditional jobs by AI, intensified competition among countries, growing economic and social disparity within and among countries, and the rise of populism, nationalism, and racism. These emerging problems have resulted in many black swan incidents in the world and have led to the decline of this wave of economic globalization. The global challenges we face are more diverse, complex, and important than ever before.

In terms of China’s relationship with the world, the country’s peaceful development is mainly attributed to its integration into the existing international system and seizing of the opportunity brought about by globalization. The modernization of a country with a population of nearly 1.4 billion is unprecedented in human history and thus exerts unprecedented influence on the existing world system. The impact is so great mainly because of China’s size and speed of development, but the country’s system of governance is also an important factor. Disputes exist not only between China and the US but also between China and other developed countries and even some developing countries. China’s development is indeed a contribution to the world, bringing new development opportunities for many countries including the US. But at the same time, China cannot overlook the problems its development has caused and should properly resolve them in a positive manner.

China’s GDP is currently approaching that of the US, and the two countries are increasingly competitive in the fields of science and technology, military, finance, and diplomacy. With structural contradictions becoming increasingly acute, it was inevitable that the US would substantially adjust its China policy. The Trump Administration has defined China as a strategic rival and is likely to consider this viewpoint when formulating policies toward other countries. This new outlook on China will cause ripples in diplomacy that go far beyond bilateral relations between China and the US. At the same time, China’s strategies and China–US relations will become more intertwined with foreign policy in other parts of the world. All countries, including US allies, will have their own considerations and won’t simply take sides. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, many countries’ foreign policies have shown greater independence than before. When responding to the changes in the US’s China policy, China’s bilateral relationship with the US isn’t the only consideration. Rather, Beijing must also consider the overall diplomatic landscape, and incorporate its vision of building a global community and a shared future for mankind. The true picture of the complex interplay between China–US relations and other bilateral and multilateral relations is unfolding in new ways right now.

3.2 US responses to changes within China

As China changes, so do China–US relations. Historically speaking, China’s changes, though occurring internally, are both deeply influenced by the outside world and have a role in shaping it. The attitude and response of the United States to China’s internal policy changes has, therefore, become an important part of the interaction between the two countries and their relationship.

Generally speaking, the US tends to have the upper hand in China–US relations, because the two countries have different national strengths and different standing in the international system. However, the status of China–US relations at a deeper level depends on the situation within China. Many major events within China in the twentieth century have had a profound impact on the evolution of China–US relations, including the Revolution of 1911, the Great Revolutionary Movement, the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the conflicts between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the ensuing civil war, the victory of the Chinese Revolution, the division of China and the Soviet Union, the reform and opening-up and the rise of economic modernization. The status of US–China relations has depended largely on America’s stance on and response to these events, be it a wait-and-see approach, intervention, opposition, or support. It should be emphasized that for a country as big as China, it is impossible to copy any foreign model. Its development path can only be determined by its own national conditions and internal forces, and the reform and progress of its social system depends on the Chinese people’s own experience and practices. History has shown that foreign or external forces have limited influence in China (Zhang 2012 ).

Compared to China’s internal development, the two countries’ expectations for the future of the world play a larger role in the evolution of the bilateral relationship. These perspectives and expectations are extraordinary because both China and the US see that each country has an important part to play in shaping the future. With the rise of China, China carries more and more of the burden of fulfilling the expectations of both countries. In fact, “the China factor” is becoming more sensitive and salient in major countries’ expectations for the future of the world. When discussing China–US relations, leaders of other nations pay attention to whether the interests of the two countries are aligned or contradictory. If China and the US share the same vision for the world, cooperation would be a natural choice; if they disagree about the world’s future, one would expect them to adjust their policies toward each other accordingly. Seeking common ground, therefore, is particularly important in efforts to get China–US relations back on track.

3.3 China–US rivalry vs. China–US mutual trust

There is an old saying in China: “No discord, no concord.” In a sense, China and the US have improved mutual understanding through confrontation and rivalry. The most important thing is to identify each other’s strengths and limits. Only in this way can we be reassured and build mutual trust.

Tough policy on one side often suggests fear on its part. To eliminate fear, major countries must recognize each other’s strengths and limits. Rivalry for a period of time is the prerequisite for building mutual trust. For example, after the founding of the PRC, China was worried that the US might launch an armed aggression, and the US was worried that China might engage in Communist expansion in Asia. This mutual fear was one of the main reasons for the long-term stand-off between the two countries. In the 1970s, China was surprised that the US could not even win the Vietnam War, while the US saw many of China’s internal problems caused by the “Cultural Revolution.” Understanding each other’s limits led to both countries relaxing with regard to the potential threat posed by the other. It was an important prerequisite for the easing and improvement of China–US relations.

Strategic competition between China and the US has occurred several times in history, mostly after the founding of the PRC. The US, as the country with the upper hand, has been used to the strategy of applying maximum pressure; while China, as the country on the defensive, always fought back with caution and restraint, preparing for the worst. China has never been the first one to provoke. Although the rivalry between China and the US was sometimes fierce, even resorting to force, both countries carefully maintained policy flexibility and allowed room for readjustment, because neither country saw any hope of eliminating or completely defeating the other. Leaders of both countries were fully aware that no matter how they fought, the two major countries would one day establish diplomatic relations (Deng 1994 ).

This pattern can be seen in the aftermath of many events that occurred from the mid-1940s to the late-1960s. For example, in the Chinese civil war, the US “unconditionally” supported Chiang Kai-Shek, but avoided directly getting involved in the war. The Communist Party of China firmly opposed the US, but carefully avoided conflicts with the US Army. The US and China fought each other in the Korean War, but President Truman decided not to extend the war to the Chinese territory. When shelling Jinmen for the second time, Mao Zedong demanded that Americans should not be hurt. When Chiang Kai-Shek later attempted to attack the mainland and the Vietnam War escalated, China and the US, without formal diplomatic relations, managed the crisis through the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw and other channels, avoiding another direct confrontation. Both sides held the bottom line, leaving room for China–US relations to turn around (Tao 1999 ).

The mutual trust between the two countries after the establishment of diplomatic relations was built on the huge gap in their comprehensive national strengths, the mutual needs in the security sector, and the complementarity in the economy due to different levels of development. Other reasons mutual trust was able to last for 30 years included: China followed Deng Xiaoping’s diplomatic policy of “keeping a low profile” and “never taking the lead,” while the US hoped that China would become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system (Zoellick 2005 ). In addition, the leaders of the two countries maintained constructive communication during times of crisis, increasing economic exchanges anchored the bilateral relationship, and the two countries maintained coordination when facing security threats and challenges such as the global financial crisis, climate change, humanitarian disasters, global health challenges and epidemics, and nuclear nonproliferation.

Now for the first time, the US fears that China might catch up and sees China as a main challenger. Similar fears have occurred three times in America’s history: fear of Germany, Italy and Japan during World War II, of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and of a fast-growing Japan after World War II. The US experience and practices in dealing with these challengers will influence its current China policy. It will take time for China and the US to find each other’s true intentions and power limits through competition.

4 Rationality and wisdom is needed in handling China–US relations

China and the US will be forced to face their emerging structural disputes. Rivalry is inevitable. The outbreak of COVID-19 and measures taken by the Trump Administration left no buffer zone for policy adjustments. There is no going back to previous China–US relations, so we must look ahead to find a clear path leading to the future.

4.1 Characteristics of the US–China disputes

In the competition or rivalry between the US and China, the US seeks to maintain its global dominance, while China seeks to maintain its own right to development. The disputes between the two countries happen when the national strengths of the two countries converge. These dynamics will determine the outcome for China–US relations and the broader world.

The Trump Administration defines China as a strategic rival based on three considerations. The most important consideration is that the Administration believes China’s development challenges America’s global leadership. The other two considerations are the fact that the US’s engagement policy has failed, and China is believed to be “revisionist” to the current global system. As a result, the US has highly politicized the economic and trade disputes, high-tech competition, and the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 as a tool against China.

From the perspective of China, accelerating development and realizing socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics is the long-cherished aspiration of the Chinese nation. But China has neither the intention nor the capability of replacing the US as the sole global superpower. China believes that there is room for improvement of the existing international order and international governance system, but the reform can only be conducted in a step-by-step manner with consultation and cooperation among countries. In fact, compared with China, many US behaviors are more like “revisionist” to the international system.

Will the current rivalry between China and the US develop into a zero-sum game like the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union? Many people are concerned. The possibility does exist. However, if we take a deeper look, we will find that today’s world is very different from the world of the Cold War. The possibility of avoiding a zero-sum game between the two countries also exists.

There are three main differences between the current China–US disputes and the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. First, instead of reconstruction after World War II, the pressing issue now is the reform and adjustment of the current world order, which requires the joint participation of China, the US, and other countries. The China–US disputes will undoubtedly undermine the advancement of reform and adjustment. Second, the key reason the US-Soviet Union Cold War developed into a zero-sum game was the two countries battled over the supremacy of political systems and ideology. The collapse of the colonial system and the emergence of a large number of independent countries after World War II provided a huge market for the rivalry. Both the US and the Soviet Union regarded each other as a representative of an evil international force rather than a nation-state, believing failure would mean the destruction of an entire lifestyle, including material and spiritual aspects. But things are different now. The so-called “China model” only appeals to some developing countries due to China’s enviable economic growth. When it comes to ideology, China always stresses that different countries should be allowed to have different ideologies, while the US is more ready to export its own ideology. Finally, the Cold War created two world economic systems led by the US and the Soviet Union, respectively, but now China and the US coexist in one economic system. The fight between two parallel economic systems is significantly different from the fight within one economic system, in both form and content.

The above-mentioned differences objectively leave some room for China and the US to avoid a zero-sum game. Both countries have some leeway in the rivalry. If the US comes to realize that the decline in its global influence is attributed to its own internal factors and its errors in foreign policy rather than China’s challenge, and if China recognizes that safeguarding its own right to development is the theme of its disputes with the US and sticks to this theme while balancing its domestic and international interests, firmly deepening reform and opening-up, and always centering on the improvement of people’s well-being, then China and the US can avoid the Thucydides Trap and ultimately achieve a win–win situation through competition and cooperation.

