feminism discussion essay

Essay on Feminism

500 words essay on feminism.

Feminism is a social and political movement that advocates for the rights of women on the grounds of equality of sexes. It does not deny the biological differences between the sexes but demands equality in opportunities. It covers everything from social and political to economic arenas. In fact, feminist campaigns have been a crucial part of history in women empowerment. The feminist campaigns of the twentieth century made the right to vote, public property, work and education possible. Thus, an essay on feminism will discuss its importance and impact.

Importance of Feminism

Feminism is not just important for women but for every sex, gender, caste, creed and more. It empowers the people and society as a whole. A very common misconception is that only women can be feminists.

It is absolutely wrong but feminism does not just benefit women. It strives for equality of the sexes, not the superiority of women. Feminism takes the gender roles which have been around for many years and tries to deconstruct them.

This allows people to live freely and empower lives without getting tied down by traditional restrictions. In other words, it benefits women as well as men. For instance, while it advocates that women must be free to earn it also advocates that why should men be the sole breadwinner of the family? It tries to give freedom to all.

Most importantly, it is essential for young people to get involved in the feminist movement. This way, we can achieve faster results. It is no less than a dream to live in a world full of equality.

Thus, we must all look at our own cultures and communities for making this dream a reality. We have not yet reached the result but we are on the journey, so we must continue on this mission to achieve successful results.

Impact of Feminism

Feminism has had a life-changing impact on everyone, especially women. If we look at history, we see that it is what gave women the right to vote. It was no small feat but was achieved successfully by women.

Further, if we look at modern feminism, we see how feminism involves in life-altering campaigns. For instance, campaigns that support the abortion of unwanted pregnancy and reproductive rights allow women to have freedom of choice.

Moreover, feminism constantly questions patriarchy and strives to renounce gender roles. It allows men to be whoever they wish to be without getting judged. It is not taboo for men to cry anymore because they must be allowed to express themselves freely.

Similarly, it also helps the LGBTQ community greatly as it advocates for their right too. Feminism gives a place for everyone and it is best to practice intersectional feminism to understand everyone’s struggle.

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Conclusion of the Essay on Feminism

The key message of feminism must be to highlight the choice in bringing personal meaning to feminism. It is to recognize other’s right for doing the same thing. The sad part is that despite feminism being a strong movement, there are still parts of the world where inequality and exploitation of women take places. Thus, we must all try to practice intersectional feminism.

FAQ of Essay on Feminism

Question 1: What are feminist beliefs?

Answer 1: Feminist beliefs are the desire for equality between the sexes. It is the belief that men and women must have equal rights and opportunities. Thus, it covers everything from social and political to economic equality.

Question 2: What started feminism?

Answer 2: The first wave of feminism occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It emerged out of an environment of urban industrialism and liberal, socialist politics. This wave aimed to open up new doors for women with a focus on suffrage.

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• Yale Divinity School

Reflections

You are here, thinking out loud about feminism.

Each of you is here because you have been formative in my understanding of feminism and commitment to feminist ideals. I want to honor your spirit, hear your voices again, check in, take stock, get clarity. As many of you know, I grew up Roman Catholic, have studied ethics, feminist and liberation theologies, and worked as an activist for sexuality education, LGBT inclusion, and reproductive rights. I’m a wife and a mother. You know me from the classroom, social service programs, or from my church communities.

What I’d like to hear from you tonight are your latest thoughts on our subject. Do you call yourself a feminist? What does that mean to you? How do you see yourself and your work related to feminism today?

“Well, I’m probably the oldest person at this table, so I’ll begin,” says B . “Yes, I proudly call my- self a feminist and have so for over forty years. The consciousness-raising groups that were important to me in the 1970s helped me see I wasn’t the only woman who felt like my college education wasn’t supposed to go to waste just because I got married. I knew I could do all the things men were doing and probably better. From that point on, I have dedicated myself to working for girls’ education so they could join whatever profession they wanted – wear pants, play sports, run a board meeting, start a business – you know what I mean – and to always make sure they are giving back to feminism’s best hopes by making it possible for other girls and women to do this too.”

Waiting politely, but clearly looking for the perfect break in conversation to speak, D responds, “I guess I see things a bit differently. I’m not that much younger than you are, and we have both been professionals in a man’s world, though I am in the academy, not a business office. My feminist and educational journeys coincided. I guess I started out wanting to have all the things men have. But I realized, rather painfully at times, that ‘equal’ doesn’t  have to mean ‘the same.’ I have focused my ef forts more on deconstructing gender in order to free women from the oppression they suffer. If we could just get to a place where gender didn’t mat- ter – and race too – then we could imagine a world where justice is possible. We would see each other as God intended – human beings, equally created in God’s image.”

“Why are we always defining ourselves in comparison to men, and which men are we talking about?” says T, setting down her fork. “Men don’t sit around wondering how they aren’t like women or don’t have women’s rights. And the men I know aren’t all that privileged. As a Womanist, I want feminism to mean more than just ‘being like a white  man.’ My Womanist vision for feminists is one that helps all men and boys see how sexism hurts them too. It should commit us, in the face of poverty and racism, to do God’s work by standing against oppression in all its forms.”

With a sigh, L admits, “I have to say, Kate, I’m not sure why you invited me. You know I think feminism is pointless. It’s based on this narrow idea of what a woman is or wants. I just got married and I want to be a stay-at-home mom. I don’t want men to become something different. What’s wrong with gender roles if you freely choose them? In our house, my husband makes the money, mows the lawn, and fixes things. That’s what my husband wants to do, and I want to focus on the kids and the house. Somehow that makes me a failure in the eyes of ‘real’ feminists. But it’s not like anyone is  forcing me into this choice. Wasn’t feminism supposed to give women more choices and free them to decide for themselves?” says L , reaching for the broken loaf of bread resting in a basket at the middle of the table.

“Ugh, I’m honestly tired of these conversations,” retorts M , setting her glass down. “Women who have racial, economic, and educational privilege still haven’t figured out that their brand of feminism isn’t relevant to most women in the world. Let’s be realistic. Women achieving access and equality with men means only predominately white, First World women getting more education and better jobs, while blacks, Asians, and Latinas are paid to do the household labor, low-paying service jobs, and childcare in the U.S. The global picture is even worse. Those of you who have spoken so far might say, ‘That’s not what I meant or intended.’ But look at the reality. Feminism can’t just be about getting more or erasing who we are as women. It has to be about some of us getting less and seeing our racial, geographic, economic, and political differences clearly.

She continues: “My expression of feminism reflects how my experience of race, culture, citizenship, and economic standing jars white, First World feminism out of a one-size-fits-all model. I am broadening and reclaiming the use of the term feminist, without modifiers, to describe my work. Even though, I get lumped into a term like ‘global  south’ or a continental category of African feminist, as if all Africans are the same, or Asians or South Americans for that matter. We come from specific countries with regional and religious differences that are extremely important to shaping our understand ing of feminism. I’m going to concentrate on acting for justice and that’s feminism to me.”

To which J nods and agrees, “Talk about one-size- fits-all. I guess I would say I’m a feminist, but I’d add queer – queer feminist. Seriously, we need to get rid of the categories of women and men altogether: gender is a performance, and sex has more than two categories. Plus, you can alter them, change them, if they don’t fit who you really are. It has been feminist and queer mentors during seminary and in my religious tradition who have taught me to define who I am on my own terms.” Taking a bite, chewing slowly, J concludes, “God made us, but we have to figure out what that means to us individually. For me to express who I know God made me to be, I have to change my appearance, and maybe even my body, to make others see what I feel. I don’t think most feminists have thought enough about what to do if ‘women’ and ‘women’s bodies’ aren’t the tie that binds the movement. I’m here to make sure we do ask that question and work together to find an answer.”

As the quietest one at the table thus far, not a usual situation for me, I guess it is my turn to speak. As you know, I proudly name myself a feminist. I have not always fit neatly into the images created by feminist theories or feminist advocates. Like some of you, as a U.S., white, educated, upper-class woman, I have received privileges from feminist struggles fought before me. As a Christian commit ted to Jesus’ call to social justice, I am constantly challenged by the failures of past and present feminist movements especially as they pertain to racism, colonialism, heterosexism , and poverty. Modifiers to the word feminism help remind us that we have different vantage points that lead to different ex periences . I do believe that language and naming matter. If I say I am a white feminist, it reminds me that my experience of race affects how I experience injustice and inequality. It suggests I have a particular entry point out of which my advocacy for justice begins. 

How each of you regards feminism influences what feminism means to me. Your witness challenges me to keep asking questions about the future of feminist movements and theory. In my experience, feminism is a justice-seeking praxis – action and reflection, theory and movements, mutually informing each other. Feminism most often starts with the real-life experience of women, oppressed because an individual, group, or society views them as inferior and then seeks to enforce its ferocity by objectification, control, and domination. We know sexism can take relatively subtle forms, such as l ower salaries for women than men. Or it erupts as domestic and sexual violence in our bedrooms, homes, and churches. Or it persists ruthlessly in a world of poverty, where a woman dies every minute in childbirth because of a lack of health services.

The church is no stranger to gendered and sexual oppression. One of my first moments of feminist awakening was in relation to my faith and church. As a young Roman Catholic school girl, I proudly told my grandmother that this was the year I got to be an altar girl. To which she replied: it’s a shame what’s become of the church. My joy was, to her, dreaded confirmation that the patriarchal sanctity of the church was slowly crumbling. I’m waiting for further decay. Theological truth, ethical analysis, and experiential evidence have yet to convince the Roman Catholic hierarchy that women can be priests as well as altar girls! This is only a minor incident in a long line of theologically justified sexism that keeps our churches from living into the fullness of God’s calling.

Feminism recognizes sexism as an entry point for understanding how oppression and injustice operate. But feminism must go beyond models of equality that value sameness between the sexes above all, especially when the sameness means aiming to be like white, First World, educated men. My hope for feminism, particularly in our churches and denominations, is not that we reach a point where gender, sex, race, religion, and culture no longer matter. They do matter. My hope is that we reach a point where who we are in our unique individual and collective identities matters so fervently that we seek justice because of our differences, not in spite of them or in order to move beyond them.

If feminist movements and theories are to make a lasting contribution to that conversation and vision, then feminism will need each of us around this table to be willing to share a meal, see each other, disagree, and stay a while.

I hope you will come to dinner next week. There are extra chairs. Please feel free to bring someone who is not here. 

Kate Ott ’00 M.A.R. is deputy director of the Religious Institute in Westport, CT, an organization that promotes a progressive religious vision of sexual morality, justice, and healing in congregational and public life. A lecturer at YDS and at Drew Theological Seminary, she is co-editor of Just Hospitality: God’s Welcome in a World of Difference (Westminster John Knox, 2009). She is also author of Sex and the Seminary: Preparing Ministers for Sexual Health and Justice (2009, Religious Institute) and co-editor of the forthcoming Keeping the Light: Scholarship, Activism, and the Next Generation (2011, Palgrave). 

5 Essays About Feminism

On the surface, the definition of feminism is simple. It’s the belief that women should be politically, socially, and economically equal to men. Over the years, the movement expanded from a focus on voting rights to worker rights, reproductive rights, gender roles, and beyond. Modern feminism is moving to a more inclusive and intersectional place. Here are five essays about feminism that tackle topics like trans activism, progress, and privilege:

“Trickle-Down Feminism” – Sarah Jaffe

Feminists celebrate successful women who have seemingly smashed through the glass ceiling, but the reality is that most women are still under it. Even in fast-growing fields where women dominate (retail sales, food service, etc), women make less money than men. In this essay from Dissent Magazine, author Sarah Jaffe argues that when the fastest-growing fields are low-wage, it isn’t a victory for women. At the same time, it does present an opportunity to change the way we value service work. It isn’t enough to focus only on “equal pay for equal work” as that argument mostly focuses on jobs where someone can negotiate their salary. This essay explores how feminism can’t succeed if only the concerns of the wealthiest, most privileged women are prioritized.

Sarah Jaffe writes about organizing, social movements, and the economy with publications like Dissent, the Nation, Jacobin, and others. She is the former labor editor at Alternet.

“What No One Else Will Tell You About Feminism” – Lindy West

Written in Lindy West’s distinct voice, this essay provides a clear, condensed history of feminism’s different “waves.” The first wave focused on the right to vote, which established women as equal citizens. In the second wave, after WWII, women began taking on issues that couldn’t be legally-challenged, like gender roles. As the third wave began, the scope of feminism began to encompass others besides middle-class white women. Women should be allowed to define their womanhood for themselves. West also points out that “waves” may not even exist since history is a continuum. She concludes the essay by declaring if you believe all people are equal, you are a feminist.

Jezebel reprinted this essay with permission from How To Be A Person, The Stranger’s Guide to College by Lindy West, Dan Savage, Christopher Frizelle, and Bethany Jean Clement. Lindy West is an activist, comedian, and writer who focuses on topics like feminism, pop culture, and fat acceptance.

“Toward a Trans* Feminism” – Jack Halberstam

The history of transactivsm and feminism is messy. This essay begins with the author’s personal experience with gender and terms like trans*, which Halberstam prefers. The asterisk serves to “open the meaning,” allowing people to choose their categorization as they see fit. The main body of the essay focuses on the less-known history of feminists and trans* folks. He references essays from the 1970s and other literature that help paint a more complete picture. In current times, the tension between radical feminism and trans* feminism remains, but changes that are good for trans* women are good for everyone.

This essay was adapted from Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability by Jack Halberstam. Halberstam is the Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, Gender Studies and Comparative Literature at the University of Southern California. He is also the author of several books.

“Rebecca Solnit: How Change Happens” – Rebecca Solnit

The world is changing. Rebecca Solnit describes this transformation as an assembly of ideas, visions, values, essays, books, protests, and more. It has many layers involving race, class, gender, power, climate, justice, etc, as well as many voices. This has led to more clarity about injustice. Solnit describes watching the transformation and how progress and “ wokeness ” are part of a historical process. Progress is hard work. Not exclusively about feminism, this essay takes a more intersectional look at how progress as a whole occurs.

“How Change Happens” was adapted from the introduction to Whose Story Is it? Rebecca Solnit is a writer, activist, and historian. She’s the author of over 20 books on art, politics, feminism, and more.

“Bad Feminist” extract – Roxane Gay

People are complicated and imperfect. In this excerpt from her book Bad Feminist: Essays , Roxane Gay explores her contradictions. The opening sentence is, “I am failing as a woman.” She goes on to describe how she wants to be independent, but also to be taken care of. She wants to be strong and in charge, but she also wants to surrender sometimes. For a long time, she denied that she was human and flawed. However, the work it took to deny her humanness is harder than accepting who she is. While Gay might be a “bad feminist,” she is also deeply committed to issues that are important to feminism. This is a must-read essay for any feminists who worry that they aren’t perfect.

Roxane Gay is a professor, speaker, editor, writer, and social commentator. She is the author of Bad Feminist , a New York Times bestseller, Hunger (a memoir), and works of fiction.

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About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Introduction to feminism, topics: what is feminism.

• Introduction
• What is Feminism?  
• Historical Context
• Normative and Descriptive Components
• Feminism and the Diversity of Women
• Feminism as Anti-Sexism
• Topics in Feminism: Overview of the Sub-Entries

Bibliography

Works cited.

• General Bibliography [under construction]
• Topical Bibliographies [under construction]

Other Internet Resources

Related entries, i.  introduction, ii.  what is feminism, a.  historical context, b.  normative and descriptive components.

i) (Normative) Men and women are entitled to equal rights and respect. ii) (Descriptive) Women are currently disadvantaged with respect to rights and respect, compared with men.

Feminism is grounded on the belief that women are oppressed or disadvantaged by comparison with men, and that their oppression is in some way illegitimate or unjustified. Under the umbrella of this general characterization there are, however, many interpretations of women and their oppression, so that it is a mistake to think of feminism as a single philosophical doctrine, or as implying an agreed political program. (James 2000, 576)

C.  Feminism and the Diversity of Women

Feminism, as liberation struggle, must exist apart from and as a part of the larger struggle to eradicate domination in all its forms. We must understand that patriarchal domination shares an ideological foundation with racism and other forms of group oppression, and that there is no hope that it can be eradicated while these systems remain intact. This knowledge should consistently inform the direction of feminist theory and practice. (hooks 1989, 22)

Unlike many feminist comrades, I believe women and men must share a common understanding--a basic knowledge of what feminism is--if it is ever to be a powerful mass-based political movement. In Feminist Theory: from margin to center, I suggest that defining feminism broadly as "a movement to end sexism and sexist oppression" would enable us to have a common political goal…Sharing a common goal does not imply that women and men will not have radically divergent perspectives on how that goal might be reached. (hooks 1989, 23)

…no woman is subject to any form of oppression simply because she is a woman; which forms of oppression she is subject to depend on what "kind" of woman she is. In a world in which a woman might be subject to racism, classism, homophobia, anti-Semitism, if she is not so subject it is because of her race, class, religion, sexual orientation. So it can never be the case that the treatment of a woman has only to do with her gender and nothing to do with her class or race. (Spelman 1988, 52-3)

D.  Feminism as Anti-Sexism

 i) (Descriptive claim) Women, and those who appear to be women, are subjected to wrongs and/or injustice at least in part because they are or appear to be women. ii) (Normative claim) The wrongs/injustices in question in (i) ought not to occur and should be stopped when and where they do.

III.  Topics in Feminism: Overview of the Sub-Entries

• Alexander, M. Jacqui and Lisa Albrecht, eds.  1998. The Third Wave: Feminist Perspectives on Racism.  New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press.
• Anderson, Elizabeth.  1999a.  “What is the Point of Equality?”  Ethics 109(2): 287-337.
• ______.  1999b.  "Reply” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, Jamie Dreier and David Estlund, editors, World Wide Web, (http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html), Posted 12/22/99.
• Anzaldúa, Gloria, ed. 1990. Making Face, Making Soul: Haciendo Caras.  San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.
• Baier, Annette C.  1994.  Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Barrett, Michèle.  1991. The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
• Bartky, Sandra. 1990.  “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power.” In her Femininity and Domination. New York: Routledge, 63-82.
• Basu, Amrita. 1995. The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Baumgardner, Jennifer and Amy Richards. 2000.  Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
• Beauvoir, Simone de. 1974 (1952).  The Second Sex. Trans. and Ed. H. M. Parshley.  New York: Vintage Books.
• Benhabib, Seyla.  1992.  Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics.   New York: Routledge.
• Calhoun, Cheshire. 2000.  Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• ______.  1989.  “Responsibility and Reproach.”  Ethics 99(2): 389-406.
• Collins, Patricia Hill.  1990.  Black Feminist Thought. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman.
• Cott, Nancy.  1987.  The Grounding of Modern Feminism.  New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.“ Stanford Law Review , 43(6): 1241-1299.
• Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas. 1995.  “Introduction.” In Critical Race Theory, ed., Kimberle Crenshaw, et al. New York: The New Press, xiii-xxxii.Davis, Angela. 1983. Women, Race and Class.  New York: Random House.
• Crow, Barbara.  2000.  Radical Feminism: A Documentary Reader.  New York: New York University Press.
• Delmar, Rosalind.  2001. "What is Feminism?” In Theorizing Feminism, ed., Anne C. Hermann and Abigail J. Stewart.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 5-28.
• Duplessis, Rachel Blau, and Ann Snitow, eds. 1998. The Feminist Memoir Project: Voices from Women's Liberation.  New York: Random House (Crown Publishing).
• Dutt, M.  1998.  "Reclaiming a Human Rights Culture: Feminism of Difference and Alliance." In Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age , ed., Ella Shohat. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 225-246.
• Echols, Alice. 1990.  Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-75.   Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Engels, Friedrich.  1972 (1845).  The Origin of The Family, Private Property, and the State.   New York: International Publishers.
• Findlen, Barbara. 2001. Listen Up: Voices from the Next Feminist Generation, 2nd edition.  Seattle, WA: Seal Press.
• Fine, Michelle and Adrienne Asch, eds. 1988. Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture, and Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
• Fraser, Nancy and Linda Nicholson.  1990.  "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism." In Feminism/Postmodernism, ed., Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge.
• Friedan, Betty.  1963. The Feminine Mystique.   New York: Norton.
• Frye, Marilyn.  1983. The Politics of Reality.  Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press.
• Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. 1997.  Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature. New York: Columbia University Press.
• Grewal, I. 1998.  "On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice."  In Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age, ed., Ella Shohat.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 501-530.
• Hampton, Jean.  1993. “Feminist Contractarianism,” in Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds. A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity,  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Haslanger, Sally. Forthcoming. “Oppressions: Racial and Other.”  In Racism, Philosophy and Mind: Philosophical Explanations of Racism and Its Implications, ed., Michael Levine and Tamas Pataki.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Held, Virginia. 1993. Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Herrman, Anne C. and Abigail J. Stewart, eds. 1994.  Theorizing Feminism: Parallel Trends in the Humanities and Social Sciences.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Heywood, Leslie and Jennifer Drake, eds. 1997.  Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism. 
• Hillyer, Barbara. 1993.  Feminism and Disability. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
• Hoagland, Sarah L.  1989. Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Values.   Palo Alto, CA: Institute for Lesbian Studies.
• Hooks, bell. 1989. Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black.  Boston: South End Press.
• ______.  1984. Feminist Theory from Margin to Center.  Boston: South End Press.
• ______. 1981.  Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism.   Boston: South End Press.
• Hurtado, Aída.  1996.  The Color of Privilege: Three Blasphemies on Race and Feminism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
• Jagger, Alison M.  1983.  Feminist Politics and Human Nature.  Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• James, Susan. 2000.  “Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity.” In The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, ed., Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kiss, Elizabeth. 1995.  "Feminism and Rights." Dissent 42(3): 342-347
• Kittay, Eva Feder.  1999.  Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency. New York: Routledge.
• Kymlicka, Will.  1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Mackenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar, eds.  2000.  Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• MacKinnon, Catharine.  1989.  Towards a Feminist Theory of the State.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• ______.  1987. Feminism Unmodified.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Mohanty, Chandra, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds.  1991.  Third  World Women and the Politics of Feminism.    Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
• Molyneux, Maxine and Nikki Craske, eds. 2001. Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.
• Moody-Adams, Michele. 1997.  Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Moraga, Cherrie.  2000. "From a Long Line of Vendidas: Chicanas and Feminism." In her Loving in the War Years, 2nd edition.  Boston: South End Press.
• Moraga, Cherrie and Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. 1981.  This Bridge Called My Back: Writings of Radical Women of Color. Watertown, MA: Persephone Press.
• Narayan, Uma.  1997.  Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism.   New York: Routledge.
• Nussbaum, Martha. 1995.  "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings." In Women, Culture and Development : A Study of Human Capabilities, ed., Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61-104.
• _______.  1999.  Sex and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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• Ong, Aihwa.  1988. "Colonialism and Modernity: Feminist Re-presentation of Women in Non-Western Societies.” Inscriptions 3(4): 90. Also in (Herrman and Stewart 1994).
• Okin, Susan Moller. 1989.  Justice, Gender, and the Family.  New York: Basic Books.
• ______.  1979.  Women in Western Political Thought.   Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Pateman, Carole.  1988.  The Sexual Contract.    Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
• Reagon, Bernice Johnson. 1983. "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century." In: Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, ed. Barbara Smith. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 356-368.
• Robinson, Fiona.  1999.  Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Affairs. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Rubin, Gayle.  1975.  “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex.”  In Towards an Anthropology of Women , ed., Rayna Rapp Reiter.  New York: Monthly Review Press, 157-210.
• Ruddick, Sara. 1989.  Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace.  Boston: Beacon Press.
• Schneir, Miriam, ed. 1994. Feminism in Our Time: The Essential Writings, World War II to the Present.  New York: Vintage Books.
• ______.  1972.  Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings. New York: Vintage Books.
• Scott, Joan W. 1988.  “Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: or The Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism.” Feminist Studies 14 (1):  33-50.
• Silvers, Anita, David Wasserman, Mary Mahowald. 1999.   Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy . Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Simpson, J. A. and E. S. C. Weiner, ed., 1989. Oxford English Dictionary.   2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. OED Online. Oxford University Press.  “feminism, n1” (1851).
• Snitow, Ann.  1990.  “A Gender Diary.”  In Conflicts in Feminism, ed. M. Hirsch and E. Fox Keller.  New York: Routledge, 9-43.
• Spelman, Elizabeth.  1988. The Inessential Woman.   Boston: Beacon Press.
• Tanner, Leslie B.  1970  Voices From Women's Liberation.   New York:  New American Library (A Mentor Book).
• Taylor, Vesta and Leila J. Rupp.  1996. "Lesbian Existence and the Women's Movement: Researching the 'Lavender Herring'."  In Feminism and Social Change , ed. Heidi Gottfried.  Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
• Tong, Rosemarie.  1993.  Feminine and Feminist Ethics.   Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
• Tuana, Nancy and Rosemarie Tong, eds. 1995.  Feminism and Philosophy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Walker, Alice. 1990. “Definition of Womanist,” In Making Face, Making Soul: Haciendo Caras , ed., Gloria Anzaldúa.  San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 370.
• Walker, Margaret Urban.  1998. Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics. New York: Routledge.
• ______, ed. 1999.  Mother Time: Women, Aging, and Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Walker, Rebecca, ed. 1995. To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism.   New York: Random House (Anchor Books).
• Ware, Cellestine.  1970.  Woman Power: The Movement for Women’s Liberation .  New York: Tower Publications.
• Weisberg, D. Kelly, ed.  1993.  Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
• Wendell, Susan. 1996. The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability. New York and London: Routledge.
• Young, Iris. 1990a. "Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics."  In Throwing Like A Girl. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 73-91.
• Young, Iris. 1990b.  “Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory.”  In her Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory . Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
• ______.  1990c.  Justice and the Politics of Difference.   Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Zophy, Angela Howard. 1990.  "Feminism."  In The Handbook of American Women's History , ed., Angela Howard Zophy and Frances M. Kavenik.  New York: Routledge (Garland Reference Library of the Humanities).