Although China and the US may avoid falling into the trap of a zero-sum game, the struggle itself is never easy, especially for China. The US envisions a certain degree of “decoupling” from China. The primary goal is economic decoupling, as the US seeks to re-write trade rules to squeeze China’s share in the world economy, exerting pressure on China from all sides. Although China hopes to maintain contacts with the US that have been established since the beginning of the reform, partial decoupling, especially in the high-tech sector, is highly likely. The US will push even harder through its policy of exerting maximum pressure. China must prepare for the long run and withstand the pressure of the US.

Historical experience shows that significant changes in US foreign policy usually take a decade of preparation. Once these changes are instituted, major adjustments will take at least another decade. Due to the personality of President Trump and the sudden outbreak of COVID-19, the US now only has a rough policy toward China, which is unique in terms of US policy changes. For some time to come, it will be difficult for the US to change its current policy direction. The US may make major adjustments in its strategy and ease some tensions in certain aspects, but overall it will be tougher and tighter. Only when the US realizes, after some period of rivalry, that this policy cannot contain China’s development and the cost will be huge, will it change course. The most remarkable aspect of this unfolding scenario will be the strategies adopted by the two countries to realize their goals, and how they will revise those goals and adjust their strategies.

4.2 Reshaping China–US relations calls for patience, wisdom, and creativity

Reform and opening up relationships with the West made China a remarkable emerging power. The relationship between China and the outside world has never been closer and more complex. China is going through a stage of increased external pressure, an inevitable stage in the rise of a major country. The situation is epitomized by the current China–US relations.

Since the beginning of reform and opening-up, a major change in China’s attitude toward diplomacy is that it recognizes the diversity of the current world and believes that different parts of the diversified world are both conflicting and interdependent. Countries, especially major countries, have common interests in dealing with many international issues. They should and can cooperate.

Objectively speaking, China has become an important variable in international relations, and the mode of China’s interaction with the world has undergone significant changes. When analyzing the international situation and handling diplomatic affairs, China should not only look at the world from its own perspective but also learn to see China from the global perspective. When interacting with other countries, China needs to become accustomed to listening and stepping into the shoes of others. When elaborating on its own foreign policies and propositions, it cannot just think about itself and should understand other countries’ views and feelings. As an emerging country, China has received support in its development from many countries including the US, and still needs to learn from other countries. Therefore, China must always maintain modesty and prudence, increase its transparency and affinity, and strive for broad international cooperation in a way that can bring mutual benefit and returns to other countries. Chauvinism is the last thing China needs as it would cause great damage to the country.

The hyped-up notion that China will replace the US as the primary global superpower is a false proposition. The world in the future is bound to be multi-polar and diverse. It will definitely not follow the path of the twentieth century. The existing model of the US as the only superpower will not last. The real issue is that China and the US, two major countries, have established extensive ties and share common interests in many aspects, but their systems are extremely different. How do these two countries face the future world under competition? Can they cooperate? It is not only a challenge to the two countries, but also to the world at large. Reforming and adjusting the existing international system and establishing rules and orders acceptable to all countries will require the involvement of multiple parties as well as a lot of consultation, negotiation, and cooperation. In this process, China and the US can put forward different proposals so as to play a constructive role, but mutual cooperation is needed.

When great changes occur in China–US relations, both sides need to remain calm, restrained, and forward-looking. First, the two countries should have patience, and maintain communication and negotiation to avoid the escalation of tensions; second, if escalation cannot be avoided, both sides must try their best to avoid confrontation; last, no matter how bad their relationship becomes, they must leave some room for a turnaround. In particular, the US must be acutely aware that if it involves China’s core interests as a bargaining chip, it will seriously damage the foundation of the bilateral relationship. When handling bilateral relations, neither side should forget that the national conditions of the two countries are vastly different and they must continue to deepen mutual understanding. It is not only about avoiding and reducing misjudgments, but also about making and adopting more effective policies. A zero-sum game in today’s world will only end up damaging both sides.

It takes patience and wisdom as well as the courage to think outside the box to shape a situation in which China–US relations meet the needs of the times. There are many similar examples in the evolution of the normalization and development of China–US relations. To cope with the current predicament and build China–US relations for the future, more wisdom and greater creativity is needed. As two great countries in the world, China and the US should have insights and capabilities that reach beyond the constraints of history.

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Zhang, B. Understanding changes in Sino-U.S. relations from a historical perspective. China Int Strategy Rev. 2 , 1–13 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00048-6

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Received : 21 June 2020

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Published : 05 August 2020

Issue Date : June 2020

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00048-6

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Is the US-China relationship the most consequential relationship for America in the world?

Subscribe to the china bulletin, graham t. allison , graham t. allison douglas dillon professor of government - harvard university josh m. cartin , josh m. cartin adjunct professor, walsh school of foreign service - georgetown university elizabeth economy , elizabeth economy senior fellow - hoover institution susan a. thornton , susan a. thornton senior fellow - paul tsai china center, yale law school, nonresident senior fellow - foreign policy , john l. thornton china center @suea_thornton ryan hass , ryan hass director - john l. thornton china center , senior fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies , john l. thornton china center , chen-fu and cecilia yen koo chair in taiwan studies @ryanl_hass patricia m. kim , and patricia m. kim fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies , john l. thornton china center @patricia_m_kim emilie kimball emilie kimball senior project manager - foreign policy.

February 6, 2024

• 31 min read

In this written debate, the authors address the title question with essay-length opening statements. The statements are followed by an interactive series of exchanges between authors on each other’s arguments. The goal of this product is not to reach any conclusion on the question, but to offer a rigorous examination of the choices and trade-offs that confront the United States in its competition with China.

Many U.S. and Chinese leaders have referred to the U.S.-China relationship as the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, for instance, made such a case last November, the day after Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping’s summit in San Francisco. Is the Sino-American relationship the “most consequential” relationship in the 21st century for either country? How does this framing impact how the United States and China relate to each other, and to other countries, going forward?

To answer these questions and articulate the choices U.S. policymakers are facing, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, and Emilie Kimball, co-leads of the Brookings Foreign Policy project: “ Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World ,” convened a group of leading experts—Graham Allison, Josh M. Cartin, Elizabeth Economy, and Susan Thornton—to engage in a written debate examining if the U.S.-China relationship is the most consequential relationship for America and the world. These experts also will participate in a live discussion on this question moderated by Evan Osnos on February 12. Their opening written statements and reactions follow below :

The most consequential relationship in the world?

The invitation from Brookings’ debate organizers asked: “Is the U.S.-China relationship the most consequential bilateral relationship for the United States in the world?”

My answer is: yes. If not China, who?

• one of only two nations that poses an existential threat to the United States.
• the only nation that poses a systemic threat to the U.S. position as the global leader, architect, and guardian of the post-World War II international order.
• the largest emitter of greenhouse gases—accounting for more emissions in 2022 than the United States and Europe combined.
• the second backbone of the world economy: the manufacturing workshop of the world, the No. 1 trading partner of most countries in the world (including the European Union and Japan), and the supplier of most critical items (including everything green and clean) in global supply chains.
• both a classic Thucydidean rival and America’s inseparable, conjoined Siamese twin.

An existential threat . In 2024, there are two—and only two—nations in the world that have nuclear arsenals that can literally erase the United States from the map. China is, therefore, one of only two nations that poses a genuinely existential threat—that is, one that threatens our existence—to the United States. It is one of only two nations with which the United States is required to survive in a relationship cold warriors described as MAD (mutually assured destruction)—a condition that creates an overriding shared imperative for both countries’ leaders to avoid a nuclear war in which their countries would be the first victims.

A systemic threat. With four times the U.S. population, an economy that has over the past generation soared to overtake the United States as the world’s largest in purchasing power parity terms, 1 and its role as most nations’ No. 1 trading partner, the world’s leading manufacturer, and a serious competitor in most advanced technologies (including artificial intelligence), China is the only nation that could displace the United States as the world’s leading power.

China sees itself returning to what it believes is its rightful place at the center of the world—a position from which it was toppled two centuries ago when Westerners with technology arrived to imperialize and humiliate it. The United States is a colossal ruling power that created a remarkable international order in the aftermath of the deadliest war in history. That order has allowed us—and the world—to enter a historically unprecedented 79th year of a long peace—a period without great power war. This security and economic order has enabled more people to see greater increases in their well-being than at any equivalent period in history. And no population has benefitted more dramatically from this than the 1.4 billion people living in China! Americans have become so accustomed to being at the top of every pecking order for a century—what we call the “American century”—that this is now part of our identity. The American foreign policy establishment is rightly proud of what American leadership has accomplished, not only for the United States, but for the world, and is not about to retreat gracefully.

Are Xi Jinping and his colleagues serious about displacing the United States as the predominant power in the Pacific in the foreseeable future? I put that question to Lee Kuan Yew, the founder and long-time prime minister of Singapore, who was the world’s most insightful China watcher until his death in 2015. I will never forget his response. With his piercing eyes widening with incredulity—as if to say, “Are you joking?”—he responded: “Of course! Why not? How could they not aspire to be number one in Asia—and, in time, the world?”

This rivalry creates a classic Thucydidean dynamic that magnifies misunderstandings, multiplies miscalculations, and increases the impact of incidents and accidents that have historically ended in war. Of the 16 cases in the last 500 years in which a major rising power seriously threatened to displace a ruling power, 12 ended in war.

Inseparable, conjoined Siamese twins. What neither the United States nor China has come to grips with is the brute fact that the fiercest rivalry of all time is occurring in specific conditions in which neither can by itself ensure its most vital national interest: namely, its own survival.

If accidents, incidents, or third-party provocations drag the rivals into war (as the assassination of an archduke did in 1914), both could be erased from the map. President Ronald Reagan’s incandescent lesson—“a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must never be fought”—is, thus, a foundational truth in U.S.-China relations. In an analog that has been called Climate MAD, on current trajectories, unconstrained Chinese or American greenhouse gas emissions could so disrupt the enclosed biosphere in which we both live that neither of us could survive. In the financial arena, the United States and China are now so deeply entangled that a financial crisis in one could lead to a global depression for all. When, in 2008, Wall Street risk-taking caused a great financial crisis in the United States, only joint stimuli by both China and the United States prevented that from spiraling into a global depression. Cooperation is also required to contain transnational threats—the proliferation of nuclear weapons, pandemics, and global terrorism—sustain the benefits both countries’ citizens expect and demand from trade, and to advance science, technology, and knowledge.