General Bibliography

Topical bibliographies.

• Feminist Theory Website
• Race, Gender, and Affirmative Action Resource Page
• Documents from the Women's Liberation Movement (Duke Univ. Archives)
• Core Reading Lists in Women's Studies (Assn of College and Research Libraries, WS Section)
• Feminist and Women's Journals
• Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy
• Feminist Internet Search Utilities
• National Council for Research on Women (including links to centers for research on women and affiliate organizations, organized by research specialties)
• Feminism and Class
• Marxist, Socialist, and Materialist Feminisms
• M-Fem (information page, discussion group, links, etc.)
• WMST-L discussion of how to define “marxist feminism” Aug 1994)
• Marxist/Materialist Feminism (Feminist Theory Website)
• MatFem   (Information page, discussion group)
• Feminist Economics
• Feminist Economics (Feminist Theory Website)
• International Association for Feminist Economics
• Feminist Political Economy and the Law (2001 Conference Proceedings, York Univ.)
• Journal for the International Association for Feminist Economics
• Feminism and Disability
• World Wide Web Review: Women and Disabilities Websites
• Disability and Feminism Resource Page
• Center for Research on Women with Disabilities (CROWD)
• Interdisciplinary Bibliography on Disability in the Humanities (Part of the American Studies Crossroads Project)
• Feminism and Human Rights, Global Feminism
• World Wide Web Review: Websites on Women and Human Rights
• International Gender Studies Resources (U.C. Berkeley)
• Global Feminisms Research Resources (Vassar Library)
• Global Feminism (Feminist Majority Foundation)
• NOW and Global Feminism
• United Nations Development Fund for Women
• Global Issues Resources
• Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI)
• Feminism and Race/Ethnicity
• General Resources
• WMST-L discussion on “Women of Color and the Women’s Movement” (5 Parts) Sept/Oct 2000)
• Women of Color Resources (Princeton U. Library)
• Core Readings in Women's Studies: Women of Color (Assn. of College and Research Libraries, WS Section)
• Women of Color Resource Sites
• African-American/Black Feminisms and Womanism
• African-American/Black/Womanist Feminism on the Web
• Black Feminist and Womanist Identity Bibliography (Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library)
• The Womanist Studies Consortium (Univ. of Georgia)
• Black Feminist/Womanist Works: A Beginning List (WMST-L)
• African-American Women Online Archival Collection (Duke U.)
• Asian-American and Asian Feminisms
• Asian American Feminism (Feminist Theory Website)
• Asian-American Women Bibliography (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe)
• American Women's History: A Research Guide (Asian-American Women)
• South Asian Women's Studies Bibliography (U.C. Berkeley)
• Journal of South Asia Women's Studies
• Chicana/Latina Feminisms
• Bibliography on Chicana Feminism (Cal State, Long Beach Library)
• Making Face, Making Soul: A Chicana Feminist Website
• Defining Chicana Feminisms, In Their Own Words
• CLNet's Chicana Studies Homepage (UCLA)
• Chicana Related Bibliographies (CLNet)
• American Indian, Native, Indigenous Feminisms
• Native American Feminism (Feminist Theory Website)
• Bibliography on American Indian Gender Roles and Relations
• Bibliography on American Indian Feminism
• Bibliography on American Indian Gay/Lesbian Topics
• Links on Aboriginal Women and Feminism
• Feminism, Sex, and Sexuality
• 1970's Lesbian Feminism (Ohio State Univ., Women's Studies)
• The Lesbian History Project
• History of Sexuality Resources (Duke Special Collections)
• Lesbian Studies Bibliography (Assn. of College and Research Libraries)
• Lesbian Feminism/Lesbian Philosophy
• Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy Internet Resources
• QueerTheory.com
• World Wide Web Review: Webs of Transgender

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Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender

Feminism is said to be the movement to end women’s oppression (hooks 2000, 26). One possible way to understand ‘woman’ in this claim is to take it as a sex term: ‘woman’ picks out human females and being a human female depends on various biological and anatomical features (like genitalia). Historically many feminists have understood ‘woman’ differently: not as a sex term, but as a gender term that depends on social and cultural factors (like social position). In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or male) from gender (being a woman or a man), although most ordinary language users appear to treat the two interchangeably. In feminist philosophy, this distinction has generated a lively debate. Central questions include: What does it mean for gender to be distinct from sex, if anything at all? How should we understand the claim that gender depends on social and/or cultural factors? What does it mean to be gendered woman, man, or genderqueer? This entry outlines and discusses distinctly feminist debates on sex and gender considering both historical and more contemporary positions.

1.1 Biological determinism

1.2 gender terminology, 2.1 gender socialisation, 2.2 gender as feminine and masculine personality, 2.3 gender as feminine and masculine sexuality, 3.1.1 particularity argument, 3.1.2 normativity argument, 3.2 is sex classification solely a matter of biology, 3.3 are sex and gender distinct, 3.4 is the sex/gender distinction useful, 4.1.1 gendered social series, 4.1.2 resemblance nominalism, 4.2.1 social subordination and gender, 4.2.2 gender uniessentialism, 4.2.3 gender as positionality, 5. beyond the binary, 6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the sex/gender distinction..

The terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ mean different things to different feminist theorists and neither are easy or straightforward to characterise. Sketching out some feminist history of the terms provides a helpful starting point.

Most people ordinarily seem to think that sex and gender are coextensive: women are human females, men are human males. Many feminists have historically disagreed and have endorsed the sex/ gender distinction. Provisionally: ‘sex’ denotes human females and males depending on biological features (chromosomes, sex organs, hormones and other physical features); ‘gender’ denotes women and men depending on social factors (social role, position, behaviour or identity). The main feminist motivation for making this distinction was to counter biological determinism or the view that biology is destiny.

A typical example of a biological determinist view is that of Geddes and Thompson who, in 1889, argued that social, psychological and behavioural traits were caused by metabolic state. Women supposedly conserve energy (being ‘anabolic’) and this makes them passive, conservative, sluggish, stable and uninterested in politics. Men expend their surplus energy (being ‘katabolic’) and this makes them eager, energetic, passionate, variable and, thereby, interested in political and social matters. These biological ‘facts’ about metabolic states were used not only to explain behavioural differences between women and men but also to justify what our social and political arrangements ought to be. More specifically, they were used to argue for withholding from women political rights accorded to men because (according to Geddes and Thompson) “what was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament” (quoted from Moi 1999, 18). It would be inappropriate to grant women political rights, as they are simply not suited to have those rights; it would also be futile since women (due to their biology) would simply not be interested in exercising their political rights. To counter this kind of biological determinism, feminists have argued that behavioural and psychological differences have social, rather than biological, causes. For instance, Simone de Beauvoir famously claimed that one is not born, but rather becomes a woman, and that “social discrimination produces in women moral and intellectual effects so profound that they appear to be caused by nature” (Beauvoir 1972 [original 1949], 18; for more, see the entry on Simone de Beauvoir ). Commonly observed behavioural traits associated with women and men, then, are not caused by anatomy or chromosomes. Rather, they are culturally learned or acquired.

Although biological determinism of the kind endorsed by Geddes and Thompson is nowadays uncommon, the idea that behavioural and psychological differences between women and men have biological causes has not disappeared. In the 1970s, sex differences were used to argue that women should not become airline pilots since they will be hormonally unstable once a month and, therefore, unable to perform their duties as well as men (Rogers 1999, 11). More recently, differences in male and female brains have been said to explain behavioural differences; in particular, the anatomy of corpus callosum, a bundle of nerves that connects the right and left cerebral hemispheres, is thought to be responsible for various psychological and behavioural differences. For instance, in 1992, a Time magazine article surveyed then prominent biological explanations of differences between women and men claiming that women’s thicker corpus callosums could explain what ‘women’s intuition’ is based on and impair women’s ability to perform some specialised visual-spatial skills, like reading maps (Gorman 1992). Anne Fausto-Sterling has questioned the idea that differences in corpus callosums cause behavioural and psychological differences. First, the corpus callosum is a highly variable piece of anatomy; as a result, generalisations about its size, shape and thickness that hold for women and men in general should be viewed with caution. Second, differences in adult human corpus callosums are not found in infants; this may suggest that physical brain differences actually develop as responses to differential treatment. Third, given that visual-spatial skills (like map reading) can be improved by practice, even if women and men’s corpus callosums differ, this does not make the resulting behavioural differences immutable. (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, chapter 5).

In order to distinguish biological differences from social/psychological ones and to talk about the latter, feminists appropriated the term ‘gender’. Psychologists writing on transsexuality were the first to employ gender terminology in this sense. Until the 1960s, ‘gender’ was often used to refer to masculine and feminine words, like le and la in French. However, in order to explain why some people felt that they were ‘trapped in the wrong bodies’, the psychologist Robert Stoller (1968) began using the terms ‘sex’ to pick out biological traits and ‘gender’ to pick out the amount of femininity and masculinity a person exhibited. Although (by and large) a person’s sex and gender complemented each other, separating out these terms seemed to make theoretical sense allowing Stoller to explain the phenomenon of transsexuality: transsexuals’ sex and gender simply don’t match.

Along with psychologists like Stoller, feminists found it useful to distinguish sex and gender. This enabled them to argue that many differences between women and men were socially produced and, therefore, changeable. Gayle Rubin (for instance) uses the phrase ‘sex/gender system’ in order to describe “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social intervention” (1975, 165). Rubin employed this system to articulate that “part of social life which is the locus of the oppression of women” (1975, 159) describing gender as the “socially imposed division of the sexes” (1975, 179). Rubin’s thought was that although biological differences are fixed, gender differences are the oppressive results of social interventions that dictate how women and men should behave. Women are oppressed as women and “by having to be women” (Rubin 1975, 204). However, since gender is social, it is thought to be mutable and alterable by political and social reform that would ultimately bring an end to women’s subordination. Feminism should aim to create a “genderless (though not sexless) society, in which one’s sexual anatomy is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom one makes love” (Rubin 1975, 204).

In some earlier interpretations, like Rubin’s, sex and gender were thought to complement one another. The slogan ‘Gender is the social interpretation of sex’ captures this view. Nicholson calls this ‘the coat-rack view’ of gender: our sexed bodies are like coat racks and “provide the site upon which gender [is] constructed” (1994, 81). Gender conceived of as masculinity and femininity is superimposed upon the ‘coat-rack’ of sex as each society imposes on sexed bodies their cultural conceptions of how males and females should behave. This socially constructs gender differences – or the amount of femininity/masculinity of a person – upon our sexed bodies. That is, according to this interpretation, all humans are either male or female; their sex is fixed. But cultures interpret sexed bodies differently and project different norms on those bodies thereby creating feminine and masculine persons. Distinguishing sex and gender, however, also enables the two to come apart: they are separable in that one can be sexed male and yet be gendered a woman, or vice versa (Haslanger 2000b; Stoljar 1995).

So, this group of feminist arguments against biological determinism suggested that gender differences result from cultural practices and social expectations. Nowadays it is more common to denote this by saying that gender is socially constructed. This means that genders (women and men) and gendered traits (like being nurturing or ambitious) are the “intended or unintended product[s] of a social practice” (Haslanger 1995, 97). But which social practices construct gender, what social construction is and what being of a certain gender amounts to are major feminist controversies. There is no consensus on these issues. (See the entry on intersections between analytic and continental feminism for more on different ways to understand gender.)

2. Gender as socially constructed

One way to interpret Beauvoir’s claim that one is not born but rather becomes a woman is to take it as a claim about gender socialisation: females become women through a process whereby they acquire feminine traits and learn feminine behaviour. Masculinity and femininity are thought to be products of nurture or how individuals are brought up. They are causally constructed (Haslanger 1995, 98): social forces either have a causal role in bringing gendered individuals into existence or (to some substantial sense) shape the way we are qua women and men. And the mechanism of construction is social learning. For instance, Kate Millett takes gender differences to have “essentially cultural, rather than biological bases” that result from differential treatment (1971, 28–9). For her, gender is “the sum total of the parents’, the peers’, and the culture’s notions of what is appropriate to each gender by way of temperament, character, interests, status, worth, gesture, and expression” (Millett 1971, 31). Feminine and masculine gender-norms, however, are problematic in that gendered behaviour conveniently fits with and reinforces women’s subordination so that women are socialised into subordinate social roles: they learn to be passive, ignorant, docile, emotional helpmeets for men (Millett 1971, 26). However, since these roles are simply learned, we can create more equal societies by ‘unlearning’ social roles. That is, feminists should aim to diminish the influence of socialisation.

Social learning theorists hold that a huge array of different influences socialise us as women and men. This being the case, it is extremely difficult to counter gender socialisation. For instance, parents often unconsciously treat their female and male children differently. When parents have been asked to describe their 24- hour old infants, they have done so using gender-stereotypic language: boys are describes as strong, alert and coordinated and girls as tiny, soft and delicate. Parents’ treatment of their infants further reflects these descriptions whether they are aware of this or not (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 32). Some socialisation is more overt: children are often dressed in gender stereotypical clothes and colours (boys are dressed in blue, girls in pink) and parents tend to buy their children gender stereotypical toys. They also (intentionally or not) tend to reinforce certain ‘appropriate’ behaviours. While the precise form of gender socialization has changed since the onset of second-wave feminism, even today girls are discouraged from playing sports like football or from playing ‘rough and tumble’ games and are more likely than boys to be given dolls or cooking toys to play with; boys are told not to ‘cry like a baby’ and are more likely to be given masculine toys like trucks and guns (for more, see Kimmel 2000, 122–126). [ 1 ]

According to social learning theorists, children are also influenced by what they observe in the world around them. This, again, makes countering gender socialisation difficult. For one, children’s books have portrayed males and females in blatantly stereotypical ways: for instance, males as adventurers and leaders, and females as helpers and followers. One way to address gender stereotyping in children’s books has been to portray females in independent roles and males as non-aggressive and nurturing (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 35). Some publishers have attempted an alternative approach by making their characters, for instance, gender-neutral animals or genderless imaginary creatures (like TV’s Teletubbies). However, parents reading books with gender-neutral or genderless characters often undermine the publishers’ efforts by reading them to their children in ways that depict the characters as either feminine or masculine. According to Renzetti and Curran, parents labelled the overwhelming majority of gender-neutral characters masculine whereas those characters that fit feminine gender stereotypes (for instance, by being helpful and caring) were labelled feminine (1992, 35). Socialising influences like these are still thought to send implicit messages regarding how females and males should act and are expected to act shaping us into feminine and masculine persons.

Nancy Chodorow (1978; 1995) has criticised social learning theory as too simplistic to explain gender differences (see also Deaux & Major 1990; Gatens 1996). Instead, she holds that gender is a matter of having feminine and masculine personalities that develop in early infancy as responses to prevalent parenting practices. In particular, gendered personalities develop because women tend to be the primary caretakers of small children. Chodorow holds that because mothers (or other prominent females) tend to care for infants, infant male and female psychic development differs. Crudely put: the mother-daughter relationship differs from the mother-son relationship because mothers are more likely to identify with their daughters than their sons. This unconsciously prompts the mother to encourage her son to psychologically individuate himself from her thereby prompting him to develop well defined and rigid ego boundaries. However, the mother unconsciously discourages the daughter from individuating herself thereby prompting the daughter to develop flexible and blurry ego boundaries. Childhood gender socialisation further builds on and reinforces these unconsciously developed ego boundaries finally producing feminine and masculine persons (1995, 202–206). This perspective has its roots in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, although Chodorow’s approach differs in many ways from Freud’s.

Gendered personalities are supposedly manifested in common gender stereotypical behaviour. Take emotional dependency. Women are stereotypically more emotional and emotionally dependent upon others around them, supposedly finding it difficult to distinguish their own interests and wellbeing from the interests and wellbeing of their children and partners. This is said to be because of their blurry and (somewhat) confused ego boundaries: women find it hard to distinguish their own needs from the needs of those around them because they cannot sufficiently individuate themselves from those close to them. By contrast, men are stereotypically emotionally detached, preferring a career where dispassionate and distanced thinking are virtues. These traits are said to result from men’s well-defined ego boundaries that enable them to prioritise their own needs and interests sometimes at the expense of others’ needs and interests.

Chodorow thinks that these gender differences should and can be changed. Feminine and masculine personalities play a crucial role in women’s oppression since they make females overly attentive to the needs of others and males emotionally deficient. In order to correct the situation, both male and female parents should be equally involved in parenting (Chodorow 1995, 214). This would help in ensuring that children develop sufficiently individuated senses of selves without becoming overly detached, which in turn helps to eradicate common gender stereotypical behaviours.

Catharine MacKinnon develops her theory of gender as a theory of sexuality. Very roughly: the social meaning of sex (gender) is created by sexual objectification of women whereby women are viewed and treated as objects for satisfying men’s desires (MacKinnon 1989). Masculinity is defined as sexual dominance, femininity as sexual submissiveness: genders are “created through the eroticization of dominance and submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social meaning of sex” (MacKinnon 1989, 113). For MacKinnon, gender is constitutively constructed : in defining genders (or masculinity and femininity) we must make reference to social factors (see Haslanger 1995, 98). In particular, we must make reference to the position one occupies in the sexualised dominance/submission dynamic: men occupy the sexually dominant position, women the sexually submissive one. As a result, genders are by definition hierarchical and this hierarchy is fundamentally tied to sexualised power relations. The notion of ‘gender equality’, then, does not make sense to MacKinnon. If sexuality ceased to be a manifestation of dominance, hierarchical genders (that are defined in terms of sexuality) would cease to exist.

So, gender difference for MacKinnon is not a matter of having a particular psychological orientation or behavioural pattern; rather, it is a function of sexuality that is hierarchal in patriarchal societies. This is not to say that men are naturally disposed to sexually objectify women or that women are naturally submissive. Instead, male and female sexualities are socially conditioned: men have been conditioned to find women’s subordination sexy and women have been conditioned to find a particular male version of female sexuality as erotic – one in which it is erotic to be sexually submissive. For MacKinnon, both female and male sexual desires are defined from a male point of view that is conditioned by pornography (MacKinnon 1989, chapter 7). Bluntly put: pornography portrays a false picture of ‘what women want’ suggesting that women in actual fact are and want to be submissive. This conditions men’s sexuality so that they view women’s submission as sexy. And male dominance enforces this male version of sexuality onto women, sometimes by force. MacKinnon’s thought is not that male dominance is a result of social learning (see 2.1.); rather, socialization is an expression of power. That is, socialized differences in masculine and feminine traits, behaviour, and roles are not responsible for power inequalities. Females and males (roughly put) are socialised differently because there are underlying power inequalities. As MacKinnon puts it, ‘dominance’ (power relations) is prior to ‘difference’ (traits, behaviour and roles) (see, MacKinnon 1989, chapter 12). MacKinnon, then, sees legal restrictions on pornography as paramount to ending women’s subordinate status that stems from their gender.