F. Scott Fitzgerald defined the test of a first-class mind as the ability to hold two contradictory ideas in one’s head at the same time and still function. Success in managing the most consequential relationship in the world will require the United States and China to find ways to live with two contradictory imperatives: to compete in the greatest rivalry of all time while cooperating where each nation’s survival requires it.

History is not kind to superlatives

Short answer: no. In the near quarter-millennium since the United States’ founding, one would be pressed to identify a single interval during which China constituted the United States’ “most consequential” relationship. For most of the United States’ existence, China has been aloof, insular, or in prolonged or intense states of internal disarray or near implosion. In the 75 years of the People’s Republic of China, the bilateral relationship has alternated among hot hostility, cold suspicion, and, subject to constraints imposed by radically different political systems, pragmatic engagement. Asserting that at any given juncture China’s situation or direction served as a decisive threat to or enabler of U.S. power invites debate. One possible exception is China as a source or reservoir for novel pathogens that have at least twice found their way onto U.S. shores to wreak havoc on the population and economy, with a few near misses, and likely more to follow.

Suppose the answer were “yes.” The factors that would impute supreme consequence to China for the United States are exclusively or overwhelmingly negative: China as a preeminent threat to this vital U.S. interest, or that conception of U.S. identity or national destiny. Not to say there has been a shortage of efforts to identify elements of positive consequence. It has been fashionable to say that the United States “needs” China’s cooperation to address transnational issues like climate change and pandemic disease. While China’s world-beating carbon emissions do confer a high degree of responsibility, climate change is a collective problem that requires the cooperation of other major emitters like India, whose consequence over time will rise relative to China, as the latter’s economy cools and transforms and population declines. On the matter of pandemic disease, China’s record of cooperation has been so poor, and is deteriorating further, so as to risk consigning it to the category of permanent liability.

China is and will be negatively consequential for the United States; the question is whether to a superlative degree. Those who perceive a second cold war would assert that if in 1945-1991 the United States regarded the Soviet Union as its “most consequential” relationship, then the same status must now be assigned to China. The analogy is seductive but falters in its particulars: U.S.-Soviet rivalry was extensive, global, constructed upon rival military alliances and competitive social ideologies, excited by dozens of proxy wars, and bounded by assurance of mutual destruction. Such was the nature of an existential threat to the United States in the 20th century. China is not there yet, and while it would be imprudent to ignore the signals, it is not certain that China’s threats will materialize into something of existential consequence for the United States.

A more interesting question is whether the United States can acknowledge China as a persistent, negative influence on and sometimes threat to U.S. vital interests, while not ascribing preeminence to its level of influence and threat. This would be consistent with the normal bandwidth of the relationship over the last 250 years and appreciates both enduring reserves of U.S. strength and China’s yo-yoing over the centuries between adventure and insularity. Whether China has now entered a periodic strategic spooling or unspooling, the country’s negative influence on U.S. interests will manifest “most consequentially” in two domains: first, the geographical domain of the Western Pacific; and second, the social domain of politics, and in particular, the changing nature of the relationship between government and the governed.

China wants the United States out of the Western Pacific or its presence much diminished. The pace, intensity, and manner in which China resources this goal and in which the United States responds will engender a dynamic of unquestionably grave consequence—given the potential for kinetic conflict. Conflict in the Western Pacific and the disposition thereof might not actually pose an existential threat to the United States—even in defeat the republic would likely still stand—but defeat would involve an epochal reorientation of a U.S. forward defense concept that has persisted since the end of World War II. A similar level of consequence could, however, be applied to a direct Russian military challenge to NATO in Europe, or an all-out Iranian assault on U.S. partnerships in the Middle East. Because it is the network of alliances and partnerships that undergirds the U.S. presence, defense strategy, and geopolitical identity in the Western Pacific and elsewhere, it begs the question of whether maintenance, nourishment, and invigoration of those relationships are “more consequential” to U.S. interests than whatever adversarial choices China might make. The perspective from which U.S. policymakers view this question of relative consequence—prioritizing relations with allies versus adversaries—has implications for how strategic resources—and political rhetoric—are to be apportioned.

There remains an underappreciated way in which China could turn out to be of unequaled consequence—something that resides at far greater depths than the strategic imaginings of China’s current leadership. It is the manner in which China’s political composition reflects and advances a certain “computational” evaluation of human life and aspiration—in which the individual is a functional cog in a social system programmed and operated from on high. China’s authoritarian impulses long predate the country’s adaptation of European communism, but the People’s Republic of China is endeavoring to distill a form of social engineering that in the high-technology era constrains to the point of suffocation the spark of individual human agency required for liberal democratic governance. This is a politics that holds appeal for the world’s dictators and kleptocrats, as well as segments of the United States’ own techno-elite. But it is a politics anathema to the United States’ founding proposition and an existential challenge to the wellspring of our national power. To whatever degree, China’s real consequence to the United States is not to be found in the geopolitical moment. It is in the challenge an empowered China might pose to the United States’ position at the vanguard of liberal democracy, and to U.S. confidence in projecting its template for enlightened governance into a future crowded with looming shadows.

The incredible, shrinking bilateral relationship

There are many ways to describe the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. For example, the relationship is the world’s most complex, most challenging, or most competitive. However, the relationship is not “the most consequential in the world for America.” Far more consequential is the United States’ relationship with its network of allies and partners in Asia, Europe, and North America. Unlike China, the United States’ allies and close partners share the same values, norms, and strategic objectives. They are the United States’ most important trade and investment partners. And state-to-state and multilateral engagements are extensive. Most importantly, they play the most consequential role in both advancing and constraining the United States’ ability to realize its most important strategic ambitions.

That is not to say that China doesn’t matter. Along with the United States, China is one of the world’s great powers. Washington has termed China its “ pacing challenge ” and “ most consequential strategic competitor .” A June 2023 Pew Foundation poll revealed that 50 percent of Americans surveyed believe that China poses the greatest threat to the United States. China’s domestic and foreign policy choices are shaping the geo-economic and strategic landscape in ways that are both profound and antithetical to U.S. interests. It is working to de-dollarize the international financial system, end the U.S.-led system of military alliances, and undermine the international human rights regime. In the name of Chinese sovereignty, Beijing attacks the security of U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Taiwan, India, and the Philippines, among others. And it is providing an economic and military lifeline to Russia in the latter’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Its developmental model produces externalities that threaten U.S. national security in areas such as climate change, global health, and trade.

But while China’s actions are highly consequential for the United States (as well as for the rest of the world), the bilateral relationship is not the most consequential. Instead, China’s behavior more often incentivizes the United States to prioritize its relationship with its network of allies and partners. In trade and investment, for example, harmful Chinese economic practices, such as economic coercion, trade-distorting subsidies, and military-civil fusion, have triggered a set of new and transformative U.S. economic initiatives, including supply chain resiliency, re- and near-shoring manufacturing, and creating a new regime around export controls and investment screening. These efforts’ success or failure relies not on the United States’ relationship with China but on Washington’s policy alignment with its close partners and allies.

Similarly, Chinese military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific has prompted the United States to bolster relations with its allies and partners in Asia and Europe. It has strengthened maritime security cooperation with its Quad partners, India, Japan, and Australia; fostered a new security arrangement, AUKUS , to support technology sharing among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and Australia’s acquisition of nuclear submarines; and initiated a new trilateral security initiative with Japan and South Korea. In addition, with U.S. encouragement, NATO and individual European countries—such as France, Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands—have become more deeply engaged in maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States has also forged new cooperative ventures with other advanced market democracies to create high-standard alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment . These initiatives are designed to meet the global demand for infrastructure financing while maintaining robust governance standards around financing, labor, environment, transparency, and gender equality and equity.

The U.S.-China bilateral relationship has certainly had moments of great consequence for the United States. When the two countries’ interests aligned, the relationship contributed to containing the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, jump-starting global cooperation on climate change in 2015, and over the decades, providing low-cost labor for American firms and a bounty of low-cost goods for American consumers. There have also been moments when important interests appeared aligned but ultimately were not, such as on North Korea’s nuclear program.

However, over the almost half-century since the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship, the bilateral relationship has never realized the potential Washington imagined. The two countries’ values, norms, and interests have increasingly diverged, and the ties that have bound them together have increasingly frayed. Today, the United States and China support distinct political, economic, and security arrangements: China backs the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS bloc, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, while the United States underpins NATO, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the G7. China is no longer the United States’ top trading partner, and bilateral trade has fallen off significantly; while U.S. exports to China have remained largely flat, in the first 11 months of 2023, China’s exports to the United States fell by more than 20 percent from 2022. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai reported in September 2023 that 40 percent of its member firms were seeking to redirect investment originally slated for China to other countries. And China does not rank even among the top 10 countries as a source of foreign direct investment in the United States. Engagement by senior U.S. officials with their Chinese counterparts is limited in both scope and time. Americans are traveling and studying in China in dramatically reduced numbers.

This weakening of the United States and China’s connective tissue is only likely to accelerate given the priority both countries are placing on de-risking their economies and advancing radically alternative visions of world order. Ultimately, without a dramatic change in domestic political dynamics or a global crisis that creates a new sense of solidarity and collaboration between the two countries, the outcome will be a more fractured world in which scholars will raise the question not of whether the U.S.-China bilateral relationship is the most consequential for America, but of whether it is of any consequence at all.

China matters, for better or worse: Our choice

This question reminds me of the story of Secretary of State George Schultz receiving outgoing U.S. ambassadors and requesting that they “point to their country” on a globe in his office. Inevitably, the ambassadors would point to the country where they were headed on diplomatic assignment, wherein Schultz would move their finger around to the United States; “This is your country.” It reminds us that the ultimate goal of U.S. foreign relations is to defend and further Americans’ interests, and that the most consequential American relationship in the world is with its own citizens. And just to be clear, relations with or actions taken by any other single country will have little consequence for Americans in the world compared to our own decisions and actions. Our fate lies in our own hands.

But that said, there is no country on Earth other than America itself that has as much potential to impact—for good and bad—the lives of ordinary American citizens as China. Recently, it has become fashionable in the United States to talk of “peak China,” “un-investable China,” or “shrinking China.” India has surpassed China as the world’s most populous country and China faces a demographic crisis. China’s economic “long-COVID” has slowed growth from double-digit annual rates to low single digits. China’s leadership appears bent on ever-expanding controls and limits on political, economic, and social life, while corruption and arbitrariness continue to undermine its authority. These may all be true, and yet there is more to the story.

Economy: The United States and China are by far ahead of the next tier of global players in economic power, and China is hands-down now and decades into the future going to be the center of precision manufacturing and a major innovation center. The two economies are complementary and tightly intertwined, for better and worse. These connections enable expanded markets, diffusion of innovations, and lower prices for consumers. They can also spawn problems, such as distorted labor markets, unfair competition, and even criminality, as seen in the Chinese role in the fentanyl trade.

China is the largest importer of both food and energy. It contributes around one-third of global growth annually, which is important to every economy, America’s included. Chinese growth may slow down but is starting from a much larger base so will remain a key growth source, as is the United States. The Mexican and Canadian economies are important for the United States, and the EU as a bloc is significant. Japan and South Korea are major players and others, like India, Brazil, and Indonesia, are growing fast. But China’s size, determination, and opportunities will preserve its “most consequential” status in the economic category for some time to come.

Science and Technology: The U.S. and Chinese scientific establishments are the largest and most advanced in the world and dwarf other players. In many areas, Chinese and American scientists have worked together on new technologies, such as medical breakthroughs and climate advances, which have major positive impacts on American lives. Chinese researchers are working with counterparts to trial promising new treatments for cancer, Alzheimer’s, and other deadly diseases, and if clinical trials can be streamlined, millions more lives might be saved. Clearly, as seen in COVID-19, China’s emergent pandemic disease surveillance and response can be crucial to American lives and livelihoods. And of course, climate change is an area where China’s decisions and actions as the largest greenhouse gas emitter will directly impact Americans and everyone else; moves by the United States, India, and others will also be important, but China has the most urgent work to do.

There are also the potential negative consequences of Chinese technology advances, particularly amid increasingly tense U.S.-China scientific competition. Some think that Chinese digital technology will be targeted against Americans; witness members of Congress calling for TikTok bans so that it can’t “corrupt young Americans and teach them to hate their country.” Or China may develop general artificial intelligence or biotech advancements that, inadequately controlled, could produce major harms. Or China might develop some other game-changing technology that it would refuse to share or that would drive major changes in America in response.

Military/Security: The U.S. and Chinese militaries are the largest, most expensive, and most advanced in the world, and while China is still behind the United States, the two are far ahead of all others. China’s continuing military modernization and its threat to take back Taiwan by force will be the biggest driver of U.S. military budget increases in the coming decades. Even if a war over Taiwan never comes, associated increasing U.S. military budgets will crowd out other federal government functions as resources are squeezed. If the war does come, it will certainly have a devastating impact on Americans, no matter the scenario.

The other security area that the United States and China dominate is digital communications and global internet infrastructure and innovations. The United States and China harbor the biggest internet tech companies and sectors, and while U.S. companies lead, Chinese companies are serious competitors. This issue crosses economic, science, technology, and security domains, and, as a result, has become very difficult for the U.S.-China relationship to manage in an era of strategic competition. These difficulties will likely impact every American with a smartphone at some point.

In short, America cannot escape “China impact.” China is big, capable, changing rapidly, and operating in all priority zones. Still, obsessing over what China does or might do is a mistake that will carry large opportunity costs for America that it cannot afford. China may be the most consequential “other country,” but we need to take responsibility for our own future, a future that will involve “China impact,” but that we can shape.

Graham T. Allison

I enjoyed reading the responses from my colleagues and was reassured about my own answer when reading Thornton’s thoughtful piece, but I was left somewhat puzzled by the responses from Economy and Cartin.

If, instead, the organizers had offered a menu of multiple-choice answers that included collections of countries, anyone who answered “China” would expand that to “adversaries” and include Russia, Iran, and North Korea—essentially for free.

Indeed, if the question were open-ended, my answer would focus not on relationships between the United States and foreign countries, but on relationships among fellow Americans. As we approach a presidential election in which our society is deeply divided between two candidates, each of whom argues that the other’s election will mean the end of American democracy, one can clearly hear echoes of Abraham Lincoln’s wise warning: “A house divided against itself cannot stand.”

• In arguing against the significance of the U.S.-China relationship, both Economy and Cartin duck the reality of China’s existential threat. The brute fact is that China is one of only two nations in the world with nuclear arsenals that constitute genuine “existential” threats—meaning threatening existence. If, as a result of nuclear war, the United States were erased from the map, could anything be more consequential for Americans? Survival is a necessary condition for any other relationship to be of consequence for us. Uncomfortable as it is, as Reagan taught us, this condition creates an overriding shared imperative for the leaders of both countries to avoid a nuclear war, of which their countries would be the first victims.
• Cartin appears to be afraid to recognize China as the fiercest rival a ruling power has ever faced because that could lead to American accommodation. While that would be one possible response, an alternative (as the Biden administration has demonstrated) is to become more serious about our own competitiveness, establish a network of allied and aligned countries as a counterbalance, and become more strategic in our diplomacy.
• Is Economy teasing when she forecasts a future “in which scholars will raise the question not of whether the U.S.-China bilateral relationship is the most consequential for America, but of whether it is of any consequence at all?” I suspect so. But lest some reader be misled, in addition to the evidence summarized in my essay, I suggest they consider the near unanimity among U.S. national security experts in both parties (see the below extracts from both Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump’s National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, and National Intelligence Assessments).

Josh M. Cartin

The overlap in the four answers is refreshing and reflects the notion that the U.S. policy community to an extent has coalesced around some fundamental understandings about China. Granted, agreeing that China is big, important, and threatening does not constitute penetrating, expert insight, but at least these answers were free of the vermillion-tinted delusion of years past.

Some noted the importance of the U.S. network of allies and partners, which is a clear, comparative advantage over China; or an absolute advantage given the tempestuous and rabid behavior of some of the all-weather, lips-and-teeth few China appears to have in its corner. Yet rather than celebrate this architecture of U.S. power and influence that our forebears constructed over decades, many Americans are too ready to slander our allies and partners as fence-sitters and freeloaders. Like it or not, those allies and partners will be part of whatever framework the United States comes up with to deal with China. Those who declaim the monumentality of China’s threat to U.S. global leadership and then denigrate one of the critical components that undergirds it are engaging in polemic disguised as policy analysis.

Getting our own house in order is something upon which most pieces agreed. Many of our “China problems” are actually “America problems,” and if better awareness of China’s challenges to U.S. interests lights a fire under efforts to make U.S. institutions fit for 21st-century competitive purposes, so much the better. We should have the wherewithal to precision-guide our responses in a way that maximizes strategic effect, minimizes collateral damage—not least to our own institutions—and which we can resource over the longer term. It is time to transition to the quiet and determined phase of U.S. China strategy, whereas the current discourse resembles a piñata party with blindfolded contestants shouting and waving sticks in every direction, creating wind but landing few blows.

Disharmony among panelists on the meaning of “existential threat” bears mention, as well as divergence on the notion of U.S.-China interdependency. The past is littered with the detritus of faded imperia and broken interchange among peoples. There is no such thing as an inevitable outcome of history, and believing that the United States is somehow locked into a status quo that may prove fleeting only constrains the hard policy choices we have no choice but to make.

Elizabeth Economy

There is broad agreement among all the contributors on one basic point: China is a big and influential global power that has the capability to impact the United States across every policy dimension: political, economic, and security—and much of that impact is negative. Beyond that unsurprising baseline agreement, however, there are some significant differences among the authors’ perspectives.

Allison and Thornton are most closely aligned in their views. They argue that high U.S.-China interdependence and high China impact or potential impact on the United States means the U.S.-China relationship is the most consequential relationship for America. Allison’s depiction of China’s impact is starker and darker than Thornton’s; he presents China as both an existential and systemic threat. Thornton, in contrast, sees opportunities, as well as challenges, emanating from the relationship. But fundamentally, they are on the same page.

If “bilateral relationship” is defined simply as impact and interdependence, it is hard to disagree with Allison and Thornton. (Of course, it also begs the question of which countries would not name China or the United States as their most consequential relationship given the two countries’ relative economic, military, and political weight in the international system.) However, by implicitly defining “bilateral relationship” differently—as intentional engagement designed to realize actors’ interests—I arrived at a different conclusion. Namely, the most consequential bilateral relationship is that between the United States and its allies and partners.

Cartin’s analysis is the most surprising. Like Allison and Thornton, he uses interdependence and impact as stand-ins for “relationship.” However, he concludes that they are weak and not consequential, except in a few distinct policy areas (although he also suggests this may change given China’s growing challenge to U.S. democratic values and global leadership). In the meantime, it would be interesting to know what bilateral relationship he believes is the most consequential relationship for America today.

Ultimately, what makes the proposition interesting and potentially important are not the answers, but whether those answers take us in meaningfully different directions with regard to U.S. policy—a point Cartin also makes. Does one answer lead to a preference for doubling down on engagement with Beijing over deepening work with U.S. allies and partners to shape the international system? What would be the policy implications of Thornton’s initial answer: that the most consequential relationship for America is with its own people? The real issue under debate shouldn’t be whether the U.S.-China relationship is the most consequential but what it means for how the United States should prioritize its scarce diplomatic and economic resources.

Susan A. Thornton

It seems that all respondents have essentially affirmed the U.S.-China relationship as our most consequential bilateral or at least no one is arguing that another single country matters more. Where we seem to dwell and differ is on whether those consequences are likely to be overwhelmingly negative, which aspects of America’s future are likely to be most China-affected, and how to ensure that we are minimizing negative and maximizing positive impacts.