3. Problems with the sex/gender distinction

3.1 is gender uniform.

The positions outlined above share an underlying metaphysical perspective on gender: gender realism . [ 2 ] That is, women as a group are assumed to share some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines their gender and the possession of which makes some individuals women (as opposed to, say, men). All women are thought to differ from all men in this respect (or respects). For example, MacKinnon thought that being treated in sexually objectifying ways is the common condition that defines women’s gender and what women as women share. All women differ from all men in this respect. Further, pointing out females who are not sexually objectified does not provide a counterexample to MacKinnon’s view. Being sexually objectified is constitutive of being a woman; a female who escapes sexual objectification, then, would not count as a woman.

One may want to critique the three accounts outlined by rejecting the particular details of each account. (For instance, see Spelman [1988, chapter 4] for a critique of the details of Chodorow’s view.) A more thoroughgoing critique has been levelled at the general metaphysical perspective of gender realism that underlies these positions. It has come under sustained attack on two grounds: first, that it fails to take into account racial, cultural and class differences between women (particularity argument); second, that it posits a normative ideal of womanhood (normativity argument).

Elizabeth Spelman (1988) has influentially argued against gender realism with her particularity argument. Roughly: gender realists mistakenly assume that gender is constructed independently of race, class, ethnicity and nationality. If gender were separable from, for example, race and class in this manner, all women would experience womanhood in the same way. And this is clearly false. For instance, Harris (1993) and Stone (2007) criticise MacKinnon’s view, that sexual objectification is the common condition that defines women’s gender, for failing to take into account differences in women’s backgrounds that shape their sexuality. The history of racist oppression illustrates that during slavery black women were ‘hypersexualised’ and thought to be always sexually available whereas white women were thought to be pure and sexually virtuous. In fact, the rape of a black woman was thought to be impossible (Harris 1993). So, (the argument goes) sexual objectification cannot serve as the common condition for womanhood since it varies considerably depending on one’s race and class. [ 3 ]

For Spelman, the perspective of ‘white solipsism’ underlies gender realists’ mistake. They assumed that all women share some “golden nugget of womanness” (Spelman 1988, 159) and that the features constitutive of such a nugget are the same for all women regardless of their particular cultural backgrounds. Next, white Western middle-class feminists accounted for the shared features simply by reflecting on the cultural features that condition their gender as women thus supposing that “the womanness underneath the Black woman’s skin is a white woman’s, and deep down inside the Latina woman is an Anglo woman waiting to burst through an obscuring cultural shroud” (Spelman 1988, 13). In so doing, Spelman claims, white middle-class Western feminists passed off their particular view of gender as “a metaphysical truth” (1988, 180) thereby privileging some women while marginalising others. In failing to see the importance of race and class in gender construction, white middle-class Western feminists conflated “the condition of one group of women with the condition of all” (Spelman 1988, 3).

Betty Friedan’s (1963) well-known work is a case in point of white solipsism. [ 4 ] Friedan saw domesticity as the main vehicle of gender oppression and called upon women in general to find jobs outside the home. But she failed to realize that women from less privileged backgrounds, often poor and non-white, already worked outside the home to support their families. Friedan’s suggestion, then, was applicable only to a particular sub-group of women (white middle-class Western housewives). But it was mistakenly taken to apply to all women’s lives — a mistake that was generated by Friedan’s failure to take women’s racial and class differences into account (hooks 2000, 1–3).

Spelman further holds that since social conditioning creates femininity and societies (and sub-groups) that condition it differ from one another, femininity must be differently conditioned in different societies. For her, “females become not simply women but particular kinds of women” (Spelman 1988, 113): white working-class women, black middle-class women, poor Jewish women, wealthy aristocratic European women, and so on.

This line of thought has been extremely influential in feminist philosophy. For instance, Young holds that Spelman has definitively shown that gender realism is untenable (1997, 13). Mikkola (2006) argues that this isn’t so. The arguments Spelman makes do not undermine the idea that there is some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines women’s gender; they simply point out that some particular ways of cashing out what defines womanhood are misguided. So, although Spelman is right to reject those accounts that falsely take the feature that conditions white middle-class Western feminists’ gender to condition women’s gender in general, this leaves open the possibility that women qua women do share something that defines their gender. (See also Haslanger [2000a] for a discussion of why gender realism is not necessarily untenable, and Stoljar [2011] for a discussion of Mikkola’s critique of Spelman.)

Judith Butler critiques the sex/gender distinction on two grounds. They critique gender realism with their normativity argument (1999 [original 1990], chapter 1); they also hold that the sex/gender distinction is unintelligible (this will be discussed in section 3.3.). Butler’s normativity argument is not straightforwardly directed at the metaphysical perspective of gender realism, but rather at its political counterpart: identity politics. This is a form of political mobilization based on membership in some group (e.g. racial, ethnic, cultural, gender) and group membership is thought to be delimited by some common experiences, conditions or features that define the group (Heyes 2000, 58; see also the entry on Identity Politics ). Feminist identity politics, then, presupposes gender realism in that feminist politics is said to be mobilized around women as a group (or category) where membership in this group is fixed by some condition, experience or feature that women supposedly share and that defines their gender.

Butler’s normativity argument makes two claims. The first is akin to Spelman’s particularity argument: unitary gender notions fail to take differences amongst women into account thus failing to recognise “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ are constructed” (Butler 1999, 19–20). In their attempt to undercut biologically deterministic ways of defining what it means to be a woman, feminists inadvertently created new socially constructed accounts of supposedly shared femininity. Butler’s second claim is that such false gender realist accounts are normative. That is, in their attempt to fix feminism’s subject matter, feminists unwittingly defined the term ‘woman’ in a way that implies there is some correct way to be gendered a woman (Butler 1999, 5). That the definition of the term ‘woman’ is fixed supposedly “operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others” (Nicholson 1998, 293). Following this line of thought, one could say that, for instance, Chodorow’s view of gender suggests that ‘real’ women have feminine personalities and that these are the women feminism should be concerned about. If one does not exhibit a distinctly feminine personality, the implication is that one is not ‘really’ a member of women’s category nor does one properly qualify for feminist political representation.

Butler’s second claim is based on their view that“[i]dentity categories [like that of women] are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1991, 160). That is, the mistake of those feminists Butler critiques was not that they provided the incorrect definition of ‘woman’. Rather, (the argument goes) their mistake was to attempt to define the term ‘woman’ at all. Butler’s view is that ‘woman’ can never be defined in a way that does not prescribe some “unspoken normative requirements” (like having a feminine personality) that women should conform to (Butler 1999, 9). Butler takes this to be a feature of terms like ‘woman’ that purport to pick out (what they call) ‘identity categories’. They seem to assume that ‘woman’ can never be used in a non-ideological way (Moi 1999, 43) and that it will always encode conditions that are not satisfied by everyone we think of as women. Some explanation for this comes from Butler’s view that all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful (Witt 1995).

In order to better understand Butler’s critique, consider their account of gender performativity. For them, standard feminist accounts take gendered individuals to have some essential properties qua gendered individuals or a gender core by virtue of which one is either a man or a woman. This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons’ persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: (i) there are no such essential properties, and (ii) gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures. First, feminists are said to think that genders are socially constructed in that they have the following essential attributes (Butler 1999, 24): women are females with feminine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at men; men are males with masculine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at women. These are the attributes necessary for gendered individuals and those that enable women and men to persist through time as women and men. Individuals have “intelligible genders” (Butler 1999, 23) if they exhibit this sequence of traits in a coherent manner (where sexual desire follows from sexual orientation that in turn follows from feminine/ masculine behaviours thought to follow from biological sex). Social forces in general deem individuals who exhibit in coherent gender sequences (like lesbians) to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ and they actively discourage such sequencing of traits, for instance, via name-calling and overt homophobic discrimination. Think back to what was said above: having a certain conception of what women are like that mirrors the conditions of socially powerful (white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western) women functions to marginalize and police those who do not fit this conception.

These gender cores, supposedly encoding the above traits, however, are nothing more than illusions created by ideals and practices that seek to render gender uniform through heterosexism, the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant (Butler 1999, 42). Gender cores are constructed as if they somehow naturally belong to women and men thereby creating gender dimorphism or the belief that one must be either a masculine male or a feminine female. But gender dimorphism only serves a heterosexist social order by implying that since women and men are sharply opposed, it is natural to sexually desire the opposite sex or gender.

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one’s gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts ” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one’s hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are . Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman.

The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction : social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person’s gender is just as real or true as anyone else’s who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278). [ 5 ] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.

For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

Many people, including many feminists, have ordinarily taken sex ascriptions to be solely a matter of biology with no social or cultural dimension. It is commonplace to think that there are only two sexes and that biological sex classifications are utterly unproblematic. By contrast, some feminists have argued that sex classifications are not unproblematic and that they are not solely a matter of biology. In order to make sense of this, it is helpful to distinguish object- and idea-construction (see Haslanger 2003b for more): social forces can be said to construct certain kinds of objects (e.g. sexed bodies or gendered individuals) and certain kinds of ideas (e.g. sex or gender concepts). First, take the object-construction of sexed bodies. Secondary sex characteristics, or the physiological and biological features commonly associated with males and females, are affected by social practices. In some societies, females’ lower social status has meant that they have been fed less and so, the lack of nutrition has had the effect of making them smaller in size (Jaggar 1983, 37). Uniformity in muscular shape, size and strength within sex categories is not caused entirely by biological factors, but depends heavily on exercise opportunities: if males and females were allowed the same exercise opportunities and equal encouragement to exercise, it is thought that bodily dimorphism would diminish (Fausto-Sterling 1993a, 218). A number of medical phenomena involving bones (like osteoporosis) have social causes directly related to expectations about gender, women’s diet and their exercise opportunities (Fausto-Sterling 2005). These examples suggest that physiological features thought to be sex-specific traits not affected by social and cultural factors are, after all, to some extent products of social conditioning. Social conditioning, then, shapes our biology.

Second, take the idea-construction of sex concepts. Our concept of sex is said to be a product of social forces in the sense that what counts as sex is shaped by social meanings. Standardly, those with XX-chromosomes, ovaries that produce large egg cells, female genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘female’ hormones, and other secondary sex characteristics (relatively small body size, less body hair) count as biologically female. Those with XY-chromosomes, testes that produce small sperm cells, male genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘male’ hormones and other secondary sex traits (relatively large body size, significant amounts of body hair) count as male. This understanding is fairly recent. The prevalent scientific view from Ancient Greeks until the late 18 th century, did not consider female and male sexes to be distinct categories with specific traits; instead, a ‘one-sex model’ held that males and females were members of the same sex category. Females’ genitals were thought to be the same as males’ but simply directed inside the body; ovaries and testes (for instance) were referred to by the same term and whether the term referred to the former or the latter was made clear by the context (Laqueur 1990, 4). It was not until the late 1700s that scientists began to think of female and male anatomies as radically different moving away from the ‘one-sex model’ of a single sex spectrum to the (nowadays prevalent) ‘two-sex model’ of sexual dimorphism. (For an alternative view, see King 2013.)

Fausto-Sterling has argued that this ‘two-sex model’ isn’t straightforward either (1993b; 2000a; 2000b). Based on a meta-study of empirical medical research, she estimates that 1.7% of population fail to neatly fall within the usual sex classifications possessing various combinations of different sex characteristics (Fausto-Sterling 2000a, 20). In her earlier work, she claimed that intersex individuals make up (at least) three further sex classes: ‘herms’ who possess one testis and one ovary; ‘merms’ who possess testes, some aspects of female genitalia but no ovaries; and ‘ferms’ who have ovaries, some aspects of male genitalia but no testes (Fausto-Sterling 1993b, 21). (In her [2000a], Fausto-Sterling notes that these labels were put forward tongue–in–cheek.) Recognition of intersex people suggests that feminists (and society at large) are wrong to think that humans are either female or male.

To illustrate further the idea-construction of sex, consider the case of the athlete Maria Patiño. Patiño has female genitalia, has always considered herself to be female and was considered so by others. However, she was discovered to have XY chromosomes and was barred from competing in women’s sports (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, 1–3). Patiño’s genitalia were at odds with her chromosomes and the latter were taken to determine her sex. Patiño successfully fought to be recognised as a female athlete arguing that her chromosomes alone were not sufficient to not make her female. Intersex people, like Patiño, illustrate that our understandings of sex differ and suggest that there is no immediately obvious way to settle what sex amounts to purely biologically or scientifically. Deciding what sex is involves evaluative judgements that are influenced by social factors.

Insofar as our cultural conceptions affect our understandings of sex, feminists must be much more careful about sex classifications and rethink what sex amounts to (Stone 2007, chapter 1). More specifically, intersex people illustrate that sex traits associated with females and males need not always go together and that individuals can have some mixture of these traits. This suggests to Stone that sex is a cluster concept: it is sufficient to satisfy enough of the sex features that tend to cluster together in order to count as being of a particular sex. But, one need not satisfy all of those features or some arbitrarily chosen supposedly necessary sex feature, like chromosomes (Stone 2007, 44). This makes sex a matter of degree and sex classifications should take place on a spectrum: one can be more or less female/male but there is no sharp distinction between the two. Further, intersex people (along with trans people) are located at the centre of the sex spectrum and in many cases their sex will be indeterminate (Stone 2007).

More recently, Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015) have argued for an inclusive and extended conception of sex: just as certain tools can be seen to extend our minds beyond the limits of our brains (e.g. white canes), other tools (like dildos) can extend our sex beyond our bodily boundaries. This view aims to motivate the idea that what counts as sex should not be determined by looking inwards at genitalia or other anatomical features. In a different vein, Ásta (2018) argues that sex is a conferred social property. This follows her more general conferralist framework to analyse all social properties: properties that are conferred by others thereby generating a social status that consists in contextually specific constraints and enablements on individual behaviour. The general schema for conferred properties is as follows (Ásta 2018, 8):

Conferred property: what property is conferred. Who: who the subjects are. What: what attitude, state, or action of the subjects matter. When: under what conditions the conferral takes place. Base property: what the subjects are attempting to track (consciously or not), if anything.

With being of a certain sex (e.g. male, female) in mind, Ásta holds that it is a conferred property that merely aims to track physical features. Hence sex is a social – or in fact, an institutional – property rather than a natural one. The schema for sex goes as follows (72):

Conferred property: being female, male. Who: legal authorities, drawing on the expert opinion of doctors, other medical personnel. What: “the recording of a sex in official documents ... The judgment of the doctors (and others) as to what sex role might be the most fitting, given the biological characteristics present.” When: at birth or after surgery/ hormonal treatment. Base property: “the aim is to track as many sex-stereotypical characteristics as possible, and doctors perform surgery in cases where that might help bring the physical characteristics more in line with the stereotype of male and female.”

This (among other things) offers a debunking analysis of sex: it may appear to be a natural property, but on the conferralist analysis is better understood as a conferred legal status. Ásta holds that gender too is a conferred property, but contra the discussion in the following section, she does not think that this collapses the distinction between sex and gender: sex and gender are differently conferred albeit both satisfying the general schema noted above. Nonetheless, on the conferralist framework what underlies both sex and gender is the idea of social construction as social significance: sex-stereotypical characteristics are taken to be socially significant context specifically, whereby they become the basis for conferring sex onto individuals and this brings with it various constraints and enablements on individuals and their behaviour. This fits object- and idea-constructions introduced above, although offers a different general framework to analyse the matter at hand.

In addition to arguing against identity politics and for gender performativity, Butler holds that distinguishing biological sex from social gender is unintelligible. For them, both are socially constructed:

If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (Butler 1999, 10–11)

(Butler is not alone in claiming that there are no tenable distinctions between nature/culture, biology/construction and sex/gender. See also: Antony 1998; Gatens 1996; Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999.) Butler makes two different claims in the passage cited: that sex is a social construction, and that sex is gender. To unpack their view, consider the two claims in turn. First, the idea that sex is a social construct, for Butler, boils down to the view that our sexed bodies are also performative and, so, they have “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute [their] reality” (1999, 173). Prima facie , this implausibly implies that female and male bodies do not have independent existence and that if gendering activities ceased, so would physical bodies. This is not Butler’s claim; rather, their position is that bodies viewed as the material foundations on which gender is constructed, are themselves constructed as if they provide such material foundations (Butler 1993). Cultural conceptions about gender figure in “the very apparatus of production whereby sexes themselves are established” (Butler 1999, 11).

For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and how we understand gender shapes how we understand sex (1999, 139). Sexed bodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sex categories are not picked out on the basis of objective features of the world. Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed : they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified (for discursive construction, see Haslanger 1995, 99). Sex assignment (calling someone female or male) is normative (Butler 1993, 1). [ 6 ] When the doctor calls a newly born infant a girl or a boy, s/he is not making a descriptive claim, but a normative one. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act (see the entry on Speech Acts ). In effect, the doctor’s utterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage in activities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two and that being female or male is an objective feature of the world, rather than being a consequence of certain constitutive acts (that is, rather than being performative). And this is what Butler means in saying that physical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, and that sex is as socially constructed as gender. They do not deny that physical bodies exist. But, they take our understanding of this existence to be a product of social conditioning: social conditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to us by discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutive acts. (For a helpful introduction to Butler’s views, see Salih 2002.)

For Butler, sex assignment is always in some sense oppressive. Again, this appears to be because of Butler’s general suspicion of classification: sex classification can never be merely descriptive but always has a normative element reflecting evaluative claims of those who are powerful. Conducting a feminist genealogy of the body (or examining why sexed bodies are thought to come naturally as female and male), then, should ground feminist practice (Butler 1993, 28–9). Feminists should examine and uncover ways in which social construction and certain acts that constitute sex shape our understandings of sexed bodies, what kinds of meanings bodies acquire and which practices and illocutionary speech acts ‘make’ our bodies into sexes. Doing so enables feminists to identity how sexed bodies are socially constructed in order to resist such construction.

However, given what was said above, it is far from obvious what we should make of Butler’s claim that sex “was always already gender” (1999, 11). Stone (2007) takes this to mean that sex is gender but goes on to question it arguing that the social construction of both sex and gender does not make sex identical to gender. According to Stone, it would be more accurate for Butler to say that claims about sex imply gender norms. That is, many claims about sex traits (like ‘females are physically weaker than males’) actually carry implications about how women and men are expected to behave. To some extent the claim describes certain facts. But, it also implies that females are not expected to do much heavy lifting and that they would probably not be good at it. So, claims about sex are not identical to claims about gender; rather, they imply claims about gender norms (Stone 2007, 70).

Some feminists hold that the sex/gender distinction is not useful. For a start, it is thought to reflect politically problematic dualistic thinking that undercuts feminist aims: the distinction is taken to reflect and replicate androcentric oppositions between (for instance) mind/body, culture/nature and reason/emotion that have been used to justify women’s oppression (e.g. Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The thought is that in oppositions like these, one term is always superior to the other and that the devalued term is usually associated with women (Lloyd 1993). For instance, human subjectivity and agency are identified with the mind but since women are usually identified with their bodies, they are devalued as human subjects and agents. The opposition between mind and body is said to further map on to other distinctions, like reason/emotion, culture/nature, rational/irrational, where one side of each distinction is devalued (one’s bodily features are usually valued less that one’s mind, rationality is usually valued more than irrationality) and women are associated with the devalued terms: they are thought to be closer to bodily features and nature than men, to be irrational, emotional and so on. This is said to be evident (for instance) in job interviews. Men are treated as gender-neutral persons and not asked whether they are planning to take time off to have a family. By contrast, that women face such queries illustrates that they are associated more closely than men with bodily features to do with procreation (Prokhovnik 1999, 126). The opposition between mind and body, then, is thought to map onto the opposition between men and women.

Now, the mind/body dualism is also said to map onto the sex/gender distinction (Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The idea is that gender maps onto mind, sex onto body. Although not used by those endorsing this view, the basic idea can be summed by the slogan ‘Gender is between the ears, sex is between the legs’: the implication is that, while sex is immutable, gender is something individuals have control over – it is something we can alter and change through individual choices. However, since women are said to be more closely associated with biological features (and so, to map onto the body side of the mind/body distinction) and men are treated as gender-neutral persons (mapping onto the mind side), the implication is that “man equals gender, which is associated with mind and choice, freedom from body, autonomy, and with the public real; while woman equals sex, associated with the body, reproduction, ‘natural’ rhythms and the private realm” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). This is said to render the sex/gender distinction inherently repressive and to drain it of any potential for emancipation: rather than facilitating gender role choice for women, it “actually functions to reinforce their association with body, sex, and involuntary ‘natural’ rhythms” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). Contrary to what feminists like Rubin argued, the sex/gender distinction cannot be used as a theoretical tool that dissociates conceptions of womanhood from biological and reproductive features.

Moi has further argued that the sex/gender distinction is useless given certain theoretical goals (1999, chapter 1). This is not to say that it is utterly worthless; according to Moi, the sex/gender distinction worked well to show that the historically prevalent biological determinism was false. However, for her, the distinction does no useful work “when it comes to producing a good theory of subjectivity” (1999, 6) and “a concrete, historical understanding of what it means to be a woman (or a man) in a given society” (1999, 4–5). That is, the 1960s distinction understood sex as fixed by biology without any cultural or historical dimensions. This understanding, however, ignores lived experiences and embodiment as aspects of womanhood (and manhood) by separating sex from gender and insisting that womanhood is to do with the latter. Rather, embodiment must be included in one’s theory that tries to figure out what it is to be a woman (or a man).