No respondent rules out the possibility of future U.S.-China conflict and all agree that such conflict must be avoided, highlighting the need for careful attention to the bilateral relationship; isolating China would thus be irresponsible, a point on which consensus has been generated with the help of U.S. allies over the last year. As Economy points out, other countries constrain or enable U.S. action depending on their own relations with China; they also tend to view U.S.-China relations as the most consequential bilateral relationship for themselves and the world. Allison further states that, while carefully managing relations to avoid conflict, the United States and China must further layer their engagement to enable not just conflict avoidance but active coordination and collaboration on the many areas where they are intertwined and are the two biggest players. This does make the relationship “complex,” but it does not make it less consequential for America; indeed, quite the opposite.

Cartin indicates that China occupies an exaggerated place in U.S. foreign policy and that a Thucydidean fear of Chinese usurpation looms overly large in the American imagination; I agree. As Cartin observes, China tends toward isolationism and is reluctant to involve itself in global problems. China’s strength lags the United States in most areas, and in some crucial areas it faces serious challenges. How China will cope with its ongoing economic transition and security vulnerabilities in an era of rapid technological change and diminished faith in authority is uncertain but will have major consequences for the United States and other countries.

Both Economy and Cartin make the point that U.S.-China cooperation has not lived up to the hype in recent decades, which is true. However, engagement brought many more benefits to Americans than the estrangement of the past five years. The deterioration in U.S.-China relations has stymied the needed coordination on major challenges where both countries carry the biggest weight in the system. If estrangement between the two grows, as Economy predicts, it will become much more difficult for the global community, including Americans, to meet economic, environmental, technological, security, and other challenges, as China’s weight in all these areas approaches America’s own. This failure will be incredibly consequential.

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US-China Relations in the 21st Century

In international affairs and international politics, US-China relations are essential in global affairs and foreign policy. As emerging powers with increasing influence on world events and actions, China and America’s relations impact many aspects of contemporary society such as economy, finance, security, technology, and environment (Hass, 2020). Both countries are members of the United Nations Security Council and nuclear powers. They are two of the world’s largest economies. Therefore, the relationship between these two countries is significant and has been a focus of attention for many scholars, researchers, and journalists.

The United States and China have had a complicated history of their relations, beginning with trade in the 19th century. The first treaty between the two countries was signed in 1844 when the two sides agreed on several points regarding commerce. It set the stage for further treaties over the next few decades, including one that gave Christian missionaries the right to proselytize in China. During this time, a growing movement within the United States called for it to open its borders to Chinese immigrants. Many Americans saw Chinese workers as an inexpensive labor source and were eager to take advantage of their willingness to work for low wages. This early relationship would become troubled when the US passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, effectively preventing Chinese immigrants from entering the country.

China and America have had an on-off relationship since the Second World War ended in 1945 (Medeiros, 2019). At this point, China was a poor and underdeveloped country with very few ties to America or any other Western country. The new communist government of China supported the Soviet Union and its allies. By contrast, America was firmly opposed to communism and did not recognize the new government of China, so it never established formal diplomatic relations with it.

The two countries would not resume normal relations until after World War II when they began working together to rebuild postwar Europe. In 1971, President Nixon traveled to China and established diplomatic relations. It led to a period of rapprochement between the two sides, culminating in the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement issued by Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The communique laid out the basic principles of US-China relations, including recognizing each other’s sovereignty and the commitment to peaceful coexistence (Goldstein, 2020). It also acknowledged that the two countries had different ideologies but affirmed that they could still work together.

Since the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in 1979, US-China relations have been a critical focus of American foreign policy. The 1990s saw a shift in the dynamics of US-China relations as Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms began to take effect in China. Former President Bill Clinton played an essential role in developing these relations, exemplified by his speech in Shanghai in 1998, where he argued that America should not let concerns about human rights issues hinder the development of economic ties between the two countries.

In the 21st century, this relationship has become increasingly important as both countries have experienced significant changes. The United States is now the world’s sole superpower, while China has become one of the world’s leading economies. As these two countries undergo significant transformations, it is essential to examine their bilateral relations and identify areas of cooperation and potential points of conflict.

The United States has long been the preeminent global power, with a military and economic might that have no equal. For much of the 20th century, this worked to its advantage, as it was able to exert its influence on other countries while enjoying relative isolation from the rest of the world. However, with the rise of China and other countries in the 21st century, this is no longer the case. The United States must now confront a world where it is no longer the only superpower, and its relationships with other countries are becoming increasingly complex (Gontcharova, 2011).

With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, there was a sharp increase in trade relationships across the nations. It led to increased investment by American companies in China and vice versa and counter-terrorism. Since the early 2000s, there has been a significant increase in Sino-US military cooperation. It has been primarily driven by American worries about China’s increasing military power, a perceived challenge to America’s position in Asia. In 2015, a senior Chinese military officer popularised “New Type of Great Power Relations” to highlight China’s ambitions to be recognized as an equal world power.

China’s meteoric economic growth has been propelled by several factors, including an open economy, a large population, and an aggressive investment in education and technology. Over the past decade, China has become the world’s leading manufacturer and exporter, totaling $2.3 trillion in 2015. It is also now the world’s second-largest economy, with a high Gross Domestic Production of more than $11 trillion as China’s economy has grown, its political and military power too. The Chinese government has used its newfound wealth to invest in several high-tech weapons systems, including aircraft carriers, stealth fighters, and ballistic missiles. It has also expanded its military presence in the South China Sea, embroiled in a territorial dispute with several other countries.

So far, the US has been reluctant to take a side in the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. However, that could change if it decided that China’s actions were detrimental to its interests or allies in the region. Military tension between the countries is unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out altogether. The United States has been watching China’s rise with a mix of apprehension and envy. On the one hand, it is alarmed by China’s growing military power and aggressive stance in the South China Sea. On the other hand, it is impressed by China’s economic progress and its ability to modernize its economy rapidly.

In the last two decades, US-China relations have taken a few hits. In 2001, a US surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet and crashed (Vinodan & Kurian, 2021). In 2009, a US security firm released a report testing cyberespionage techniques on several large American corporations from China, to which the Chinese government said it would investigate the intelligence breach. In 2010, the US announced a plan to sell arms to Taiwan. It angered the Chinese government and led to several months of tension. In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the US had been spying on China for years.

Another area of concern is China’s willingness to support Russia politically and financially. Although the country had always tried to maintain good relations with its northern neighbor, it now seems more committed than ever to supporting Russia in international affairs. It is most apparent when it comes to the ongoing conflict in Syria. In recent years, China has supported several UN resolutions to sanction Bashar al-Assad’s regime while also repeatedly blocking Western efforts to enforce them.

On the other hand, many Chinese citizens resent American hegemony for several reasons. The US has militarily and politically interfered in many countries’ internal affairs, including Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Americans also killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians during World War II with the atomic bomb and supported Taiwan’s independence movement in the 1950s and 60s.

The 21st century has seen a significant evolution in US-China relations. From trade disputes to accusations of cyber theft, the two countries have had their share of disagreements. Trade is a significant concern in US-China relations. The United States has long been concerned about China’s high tariffs and barriers to entry for American businesses. IN RECENT YEARS, the US has accused China of engaging in unfair trade practices, such as currency manipulation and intellectual property theft. As a result, the US has imposed tariffs on Chinese goods. China has responded to the US tariffs by imposing its tariffs on American goods.

The trade war between the two countries has hurt both economies. In particular, it has caused prices of consumer goods to increase and jobs to be lost. Another issue that has caused tension between the US and China is cybertheft (Lukin, 2019). The US has accused China of cyber espionage or stealing intellectual property from American businesses. China has denied these accusations, but the US has continued to pressure China to stop its cyberattacks.

Nevertheless, despite these tensions, the United States and China have made significant progress in other aspects of their bilateral relationship. In November 2014, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping announced that the United States would significantly reduce its carbon emissions by 26-28% before 2025, while China agreed it would peak its emissions by 2030. It was seen as a breakthrough, as China and US are responsible for over 40% of the carbon emitted to the globe. In November 2015, the countries also agreed on cyber security, in which both sides pledged not to conduct or support cyber theft of trade secrets or intellectual property for commercial gain.

The two countries have coexisted relatively peacefully up until recently, but with the election of Donald, Trump relations have become more strained. Trump has accused China of unfair trade practices and currency manipulation, among other things. He has also threatened to raise tariffs on Chinese goods, which could spark a trade war between the two countries. Many Chinese citizens were angry with the US because they felt that Trump was trying to contain its development. Some of Trump’s policies, opposing the One China policy and supporting the independence of Taiwan, made the US-China relationship tense and uncertain (Chen, 2019). It could have severe consequences for both countries and the world. Despite their differences, the nations must continue to work together.

The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies, and their bilateral relationship will always be necessary. The two countries have somewhat different political systems, and their economies are inextricably linked. In order for the relationship to continue to grow and flourish, both sides need to continue to work together on issues where they can agree while also managing and resolving areas of disagreement in a constructive manner (Lejun, 2021). Tensions will always exist between these two great powers, but they must manage these tensions effectively not to jeopardize the overall relationship.

One area where the two countries have worked cooperatively is in international security. The two countries have partnered to address issues like the nuclear weapons program in North Korea and the issue of climate change. They also cooperate on UN peacekeeping missions. In 2015, the US and China reached a landmark deal to limit carbon emissions at the UN Climate Change Conference. While this agreement was widely viewed as a diplomatic success, there are areas where cooperative relations have been less successful. For example, despite years of negotiations on trade agreements such as the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, issues such as intellectual property protection remain unresolved.

The United States has long considered China’s human rights record an area of significant concern for bilateral relations (Kim, 2018). China has faced growing international criticism over its treatment of political dissidents and ethnic minorities in recent years. Chinese leaders have emphasized their country’s state-centric sovereignty system in response to these criticisms. Despite continued American pressure on human rights, leaders in Beijing have remained resistant to international intervention in domestic affairs.

While the US and China have often seen each other as adversaries, there are several reasons why they should continue to work together in the 21st century. The most important of these is global economic interdependence (Lampton, 2013). Simply put, American prosperity is heavily dependent on China’s continued growth. Therefore, the conflict between these two countries could result in higher tariffs or greater economic sanctions and significant trade disruption that negatively impacts both countries’ economies. It makes it far less likely that either country will move towards military confrontation since this would be too costly for all parties involved. Another reason both countries should cooperate is that doing so could help them address other major global issues.