Mikkola (2011) argues that the sex/gender distinction, which underlies views like Rubin’s and MacKinnon’s, has certain unintuitive and undesirable ontological commitments that render the distinction politically unhelpful. First, claiming that gender is socially constructed implies that the existence of women and men is a mind-dependent matter. This suggests that we can do away with women and men simply by altering some social practices, conventions or conditions on which gender depends (whatever those are). However, ordinary social agents find this unintuitive given that (ordinarily) sex and gender are not distinguished. Second, claiming that gender is a product of oppressive social forces suggests that doing away with women and men should be feminism’s political goal. But this harbours ontologically undesirable commitments since many ordinary social agents view their gender to be a source of positive value. So, feminism seems to want to do away with something that should not be done away with, which is unlikely to motivate social agents to act in ways that aim at gender justice. Given these problems, Mikkola argues that feminists should give up the distinction on practical political grounds.

Tomas Bogardus (2020) has argued in an even more radical sense against the sex/gender distinction: as things stand, he holds, feminist philosophers have merely assumed and asserted that the distinction exists, instead of having offered good arguments for the distinction. In other words, feminist philosophers allegedly have yet to offer good reasons to think that ‘woman’ does not simply pick out adult human females. Alex Byrne (2020) argues in a similar vein: the term ‘woman’ does not pick out a social kind as feminist philosophers have “assumed”. Instead, “women are adult human females–nothing more, and nothing less” (2020, 3801). Byrne offers six considerations to ground this AHF (adult, human, female) conception.

• It reproduces the dictionary definition of ‘woman’.
• One would expect English to have a word that picks out the category adult human female, and ‘woman’ is the only candidate.
• AHF explains how we sometimes know that an individual is a woman, despite knowing nothing else relevant about her other than the fact that she is an adult human female.
• AHF stands or falls with the analogous thesis for girls, which can be supported independently.
• AHF predicts the correct verdict in cases of gender role reversal.
• AHF is supported by the fact that ‘woman’ and ‘female’ are often appropriately used as stylistic variants of each other, even in hyperintensional contexts.

Robin Dembroff (2021) responds to Byrne and highlights various problems with Byrne’s argument. First, framing: Byrne assumes from the start that gender terms like ‘woman’ have a single invariant meaning thereby failing to discuss the possibility of terms like ‘woman’ having multiple meanings – something that is a familiar claim made by feminist theorists from various disciplines. Moreover, Byrne (according to Dembroff) assumes without argument that there is a single, universal category of woman – again, something that has been extensively discussed and critiqued by feminist philosophers and theorists. Second, Byrne’s conception of the ‘dominant’ meaning of woman is said to be cherry-picked and it ignores a wealth of contexts outside of philosophy (like the media and the law) where ‘woman’ has a meaning other than AHF . Third, Byrne’s own distinction between biological and social categories fails to establish what he intended to establish: namely, that ‘woman’ picks out a biological rather than a social kind. Hence, Dembroff holds, Byrne’s case fails by its own lights. Byrne (2021) responds to Dembroff’s critique.

Others such as ‘gender critical feminists’ also hold views about the sex/gender distinction in a spirit similar to Bogardus and Byrne. For example, Holly Lawford-Smith (2021) takes the prevalent sex/gender distinction, where ‘female’/‘male’ are used as sex terms and ‘woman’/’man’ as gender terms, not to be helpful. Instead, she takes all of these to be sex terms and holds that (the norms of) femininity/masculinity refer to gender normativity. Because much of the gender critical feminists’ discussion that philosophers have engaged in has taken place in social media, public fora, and other sources outside academic philosophy, this entry will not focus on these discussions.

4. Women as a group

The various critiques of the sex/gender distinction have called into question the viability of the category women . Feminism is the movement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how should the category of women be understood if feminists accept the above arguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharp distinction between biological sex and social gender is false or (at least) not useful, and that various features associated with women play a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (like a variety of social roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features and experiences)? Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women differ. These concerns (among others) have generated a situation where (as Linda Alcoff puts it) feminists aim to speak and make political demands in the name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is a unified category of women (2006, 152). If feminist critiques of the category women are successful, then what (if anything) binds women together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demands can feminists make on behalf of women?

Many have found the fragmentation of the category of women problematic for political reasons (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Bach 2012; Benhabib 1992; Frye 1996; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Martin 1994; Mikkola 2007; Stoljar 1995; Stone 2004; Tanesini 1996; Young 1997; Zack 2005). For instance, Young holds that accounts like Spelman’s reduce the category of women to a gerrymandered collection of individuals with nothing to bind them together (1997, 20). Black women differ from white women but members of both groups also differ from one another with respect to nationality, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and economic position; that is, wealthy white women differ from working-class white women due to their economic and class positions. These sub-groups are themselves diverse: for instance, some working-class white women in Northern Ireland are starkly divided along religious lines. So if we accept Spelman’s position, we risk ending up with individual women and nothing to bind them together. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense. Young writes that without doing so “it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process” (1997, 17). Some, then, take the articulation of an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics and a rich literature has emerged that aims to conceptualise women as a group or a collective (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Ásta 2011; Frye 1996; 2011; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Stoljar 1995, 2011; Young 1997; Zack 2005). Articulations of this category can be divided into those that are: (a) gender nominalist — positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that seek to unify women’s social kind by appealing to something external to women; and (b) gender realist — positions that take there to be something women qua women share (although these realist positions differ significantly from those outlined in Section 2). Below we will review some influential gender nominalist and gender realist positions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that not everyone is convinced that attempts to articulate an inclusive category of women can succeed or that worries about what it is to be a woman are in need of being resolved. Mikkola (2016) argues that feminist politics need not rely on overcoming (what she calls) the ‘gender controversy’: that feminists must settle the meaning of gender concepts and articulate a way to ground women’s social kind membership. As she sees it, disputes about ‘what it is to be a woman’ have become theoretically bankrupt and intractable, which has generated an analytical impasse that looks unsurpassable. Instead, Mikkola argues for giving up the quest, which in any case in her view poses no serious political obstacles.

Elizabeth Barnes (2020) responds to the need to offer an inclusive conception of gender somewhat differently, although she endorses the need for feminism to be inclusive particularly of trans people. Barnes holds that typically philosophical theories of gender aim to offer an account of what it is to be a woman (or man, genderqueer, etc.), where such an account is presumed to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being a woman or an account of our gender terms’ extensions. But, she holds, it is a mistake to expect our theories of gender to do so. For Barnes, a project that offers a metaphysics of gender “should be understood as the project of theorizing what it is —if anything— about the social world that ultimately explains gender” (2020, 706). This project is not equivalent to one that aims to define gender terms or elucidate the application conditions for natural language gender terms though.

4.1 Gender nominalism

Iris Young argues that unless there is “some sense in which ‘woman’ is the name of a social collective [that feminism represents], there is nothing specific to feminist politics” (1997, 13). In order to make the category women intelligible, she argues that women make up a series: a particular kind of social collective “whose members are unified passively by the objects their actions are oriented around and/or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the other” (Young 1997, 23). A series is distinct from a group in that, whereas members of groups are thought to self-consciously share certain goals, projects, traits and/ or self-conceptions, members of series pursue their own individual ends without necessarily having anything at all in common. Young holds that women are not bound together by a shared feature or experience (or set of features and experiences) since she takes Spelman’s particularity argument to have established definitely that no such feature exists (1997, 13; see also: Frye 1996; Heyes 2000). Instead, women’s category is unified by certain practico-inert realities or the ways in which women’s lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities (Young 1997, 23–4). For example, bus commuters make up a series unified through their individual actions being organised around the same practico-inert objects of the bus and the practice of public transport. Women make up a series unified through women’s lives and actions being organised around certain practico-inert objects and realities that position them as women .

Young identifies two broad groups of such practico-inert objects and realities. First, phenomena associated with female bodies (physical facts), biological processes that take place in female bodies (menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth) and social rules associated with these biological processes (social rules of menstruation, for instance). Second, gender-coded objects and practices: pronouns, verbal and visual representations of gender, gender-coded artefacts and social spaces, clothes, cosmetics, tools and furniture. So, women make up a series since their lives and actions are organised around female bodies and certain gender-coded objects. Their series is bound together passively and the unity is “not one that arises from the individuals called women” (Young 1997, 32).

Although Young’s proposal purports to be a response to Spelman’s worries, Stone has questioned whether it is, after all, susceptible to the particularity argument: ultimately, on Young’s view, something women as women share (their practico-inert realities) binds them together (Stone 2004).

Natalie Stoljar holds that unless the category of women is unified, feminist action on behalf of women cannot be justified (1995, 282). Stoljar too is persuaded by the thought that women qua women do not share anything unitary. This prompts her to argue for resemblance nominalism. This is the view that a certain kind of resemblance relation holds between entities of a particular type (for more on resemblance nominalism, see Armstrong 1989, 39–58). Stoljar is not alone in arguing for resemblance relations to make sense of women as a category; others have also done so, usually appealing to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ relations (Alcoff 1988; Green & Radford Curry 1991; Heyes 2000; Munro 2006). Stoljar relies more on Price’s resemblance nominalism whereby x is a member of some type F only if x resembles some paradigm or exemplar of F sufficiently closely (Price 1953, 20). For instance, the type of red entities is unified by some chosen red paradigms so that only those entities that sufficiently resemble the paradigms count as red. The type (or category) of women, then, is unified by some chosen woman paradigms so that those who sufficiently resemble the woman paradigms count as women (Stoljar 1995, 284).

Semantic considerations about the concept woman suggest to Stoljar that resemblance nominalism should be endorsed (Stoljar 2000, 28). It seems unlikely that the concept is applied on the basis of some single social feature all and only women possess. By contrast, woman is a cluster concept and our attributions of womanhood pick out “different arrangements of features in different individuals” (Stoljar 2000, 27). More specifically, they pick out the following clusters of features: (a) Female sex; (b) Phenomenological features: menstruation, female sexual experience, child-birth, breast-feeding, fear of walking on the streets at night or fear of rape; (c) Certain roles: wearing typically female clothing, being oppressed on the basis of one’s sex or undertaking care-work; (d) Gender attribution: “calling oneself a woman, being called a woman” (Stoljar 1995, 283–4). For Stoljar, attributions of womanhood are to do with a variety of traits and experiences: those that feminists have historically termed ‘gender traits’ (like social, behavioural, psychological traits) and those termed ‘sex traits’. Nonetheless, she holds that since the concept woman applies to (at least some) trans persons, one can be a woman without being female (Stoljar 1995, 282).

The cluster concept woman does not, however, straightforwardly provide the criterion for picking out the category of women. Rather, the four clusters of features that the concept picks out help single out woman paradigms that in turn help single out the category of women. First, any individual who possesses a feature from at least three of the four clusters mentioned will count as an exemplar of the category. For instance, an African-American with primary and secondary female sex characteristics, who describes herself as a woman and is oppressed on the basis of her sex, along with a white European hermaphrodite brought up ‘as a girl’, who engages in female roles and has female phenomenological features despite lacking female sex characteristics, will count as woman paradigms (Stoljar 1995, 284). [ 7 ] Second, any individual who resembles “any of the paradigms sufficiently closely (on Price’s account, as closely as [the paradigms] resemble each other) will be a member of the resemblance class ‘woman’” (Stoljar 1995, 284). That is, what delimits membership in the category of women is that one resembles sufficiently a woman paradigm.

4.2 Neo-gender realism

In a series of articles collected in her 2012 book, Sally Haslanger argues for a way to define the concept woman that is politically useful, serving as a tool in feminist fights against sexism, and that shows woman to be a social (not a biological) notion. More specifically, Haslanger argues that gender is a matter of occupying either a subordinate or a privileged social position. In some articles, Haslanger is arguing for a revisionary analysis of the concept woman (2000b; 2003a; 2003b). Elsewhere she suggests that her analysis may not be that revisionary after all (2005; 2006). Consider the former argument first. Haslanger’s analysis is, in her terms, ameliorative: it aims to elucidate which gender concepts best help feminists achieve their legitimate purposes thereby elucidating those concepts feminists should be using (Haslanger 2000b, 33). [ 8 ] Now, feminists need gender terminology in order to fight sexist injustices (Haslanger 2000b, 36). In particular, they need gender terms to identify, explain and talk about persistent social inequalities between males and females. Haslanger’s analysis of gender begins with the recognition that females and males differ in two respects: physically and in their social positions. Societies in general tend to “privilege individuals with male bodies” (Haslanger 2000b, 38) so that the social positions they subsequently occupy are better than the social positions of those with female bodies. And this generates persistent sexist injustices. With this in mind, Haslanger specifies how she understands genders:

S is a woman iff [by definition] S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.

S is a man iff [by definition] S is systematically privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction. (2003a, 6–7)

These are constitutive of being a woman and a man: what makes calling S a woman apt, is that S is oppressed on sex-marked grounds; what makes calling S a man apt, is that S is privileged on sex-marked grounds.

Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis is counterintuitive in that females who are not sex-marked for oppression, do not count as women. At least arguably, the Queen of England is not oppressed on sex-marked grounds and so, would not count as a woman on Haslanger’s definition. And, similarly, all males who are not privileged would not count as men. This might suggest that Haslanger’s analysis should be rejected in that it does not capture what language users have in mind when applying gender terms. However, Haslanger argues that this is not a reason to reject the definitions, which she takes to be revisionary: they are not meant to capture our intuitive gender terms. In response, Mikkola (2009) has argued that revisionary analyses of gender concepts, like Haslanger’s, are both politically unhelpful and philosophically unnecessary.

Note also that Haslanger’s proposal is eliminativist: gender justice would eradicate gender, since it would abolish those sexist social structures responsible for sex-marked oppression and privilege. If sexist oppression were to cease, women and men would no longer exist (although there would still be males and females). Not all feminists endorse such an eliminativist view though. Stone holds that Haslanger does not leave any room for positively revaluing what it is to be a woman: since Haslanger defines woman in terms of subordination,

any woman who challenges her subordinate status must by definition be challenging her status as a woman, even if she does not intend to … positive change to our gender norms would involve getting rid of the (necessarily subordinate) feminine gender. (Stone 2007, 160)

But according to Stone this is not only undesirable – one should be able to challenge subordination without having to challenge one’s status as a woman. It is also false: “because norms of femininity can be and constantly are being revised, women can be women without thereby being subordinate” (Stone 2007, 162; Mikkola [2016] too argues that Haslanger’s eliminativism is troublesome).

Theodore Bach holds that Haslanger’s eliminativism is undesirable on other grounds, and that Haslanger’s position faces another more serious problem. Feminism faces the following worries (among others):

Representation problem : “if there is no real group of ‘women’, then it is incoherent to make moral claims and advance political policies on behalf of women” (Bach 2012, 234). Commonality problems : (1) There is no feature that all women cross-culturally and transhistorically share. (2) Delimiting women’s social kind with the help of some essential property privileges those who possess it, and marginalizes those who do not (Bach 2012, 235).

According to Bach, Haslanger’s strategy to resolve these problems appeals to ‘social objectivism’. First, we define women “according to a suitably abstract relational property” (Bach 2012, 236), which avoids the commonality problems. Second, Haslanger employs “an ontologically thin notion of ‘objectivity’” (Bach 2012, 236) that answers the representation problem. Haslanger’s solution (Bach holds) is specifically to argue that women make up an objective type because women are objectively similar to one another, and not simply classified together given our background conceptual schemes. Bach claims though that Haslanger’s account is not objective enough, and we should on political grounds “provide a stronger ontological characterization of the genders men and women according to which they are natural kinds with explanatory essences” (Bach 2012, 238). He thus proposes that women make up a natural kind with a historical essence:

The essential property of women, in virtue of which an individual is a member of the kind ‘women,’ is participation in a lineage of women. In order to exemplify this relational property, an individual must be a reproduction of ancestral women, in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic processes through which a historical gender system replicates women. (Bach 2012, 271)

In short, one is not a woman due to shared surface properties with other women (like occupying a subordinate social position). Rather, one is a woman because one has the right history: one has undergone the ubiquitous ontogenetic process of gender socialization. Thinking about gender in this way supposedly provides a stronger kind unity than Haslanger’s that simply appeals to shared surface properties.

Not everyone agrees; Mikkola (2020) argues that Bach’s metaphysical picture has internal tensions that render it puzzling and that Bach’s metaphysics does not provide good responses to the commonality and presentation problems. The historically essentialist view also has anti-trans implications. After all, trans women who have not undergone female gender socialization won’t count as women on his view (Mikkola [2016, 2020] develops this line of critique in more detail). More worryingly, trans women will count as men contrary to their self-identification. Both Bettcher (2013) and Jenkins (2016) consider the importance of gender self-identification. Bettcher argues that there is more than one ‘correct’ way to understand womanhood: at the very least, the dominant (mainstream), and the resistant (trans) conceptions. Dominant views like that of Bach’s tend to erase trans people’s experiences and to marginalize trans women within feminist movements. Rather than trans women having to defend their self-identifying claims, these claims should be taken at face value right from the start. And so, Bettcher holds, “in analyzing the meaning of terms such as ‘woman,’ it is inappropriate to dismiss alternative ways in which those terms are actually used in trans subcultures; such usage needs to be taken into consideration as part of the analysis” (2013, 235).

Specifically with Haslanger in mind and in a similar vein, Jenkins (2016) discusses how Haslanger’s revisionary approach unduly excludes some trans women from women’s social kind. On Jenkins’s view, Haslanger’s ameliorative methodology in fact yields more than one satisfying target concept: one that “corresponds to Haslanger’s proposed concept and captures the sense of gender as an imposed social class”; another that “captures the sense of gender as a lived identity” (Jenkins 2016, 397). The latter of these allows us to include trans women into women’s social kind, who on Haslanger’s social class approach to gender would inappropriately have been excluded. (See Andler 2017 for the view that Jenkins’s purportedly inclusive conception of gender is still not fully inclusive. Jenkins 2018 responds to this charge and develops the notion of gender identity still further.)

In addition to her revisionary argument, Haslanger has suggested that her ameliorative analysis of woman may not be as revisionary as it first seems (2005, 2006). Although successful in their reference fixing, ordinary language users do not always know precisely what they are talking about. Our language use may be skewed by oppressive ideologies that can “mislead us about the content of our own thoughts” (Haslanger 2005, 12). Although her gender terminology is not intuitive, this could simply be because oppressive ideologies mislead us about the meanings of our gender terms. Our everyday gender terminology might mean something utterly different from what we think it means; and we could be entirely ignorant of this. Perhaps Haslanger’s analysis, then, has captured our everyday gender vocabulary revealing to us the terms that we actually employ: we may be applying ‘woman’ in our everyday language on the basis of sex-marked subordination whether we take ourselves to be doing so or not. If this is so, Haslanger’s gender terminology is not radically revisionist.

Saul (2006) argues that, despite it being possible that we unknowingly apply ‘woman’ on the basis of social subordination, it is extremely difficult to show that this is the case. This would require showing that the gender terminology we in fact employ is Haslanger’s proposed gender terminology. But discovering the grounds on which we apply everyday gender terms is extremely difficult precisely because they are applied in various and idiosyncratic ways (Saul 2006, 129). Haslanger, then, needs to do more in order to show that her analysis is non-revisionary.

Charlotte Witt (2011a; 2011b) argues for a particular sort of gender essentialism, which Witt terms ‘uniessentialism’. Her motivation and starting point is the following: many ordinary social agents report gender being essential to them and claim that they would be a different person were they of a different sex/gender. Uniessentialism attempts to understand and articulate this. However, Witt’s work departs in important respects from the earlier (so-called) essentialist or gender realist positions discussed in Section 2: Witt does not posit some essential property of womanhood of the kind discussed above, which failed to take women’s differences into account. Further, uniessentialism differs significantly from those position developed in response to the problem of how we should conceive of women’s social kind. It is not about solving the standard dispute between gender nominalists and gender realists, or about articulating some supposedly shared property that binds women together and provides a theoretical ground for feminist political solidarity. Rather, uniessentialism aims to make good the widely held belief that gender is constitutive of who we are. [ 9 ]

Uniessentialism is a sort of individual essentialism. Traditionally philosophers distinguish between kind and individual essentialisms: the former examines what binds members of a kind together and what do all members of some kind have in common qua members of that kind. The latter asks: what makes an individual the individual it is. We can further distinguish two sorts of individual essentialisms: Kripkean identity essentialism and Aristotelian uniessentialism. The former asks: what makes an individual that individual? The latter, however, asks a slightly different question: what explains the unity of individuals? What explains that an individual entity exists over and above the sum total of its constituent parts? (The standard feminist debate over gender nominalism and gender realism has largely been about kind essentialism. Being about individual essentialism, Witt’s uniessentialism departs in an important way from the standard debate.) From the two individual essentialisms, Witt endorses the Aristotelian one. On this view, certain functional essences have a unifying role: these essences are responsible for the fact that material parts constitute a new individual, rather than just a lump of stuff or a collection of particles. Witt’s example is of a house: the essential house-functional property (what the entity is for, what its purpose is) unifies the different material parts of a house so that there is a house, and not just a collection of house-constituting particles (2011a, 6). Gender (being a woman/a man) functions in a similar fashion and provides “the principle of normative unity” that organizes, unifies and determines the roles of social individuals (Witt 2011a, 73). Due to this, gender is a uniessential property of social individuals.

It is important to clarify the notions of gender and social individuality that Witt employs. First, gender is a social position that “cluster[s] around the engendering function … women conceive and bear … men beget” (Witt 2011a, 40). These are women and men’s socially mediated reproductive functions (Witt 2011a, 29) and they differ from the biological function of reproduction, which roughly corresponds to sex on the standard sex/gender distinction. Witt writes: “to be a woman is to be recognized to have a particular function in engendering, to be a man is to be recognized to have a different function in engendering” (2011a, 39). Second, Witt distinguishes persons (those who possess self-consciousness), human beings (those who are biologically human) and social individuals (those who occupy social positions synchronically and diachronically). These ontological categories are not equivalent in that they possess different persistence and identity conditions. Social individuals are bound by social normativity, human beings by biological normativity. These normativities differ in two respects: first, social norms differ from one culture to the next whereas biological norms do not; second, unlike biological normativity, social normativity requires “the recognition by others that an agent is both responsive to and evaluable under a social norm” (Witt 2011a, 19). Thus, being a social individual is not equivalent to being a human being. Further, Witt takes personhood to be defined in terms of intrinsic psychological states of self-awareness and self-consciousness. However, social individuality is defined in terms of the extrinsic feature of occupying a social position, which depends for its existence on a social world. So, the two are not equivalent: personhood is essentially about intrinsic features and could exist without a social world, whereas social individuality is essentially about extrinsic features that could not exist without a social world.