While the United States and China have collaborated on particular security concerns affecting the globe, they have struggled to find common ground on topics such as climate change. In order to address these challenges, both countries need a stable relationship where each side can trust the other. Cooperative relations in one area will enable leaders in Beijing and Washington DC to build trust between them and gradually expand their areas of cooperation until they can find solutions for all of the world’s major problems.

Many scholars predict that the US-China relationship will continue to be unstable in the future, though most agree there will be no full-on conflict. The two countries have become too economically intertwined with severing all ties. While trade disputes cause tensions between these two countries, they pale in comparison with the economic benefits of cooperation. The countries’ shared interests in world stability and free trade make it unlikely that any US-China disagreement will escalate into a full-fledged military conflict between these two powers.

In conclusion, since the early 21st century, the two nations have experienced a complicated relationship. The two countries are the world’s largest economies and have many areas of mutual interest. Some of the key issues in US-China relations include trade, cybersecurity, human rights, and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. In recent years, these issues have become increasingly contentious, and the two countries have sometimes been unable to reach a consensus on moving forward. Therefore, friction is inevitable even though the two countries have extensive economic, trade, military, and cultural ties (Friedberg, 2005). The key to maintaining a constructive and positive relationship between the United States and China is through open dialogue and cooperation on areas of mutual interest while carefully managing the differences between them.

Bremmer, I. (2019, February 28).  U.S.-China relations are beyond repair as the trade war goes on . Time. Retrieved November 22, 2021, from https://time.com/5540855/us-china-trade-relationship/.

Chen, D. P. (2019). The Trump Administration’s One‐China Policy: Tilting toward Taiwan in an Era of US‐PRC Rivalry? Asian Politics & Policy, 11(2), 250-278.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2021).  Timeline: US relations with China 1949–2021 . Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved November 22, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china.

De Graaff, N., & Van Apeldoorn, B. (2018). US-China relations and the Liberal World Order: Contending Elites, colliding visions?  International Affairs ,  94 (1), 113–131. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix232

Economy, E. c, Huang, Y., Cohen, J. A., Segal, A., & Gewirtz, J. (2020, December 15).  How 2020 shaped u.s.-china relations . Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/article/how-2020-shaped-us-china-relations.

Friedberg, A. L. (2005). The future of u.s.-china relations: Is conflict inevitable?  International Security ,  30 (2), 7–45. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228805775124589

Goldstein, A. (2020). US-China rivalry in the twenty-first Century: Déjà Vu and Cold War II.  China International Strategy Review ,  2 (1), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00036-w

Gontcharova, A. (2011, July 8).  China: 21st Century “superpower”?  E. Retrieved November 22, 2021, from https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/07/china-21st-century-superpower/.

Hass, R. (2020, February).  U.S.-China relations: The search for a new equilibrium . U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. Retrieved November 22, 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_2020026_us_china_relations_hass.pdf.

Kim, H. J. (2018). The prospects of human rights in the US–china relations: A constructivist understanding.  International Relations of the Asia-Pacific ,  20 (1), 91–118. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcy020

Lampton, D. M. (2013). A new major-power relationship: Seeking a durable foundation for U.S.-China ties.  Asia Policy ,  16 (1), 51–68. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2013.0025

Lejun, W. (2021, January 15).  Rebuilding strong China-US bonds would benefit the world: Report . People’s Daily English language App – Homepage – Breaking News, China News, World News, and Video. Retrieved November 22, 2021, from https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/business/rebuilding-strong-china-us-bonds-would-benefit-the-world-report-193320.html.

Lukin, A. (2019). The US-China trade war and China’s strategic future.  Survival ,  61 (1), 23–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1568045

Marsh, C., & Dreyer, J. T. (2004).  U.S.-China relations in the twenty-first Century: Policies, prospects, and possibilities . Lexington.

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Vinodan, C., & Kurian, A. L. (2021).  Us-China relations in the 21st century  (1st ed.). ROUTLEDGE

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Zhong, R. (2021, November 17).  Taiwan, Trade, Tech, and More: A Tense Era in U.S.-China Ties . Newyork times. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html

Zhu, Z. (2006).  Us-China relations in the 21st Century: Power transition and peace  (1st Ed.). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

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The US relationship with China is entering a dangerous era. Time may be running out to save it.

• US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken met China's Xi Jinping in Beijing Friday. 
• The pair remain at loggerheads over issues including the economy, national security, and Ukraine. 
• Xi told Blinken that the US should avoid "vicious competition" with China. 

Ahead of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's meeting with China's leader, Xi Jinping, China's top diplomat, Wang Yi, had a stark warning.

There was a risk, he said, that US-China relations could "return to a downward spiral."

US cooperation with China had increased in some areas, he added, but "on the other hand, negative factors in Sino-US relations are still rising and accumulating", according to Chinese state media.

China's relationship with the US has been under serious strain in recent years. From Ukraine to the Middle East, TikTok to trade, the superpowers remain at loggerheads on various issues.

A US military chief in March warned that China is engaging in the biggest military build-up since World War II and could be preparing an attack on Taiwan that risks direct military confrontation with the US.

The independent island is the main flash point between Washington and Beijing, with the US signaling that it would help defend it from China, which has long sought to bring it under its control.

As such, the US-China relationship appears to have entered a dangerous period, and time may be running out to save it.

Smoothing relations

There are reasons to be hopeful that the superpowers can remain on good terms. In recent months, there have been signs that both nations are keen to reduce tensions.

In his meeting with Blinken Friday, Xi struck a conciliatory tone, saying that the US and China should be "partners, not rivals" and avoid engaging in "vicious competition."

China's economy, after decades of growth, is in a property market-fuelled crisis, with foreign investment down, consumer spending low, and unemployment spiking.

Analysts say that Xi is keen to smooth ties with the West to secure the flow of US cash and retain access to crucial markets in Western Europe.

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Last year, Xi offered US President Joe Biden a series of concessions to improve relations, and Chinese rhetoric against the US has been markedly less confrontational ever since.

While tensions are growing, both sides seem to want to avoid a potentially catastrophic confrontation.

"Secretary Blinken's meetings in China underscored both the continuation of the tactical thaw in bilateral relations and the accumulation of fundamental stresses," Ali Wyne, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, told Business Insider.

He said that technological rivalry and Taiwan tensions "are poised to intensify," and the two countries remain "far apart" over the Russia-Ukraine war." 

"If there is a silver lining, it is that the deterioration of US-China relations is now occurring in a more predictable, controlled manner than it was a year earlier."

China's red lines

As well as expressing a desire for improved relations with the US, China's foreign minister, Wang, warned the US Thursday against crossing China's "red lines."

Serious tensions on a range of issues remain as China intensifies its bid to dent US global power.

China is escalating its support for Russia's military industry, according to the US, which says it is providing crucial components for weapons used to attack Ukraine.

The US has handed Ukraine billions in aid and military support to resist the invasion, with a new $61 billion bill passing this week.

Blinken said he raised concerns about China's support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. Ahead of the meeting, reports said that the US could seek to sanction Chinese banks for facilitating China's trade in technological parts with Russia.

China denied the accusation and previously accused NATO of stoking the war in Ukraine.

A US aid package this week contained $8 billion in support for Taiwan amid escalating fears of a Chinese invasion, drawing criticism from Beijing that accused the US of a dangerous provocation.

On trade, there are further tensions, with a US law this week meaning that Chinese-owned video site TikTok could be forced to sell or be banned in the US amid concerns over the security of user data.

Despite attempts to stabilize relations, serious challenges remain.

"The trend for this year has been more engagement, more communications, but not more trust," Ian Bremmer, the president and founder of the political-risk consultancy Eurasia Group, told Bloomberg TV this week.

Blinken will have to overcome several hurdles for US-China relations to improve.

Watch: China, Russia boast that trade is at an "all-time high" despite Western sanctions

• Main content

China-US Relations Stable Despite US 'Interference', Chinese Official Says

China-US Relations Stable Despite US 'Interference', Chinese Official Says

FILE PHOTO: A man walks past the national flags of China and the U.S. before a meeting between China's Vice Premier He Lifeng and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen at the Guangdong Zhudao Guest House, in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, China, April 6, 2024. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

BEIJING (Reuters) - Relations between Beijing and Washington are stabilising despite U.S. actions that harm Chinese interests, a Chinese foreign ministry official has said ahead of a visit by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

In laying out goals for the visit, the unnamed official, described as director-general of the foreign ministry's department of North American and Oceanian affairs, said relations should stabilise and advance on a sustainable path.

But he said Chinese interests and its "bottom line" must be safeguarded, the state news agency Xinhua reported on Tuesday.

"The United States stubbornly promotes the strategy of containing China, continuously adopts erroneous words and actions that interfere in China's internal affairs, smear China's image, and harm China's interests," the official was quoted as saying.

During Blinken's visit, China will focus on strengthening understanding and dialogue, managing differences and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation and shared responsibilities, the official added.

The trip will be Blinken's first to China since June, when the United States was trying to restore high-level engagements after "spy balloon" incidents, and increased tensions around Taiwan were souring relations.

Photos You Should See - April 2024

Since then, friction has eased, but Blinken is expected to raise a number of concerns related to the South China Sea, the Russia-Ukraine war and the crisis in the Middle East, among others.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden recently held talks that touched on hot-button issues, most notably ongoing confrontations in the South China Sea, and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Xi had said ties between the China and the U.S. were beginning to stabilize, but that they could "slide into conflict or confrontation", according to Xinhua.

(Reporting by Liz Lee; Writing by Bernard Orr; Editing by Kevin Liffey)

Copyright 2024 Thomson Reuters .

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The US and China Talk Past Each Other on Most Issues, But at Least They’re Still Talking

BEIJING (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrapped up his just-concluded latest visit to China with a stop at a Beijing record store where he bought albums by Taylor Swift and Chinese rocker Dou Wei in a symbolic nod to cross-cultural exchanges and understanding he had been promoting for three days.

Music, he said at the Li-Pi shop on his way to the airport late Friday, “is the best connector, regardless of geography.”