Witt’s gender essentialist argument crucially pertains to social individuals , not to persons or human beings: saying that persons or human beings are gendered would be a category mistake. But why is gender essential to social individuals? For Witt, social individuals are those who occupy positions in social reality. Further, “social positions have norms or social roles associated with them; a social role is what an individual who occupies a given social position is responsive to and evaluable under” (Witt 2011a, 59). However, qua social individuals, we occupy multiple social positions at once and over time: we can be women, mothers, immigrants, sisters, academics, wives, community organisers and team-sport coaches synchronically and diachronically. Now, the issue for Witt is what unifies these positions so that a social individual is constituted. After all, a bundle of social position occupancies does not make for an individual (just as a bundle of properties like being white , cube-shaped and sweet do not make for a sugar cube). For Witt, this unifying role is undertaken by gender (being a woman or a man): it is

a pervasive and fundamental social position that unifies and determines all other social positions both synchronically and diachronically. It unifies them not physically, but by providing a principle of normative unity. (2011a, 19–20)

By ‘normative unity’, Witt means the following: given our social roles and social position occupancies, we are responsive to various sets of social norms. These norms are “complex patterns of behaviour and practices that constitute what one ought to do in a situation given one’s social position(s) and one’s social context” (Witt 2011a, 82). The sets of norms can conflict: the norms of motherhood can (and do) conflict with the norms of being an academic philosopher. However, in order for this conflict to exist, the norms must be binding on a single social individual. Witt, then, asks: what explains the existence and unity of the social individual who is subject to conflicting social norms? The answer is gender.

Gender is not just a social role that unifies social individuals. Witt takes it to be the social role — as she puts it, it is the mega social role that unifies social agents. First, gender is a mega social role if it satisfies two conditions (and Witt claims that it does): (1) if it provides the principle of synchronic and diachronic unity of social individuals, and (2) if it inflects and defines a broad range of other social roles. Gender satisfies the first in usually being a life-long social position: a social individual persists just as long as their gendered social position persists. Further, Witt maintains, trans people are not counterexamples to this claim: transitioning entails that the old social individual has ceased to exist and a new one has come into being. And this is consistent with the same person persisting and undergoing social individual change via transitioning. Gender satisfies the second condition too. It inflects other social roles, like being a parent or a professional. The expectations attached to these social roles differ depending on the agent’s gender, since gender imposes different social norms to govern the execution of the further social roles. Now, gender — as opposed to some other social category, like race — is not just a mega social role; it is the unifying mega social role. Cross-cultural and trans-historical considerations support this view. Witt claims that patriarchy is a social universal (2011a, 98). By contrast, racial categorisation varies historically and cross-culturally, and racial oppression is not a universal feature of human cultures. Thus, gender has a better claim to being the social role that is uniessential to social individuals. This account of gender essentialism not only explains social agents’ connectedness to their gender, but it also provides a helpful way to conceive of women’s agency — something that is central to feminist politics.

Linda Alcoff holds that feminism faces an identity crisis: the category of women is feminism’s starting point, but various critiques about gender have fragmented the category and it is not clear how feminists should understand what it is to be a woman (2006, chapter 5). In response, Alcoff develops an account of gender as positionality whereby “gender is, among other things, a position one occupies and from which one can act politically” (2006, 148). In particular, she takes one’s social position to foster the development of specifically gendered identities (or self-conceptions): “The very subjectivity (or subjective experience of being a woman) and the very identity of women are constituted by women’s position” (Alcoff 2006, 148). Alcoff holds that there is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals on the grounds of (actual or expected) reproductive roles:

Women and men are differentiated by virtue of their different relationship of possibility to biological reproduction, with biological reproduction referring to conceiving, giving birth, and breast-feeding, involving one’s body . (Alcoff 2006, 172, italics in original)

The thought is that those standardly classified as biologically female, although they may not actually be able to reproduce, will encounter “a different set of practices, expectations, and feelings in regard to reproduction” than those standardly classified as male (Alcoff 2006, 172). Further, this differential relation to the possibility of reproduction is used as the basis for many cultural and social phenomena that position women and men: it can be

the basis of a variety of social segregations, it can engender the development of differential forms of embodiment experienced throughout life, and it can generate a wide variety of affective responses, from pride, delight, shame, guilt, regret, or great relief from having successfully avoided reproduction. (Alcoff 2006, 172)

Reproduction, then, is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals that takes on a cultural dimension in that it positions women and men differently: depending on the kind of body one has, one’s lived experience will differ. And this fosters the construction of gendered social identities: one’s role in reproduction helps configure how one is socially positioned and this conditions the development of specifically gendered social identities.

Since women are socially positioned in various different contexts, “there is no gender essence all women share” (Alcoff 2006, 147–8). Nonetheless, Alcoff acknowledges that her account is akin to the original 1960s sex/gender distinction insofar as sex difference (understood in terms of the objective division of reproductive labour) provides the foundation for certain cultural arrangements (the development of a gendered social identity). But, with the benefit of hindsight

we can see that maintaining a distinction between the objective category of sexed identity and the varied and culturally contingent practices of gender does not presume an absolute distinction of the old-fashioned sort between culture and a reified nature. (Alcoff 2006, 175)

That is, her view avoids the implausible claim that sex is exclusively to do with nature and gender with culture. Rather, the distinction on the basis of reproductive possibilities shapes and is shaped by the sorts of cultural and social phenomena (like varieties of social segregation) these possibilities gives rise to. For instance, technological interventions can alter sex differences illustrating that this is the case (Alcoff 2006, 175). Women’s specifically gendered social identities that are constituted by their context dependent positions, then, provide the starting point for feminist politics.

Recently Robin Dembroff (2020) has argued that existing metaphysical accounts of gender fail to address non-binary gender identities. This generates two concerns. First, metaphysical accounts of gender (like the ones outlined in previous sections) are insufficient for capturing those who reject binary gender categorisation where people are either men or women. In so doing, these accounts are not satisfying as explanations of gender understood in a more expansive sense that goes beyond the binary. Second, the failure to understand non-binary gender identities contributes to a form of epistemic injustice called ‘hermeneutical injustice’: it feeds into a collective failure to comprehend and analyse concepts and practices that undergird non-binary classification schemes, thereby impeding on one’s ability to fully understand themselves. To overcome these problems, Dembroff suggests an account of genderqueer that they call ‘critical gender kind’:

a kind whose members collectively destabilize one or more elements of dominant gender ideology. Genderqueer, on my proposed model, is a category whose members collectively destabilize the binary axis, or the idea that the only possible genders are the exclusive and exhaustive kinds men and women. (2020, 2)

Note that Dembroff’s position is not to be confused with ‘gender critical feminist’ positions like those noted above, which are critical of the prevalent feminist focus on gender, as opposed to sex, kinds. Dembroff understands genderqueer as a gender kind, but one that is critical of dominant binary understandings of gender.

Dembroff identifies two modes of destabilising the gender binary: principled and existential. Principled destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ social or political commitments regarding gender norms, practices, and structures”, while existential destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ felt or desired gender roles, embodiment, and/or categorization” (2020, 13). These modes are not mutually exclusive, and they can help us understand the difference between allies and members of genderqueer kinds: “While both resist dominant gender ideology, members of [genderqueer] kinds resist (at least in part) due to felt or desired gender categorization that deviates from dominant expectations, norms, and assumptions” (2020, 14). These modes of destabilisation also enable us to formulate an understanding of non-critical gender kinds that binary understandings of women and men’s kinds exemplify. Dembroff defines these kinds as follows:

For a given kind X , X is a non-critical gender kind relative to a given society iff X ’s members collectively restabilize one or more elements of the dominant gender ideology in that society. (2020, 14)

Dembroff’s understanding of critical and non-critical gender kinds importantly makes gender kind membership something more and other than a mere psychological phenomenon. To engage in collectively destabilising or restabilising dominant gender normativity and ideology, we need more than mere attitudes or mental states – resisting or maintaining such normativity requires action as well. In so doing, Dembroff puts their position forward as an alternative to two existing internalist positions about gender. First, to Jennifer McKitrick’s (2015) view whereby gender is dispositional: in a context where someone is disposed to behave in ways that would be taken by others to be indicative of (e.g.) womanhood, the person has a woman’s gender identity. Second, to Jenkin’s (2016, 2018) position that takes an individual’s gender identity to be dependent on which gender-specific norms the person experiences as being relevant to them. On this view, someone is a woman if the person experiences norms associated with women to be relevant to the person in the particular social context that they are in. Neither of these positions well-captures non-binary identities, Dembroff argues, which motivates the account of genderqueer identities as critical gender kinds.

As Dembroff acknowledges, substantive philosophical work on non-binary gender identities is still developing. However, it is important to note that analytic philosophers are beginning to engage in gender metaphysics that goes beyond the binary.

This entry first looked at feminist objections to biological determinism and the claim that gender is socially constructed. Next, it examined feminist critiques of prevalent understandings of gender and sex, and the distinction itself. In response to these concerns, the entry looked at how a unified women’s category could be articulated for feminist political purposes. This illustrated that gender metaphysics — or what it is to be a woman or a man or a genderqueer person — is still very much a live issue. And although contemporary feminist philosophical debates have questioned some of the tenets and details of the original 1960s sex/gender distinction, most still hold onto the view that gender is about social factors and that it is (in some sense) distinct from biological sex. The jury is still out on what the best, the most useful, or (even) the correct definition of gender is.

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Beauvoir, Simone de | feminist philosophy, approaches: intersections between analytic and continental philosophy | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on reproduction and the family | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self | homosexuality | identity politics | speech acts

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Tuukka Asplund, Jenny Saul, Alison Stone and Nancy Tuana for their extremely helpful and detailed comments when writing this entry.

Copyright © 2022 by Mari Mikkola < m . mikkola @ uva . nl >

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From Friedan Forward—Considering a Feminist Perspective

• Resources & Preparation
• Instructional Plan
• Related Resources

Combining letter writing, potential publication, and the power of perspective, this lesson challenges students to think about how opinions develop and change based on such things as age, experience, time, and place. Students first freewrite about the potentially controversial topic of feminism, and share their thoughts in a class discussion. They read and discuss the short story "We" and Betty Friedan's "The Problem That Has No Name" and review the history of feminism and the goals of the feminist movement. After examining their own feelings about those goals, each student writes a letter expressing his/her views on the topic. Sealed in a stamped envelope, each letter is mailed to its writer by the teacher six years later. This lesson focuses on feminism as a controversial topic, but the lesson plan can be used effectively with a variety of issues.

Featured Resources

Letter Generator : Students can use this online tool to publish letters. Putting It In Perspective—A Letter to Myself : This handout explains the letter writing and publishing assignment.

From Theory to Practice

By focusing students' attention on meaningful audiences, teachers can more effectively explore writing and publishing with students. This lesson plan concentrates on what Rubenstein describes as "writing that matters":

Only when adolescents are involved in writing that matters-and matters beyond the quest for the almighty A-can they produce work that speaks from their hearts and speaks to an audience beyond that of the teacher. Unfortunately, most students are all too comfortable with "school writing." Tell them to write a five-hundred-word essay on "My Most Important Decision" and they'll spew it out with ease, the bright ones even remembering to use that sacred five-paragraph format! And when the teacher reads these essays, some will be "good" and some will be "poor," but rarely will there be one that takes her breath away. Even if there is one essay that does, where will it go from there?. . . Certainly there is nothing wrong with teaching students to write personal essays. . . But as a form it is perhaps overused in middle and high school classrooms, and when students begin to see it as "the way one writes in school," they adopt a writing voice that is academic and artificial and calculated to please the teacher alone. The teacher's task, then, is to design assignments that will have a natural audience-and one that extends beyond the classroom. When the audience is real-and red penless-so too does the writing become real, free of the classroom clichés and studentspeak that spoils good writing. (15-16)

Further Reading

Common Core Standards

This resource has been aligned to the Common Core State Standards for states in which they have been adopted. If a state does not appear in the drop-down, CCSS alignments are forthcoming.

State Standards

This lesson has been aligned to standards in the following states. If a state does not appear in the drop-down, standard alignments are not currently available for that state.

NCTE/IRA National Standards for the English Language Arts

• 1. Students read a wide range of print and nonprint texts to build an understanding of texts, of themselves, and of the cultures of the United States and the world; to acquire new information; to respond to the needs and demands of society and the workplace; and for personal fulfillment. Among these texts are fiction and nonfiction, classic and contemporary works.
• 2. Students read a wide range of literature from many periods in many genres to build an understanding of the many dimensions (e.g., philosophical, ethical, aesthetic) of human experience.
• 3. Students apply a wide range of strategies to comprehend, interpret, evaluate, and appreciate texts. They draw on their prior experience, their interactions with other readers and writers, their knowledge of word meaning and of other texts, their word identification strategies, and their understanding of textual features (e.g., sound-letter correspondence, sentence structure, context, graphics).
• 4. Students adjust their use of spoken, written, and visual language (e.g., conventions, style, vocabulary) to communicate effectively with a variety of audiences and for different purposes.
• 5. Students employ a wide range of strategies as they write and use different writing process elements appropriately to communicate with different audiences for a variety of purposes.
• 6. Students apply knowledge of language structure, language conventions (e.g., spelling and punctuation), media techniques, figurative language, and genre to create, critique, and discuss print and nonprint texts.
• 7. Students conduct research on issues and interests by generating ideas and questions, and by posing problems. They gather, evaluate, and synthesize data from a variety of sources (e.g., print and nonprint texts, artifacts, people) to communicate their discoveries in ways that suit their purpose and audience.
• 8. Students use a variety of technological and information resources (e.g., libraries, databases, computer networks, video) to gather and synthesize information and to create and communicate knowledge.
• 9. Students develop an understanding of and respect for diversity in language use, patterns, and dialects across cultures, ethnic groups, geographic regions, and social roles.
• 11. Students participate as knowledgeable, reflective, creative, and critical members of a variety of literacy communities.
• 12. Students use spoken, written, and visual language to accomplish their own purposes (e.g., for learning, enjoyment, persuasion, and the exchange of information).

Materials and Technology

• Copies of  “We” in Stealing Time by Mary Grimm (Random House 1994) or a similar short story that inspires discussion of the role of women in society
• Copies of “ The Problem That Has No Name ” in The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan (1963)
• Additional texts for research and exploration
• Discussion Questions for “We” by Mary Grimm
• Putting It In Perspective—A Letter to Myself
• Reflection Questions

(segments #1 and #3)

Preparation

• Obtain copies of Mary Grimm’s short story “We” which appears in her book Stealing Time (NY: Random House, 1994) and in the New Yorker (October 17, 1988).
• Obtain copies of Betty Friedan’s essay “The Problem That Has No Name,” Chapter One of The Feminine Mystique (New York: Norton, 1963), as well as in with numerous reprints. Chapter One can also be viewed online .
• Familiarize yourself with biographical material on Betty Friedan and historical information about the feminist movement. Useful resources can be found in the Websites listed in the Resources section.
• Prepare and make copies of Discussion Questions on “We,” Assignment Sheet: Putting It In Perspective—A Letter to Myself , and Reflection Questions .
• Test the ReadWriteThink Letter Generator on your computers to familiarize yourself with the tools and ensure that you have the Flash plug-in installed. You can download the plug-in from the technical support page.

Student Objectives

Students will

• read and discuss fiction and nonfiction texts.
• research and analyze the feminist movement from the 1960s to the present.
• consider their own goals, plans and hopes for the future.
• apply their knowledge to express their views on feminism in both oral and written form.
• employ all the steps of the writing process to create a polished piece.
• appreciate the importance of writing for a real audience.
• take the first steps toward writing for publication.

Session One

• Ask students to freewrite for 8–10 minutes on this question: “What specific experiences have you had that caused you to think that you were treated in particular way because of your gender?” Encourage them to write about more than one experience if applicable.
• Ask students to share their responses orally. Encourage them to explain why they felt they were treated in a certain way and to describe the feelings they had in the situation. Expect lively discussion!
• Now pose this question: “Do you believe males and females are equal in American society today?”
• Ask students to freewrite again for 8–10 minutes, and encourage them to include specific reasons for the views they express.
• Ask students to share their responses orally.
• Collect both freewrites, and put aside to use in later sessions.
• For homework, ask students to read “We” by Mary Grimm, and to be prepared to respond to the Discussion Questions .

Session Two

• Ask students to share their gut-level reaction to “We” by focusing on questions #2 and #3 from the Discussion Questions . Use this conversation to begin to spark interest in the issues that will form the core of the writing assignment.
• Next, ask students to form small groups of three or four, and assign one of the quoted lines from question #4 from the Discussion Questions to each group.
• Ask each group to discuss the quotation and prepare a brief oral explanation of its significance to share with the class.
• Continue class discussion with response to questions #1 and #5. Use Question #5 as a transition to a conversation about issues in the feminist movement.
• Ask students what they know about feminism. Ask them how they define the term and to explain if they see themselves as feminists based on their definitions.
• Encourage students to share whatever information they already know about the history of the feminist movement and its goals.
• Depending on the focus of the class, this can be a place to offer factual content in a lecture format and/or to assign students the task of doing research on the development of the movement.
• Introduce Betty Friedan and her book The Feminine Mystique with background material.
• Hand out “The Problem That Has No Name,” and begin reading it with the class to help them understand the basic intent of the piece.
• For homework, ask students to finish reading the text.

Session Three

• During this session, encourage students to identify the issues that the feminist movement addresses and to examine their own opinions and ideas on these issues.
• Ask students to brainstorm a list of the issues that are at the core of he women’s movement. Record their responses on the board or chart paper. Such issues might include equal opportunity in education and employment, the role of the housewife and division of labor in the home, childcare, a woman’s right to control her body, and violence against women.
• Using both the fictional story “We” and the nonfiction chapter “The Problem That Has No Name,” ask students to find examples that show how women express these concerns and deal with them. Encourage students to find parallel examples in the two pieces.
• Do you consider yourself a feminist? Why or why not?
• How do you define the term feminist ?
• Equal opportunity in education
• Equal opportunity in employment
• A woman’s right to control her body
• Sexual freedom
• Violence against women (rape, domestic abuse, etc.)
• Maternity leave
• What problems do you imagine encountering in the future in working out your role as a woman or as a man?
• Has the feminist movement made life in the United states better? Why or why not?
• After they have responded to the questions, ask students to discuss their answers with one another. It’s likely that enthusiastic discussion will ensue.
• Remind students that they need to support their opinions with specific examples and that they need to listen to and reflect on the comments of their peers.
• Observe the discussion, but if possible, do not participate—so that you can avoid influencing students’ opinions.
• At the conclusion of the discussion, hand out the Assignment Sheet: Putting It In Perspective—A Letter to Myself .
• to make two copies of the final piece—one to be graded and the other to be sealed in the envelope.
• to supply an envelope, which will be addressed and collected in the class session in which the final paper is due.
• to bring two stamps to that class session (two are necessary because of the inevitable rise in postal rates), or to bring in money if you are willing to make the trip to the post office for them.
• Tell students to begin working on the first draft of the piece.
• Use the ReadWriteThink Letter Generator to review the general requirements of friendly letters.
• Remind students that their letters will be in friendly letter format and will therefore have an informal tone, but that it must address these issues clearly and with solid and specific supporting ideas.
• Return the freewrites from the first session for students to use as additional material.

Session Four

• Have student share the drafts of their letters in response groups.
• In particular, ask responders to look for details that indicate the writing expresses specific reasons for the opinions the writers puts forth.
• During discussion with responders, the writer’s task is to make a strong case for the views expressed in the papers.
• Demonstrate how to use the ReadWriteThink Letter Generator to create final drafts of the letters.
• Give students whatever time is necessary for further revision and response.
• As students are working outside of class on their letters, more in-class time can be devoted to further study/discussion of the feminist movement.

Session Five

• Pass out copies of the Reflection Questions , and ask students to respond to the questions.
• Ask for volunteers to read their letters and/or to share their ideas with the whole class or in small groups.
• Collect one copy of the letter along with the  Reflection Questions for grading purposes.
• Ask students to seal the other copy in the envelope. If necessary, conduct a mini-lesson on addressing envelopes.
• Suggest that students include a return address that might serve as a second chance if the intended address is not applicable in six years.
• Collect all envelopes and make a show of binding them with ribbon or string and the promise to store them safely for six years.
• Ask students to imagine how they will react to their letters in six years. Ask how many think their views will change, and encourage discussion about why they believe they may feel differently in the future.
• This lesson can be used with a variety of literature texts that will inspire discussion about feminist issues. The teacher can also guide students to examine the changing roles and views of women based on the time frame of each of the pieces studied. The text list contains options for extensions.
• With student permission, create a bulletin board to publish these letters. Suggest that students add pictures, photographs, and/or words that illustrate various people, events, and issues central the feminist movement.
• Create a class time capsule, a class publication of all letters collected in a booklet or binder. Consider bringing this collection to class reunion.

Student Assessment / Reflections

• Grade each letter as a complete writing assignment. When students are writing and revising their letters, they should be guided by the specific questions outlined in the assignment sheet.
• What aspect of your letter are you most satisfied with? Why?
• What do you think is the most persuasive point you’ve made in the letter?
• What makes it a strong point?
• What part of the letter are you still dissatisfied with? Why?
• Where could you include some more specific detail?
• What was the best piece of advice you got from your response group?
• What did you say in your letter that surprised you?
• How do you think your views differ from those of your classmates?
• In writing this piece, what did you discover about yourself as a writer? As a person?
• How do you think you will react when you receive this letter in six years?
• Which, if any, of your views do you think will change?
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The Letter Generator is a useful tool for students to learn the parts of a business or friendly letter and then compose and print letters for both styles of correspondence.

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Feminist Theory in Sociology

An Overview of Key Ideas and Issues

Illustration by Hugo Lin. ThoughtCo.

• Key Concepts
• Major Sociologists
• News & Issues
• Research, Samples, and Statistics
• Recommended Reading
• Archaeology

Feminist theory is a major branch within sociology that shifts its assumptions, analytic lens, and topical focus away from the male viewpoint and experience toward that of women.

In doing so, feminist theory shines a light on social problems, trends, and issues that are otherwise overlooked or misidentified by the historically dominant male perspective within social theory .

Key Takeaways

Key areas of focus within feminist theory include:

• discrimination and exclusion on the basis of sex and gender
• objectification
• structural and economic inequality
• power and oppression
• gender roles and stereotypes

Many people incorrectly believe that feminist theory focuses exclusively on girls and women and that it has an inherent goal of promoting the superiority of women over men.

In reality, feminist theory has always been about viewing the social world in a way that illuminates the forces that create and support inequality, oppression, and injustice, and in doing so, promotes the pursuit of equality and justice.

That said, since the experiences and perspectives of women and girls were historically excluded for years from social theory and social science, much feminist theory has focused on their interactions and experiences within society to ensure that half the world's population is not left out of how we see and understand social forces, relations, and problems.

While most feminist theorists throughout history have been women, people of all genders can be found working in the discipline today. By shifting the focus of social theory away from the perspectives and experiences of men, feminist theorists have created social theories that are more inclusive and creative than those that assume the social actor to always be a man.

Part of what makes feminist theory creative and inclusive is that it often considers how systems of power and oppression interact , which is to say it does not just focus on gendered power and oppression, but on how this might intersect with systemic racism, a hierarchical class system, sexuality, nationality, and (dis)ability, among other things.

Gender Differences

Some feminist theory provides an analytic framework for understanding how women's location in and experience of social situations differ from men's.

For example, cultural feminists look at the different values associated with womanhood and femininity as a reason for why men and women experience the social world differently.   Other feminist theorists believe that the different roles assigned to women and men within institutions better explain gender differences, including the sexual division of labor in the household .  

Existential and phenomenological feminists focus on how women have been marginalized and defined as  “other”  in patriarchal societies . Some feminist theorists focus specifically on how masculinity is developed through socialization, and how its development interacts with the process of developing femininity in girls.

Gender Inequality

Feminist theories that focus on gender inequality recognize that women's location in and experience of social situations are not only different but also unequal to men's.

Liberal feminists argue that women have the same capacity as men for moral reasoning and agency, but that patriarchy , particularly the sexist division of labor, has historically denied women the opportunity to express and practice this reasoning.  

These dynamics serve to shove women into the  private sphere  of the household and to exclude them from full participation in public life. Liberal feminists point out that gender inequality exists for women in a heterosexual marriage and that women do not benefit from being married.  

Indeed, these feminist theorists claim, married women have higher levels of stress than unmarried women and married men.   Therefore, the sexual division of labor in both the public and private spheres needs to be altered for women to achieve equality in marriage.

Gender Oppression

Theories of gender oppression go further than theories of gender difference and gender inequality by arguing that not only are women different from or unequal to men, but that they are actively oppressed, subordinated, and even abused by men .  

Power is the key variable in the two main theories of gender oppression: psychoanalytic feminism and  radical feminism .

Psychoanalytic feminists attempt to explain power relations between men and women by reformulating Sigmund Freud's theories of human emotions, childhood development, and the workings of the subconscious and unconscious. They believe that conscious calculation cannot fully explain the production and reproduction of patriarchy.  

Radical feminists argue that being a woman is a positive thing in and of itself, but that this is not acknowledged in  patriarchal societies  where women are oppressed. They identify physical violence as being at the base of patriarchy, but they think that patriarchy can be defeated if women recognize their own value and strength, establish a sisterhood of trust with other women, confront oppression critically, and form female-based separatist networks in the private and public spheres.  

Structural Oppression

Structural oppression theories posit that women's oppression and inequality are a result of capitalism , patriarchy, and racism .

Socialist feminists agree with  Karl Marx  and Freidrich Engels that the working class is exploited as a consequence of capitalism, but they seek to extend this exploitation not just to class but also to gender.  

Intersectionality theorists seek to explain oppression and inequality across a variety of variables, including class, gender, race, ethnicity, and age. They offer the important insight that not all women experience oppression in the same way, and that the same forces that work to oppress women and girls also oppress people of color and other marginalized groups.  

One way structural oppression of women, specifically the economic kind, manifests in society is in the gender wage gap , which shows that men routinely earn more for the same work than women.

An intersectional view of this situation shows that women of color, and men of color, too, are even further penalized relative to the earnings of white men.  

In the late 20th century, this strain of feminist theory was extended to account for the globalization of capitalism and how its methods of production and of accumulating wealth center on the exploitation of women workers around the world.

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Norlock, Kathryn. "Feminist Ethics." Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 27 May 2019.

Liu, Huijun, et al. "Gender in Marriage and Life Satisfaction Under Gender Imbalance in China: The Role of Intergenerational Support and SES." Social Indicators Research , vol. 114, no. 3, Dec. 2013, pp. 915-933., doi:10.1007/s11205-012-0180-z

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Barone-Chapman, Maryann . " Gender Legacies of Jung and Freud as Epistemology in Emergent Feminist Research on Late Motherhood." Behavioral Sciences , vol. 4, no. 1, 8 Jan. 2014, pp. 14-30., doi:10.3390/bs4010014

Srivastava, Kalpana, et al. "Misogyny, Feminism, and Sexual Harassment." Industrial Psychiatry Journal , vol. 26, no. 2, July-Dec. 2017, pp. 111-113., doi:10.4103/ipj.ipj_32_18

Armstrong, Elisabeth. "Marxist and Socialist Feminism." Study of Women and Gender: Faculty Publications . Smith College, 2020.

Pittman, Chavella T. "Race and Gender Oppression in the Classroom: The Experiences of Women Faculty of Color with White Male Students." Teaching Sociology , vol. 38, no. 3, 20 July 2010, pp. 183-196., doi:10.1177/0092055X10370120

Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. "The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations." Journal of Economic Literature , vol. 55, no. 3, 2017, pp. 789-865., doi:10.1257/jel.20160995

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Literary Theory and Criticism

Home › Feminism: An Essay

Feminism: An Essay

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on April 27, 2016 • ( 6 )

Feminism as a movement gained potential in the twentieth century, marking the culmination of two centuries’ struggle for cultural roles and socio-political rights — a struggle which first found its expression in Mary Wollstonecraft ‘s Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). The movement gained increasing prominence across three phases/waves — the first wave (political), the second wave (cultural) and the third wave (academic). Incidentally Toril Moi also classifies the feminist movement into three phases — the female (biological), the feminist (political) and the feminine (cultural).

The first wave of feminism, in the 19th and 20th centuries, began in the US and the UK as a struggle for equality and property rights for women, by suffrage groups and activist organisations. These feminists fought against chattel marriages and for polit ical and economic equality. An important text of the first wave is Virginia Woolf ‘s A Room of One’s Own (1929), which asserted the importance of woman’s independence, and through the character Judith (Shakespeare’s fictional sister), explicated how the patriarchal society prevented women from realising their creative potential. Woolf also inaugurated the debate of language being gendered — an issue which was later dealt by Dale Spender who wrote Man Made Language (1981), Helene Cixous , who introduced ecriture feminine (in The Laugh of the Medusa ) and Julia Kristeva , who distinguished between the symbolic and the semiotic language.

The second wave of feminism in the 1960s and ’70s, was characterized by a critique of patriarchy in constructing the cultural identity of woman. Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1949) famously stated, “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman” – a statement that highlights the fact that women have always been defined as the “Other”, the lacking, the negative, on whom Freud attributed “ penis-envy .” A prominent motto of this phase, “The Personal is the political” was the result of the awareness .of the false distinction between women’s domestic and men’s public spheres. Transcending their domestic and personal spaces, women began to venture into the hitherto male dominated terrains of career and public life. Marking its entry into the academic realm, the presence of feminism was reflected in journals, publishing houses and academic disciplines.

Mary Ellmann ‘s Thinking about Women (1968), Kate Millett ‘s Sexual Politics (1969), Betty Friedan ‘s The Feminine Mystique (1963) and so on mark the major works of the phase. Millett’s work specifically depicts how western social institutions work as covert ways of manipulating power, and how this permeates into literature, philosophy etc. She undertakes a thorough critical understanding of the portrayal of women in the works of male authors like DH Lawrence, Norman Mailer, Henry Miller and Jean Genet.

In the third wave (post 1980), Feminism has been actively involved in academics with its interdisciplinary associations with Marxism , Psychoanalysis and Poststructuralism , dealing with issues such as language, writing, sexuality, representation etc. It also has associations with alternate sexualities, postcolonialism ( Linda Hutcheon and Spivak ) and Ecological Studies ( Vandana Shiva )

Elaine Showalter , in her “ Towards a Feminist Poetics ” introduces the concept of gynocriticism , a criticism of gynotexts, by women who are not passive consumers but active producers of meaning. The gynocritics construct a female framework for the analysis of women’s literature, and focus on female subjectivity, language and literary career. Patricia Spacks ‘ The Female Imagination , Showalter’s A Literature of their Own , Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar ‘s The Mad Woman in the Attic are major gynocritical texts.

The present day feminism in its diverse and various forms, such as liberal feminism, cultural/ radical feminism, black feminism/womanism, materialist/neo-marxist feminism, continues its struggle for a better world for women. Beyond literature and literary theory, Feminism also found radical expression in arts, painting ( Kiki Smith , Barbara Kruger ), architecture( Sophia Hayden the architect of Woman’s Building ) and sculpture (Kate Mllett’s Naked Lady).

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Feminist theory.

• Pelagia Goulimari Pelagia Goulimari Department of English, University of Oxford
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190201098.013.976
• Published online: 19 November 2020

Feminist theory in the 21st century is an enormously diverse field. Mapping its genealogy of multiple intersecting traditions offers a toolkit for 21st-century feminist literary criticism, indeed for literary criticism tout court. Feminist phenomenologists (Simone de Beauvoir, Iris Marion Young, Toril Moi, Miranda Fricker, Pamela Sue Anderson, Sara Ahmed, Alia Al-Saji) have contributed concepts and analyses of situation, lived experience, embodiment, and orientation. African American feminists (Toni Morrison, Audre Lorde, Alice Walker, Hortense J. Spillers, Saidiya V. Hartman) have theorized race, intersectionality, and heterogeneity, particularly differences among women and among black women. Postcolonial feminists (Assia Djebar, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Florence Stratton, Saba Mahmood, Jasbir K. Puar) have focused on the subaltern, specificity, and agency. Queer and transgender feminists (Judith Butler, Jack Halberstam, Susan Stryker) have theorized performativity, resignification, continuous transition, and self-identification. Questions of representation have been central to all traditions of feminist theory.

• continuous transition
• heterogeneity
• intersectionality
• lived experience
• performativity
• resignification
• self-identification
• the subaltern

Mapping 21st-Century Feminist Theory

Feminist theory is a vast, enormously diverse, interdisciplinary field that cuts across the humanities, sciences, and social sciences. As a result, this article cannot offer a historical overview or even an exhaustive account of 21st-century feminist theory. But it offers a genealogy and a toolkit for 21st-century feminist criticism. 1 The aim of this article is to outline the questions and issues 21st-century feminist theorists have been addressing; the concepts, figures, and narratives they have been honing; and the practices they have been experimenting with—some inherited, others new. This account of feminist theory will include African American, postcolonial, and Islamic feminists as well as queer and transgender theorists and writers who identify as feminists. While these fields are distinct and while they need to reckon with their respective Eurocentrism, racism, misogyny, queerphobia, or transphobia, this article will focus on their mutual allyship, in spite of continuing tensions. Particularly troubling are feminists who define themselves against queer and transgender theory and activism; by way of response, this article will be highlighting feminist queer theory and transfeminism.

On the one hand, literary criticism is not high on the agenda of many 21st-century feminist theorists. This means that literary critics need to imaginatively transpose feminist concepts to literature. On the other hand, a lot of feminist theorists practice literature; they write in an experimental way that combines academic work, creative writing, and life-writing; they combine narrative and figurative language with concepts and arguments. Contemporary feminist theory offers a powerful mix of experimental writing, big issues, quirky personal accounts, and utopian thinking of a new kind.

Feminists have been combining theory, criticism, and literature; Mary Wollstonecraft, Simone de Beauvoir, Toni Morrison, Audre Lorde, Hélène Cixous, and Alice Walker have written across these genres. In African Sexualities: A Reader ( 2011 ), Sylvia Tamale’s decision to place academic scholarship side by side with poems, fiction, life-writing, political declarations, and reports is supported by feminist traditions. 2 Furthermore, the border between feminist theory, literature, and life-writing has been increasingly permeable in the 21st century , hence the centrality of texts in hybrid genres: theory with literary and life-writing elements, literature with meta-literary elements, and so on. Early 21st-century terms such as autofiction and autotheory register the prevalence of the tendency. This is at least partly a question of addressing different audiences—aiming for public engagement and connection with activism outside universities and bypassing the technical jargon of academic feminist theory. Another reason is that feminist theorists, especially those from marginalized groups, have found some of the conventions of academic scholarship objectionable or false—for example, the assumption of a universal, disembodied, or unsituated perspective.

Nevertheless, recent feminist experiments with genre—for example, by Anne Carson, Paul B. Preciado, Maggie Nelson, or Alison Bechdel—nod toward an integral part of women’s writing and feminist writing. 3 Historic experiments in mixed genre, going back to Elizabeth Barrett-Browning’s poem-novel Aurora Leigh , include: Virginia Woolf’s critical-theoretical-fictional A Room of One’s Own ; Julia Kristeva’s poetico-theoretical “Stabat Mater”; Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time , oscillating between speculative science fiction and naturalist novel; Audre Lorde’s “biomythography,” Zami ; the mix of theory, fiction, and life-writing in Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues and Chris Kraus’ I Love Dick ; or Qurratulain Hyder’s Fireflies in the Mist , hovering between historical fiction and romance. 4

Twenty-first-century feminist theory also tends to be thematically expansive and more than feminist theory narrowly understood, in that it is not only about “women” (those assigned female at birth or socially counted as women or self-identifying as women). It is a mature field that addresses structural injustice, social justice, and the future of the planet. As a result, cross-fertilization with other academic fields abounds. Relatively new academic fields such as feminist theory, postcolonial theory, and critical race theory—emerging since the 1960s, established in the 1980s, and having initially to cement their distinctiveness and place within the academy—have been increasingly coming together and cross-fertilizing in the 21st century . Distinct feminist perspectives (phenomenological, poststructuralist, African American intersectional, postcolonial, Islamic, queer, transgender) have also been coming together and variously informing 21st-century feminist theory. While this article will introduce these perspectives, it will aim to show that feminist theorists are increasingly difficult to put in a box, and this is a good thing.

Feminist Phenomenology (Beauvoir, Young, Moi, Fricker, Anderson, Ahmed, Al-Saji): Situation, Lived Experience, Embodiment, Orientation

Simone de Beauvoir initiates feminist phenomenology, her existentialism emerging within the broader tradition of phenomenology. While the present account of feminist theory begins with Beauvoir, it is important to acknowledge the continuing influence of older feminists and proto-feminists, as “feminism” only acquired its current ( 20th- and 21st-century ) meaning in the late 19th century , according to the Oxford English Dictionary. See, for example, Christine de Pizan, “Jane Anger,” Margaret Cavendish, Aphra Behn, Mary Astell, Anne Finch, Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Hays, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Jacobs, Emily Davies, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, and Virginia Woolf.

All contemporary feminist theory has been influenced by Beauvoir, in some respect or other. Her famous claim that “One is not born, but rather becomes, woman,” opening volume 2 of The Second Sex ( 1949 ), points to the asymmetrical socialization of men and women. 5 In her philosophical terms, man is the One, the universal, subject, freedom, transcendence, mind, spirit, culture; woman is the Other, the particular, object, situation, immanence, body, flesh, nature. Patriarchy for Beauvoir is a system of binary oppositions, whose terms are mutually exclusive: the One/the Other, the universal/the particular, subject/object, freedom/situation, transcendence/immanence, mind/body, spirit/flesh, culture/nature. Men have been socialized to aim for—indeed to become—the valued terms in each binary opposition (the One, the universal, subject, freedom, transcendence, mind, spirit, culture); while the undesirable terms (the Other, the particular, object, situation, immanence, body, flesh, nature) are projected onto women, who are socialized to become those terms—to become object, for example. Emerging from this system is the illusion of a transhistorical feminine essence or a norm of femininity that misconstrues, disciplines, and oppresses actual, historical women. Women for Beauvoir are an oppressed group, and her aim is their liberation. 6

Beauvoir critiques the social aims and myths of patriarchy, pointing to the pervasiveness of patriarchal myths in philosophy, literature, and culture. But she also critiques the very forms of patriarchy—binary opposition, dualistic thinking, essentialism, universalism, abstraction—while not completely able to free her own analysis from them. Instead of them, Beauvoir advocates attention to concrete situation and close phenomenological description; indeed The Second Sex abounds in vivid and richly detailed descriptions of early 20th-century French women’s lives. Such close attention and description allow her to demonstrate that all humans are, potentially, both subject and object, free and situated, transcendent and immanent, spirit and flesh, hence the ambiguity of the human condition. 7

The philosophy of existentialism and the broader philosophical movement of phenomenology, within which Beauvoir situates her work, claim to offer radical aims and methods. Phenomenology (Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon) is committed to the phenomenological description of the particular in order to avoid the abstractions of scientism. It aims to avoid traditional philosophical dualisms such as mind/body. It re-describes human beings not as disembodied minds but as intentional beings engaged with the world, being-in-the-world (Heidegger’s term), situated in a particular time and place; as lived bodies that are centers of perception, action, and lived experience rather than mere objects; and as being-with and being-for others in inter-subjective relationships rather than just subject/object relationships. Human beings immerse themselves in their projects, using the world and their own bodies—with all their acquired skills, competencies, and sedimented habits—as instruments. While these instruments are indispensable to their projects, they are usually unperceived and remain in the background. They are the background against which objects of perception and action objectives come into view. And yet what is backgrounded can always come to the foreground, suddenly and rudely—when the world resists one, when a blunt knife does not cut the bread, when one’s body is in pain or sick and intrudes, interrupting one’s vision and plans. 8

Without minimizing the novelty of Beauvoir’s theorization of patriarchy, the present quick sketch of phenomenology ought to have highlighted its suitability for feminist appropriations. Nevertheless, Sartre, Beauvoir’s closest collaborator, for example, continues to think that one is distinctively human only to the extent that they transcend their situation. This arguably universalizes Sartre’s particular situation as a member of a privileged group determined to be free, while effectively blaming the situation of oppressed groups on their members, blaming the victims for lacking humanity. 9 By contrast, Beauvoir sheds light on women’s social situation and lived experience: men have “far more concrete opportunities” to be effective; women experience the world not as tools for their projects but as resistance to them; their “energy” is “thrown into the world” but “fails to grasp any object”; a woman’s body is not the “pure instrument of her grasp on the world” but painfully objectified and foregrounded. 10 Beauvoir goes on to distinguish between a variety of unequal social situations with different degrees of freedom inherent in them. Yes, on the whole, French men are freer, less constrained than French women. But Beauvoir discusses the “concrete situation” of other groups “kept in a situation of inferiority”—workers, the colonized, African American slaves, her contemporary African Americans, Jews—while explicitly acknowledging that women themselves are socially divided by class and race. 11

Beauvoir outlines impediments to women’s collective and individual liberation and sketches out paths to collective action and to the “independent woman” of the future, placing literature center stage. She claims that women lack the “concrete means” to organize themselves “in opposition” to patriarchy, in that they lack a shared collective space, such as the factory and the racially segregated community for working-class and black struggles, instead living dispersed private lives. 12 While white middle-class women “are in solidarity” with men of their class and race, rather than with working-class and black women, Beauvoir calls for solidarity among women across class and race boundaries. 13 She addresses white middle-class women like herself, who benefit materially from their connection to white middle-class men, asking them to abandon these benefits for the precarious pursuit of women’s solidarity and freedom. To the extent that women lack freedom by virtue of their social situation qua women, they need to claim their freedom in collective “revolt.” 14 Beauvoir’s 1949 call to organized political action was “the movement before the movement,” according to Michèle Le Doeuff. 15

However, Beauvoir also advocates writing literature as a means of liberation for women and considers all her writing—philosophical, literary, life-writing—a form of activism. Beauvoir devotes considerable space to literary criticism throughout The Second Sex . She shows how writers have reproduced patriarchal myths, often unwittingly. 16 But her future-oriented, crucial chapter “The Independent Woman” centers on a discussion of women writers and even addresses women writers. Having sketched out a history of women’s writing, she turns to young writers to offer advice, based on her analysis of women’s “situation.” 17 To overcome women’s socially imposed apprenticeship in “reasonable modesty,” they need to undertake a counter-practice of “abandonment and transcendence,” “pride” and boldness; they need to become “women insurgents” who feel “responsible for the universe.” 18 Her call, “The free woman is just being born” energizes new women writers to live and write freely—and has been answered by many. 19 But this is not triumphalist empty rhetoric; women writers also need to understand the “ambiguity” of the human condition and of truth itself. 20

Iris Marion Young returns to Beauvoir’s description of women’s social situation and lived experience in “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality” ( 1980 ). Young takes Beauvoir’s description as the starting point for her own phenomenology of women’s project-oriented bodily movement in “contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial society,” arguing that their movement is inhibited, ambiguous, discontinuous, and ineffective. 21 Women exhibit a form of socially induced dyspraxia. Young contends that women’s movement “exhibits an ambiguous transcendence, an inhibited intentionality, and a discontinuous unity with its surroundings.” 22 Young turns to women’s bodies in their “orientation toward and action upon and within” their surroundings, particularly the “confrontation of the body’s capacities and possibilities with the resistance and malleability of things” when the body “aims to accomplish a definite purpose or task.” 23 It will be remembered that the phenomenological tradition theorizes the human body as a lived body that is the locus of subjectivity, perception, and action, a capable body extending itself into the world rather than a thing; this is especially the case with Merleau-Ponty. Young’s description of the deviation of women’s bodily experience from this norm is a powerful indictment of women’s social situation.