Yet Swift’s “Midnights” and Dou Wei’s “Black Dream” could just as easily represent the seemingly intractable divisions in the deeply troubled relationship between the world’s two largest economies that both sides publicly and privately blame on the other.

Blinken and his Chinese interlocutors, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, all referred to these rifts even as they extolled the virtues of keeping communication channels open to manage these differences and avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.

Blinken went out of his way to champion the importance of U.S.-China exchanges at all levels. In Shanghai , he ate at a famous soup dumpling restaurant, attended a Chinese basketball playoff game and visited with American and Chinese students at the New York University branch. In his official meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing, he spoke repeatedly of improvements in ties over the past year.

But he also stressed that the U.S. has serious and growing concerns with China’s policies and practices on the local, regional and global stages. And, he said, the U.S. would not back down. “America will always defend our core interests and values,” he said.

On several occasions, he slammed Chinese overproduction of electric vehicles that threatened to have detrimental effects on U.S. and European automakers and complained that China was not doing enough to stop the production and export of synthetic opioid precursors.

At one point he warned bluntly that if China does not end support for Russia ’s defense industrial sector, something the Biden administration says has allowed Russia to step up its attacks on Ukraine and threaten European security, the U.S. would act to stop it. “I made clear that if China does not address this problem, we will,” Blinken told reporters after meeting with Xi.

Chinese officials were similarly direct, saying that while relations have generally improved since a low point last year over the shootdown of a Chinese surveillance balloon, they remained fraught.

“The two countries should help each other succeed rather than hurt each other, seek common ground and reserve differences rather than engage in vicious competition, and honor words with actions rather than say one thing but do the opposite,” Xi told Blinken in a not-so-veiled accusation of U.S. hypocrisy.

Wang, the foreign minister, said China is fed up with what it considers to be U.S. meddling in human rights , Taiwan and the South China Sea and efforts to restrict its trade and relations with other countries. “Negative factors in the relationship are still increasing and building and the relationship is facing all kinds of disruptions,” he said. He urged the U.S. “not to step on China’s red lines on China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests.”

Or, as Yang Tao, the director general of North American and Oceania affairs at the Foreign Ministry, put it, according to the official Xinhua News Agency: “If the United States always regards China as its main rival, China-US relations will continuously face troubles and many problems.”

Still, Blinken pressed engagement on all levels. He announced a new agreement to hold talks with China on the threats posed by artificial intelligence but lamented a dearth of American students studying in China – fewer than 900 now, compared to more than 290,000 Chinese in the U.S. He said both sides wanted to increase that number.

“We have an interest in this, because if our future leaders – whether it’s in government, whether it’s in business, civil society, climate, tech, and other fields – if they’re going to be able to collaborate, if they want to be able to solve big problems, if they’re going to be able to work through our differences, they’ll need to know and understand each other’s language, culture, history,” he said. But he added a caveat the Chinese were likely to see as a barb.

“What I told my PRC counterparts on this visit is if they want to attract more Americans here to China, particularly students, the best way to do that is to create the conditions that allow learning to flourish anywhere – a free and open discussion of ideas, access to a wide range of information, ease of travel, confidence in the safety, security, and privacy of the participants,” Blinken said.

Those are issues that neither Taylor Swift nor Dou Wei can overcome.

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Free United States And China Relations Essay Example

Type of paper: Essay

Topic: China , War , Trade , Business , Commerce , Country , Presentation , Relationships

Words: 1400

Published: 03/30/2023

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The relationship between the United States and China has always been a strange one. This is because the United States have always struggled with the decision has to how best to deal with or approach China. Should China be seen as a threat? Or should this country be seen as an ally? In answering whether China should be perceived as a threat, experts in US foreign relations argue that a containment policy should be used to handle China as a threat to the free world as a rising military power. A containment policy adopted by the United States may require that China be denied access to markets while continuing “US military growth” (“Will China and the US Fight?” PowerPoint presentation 15). Furthermore, Andrew Browne noted that President Obama has implemented a containment policy that involves “bringing advanced American combat ships to Singapore, Marines to Australia and military advisers to the Philippines” (Browne par. 10). This is intended to help to “preserve the independence of smaller Asian nations” who do not want to “China’s territorial ambitions” (Browne par. 10). On the other hand, some argue for an engagement policy that recognizes the benefits that can be had from cooperating with China. If the United States continues to cooperate with China then this would mean that “[c] onflict of interests can be resolved through negotiations” (“Will China and US Fight?” PowerPoint presentation 16). In addition, cooperation with China will recognize the fact that the “Chinese economic growth benefits” the “whole world” (“Will China and US Fight?” PowerPoint presentation 16). Furthermore, China’s cooperation is necessary on “major issues like terrorism and climate change” (“Will China and US Fight?” PowerPoint presentation 16). Nevertheless, from the US’s perspective, it is rather difficult to decide on the best strategy to use when approaching China. This can be portrayed in the types of games that are used by the United States when approaching diplomatic relations with China. For instance, when using the Prisoner Dilemma theory in its approach to diplomatic relations with China, the US might consider the need to use antagonistic measures to deal with Chinese “expansionism” (Kai par. 3). In the scenario involving the Prisoner Dilemma, the “objective of the two nation-states in a direct confrontation” is to “protect themselves from the possibility of destruction or domination by the other” (Correa 6). In other words, when China and the US employ the principles of the Prisoner Dilemma game, then they will act in order to respond to the actions of the other so as to ensure that each other’s interest is preserved. The Prisoner Dilemma when the countries trade with the each other. For instance, the United States can decide to place tariffs on Chinese made goods, but the Chinese will respond by placing tariffs on American made goods. This will create a “[s] ub-optimal outcome” because both countries’ producers will lose profits (“Feb 10: Institutions and Game Theory” 6). The principles governing the Prisoner Dilemma explains that although the best scenario will be that one country imposes taxes and the other does not, this will most likely not happen. One country will retaliate when the other imposes taxes. This will also happen as it pertains to relationship with other countries in South Asia. Jin Kai observes that, from China’s perspective, US appears to “automatically support any party [in South Asia, specifically] that has trouble with China, either directly or indirectly” (Kai par. 3). This support might be military support or otherwise. China has responded by “dredging tiny coral reefs in the South China Sea to create runways, apparently for military jets” (Browne par. 9). Nevertheless, it can be said that behaving in an antagonistic manner is necessary for nation-states because it allows them to retain power. For example, it has been proven that a high percentage of “non-democratic leaders clung to power after winning wars” (“Whose Interest Count? Do Politicians Spark War?” PowerPoint presentation 39). On the other hand, if a dictator loses a war, his chances of “retaining power after a loss are 50/50” (“Whose Interest Count? Do Politicians Spark War?” PowerPoint presentation 39). This may explain why China feels the need to expand its territory in East Asia. Furthermore, a democratic country, such as the US, will be able to gain from winning a war against China since a “third of democratic leaders who led their country into war” and won, lost the elections (“Whose Interest Count? Do Politicians Spark War?” PowerPoint presentation 39). On the other hand, losing a war still does not enable a democratic politician to retain his power since only “ten percent of elected leaders” who have lost their wars, return to power (“Whose Interest Count? Do Politicians Spark War?” PowerPoint presentation 39). In light of these statistics, it should be noted that the politicians should not be totally blamed for sparking wars in regions. It should be noted that China’s and the US’s leaders are mainly by the “politics of their country” (“Whose Interest Count? Do Politicians Spark War?” PowerPoint presentation 19). Moreover, it can be argued that the decisions of a leader are not influenced by the entire country, but by special interest groups and other actors within a country, especially as it pertains to the idea of going to war. However, in the case of the US, it will be more beneficial to engage China in economic relations and trade. Furthermore, trade is “[m] utually [b] eneficial” for both parties involved (“Chapter 7: What’s So Good About Trade?” PowerPoint presentation 4). This is because it helps to facilitate the “[d] vision of labor” and “[s] pecialization” (“Chapter 7: What’s So Good About Trade?” PowerPoint presentation 4). In other words, free trade enables each country to become efficient at producing a specific product. For instance, free trade allows Japan to be efficient at creating automobiles and New Zealand, through free trade, is able to specialize in producing dairy products. Free trade ensures that nations are not required to be self-sufficient and are allowed to divide labor and specialize in a particular area of expertise. It is important that the US co-operates with China since it has an “increased share of global economic activity and increased capacity” (“FACT SHEET: US-China Economic Relations par. 1). On the other hand, China, as a country with a totalitarian government, benefits from being in a war with the US. For instance, it was mentioned earlier that a totalitarian leader benefits from winning a war. Additionally, the US also benefits from having a war against China since it will ensure that the country will be contained and will not challenge its position as a super world power by expanding its territory. In conclusion, I believe that the US-China relations are difficult to handle by both nations since each can gain benefits from co-operating with each other as well as being antagonistic to each other. If China cooperates with the US, it will be able to gain much from its trade with the US and vice versa. If the US becomes antagonistic towards China then it would be able to contain the efforts of China to expand its territory and further modernize its military. On the other hand, if China becomes antagonistic towards the US then it would be able to seriously challenge the US position as the super world power.

Works Cited

Browne, Andrew. “Can China Be Contained?” WSJ. Dow Jones and Company, 12 June 2015. Web. 22 May 2016. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534>. Chapter 7: What's So Good About Trade? N.p.: n.p., 14 Mar. 2016. PPT. Kai, Jin. "The US, China, and the 'Containment Trap'" The Diplomat. N.p., 30 Apr. 2014. Web. 22 May 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-us-china-and-the-containment-trap/>. “FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Economic Relations.” The White House. The White House, 25 Sept. 2015. Web. 22 May 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-us-china-economic-relations>. Feb 10: Institutions and Game Theory N.p.: n.p.: n.p., n.d. PPT. Whose Interests Count? Do Politicians Spark War? N.p.: n.p., 24 Feb. 2016. PPT. Will China and the US Fight? N.p.: n.p., n.d. PPT.