Firstly, Young identifies that women experience their bodies as ambiguously transcendent: both as a “capacity” and as a “ thing ”; both striving to act upon the world and a “burden.” 24 Secondly, they experience an inhibited intentionality: while acting, they hesitate, their “hesitancy” resulting in “wasted motion . . . from the effort of testing and reorientation.” 25 Thirdly, they experience their bodies as discontinuous with the world: rather than extending themselves and acting upon their surroundings, which is the norm, they live their bodies as objects “ positioned in space.” 26 Or rather, the “space that belongs to her and is available to her grasp and manipulation” is experienced as “constricted,” while “the space beyond is not available to her.” 27 In other words, she experiences her surroundings not as at-hand and within-reach for her projects but as out-of-reach. This discontinuity between “aim and capacity to realize” it is the secret of women’s “tentativeness and uncertainty.” 28 Even more ominously, they live the “ever-present possibility” of becoming the “object of another subject’s . . . manipulations.” 29 In the very exercise of bodily freedom—for example, in opening up the “body in free, active, open extension and bold outward-directedness”—women risk “objectification,” Young argues. 30

Young describes the situation of women as one in which they have to learn “actively to hamper” their “movements.” 31 If this has been the norm of genderization in modern Western urban societies, is it still at work and is it lived differently depending on one’s class, race, sexuality, and so on? 32 Similarly with Beauvoir’s theorization of the situation of women: does it continue to be relevant and useful?

The emergence of “sexual difference” feminism or écriture féminine in France in the mid-1970s, with landmark publications by Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, brought with it a critique of Beauvoir. 33 In view of the present discussion of Beauvoir, one might argue that Beauvoir’s aim is the abolition of gender. Her horizon is the abolition of gender binarism and an end to the oppression of women. However, in “Equal or Different?” ( 1986 ) Irigaray reads this as a pursuit of equality through women’s adoption of male norms, at a great cost, that of “suppress[ing] sexual difference.” 34 In Irigaray’s eyes, Beauvoir’s work is assimilationist, while her own work is radical—it aims to redefine femininity in positive terms. Irigaray insists on the political autonomy of women’s struggles from other liberation movements and, controversially, the priority of feminism over other movements because of the priority of gender over class, race, and so on. Gender is “the primary and irreducible division.” 35

In 1994 feminist literary critic Toril Moi compares Beauvoir to Irigaray and Frantz Fanon, one of the founders of postcolonial theory. Like Fanon who redefined blackness positively and viewed anticolonial struggles as autonomous, Irigaray aims to redefine femininity and mobilize it autonomously, while Beauvoir failed to “grasp the progressive potential of ‘femininity’ as a political discourse” and also “vastly underestimated the potential political impact of an independent woman’s movement.” 36 However, Moi sides with Beauvoir against Irigaray and other “sexual difference” feminists, when comparing their aims. Beauvoir’s ultimate aim is the disappearance of gender, while difference feminists “focus on women’s difference, often without regard for other social movements,” claiming that “women’s interests are best served by the establishment of an enduring regime of sexual difference.” 37

Aiming toward the disappearance of gender does not mean blinding oneself to the situation and lived experience of women. In a 2009 piece on women writers, literature, and feminist theory, Moi turns to Beauvoir to analyze the social situation of women writers. Importantly, Beauvoir focuses on what happens “ once somebody has been taken to be a woman ”—the woman in question might or might not be assigned female at birth and might or might not identify as a woman. 38 While the body of someone taken to be a man is viewed as a “direct and normal connection with the world” that he “apprehends objectively,” the body of someone taken to be a woman is viewed as “weighed down by everything specific to it: an obstacle, a prison.” 39 Concomitantly, male writers and their perspectives and concerns are associated with universality—women writers associated with biased particularity. But if women writers adopt male perspectives and concerns to lay claim to universality, they are alienated from their own lived experience. This is how a “sexist (or racist) society” forces “women and blacks, and other raced minorities, to ‘eliminate’ their gendered (or raced) subjectivity” and “masquerade as some kind of generic universal human being, in ways that devalue their actual experiences as embodied human beings in the world.” 40 All too often women writers have declared “I am not a woman writer,” but this has to be understood as a “ defensive speech act”: a “ response ” to those who have tried to use her gender “against her.” 41

In 2001 feminist philosopher and Beauvoir scholar Michèle Le Doeuff announces a renaissance in Beauvoir studies, in her keynote for the Ninth International Simone de Beauvoir Conference: “It is no longer possible to claim, in the light of a certain New French Feminism, that Beauvoir is obsolete.” 42 She prioritizes the need for scholarship on the conflicts between Sartre and Beauvoir, with a view to making the case for Beauvoir’s originality as a philosopher, in spite of Beauvoir’s self-identification as a writer and reluctance to clash with Sartre philosophically.

Feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker returns more than once to the question of whether Beauvoir is a philosopher or a writer. In 2003 Fricker locates Beauvoir’s originality in her understanding of ambiguity and argues that life-writing has been the medium most suited to her thought, focusing on Beauvoir’s The Prime of Life ( La Force de l’age , 1960 ). 43 Beauvoir found in the institution of philosophy, as she experienced it, a pathological, obsessional attitude—a demand for abstract theorizing that divorces thinkers from their situation to lend their thought universal applicability. This imperious, sovereign role was seriously at odds with Beauvoir’s sense of reality, history, and the self. For Beauvoir, reality is “full of ambiguities, baffling, and impenetrable” and history a violent shock to the self: “History burst over me, and I dissolved into fragments . . . scattered over the four quarters of the globe, linked by every nerve in me to each and every other individual.” 44 Beauvoir uses narrative, particularly life-writing, to connect with her past selves but also to appeal to the reader: “self-knowledge is impossible, and the best one can hope for is self-revelation” to the reader. 45 Fricker claims that Beauvoir primarily addresses female readers; and Beauvoir’s alliance-building with her readers—her “feminist commitment to female solidarity”—promises to bring out, through the reader, “the ‘unity’ to that ‘scattered, broken’ object that is her life.” 46

An example of the role of the reader is Fricker’s 2007 reading of Beauvoir’s under-written account of an early epistemic clash with Sartre. 47 Beauvoir’s first-person narrative voice doesn’t quite say that Sartre undermined her as a knower, but Fricker interprets this incident as an epistemic attack by Sartre that Beauvoir had the resilience to survive, and which contributed to her self-identification as a writer rather than a philosopher. Here the violence of history and the institution of philosophy take very concrete, embodied, intimate form. But the incident also serves as a springboard for Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice and its two forms: testimonial injustice, and hermeneutical injustice and lacunas. For Fricker, Sartre in this instance does Beauvoir a “testimonial injustice” in that he erodes her confidence and her credibility as a knower. 48 This process might also be “ongoing” and involve “persistent petty intellectual underminings.” 49 Hermeneutical (or interpretive) injustice, on the other hand, has to do with a gap in collective interpretative resources, where a name should be to describe a social experience. 50 For example, the relatively recent term “sexual harassment” has described a social experience where previously there was a hermeneutic lacuna, according to Fricker. Such lacunas are often due to the systemic epistemic marginalization of some groups, and any progress (for example, in adopting a proposed new term) is contingent upon a “virtuous hearer” who will try to listen without prejudice but also requires systemic change. 51 In George Eliot’s Mill on the Floss Maggie Tulliver suffers both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. 52

This article will now turn to feminist phenomenology within queer theory and critical race theory. Sara Ahmed, in Queer Phenomenology ( 2006 ), offers not a phenomenology of queerness but rather a phenomenological account of heteronormativity as well as a feminist queer critique of phenomenology. In an important reversal of perspective, Ahmed denaturalizes being straight—denaturalizes heteronormativity—by asking: how does one become straight? This is not simply a matter of sexual orientation and choice of love-object. Rather heteronormativity is itself “something that we are oriented around, even if it disappears from view”; “bodies become straight by ‘lining up’” with normative “lines that are already given.” 53 Being straight is “an effect of being ‘in line.’” 54 Unlike earlier phenomenologists such as Heidegger, what is usually being backgrounded and thus invisible is a naturalized system that Ahmed hopes to foreground and bring “into view”: heteronormativity. 55 Ahmed thus extends Beauvoir’s and Young’s analyses of the systematic oppression and incapacitation of women, respectively. 56 Ahmed puts Young’s language to use in order to talk about lesbian lives: heteronormativity “puts some things in reach and others out of reach,” in a manner that incapacitates lesbian lives. Ahmed searches for a different form of sociality, “a space in which the lesbian body can extend itself , as a body that gets near other bodies.” 57 Her critique of even the most promising phenomenologists is that in their work “the straight world is already in place” as an invisible background. 58

Ahmed extends her analysis of the production of heteronormativity to the production of whiteness in “A Phenomenology of Whiteness” ( 2007 ), asking: how does one become white? Ahmed thus furthers her critique of phenomenology from within. Phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty define the body as “successful,” as “‘able’ to extend itself (through objects) in order to act on and in the world,” as a body that “‘can do’ by flowing into space.” 59 However, far from this being a universal experience, it is the experience of a “bodily form of privilege” from which many groups are excluded. 60 Ahmed does not here acknowledge Young’s analysis of women’s socially induced dyspraxia but turns instead to Fanon’s “phenomenology of ‘being stopped.’” 61 Ahmed calls “discomfort” the social experience of being impeded and goes on to outline its critical potential in “bringing what is in the background, what gets over-looked” back into view. 62 More than a negative feeling, discomfort has the exhilarating potential of opening up a whole world that was previously obscured. 63 Ahmed’s subsequent work has focused on institutional critique, especially of universities in their continuing failure to become inclusive, hospitable spaces for certain groups, in spite of their managerial language of diversity. 64

Where Ahmed calls for critical and transformative “discomfort,” Alia Al-Saji calls for a critical and transformative “hesitation” in “A Phenomenology of Hesitation” ( 2014 ). Al-Saji’s concept of hesitation revises the work of Beauvoir and Young and enlarges their focus on gender to include race. Beauvoir’s analysis of patriarchy as a system that projects and naturalizes fixed, oppositional, hierarchical identities is redeployed toward a “race-critical and feminist” project, though Al-Saji does not acknowledge Beauvoir explicitly but credits Fanon’s work. 65 The systematic and “socially pathological othering” of fluid, relational, contextual, contingent differences into rigid, frozen, naturalized hierarchies remains “hidden from view.” 66 Experience, affect, and vision, in their pathological form, are closed and rigid; in their healthy form, they have a “creative and critical potential . . . to hesitate”—they are ambiguous, open, fluid, responsive, receptive, dynamic, changing, improvisational, self-critical. 67 Al-Saji argues that the “paralyzing hesitation” analyzed by Young can be “mined” to extract a critical hesitation, as Young’s own work exemplifies. 68 By contrast, the “normative ‘I can’ – posited as human but in fact correlated to white, male bodies”—rigidly “excludes other ways of seeing and acting”; it is “objectifying – racializing and sexist[,] . . . reifying and othering .” 69 The alternative to both thoughtless action and paralyzing inaction is: “ acting hesitantly ” and responsively. 70

Feminist philosopher Pamela Sue Anderson’s last writings on “vulnerability” build on Michèle Le Doeuff’s critique of unexamined myths and narratives underlying the Western “imaginary.” One values and strives for invulnerability and equates vulnerability with exposure to violence and suffering. One projects vulnerability onto “the vulnerable” to disavow their own vulnerability: “a dark social imaginary continues to stigmatize those needing to be cared for as a drain on an economy, carefully separating ‘the cared for’ from those who are thought to be ‘in control’ of their lives and of the world.” 71 Furthermore, members of privileged groups often exhibit a “wilful ignorance” of systemic forms of social vulnerability and social injustice. 72 But Anderson also outlines “ethical” vulnerability as a capability for a transformative and life-enhancing openness to others and mutual affection—occasioned by ontological vulnerability. Ethical vulnerability is envisaged as a project where reason, critical self-reflexivity, emotion, intuition and imagination, concepts, arguments, myths and narrative all have a role to play, while also needing to be reimagined and rethought.

African American Feminisms (Morrison, Lorde, Walker, Spillers, Hartman): Race, Intersectionality, Differences among Women and among Black Women

African American and postcolonial feminists have struggled to create space for themselves, caught between a predominantly white women’s movement on the one hand, and male-led civil-rights and anticolonial struggles and postcolonial elites on the other hand. They have fought against assumptions that “All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men” and that white women are “saving brown women from brown men.” 73 African American and postcolonial writers and thinkers (from Toni Morrison to Chandra Talpade Mohanty) have hesitated to self-identify with a primarily white movement that, they argued powerfully, effectively excluded them in unthinkingly prioritizing the concerns of white, middle-class women. Some have avoided self-identifying as a feminist, self-identifying as a “black woman writer” instead. Alice Walker invented the term “womanism” to signal black feminism. “Intersectionality” was coined by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins, and other African American feminists to highlight the intersections of gender and race, feminist and antiracist struggles, creating a space between the white women’s movement and the male-led civil-rights movement. 74 Postcolonial feminists (Assia Djebar, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Chandra Talpade Mohanty) similarly created a space between Western feminists and male-led anticolonial struggles and postcolonial elites.

African American feminists have been critical of Beauvoir and of the women’s movements of the 1960s. They have been reconstructing oral, written, and activist traditions of black women such as abolitionists Sojourner Truth and Harriet Jacobs, and modernists Zora Neale Hurston and Nella Larsen—all previously neglected and marginalized. 75 These traditions prioritize: collectivism; the need to critique and resist internalized but unlivable white middle-class norms; waywardness or willfulness rather than individualism; differences among women; difference among black women; and friendship and solidarity among black women across their differences. (By contrast, contemporary white American feminist critics such as Elaine Showalter emphasized self-realization and self-actualization. 76 ) African American women writers—rather than literary critics—have led the way, inspired by orators, musicians, and collective oral forms, as critics have acknowledged. 77

Toni Morrison, as a self-identified black woman writer, announces these strategic priorities in her first novel, The Bluest Eye ( 1970 ). 78 In The Bluest Eye she revises Beauvoir’s analysis of patriarchy as a binary opposition—man/woman—that projects onto “woman” what men disown in themselves. She examines a related binary opposition: white, light-skinned, middle-class, beautiful, proper lady vs. dark-skinned, poor, ugly girl (the racialized opposition between angelic and demonic woman). The first novel to focus on black girls, The Bluest Eye shows the systemic propagation and internalization of white norms of beauty and femininity, leading to hierarchical oppositions between black and white girls as well as between black girls (light-skinned middle-class Maureen, solidly working-class Claudia and Frieda, and precariously poor Pecola). The projection, by everyone, of all ugliness onto poor, dark-skinned Pecola, combined with white norms that are impossible for her, lead to Pecola’s madness. Her attempts at existential affirmation are crushed by the judgment of the world. Pecola’s Bildungsroman turns out naturalist tragedy. However, Claudia, the narrator, develops anagnorisis and shares her increasingly complex critique with the readers.

In “What the Black Woman Thinks about Women’s Lib” ( 1971 ) Morrison uses Beauvoir’s language to bring attention both to the situation of African American women and to their traditions of resistance. Reminding readers of two segregation-era signs—“White Ladies” and “Black Women”—she asserts that many black women rejected ladylike behavior and “frequently kicked back . . . [O]ut of the profound desolation of her reality” the black woman “may very well have invented herself.” 79 Black women have been working and heading single-parent households in a hostile world. If ladies are all “softness, helplessness and modesty,” black women have been “tough, capable, independent and immodest.” 80

Audre Lorde explores similar themes. Her poem, “Who Said It Was Simple” ( 1973 ) illustrates the hierarchy between white “ladies,” in their feminist struggle for self-realization, and black “girls” on whose work they rely. Sister Outsider , Lorde’s essays and speeches from 1976 to 1984 , theorizes intersections of race, sexuality, class, and age that are particularly binding and threatening for black lesbian women. 81 White feminists are ignorant of racism and wrongly assume their concerns to be universally shared by all women, thus replicating the patriarchal elevation of men to the universal analyzed by Beauvoir; they need to drop the “pretense to a homogeneity of experience,” educate themselves about black women, read their work, and listen. 82 In “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” delivered during a Beauvoir conference, Lorde argues that Beauvoir’s call to know “the genuine conditions of our lives” must include racism and homophobia. 83 Black men misdirect their anger for the racism they encounter toward black women, who, paid less and more socially devalued, are easy targets. Falsely equating anti-sexist with anti-Black, black men are hostile to black feminists and especially lesbians; so black men’s sexism is different from the sexism of privileged white men analyzed by Beauvoir. 84 Black women have also been hostile toward each other, due to internalized racism and sexism, projected toward the most marginalized among them; identifying with their oppressors, black women suffer a “misnaming” and “distortion” in their understanding of their situation. 85

But Lorde also exalts traditions of black women’s solidarity across their differences. Once differences among women and among black women are properly understood and named, they can be creative and generative. To achieve this, she extols recording, examining, and naming one’s experience, perceptions, and feelings, as a path to clarity, precision, and illumination, leading to concepts and theories but also to empowerment. Anger, unlike hatred, is potentially both full of information and generative. 86 Affect, more broadly, can be a path to understanding, as affect and rationality are not mutually exclusive: “I don’t see feel/think as a dichotomy.” 87 Particularly innovative is Lorde’s theorization of the “erotic.” In contrast to the pornographic, the erotic is a power intrinsically connected to (and cutting across) love, friendship, self-connection, joy, the spiritual, creativity, work, collaboration, and the political—especially among black women. 88 But relations of interdependence and mutuality among women are only possible in a context of non-hierarchical differences among equals and peers, Lorde stresses repeatedly. 89

Alice Walker attends to many of these themes in Color Purple ( 1982 ). 90 In her collection of essays, In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose ( 1983 ), she pays tribute to black women’s traditions of resistance, due to which “womanish” connotes “outrageous, audacious, courageous or willful behavior.” 91 Her term “womanism” honors these collectivist traditions and their commitment to the “survival and wholeness of entire people, male and female.” 92 But she also calls for the reconstruction of a written tradition of forgotten black women writers, resurrecting Zora Neale Hurston from oblivion in “Looking for Zora,” initially published in Ms . magazine in 1975 . 93

In 1979 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination established the enforced privatization and entrapped idleness of 19th-century white middle-class women. 94 In 1987 Hortense J. Spillers powerfully added that this was made possible by the enforced hard labor of black women, as house or field slaves and later as domestic servants who often headed single-parent households. 95 Furthermore, the gender polarization within the white middle-class family was accompanied by the ungendering of African American slaves, who were not allowed to marry and raise their children, and the structural rape of black women. In the late 1980s Crenshaw and Collins formally introduced the concept of intersectionality, though intersectionality-like ideas—that the black woman is the “mule uh de world”—have been a part of black women’s thought for a long time. 96

“Slavery and gender” has been a core topic since the 1980s, with publications such as Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death ( 1982 ), Toni Morrison’s Beloved ( 1987 ) and Playing in the Dark ( 1992 ), and Saidiya V. Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection ( 1997 ). 97 Hartman’s abiding topic has been a lost history of black girls and women that can only partially be retrieved and that requires new methodologies. Archives and official records are full of gaps, systematically “dissimulate the extreme violence” of slavery, and “disavow the pain” and “deny the sorrow” of slaves. 98 Even while reading them “against the grain,” Hartman underlines the “ impossibility of fully recovering the experience of the enslaved.” 99 In Lose Your Mother ( 2006 ) Hartman’s concept of the “afterlife of slavery” describes the persistence of “devalued” and “imperiled” black lives, racialized violence, “skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery.” 100 In “Venus in Two Acts” ( 2008 ), Hartman defines her method as “critical fabulation”: mixing critical use of archival research, theorization, and multiple speculative narratives, in an experimental writing that acknowledges its own failure and refuses “to fill in the gaps” to “provide closure.” 101 This writing is:

straining against the limits of the archive . . . and . . . enacting the impossibility of representing the lives of the captives precisely through the process of narration . . . [in order] to displace the . . . authorized account, . . . to imagine what might have happened[,] . . . to listen for the mutters and oaths and cries of the commodity[,] . . . to illuminate the contested character of history, narrative, event, and fact, to topple the hierarchy of discourse, and to engulf authorized speech in the clash of voices. 102

In “The Anarchy of Colored Girls Assembled in a Riotous Manner” ( 2018 ) Hartman returns to “critical fabulation” and offers a “speculative history” of Esther Brown, her friends, and their life in Harlem around 1917 . 103 Their experiments in “free love and free motherhood” were criminalized as “Loitering. Riotous and Disorderly. Solicitation. Violation of the Tenement House Law. . . . Vagrancy.” 104 Questions such as “ Is this man your husband? Where is the father of your child ?”—meant to detect the “likelihood” of their “future criminality” and moral depravity—might render them “three years confined at Bedford and . . . entangled with the criminal justice system and under state surveillance for a decade.” 105 In official records, these measures were narrated as rescuing, reforming, and rehabilitating, therapeutic interventions for the benefit of young black women.

Reading such records against the grain, Hartman tells the story of a “ revolution in a minor key ”: of “ too fast girls and surplus women and whores ” as “social visionaries, radical thinkers, and innovators.” 106 Their “wild and wayward” collective experiments, at the beginning of the 20th century , were building on centuries of black women’s “mutual aid societies” conducted “in stealth.” 107 Their aspiration has been “singularity and freedom”—not the “individuality and sovereignty” coveted by white liberal feminists. 108

Hartman’s work emerges out of African American feminist traditions but also out of postcolonial feminists, whose work pays particular attention to impossibility, failure, aporia, and the limits of representing the subaltern, as well as the heterogeneity and specificity of women’s agency.