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Tensions between Beijing and Washington are the biggest worry for US companies in China, report says

FILE - A hostess walks by the national flags of the United States and China ahead of the bilateral meeting between U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, at the Guangdong Zhudao Guest House in southern China’s Guangdong province, April 6, 2024. Simmering tensions between Beijing and Washington remain the top worry for U.S. companies operating in China, according to a report by the American Chamber of Commerce in China released Tuesday, April 23, 2024. (AP Photo/Andy Wong, Pool, File)

FILE - U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen delivers a speech during the AmCham China Fireside Chat at the Baiyun International Conference Center (BICC) in southern China’s Guangdong province, April 5, 2024. Simmering tensions between Beijing and Washington remain the top worry for U.S. companies operating in China, according to a report by the American Chamber of Commerce in China released Tuesday, April 23, 2024. (AP Photo/Andy Wong, Pool, File)

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Simmering tensions between Beijing and Washington remain the top worry for American companies operating in China , according to a report by the American Chamber of Commerce in China released Tuesday.

The survey of U.S. companies said inconsistent and unclear policies and enforcement, rising labor costs and data security issues were other top concerns. It also said that, despite the insistence of Chinese leaders that Beijing welcomes foreign businesses, many still are hindered from free competition.

“The Chinese government has stated that it encourages foreign direct investment, but many of our members continue to encounter barriers to investment and operations including policies that discriminate against them and public relations campaigns that create suspicion of foreigners,” the report said.

The report welcomed an improvement in relations in 2023 that was capped by summit meetings of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden , but said the U.S. presidential election in November was “looming large” over the future business environment.

It’s unclear what ramifications a victory for either Biden or former President Donald Trump might have for relations. But Trump could deepen a trade war he started during his first term. His tough rhetoric on China and isolationist approach to foreign policy could ramp up uncertainties.

More recently, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited Beijing , where she raised concerns that potential overcapacity in Chinese industries — such as electric vehicles, steel making and solar panels — might crowd out U.S. and other foreign manufacturers.

The fact that such visits are taking place shows “that on difficult issues, the two governments are talking and they’re able to do so in a way that’s not acrimonious. So that was very positive,” said the chamber’s chair, Sean Stein.

The Chamber sees high-level exchanges and communication between the two sides as a top priority, the report said.

American businesses are frustrated by slow progress on promises by China to level the playing field between foreign and Chinese companies, the report said. Meanwhile, heightened U.S. export controls and other restrictions have raised the costs of doing business.

“So the end result is companies are getting squeezed between the two governments, and on the regulatory front, what we’re seeing is it’s not getting easier to do business in China; it’s getting harder,” Stein said.

American companies operating in China saw improved profits last year, though slightly less than half expect to be profitable in 2024.

Still, many members of the American Chamber said they were more optimistic about growth of China’s own economy.

Among its many recommendations the report urged China to create and implement “transparent and practical economic policies which treat domestic and foreign entities equally.”

Referring to concerns that business people are at risk of being caught up in accusations they have violated China’s national security, it also appealed to China’s leaders to clarify and narrow the scope of the country’s anti-espionage law to prevent it from interfering with normal business operations.

Such requests follow repeated raids on foreign companies that Chinese authorities say were conducted on national security grounds. Raids on consulting companies also tend to hinder foreign companies from assessing the business environment, leaving less willing to invest, said Lester Ross, a co-chair of the chamber’s policy committee.

The report also had recommendations for the U.S. side, including providing clear visa policies for Chinese students to show they will be welcomed. Similarly, American students should be encouraged to study in China, the report said.

It also called on U.S. officials to avoid resorting to unilateral controls that may be ineffective and fail to meet goals for national security and foreign policy. Washington should engage with Chinese companies to allow them to address export control concerns such as military use of civilian technologies before the companies are subjected to sanctions, it said.

The 617-page bilingual report provided hundreds of recommendations spanning a wide variety of industries, from sports and online streaming to occupational safety issues and rural traffic management.

American companies generally are not planning to move supply chains out of China given how large and important it is as a market of 1.4 billion people. But their willingness to increase investments there and make it their strategic focus has been decreasing as its advantages diminish, the report said.

AP writer Simina Mistreanu contributed from Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

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Xi Thinks China Can Slow Climate Change. What if He’s Right?

By Jacob Dreyer

Mr. Dreyer, an editor and writer who focuses on the Chinese political economy and science, wrote from Shanghai.

At first glance, Xi Jinping seems to have lost the plot.

China’s president appears to be smothering the entrepreneurial dynamism that allowed his country to crawl out of poverty and become the factory of the world. He has brushed aside Deng Xiaoping’s maxim “To get rich is glorious” in favor of centralized planning and Communist-sounding slogans like “ ecological civilization ” and “ new, quality productive forces ,” which have prompted predictions of the end of China’s economic miracle.

But Mr. Xi is, in fact, making a decades-long bet that China can dominate the global transition to green energy, with his one-party state acting as the driving force in a way that free markets cannot or will not. His ultimate goal is not just to address one of humanity’s most urgent problems — climate change — but also to position China as the global savior in the process.

It has already begun. In recent years, the transition away from fossil fuels has become Mr. Xi’s mantra and the common thread in China’s industrial policies. It’s yielding results: China is now the world’s leading manufacturer of climate-friendly technologies, such as solar panels , batteries and electric vehicles . Last year the energy transition was China’s single biggest driver of overall investment and economic growth, making it the first large economy to achieve that.

This raises an important question for the United States and all of humanity: Is Mr. Xi right? Is a state-directed system like China’s better positioned to solve a generational crisis like climate change, or is a decentralized market approach — i.e., the American way — the answer?

How this plays out could have serious implications for American power and influence.

Look at what happened in the early 20th century, when fascism posed a global threat. America entered the fight late, but with its industrial power — the arsenal of democracy — it emerged on top. Whoever unlocks the door inherits the kingdom, and the United States set about building a new architecture of trade and international relations. The era of American dominance began.

Climate change is, similarly, a global problem, one that threatens our species and the world’s biodiversity. Where do Brazil , Pakistan , Indonesia and other large developing nations that are already grappling with the effects of climate change find their solutions? It will be in technologies that offer an affordable path to decarbonization, and so far, it’s China that is providing most of the solar panels , electric cars and more. China’s exports, increasingly led by green technology, are booming, and much of the growth involves exports to developing countries .

From the American neoliberal economic viewpoint, a state-led push like this might seem illegitimate or even unfair. The state, with its subsidies and political directives, is making decisions that are better left to the markets, the thinking goes.

But China’s leaders have their own calculations, which prioritize stability decades from now over shareholder returns today. Chinese history is littered with dynasties that fell because of famines, floods or failures to adapt to new realities. The Chinese Communist Party’s centrally planned system values constant struggle for its own sake, and today’s struggle is against climate change. China received a frightening reminder of this in 2022, when vast areas of the country baked for weeks under a record heat wave that dried up rivers , withered crops and was blamed for several heatstroke deaths.

China’s government knows that it must make this green transition out of rational self-interest or risk joining the Soviet Union on history’s scrap heap, and is actively positioning itself to do so. It is increasingly led by people with backgrounds in science, technology and environmental issues. Shanghai, the country’s largest city and its financial and industrial leading edge, is headed by Chen Jining, an environmental systems expert and China’s former minister of environmental protection. Across the country, money is being poured into developing and bringing to market new advances in things like rechargeable batteries and into creating corporate champions in renewable energy .

To be clear, for Mr. Xi, this green agenda is not purely an environmental endeavor. It also helps him tighten his grip on power. In 2015, for instance, the Central Environmental Inspection Team was formed to investigate whether provincial leaders and even agencies of the central government were adhering to his green push, giving him another tool with which to exert his already considerable power and authority.

At the same time, locking in renewable energy sources is a national security issue for Mr. Xi; unlike the United States, China imports almost all of its oil, which could be disrupted by the U.S. Navy in choke points like the Malacca Strait in the event of war.

Mr. Xi’s plan — call it his Green Leap Forward — has serious deficiencies. China continues to build coal-fired power plants , and its annual greenhouse-gas emissions remain far greater than those of the United States, though American emissions are higher on a per-capita basis. China’s electric vehicle industry was built on subsidies , and the country may be using forced labor to produce solar panels. Those are serious concerns, but they fade into the background when Pakistan floods or Brazil wants to build an E.V. factory or South Africa desperately needs solar panels for a faltering energy grid.

American politics may be inadvertently helping China gobble up global market share in renewable energy products. When the United States — whether for national security or protectionist reasons — keeps Chinese companies like Huawei out of the American market or rolls up the welcome mat for electric vehicle makers like BYD or companies involved in artificial intelligence or self-driving cars, those businesses must look elsewhere.

President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act , aimed at tackling climate change, has put the United States on a solid path toward carbon neutrality. But America’s decentralization and focus on private innovation means government policy cannot have quite the same impact that it can in China.

So it is crucial for Americans to recognize that, for most of the world, perhaps for all of us, China’s ability to provide low-cost green technology is, on balance, great news. All of humanity needs to move toward renewables at a huge scale — and fast. America still leads in innovation, while China excels in taking frontier science and making its application in the real world cost-effective. If American politicians, investors and businesses recognize that climate change is humanity’s biggest threat, that could open pathways for diplomacy, collaboration and constructive competition with China that benefit us all.

Together, China and the United States could decarbonize the world. But if Americans don’t get serious about it, the Chinese will do it without them.

And if the United States tries to obstruct China, by way of corporate blacklists, trade or technology bans or diplomatic pressure, it will end up looking like part of the climate problem. That happened earlier this month when Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, during a visit to China, urged officials here to rein in green technology exports that the United States says are hurting American companies.

Mr. Xi won’t completely toss out the polluting manufacturing-for-export economic model that has served China so well, nor does he seem ready to halt construction of coal plants. Both are considered necessary for economic and energy security until the green transition is complete. But they are now only a means to an end. The endgame, it seems, is to reach carbon neutrality while dominating the industries making that possible.

Much like how the United States showed up late for World War II, China’s clean-tech companies are latecomers, piggybacking on technology developed elsewhere. But history rewards not necessarily who was there first but who was there last — when a problem was solved. Mr. Xi seems to discern the climate chaos on the horizon. Winning the race for solutions means winning the world that comes next.

Jacob Dreyer is an American editor and writer focused on the intersection of the Chinese political economy and science. He lives in Shanghai.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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