Postcolonial Feminisms (Djebar, Spivak, Mohanty, Stratton, Mahmood, Puar): The Subaltern, Specificity, Agency

Colonized women had to contend not only with the “imbalances of their relations with their own men but also the baroque and violent array of hierarchical rules and restrictions that structured their new relations with imperial men and women.” 109 Furthermore, they were central to powerful orientalist fantasies that rendered their actual lives invisible. The relation of colonized land to colonizer was figured as that of a nubile, sexually available woman waiting for her lover, as in H. Rider Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mines where the map of the land centers around “Sheba’s Breasts” and “Mouth of treasure cave.” 110 Algerian writer Assia Djebar exposes this colonial fantasy in Fantasia ( 1985 ). 111 The city of Algiers is seen by the arriving colonizers as a virginal bride waiting for her groom to possess her. She is an “Impregnable City” that “sheds her veils,” as if this was “mutual love at first sight” and “the invaders were coming as lovers!” 112 The Victorian patriarchal, hierarchical nuclear family, ruled by a benign and loving husband and father, was key to the colonial “civilizing mission” because it was the perfect metaphor for the relation between colonizer and colonized in colonial ideology. 113 However, in Women of Algiers in Their Apartment ( 1980 ; mirroring the title of Eugène Delacroix’s orientalist paintings) Djebar reminds her readers that women took part in large numbers in the Algerian anticolonial struggle and suffered torture, rape, and loss of life, but that their contribution was marginalized in post-independence narratives, while they were expected to return to a patriarchal mold ostensibly for the good of the new nation. 114 By contrast, Women of Algiers in Their Apartment foregrounds Algerian women’s heterogeneity but also the intergenerational transmission of their socially repressed, traumatic history, which cannot be fully recovered—hence the self-conscious aporia of Djebar’s project.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” ( 1983 , 1988 , 1999 ) is a subtle theorization of what remains outside colonial, anticolonial, postcolonial, neocolonial, and even “liberal multiculturalist” elites and discourses. 115 Spivak’s starting point is the unpresentability of the “subaltern” (those most marginalized and excluded). The subaltern exceeds any representation treating it as a full identity with a fixed meaning. The subaltern is an inaccessible social unconscious that can only be ethically presented in its unpresentability—fleetingly visible in fragments.

Rather than documenting “subaltern” resistance in its “taxonomic” difference from the elite and rather than assuming that political forces are self-conscious and already constituted identities, Spivak assumes that political identities are being constituted through political action. 116 Many subaltern groups are highly articulate about their aims and their relations to elites and other subaltern groups, but Spivak understands the “subaltern” as singular acts of resistance that are “irretrievably heterogeneous” in relation to constituted identities. 117 Rather than asking for the recognition of “subjugated” and previously “disqualified” forms of knowledge, Spivak is intent on acknowledging her privileged positionality and insists that what she calls the “subaltern” is irretrievably silenced; the “subaltern” is what escapes—or is excluded from—any discourse. 118

Spivak’s heterogeneous subaltern is a (Derridean) singularity that cannot be translated fully or repeated exactly but can only be repeated differently. 119 The singularity in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” is Talu’s suicide, as retold by Spivak. Spivak interprets it as a complex political intervention, by a young middle-class woman activist, that remained illegible as such. Entrusted with a political assassination in the context of the struggle for Indian independence, Spivak claims that Talu’s suicide was a complex refusal to do her mission without betraying the cause. Talu questioned anticolonial nationalism, sati suicide, and female “imprisonment” in heteronormativity, but her “Speech Act was refused” by everyone because it resisted translation into established discourses. 120 Spivak iterates Talu’s singularity differently: as a postcolonial feminist heroine. She does not present her version of Talu’s story as restoring speech to the subaltern. Speech acts are addressed to others and completed by others; they involve “distanced decipherment by another, which is, at best, an interception.” 121 To claim that Talu has finally spoken through Spivak would be a neocolonial “missionary” claim of saving the subaltern. 122 To avoid this, Spivak self-dramatizes her privileged institutional “positionality” and calls for “unlearning” one’s privilege. 123

Postcolonial feminists have been telling the story of the marginalization of women of color within anticolonial movements, postcolonial states, and within Western feminist movements. In “Three Women’sTexts and a Critique of Imperialism” ( 1985 ), Spivak argues that Gilbert and Gubar, in their reading of Jane Eyre in Madwoman in the Attic , unwittingly reproduce the “axioms of imperialism.” 124 For Spivak, in Jane Eyre Bertha, a dark colonial woman, sets the house on fire and kills herself so that Jane Eyre “can become the feminist individualist heroine of British fiction”; she is “sacrificed as an insane animal” for her British “sister’s consolidation” in a manner that is exemplary of the “epistemic violence” of imperialism. 125 Gilbert and Gubar fail to see this and only read Jane and Bertha in individual, “psychological terms.” 126 By contrast, Jean Rhys’s rewriting of Jane Eyre in Wide Sargasso Sea ( 1966 ) makes this visible and enables Spivak’s critique. 127 Rhys allows Bertha to tell her story and keeps Bertha’s “humanity, indeed her sanity as critic of imperialism, intact.” 128 In “Does the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak articulates the value of postcolonial feminism but refuses to defend it as a redemptive breakthrough. Instead she issues a call for self-reflexivity.

Chandra Talpade Mohanty, in “Under Western Eyes” ( 1984 ), calls for studies of local collective struggles and for localized theorizing by investigators. 129 The category of “Third World Woman” is an essentialist fabrication reducing the irreducible “heterogeneity” of women in the Third World. 130 Mohanty’s call for specificity is a rejection of white middle-class feminists’ generalizations on “women” and “Third World women” as neocolonial:

Women are constituted as women through the complex interaction between class, culture, religion and other ideological institutions and frameworks. . . . [R]eductive cross-cultural comparisons result in the colonization of the conflicts and contradictions which characterize women of different social classes and cultures. 131

Mohanty is here remarkably close to African American feminists. What is at stake for Mohanty is for groups of marginalized women to represent themselves and to retrieve forms of agency within their own traditions. As she stresses in Feminism without Borders ( 2003 ): the “application of the notion of women as a homogeneous category to women in the Third World colonizes and appropriates the pluralities” of their complex location and “robs them of their historical and political agency .” 132

Saba Mahmood, in “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival” ( 2001 ), argues that rather than reading a specific cultural phenomenon through an established conception of agency, agency should be theorized through the specific phenomenon studied. 133 Her target is the Western feminist equation of feminist agency with secularism, resistance, and transgression, which she finds unhelpful when studying the “urban women’s mosque movement that is part of the larger Islamic revival in Cairo.” 134 While in some contexts feminist agency might take the form of “dramatic transgression and defiance,” for these Egyptian women it took the form of active participation and engagement with a religious movement. 135 It would be a neocolonial gesture to understand their involvement as due to “false consciousness” or internalized patriarchy. 136 Mahmood’s “situated analysis” thus endorses plural, local theories and concepts. 137

Florence Stratton focuses on gender in African postcolonial literature and criticism. She analyses the multiplicity of “ways in which women writers have been written out of the African literary tradition.” 138 They have been ignored by critics, marginalized by definitions of the African canon that universalize the tropes and themes of male writers, and silenced by “gender definitions which . . . maintain the status quo of women’s exclusion from public life.” 139 Particularly pernicious has been the “iteration in African men’s writing of the conventional colonial trope of Africa as female.” 140 Stratton discerns a ubiquitous pattern in African postcolonial men’s writing. Women are cast as symbols of the nation, in sexualized or bodily roles: as nubile virgin to be impregnated or as mother (Stratton calls this the “pot of culture” trope); or, alternatively, as degraded prostitute (the “sweep of history” trope). 141 So women are figured either as embodiments of an ostensibly static traditional culture (trope 1) or as passive victims of historical change (trope 2). This is coupled with a male quest narrative, where the male hero and his vision actively transform prostitute into mother Africa. Underlying this is a patriarchal division of active/passive and subject/object, which denies women as artists and citizens and neglects women’s issues (so actual sex work is totally obscured by its metaphorical role). Stratton goes on to show how African women writers have been “initiators” of “dialogue” with African male writers in order to self-authorize their work and make space for it in the African literary canon. 142 Stratton is also critical of white feminists who read African women writers through their own formal and thematic priorities, oblivious to African feminist traditions. 143

Jasbir K. Puar analyses how the “war on terror” and rising Islamophobia in the West, particularly the United States, have coopted feminist and queer struggles. While colonial orientalist fantasies projected sexual license onto the Middle East, 21st-century orientalist fantasies are “Islamophobic constructions” othering Muslims as “homophobic and perverse,” while constructing the West as “‘tolerant’ but sexually, racially, and gendered normal.” 144 On the one hand, Muslims are presented as “fundamentalist, patriarchal, and, often even homophobic.” 145 On the other hand, a “rhetoric of sexual modernization” turns American queer bodies into “normative patriot bodies.” 146 This involves the loss of an intersectional perspective and the “fissuring of race from sexuality.” 147 Muslims are seen as only marked by race and “presumptively sexually repressed, perverse, or both,” while Western queers are seen as only marked by sexuality and “presumptively white,” male, and “gender normative.” 148

Queer and Transgender Feminisms (Butler, Halberstam, Stryker): Performativity, Resignification, Continuous Transition, Self-Identification

Queer theory emerged in the period from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, in the midst of the outbreak of HIV/AIDS. 149 Queer theory, as an academic field, can be located at the intersection of poststructuralism (especially the work of Michel Foucault, but also Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze), Francophone feminism from Beauvoir to Irigaray, and African American feminism. Queer theorists have negotiated this genealogy variously; some are predominantly influenced by Foucault, less by feminist thought. The present account will focus on feminist queer theory, especially the work of Judith Butler, and its relation to earlier and subsequent feminist, queer, and transgender thought. As queer theory evolved, postcolonial feminists also became increasingly influential.

In brief, feminist queer theory, while indebted to “sexual difference” feminists such as Irigaray, critiques them through African American feminism. A core theoretical insight of African American feminism is that gender must not be considered on its own or as primary in relation to other social categories and hierarchies. Queer theorists adopt this insight. For queer theorists, sexual orientation is at least as important as gender. Indeed, they contend that what underpins the gender binary (the polarization of two genders) is the institution of “compulsory heterosexuality” or heteronormativity.

Transgender theory emerged in the mid to late 1990s, within the orbit of queer theory but also through its critique. The crux of this critique is that, despite queer theorists’ best intentions, the queer subject is primarily or implicitly white, Western, gender-normative, and cisgender. In attending to sexual orientation, queer theory neglected the spectrum of gender identities and translated issues of gender identification into issues of sexual orientation. Strands of queer activism—for example, figures such as Sylvia Rivera or Stormé DeLarverie in the United States—were marginalized by a politics of respectability led by affluent, white, cisgender queers. 150 This is particularly ironic, given the aspirations invested in the term “queer.”

In queer theory, the term “queer” was intended as an appropriation and resignification of a term of abuse but also as a floating signifier without a fixed meaning or definition and thus open to multiple and changing uses, in keeping with poststructuralist theory. “Queer” has been defined as beyond definition, transgressive, excessive, beyond polar opposites, and exceeding false polarization. So “queer” is both a particular social identity but also exemplary of a potential for openness, fluidity, and transformation in all identities (what poststructuralist theory calls the infinite deferral of the signified). It is important to point out that Spivak defined the “subaltern” and Irigaray the “feminine” in similar terms, also within a poststructuralist frame. A problem with such terms is that, though they are intended to be inclusive, they are exclusive in some of their effects. The chosen term is privileged as the only term that stands for marginality, potential for change, or openness to the past or future. In the process, the privileged term also loses specificity and becomes a metaphor. This is perhaps replicated in some uses of the term “trans” or “trans*,” where once again the term becomes a metaphor for the element of fluidity and openness in all identities.

Retracing one’s steps back to the beginnings of queer theory, while Beauvoir called for equality and the disappearance of gender, “sexual difference” feminists, such as Irigaray and Cixous, called for autonomous women’s struggles and a radical, utopian revisioning of the “feminine” to be performed by their écriture féminine . Judith Butler in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity ( 1990 ), one of queer theory’s inaugural texts, questions Irigaray’s utopianism and takes as her starting point Beauvoir’s “One is not born, but rather becomes, woman.” 151 Forty years after The Second Sex , Butler contends that societies continue to systematically produce two “discreet and polar genders,” as a prerequisite of heteronormativity; two “[d]iscreet genders are part of what ‘humanizes’ individuals within contemporary society; indeed, we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right.” 152 One is produced as a recognizably human individual in their very repetition of genderizing practices, performance of gender norms, and iteration of speech acts that bring about gender and its effect of timeless naturalness. But the performativity and iterability of gender show up the “ imitative structure of gender ” and its historical “ contingency .” 153 In spite of the pervasiveness of genderizing practices and the unavailability of a position outside gender, the very performativity and iterability of gender open up the possibility of repeating it slightly differently. Butler hopes for destabilized and constantly resignified genders: “a fluidity of identities,” “an openness to resignification,” and “proliferating gender configurations.” 154 While gender is a normalizing, disciplinary force, it is possible to engage consciously with gender norms and open them to resignification. However, the success or failure of an attempt at resignification also depends on its audience or addressees and the authority they are prepared to attribute to it.

In the context of feminist theory, Butler’s call for continuous resignification takes the form of resignifying “woman” and “feminism” itself. As part of her “radical democratic” feminist politics, she aims to “release” the term “woman” into a “future of multiple significations.” 155 In resignifying feminism, she writes against those feminists who assume that there is an “ontological specificity to women. . . . In the 1980s, the feminist ‘we’ rightly came under attack by women of color who claimed that the ‘we’ was invariably white.” 156 Not only heterogeneity but contentions among feminists ought to be valued: “the rifts among women over the content” of the term “woman” ought to be “safeguarded and prized.” 157 Furthermore, Butler distrusts the utopianism of those feminists who believe they are “beyond the play of power,” asking instead for self-reflexive recognition of feminists’ inevitable embeddedness in power relations. 158

One of the targets of Butler’s critique is Irigaray. Her nuanced reading of Irigaray in Bodies That Matter defends her from accusations of essentialism but rejects the primacy of sexual difference over other forms of difference—race, class, sexual orientation, and so on—in Irigaray’s work. For example, Butler finds that Irigaray’s alternative mythology of two labial lips touching and being touched by each other is a self-conscious textual “rhetorical strategy” intended to counter established understandings of women’s genitals as a lack, a wound, and so on. 159 Rather than describing an essential sexual difference, Irigaray’s reparative, positive figuration of the two lips is a deliberately improper and catachrestic form of mimicry akin to Butler’s resignification; it is “not itself a natural relation, but a symbolic articulation.” 160 Irigaray distinguishes between the false feminine within gender binaries and a true feminine “excluded in and by such a binary opposition” and appearing “only in catachresis .” 161 The true feminine is an “ excessive feminine” in that it “exceeds its figuration”; its essence is to have no essence, to undermine binary oppositions and their essences, and to exceed conceptuality. 162 Irigaray’s textual practice is intended as the “very operation of the feminine in language.” 163 Butler seems to endorse Irigaray’s purely strategic essentialism. However, it is troubling that Irigaray’s true feminine is a name for all that escapes binary oppositions and social hierarchies.

Butler’s critique of Irigaray is that her exclusive focus on the feminine is an implicitly white, middle-class, heterosexual position attending to the marginalization of women qua women but neglecting other forms of social marginalization. Since Irigaray’s true feminine is “exactly what is excluded” from binary oppositions, it “monopolizes the sphere of exclusion,” resulting in Irigaray’s “constitutive exclusions” of other forms of difference. 164 For Irigaray “the outside is ‘always’ the feminine,” breaking its link to race, class, sexual orientation, and so on. 165 By contrast, Butler embraces intersectionality. Whereas for Irigaray sexual difference is “autonomous” and “more fundamental” than other differences, which are viewed as “ derived from” it, for Butler gender is “articulated through or as other vectors of power.” 166

Butler acknowledges her debt to African American literature and feminist thought, in a rare foray into literary criticism, her close reading of Nella Larsen’s 1929 novel, Passing . She also pays tribute to feminists of color, such as Chicana feminist Norma Alarcón, who similarly theorized women of color as multiply rather than singly positioned and marginalized. In Passing and in related African American literary criticism by Barbara Christian, Hazel Carby, Deborah McDowell, and others, Butler finds valuable theoretical insights that “ racializing norms ” and gender norms are “articulated through one another.” 167 But these texts also identify the value of solidarity among black women and the many obstacles to this solidarity. Versions of “racial uplift” adhering to the white middle-class nuclear family have been obstructive; they have been “masculine uplift” whose disproportionate “cost . . . for black women” has been the “impossibility of sexual freedom” for them. 168 Larsen’s critique of “racial uplift”—and its promotion of white middle-class gender norms, marriage, nuclear family, and heteronormativity—grasps the interimplication of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. By contrast, Larsen’s Passing and Toni Morrison’s Sula uphold the precarious “promise of connection” among black women. 169

If “racial uplift” has been obstructive, Irigaray’s exclusive focus on the feminine is equally obstructive, according to Butler. Irigaray seems to assume that sexual difference is “unmarked by race” and that “whiteness is not a form of racial difference.” 170 By contrast, Larsen highlights historical articulations “of racialized gender, of gendered race, of the sexualization of racial ideals, or the racialization of gender norms.” 171 In Passing Clare passes as white, and Butler’s reading particularly traces the convergence of race and sexuality. Clare’s “risk-taking” takes the dual form of “racial crossing and sexual infidelity” that undermines middle-class norms, questioning both the “sanctity of marriage” and the “clarity of racial demarcations.” 172 Sexual and racial closeting are also interlinked: “the muteness of homosexuality converges in the story with the illegibility of Clare’s blackness.” 173 The word “queering” in Passing is “a term for betraying what ought to remain concealed,” in relation to both race and sexuality. 174

If some early commentators interpreted Butler’s theory of the performativity of gender and her call for gender resignification as a voluntarist, individualist, consumerist lifestyle choice for privileged Westerners, this article has tried to show just how constrained gender resignification is, and how inextricable from other social struggles. In Butler’s more recent work, issues of gender and sexual orientation are situated in interlocking frames of social exclusion and social precarity. Neither gender nor sexual orientation on their own can determine what counts as a human, livable, and grievable life. 175

Susan Stryker, one of the founders of transgender theory, addresses her first publication, “My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix” ( 1994 ), to feminist and queer communities and exposes their exclusion and abjection of the “transgendered subject” as a monster. 176 Through a close reading of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein , she expresses her affinity with Frankenstein’s monster. 177 She criticizes the medical discourse that “produced sex reassignment techniques” for its “deeply conservative attempt to stabilize gendered identity in service of the naturalized heterosexual order” and insists on the disjunction between the “naturalistic effect biomedical technology can achieve” and the “subjective experience” of this transformation. 178 She rejects the continuing pathologization of the transgendered subject by psychiatrists, with the effect that “the sounds that come out of my mouth can be summarily dismissed.” 179 Notable here is an emphasis on self-identification and lived experience, which inherits the insights of phenomenological feminists that the body is not an object but a center of perception. To honor this emphasis, Stryker enlists a mixed form that combines criticism, diary entry, poetry, and theory.

Jack Halberstam’s 1998 Female Masculinity is a complex negotiation between feminist theory, queer theory, and the emerging field of transgender theory. While in medical discourse the approved narrative for the authorization of hormones and gender confirmation surgery is that of being in the wrong body and transitioning toward the right body, Halberstam warns that the “metaphor of crossing over and indeed migrating to the right body from the wrong body merely leaves the politics of stable gender identities, and therefore stable gender hierarchies, completely intact.” 180 Indeed he endorses the very “refusal of the dialectic of home and border” in Chicana/o studies and postcolonial studies. 181 Taking a broadly intersectional position, he argues that “alternative masculinities, ultimately, will fail to change existing gender hierarchies to the extent to which they fail to be feminist, antiracist, and queer.” 182

In his 2018 “Preface to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition” of Female Masculinity Halberstam defines “female masculinity” and “the butch” in a manner that bears a family resemblance to Irigaray’s “feminine,” Spivak’s “subaltern,” and queer theory’s “queer.” “Female masculinity” includes “multiple modes of identification and gender assignation” without “stabilizing” their “meanings.” 183 “The butch” is a “placeholder for the unassimilable, for that which remains indefinable or unspeakable within the many identifications that we make and that we claim”; “let the butch stand as all that cannot be absorbed into systems of signification, legitimation, legibility, recognition, and legality.” 184 The butch is “neither cis-gender nor simply transgender” but a “bodily catachresis . . . the rhetorical practice of misnaming something for which there would otherwise be no words.” 185 In Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability ( 2018 ) Halberstam defines trans* in similar terms. In keeping with his commitment to gender identity as “continuous transition,” the term trans* “embraces the nonspecificity of the term ‘trans’ and uses it to open the term up to a shifting set of conditions and possibilities rather than to attach it only to the life narratives of a specific group of people”; the asterisk “keeps at bay any sense of knowing in advance what the meaning of this or that gender variant form may be.” 186 His 2018 “Theory in the Wild,” co-written with Tavia Nyong’o, folds a “range of concerns” in addition to gender and sexuality—“race, coloniality, ecology, anarchy”—in a language that stretches from academic to creative writing. 187

In “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil Twin” ( 2004 ), Susan Stryker launches transgender studies as an academic field “born of the union of sexuality studies and feminism” but distinct from them. The rationale for this autonomization is that “all too often queer remains a code word for ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian,’” while “transgender phenomena are misapprehended through a lens that privileges sexual orientation.” 188 Transgender studies is intended to disrupt the “privileged . . . narratives that favor sexual identity labels” at the expense of “gender categories.” 189 But Stryker is keen to acknowledge her own Western privilege: transgender studies is “marked by its First World point of origin” and the new field risks reproducing the “power structures of colonialism by subsuming non-Western configurations of personhood into Western constructs of sexuality and gender.” 190

In “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies” ( 2006 ), Stryker continues to argue that, within queer theory, “the entire discussion of ‘gender diversity’” was “subsumed within a discussion of sexual desire—as if the only reason to express gender was to signal the mode of one’s attractions.” 191 While the term transgender “began as a buzzword of the early 1990s,” in the 21st century it is established as the name for a “wide range of phenomena that call attention to the fact that ‘gender,’ as it is lived, embodied, experienced, performed, and encountered, is more complex and varied” than previously thought. 192 As this definition suggests, transgender studies draws on the insights of all the strands of feminist theory discussed in this article—phenomenological, poststructuralist, intersectional, and postcolonial. Stryker reminds readers that, since at least Sojourner Truth, “fighting for representation within the term ‘woman’ has been . . . a part of the feminist tradition,” and “the fight over transgender inclusion within feminism is not significantly different.” 193 As with African American and postcolonial feminisms, transgender theory calls for feminists’ examination of their “exclusionary assumptions.” 194 In turn, transgender theorists need to reckon with the “whiteness” of their academic field and the “First World origin” of the term transgender, as it is being exported globally across “racial, ethnic, linguistic, and socioeconomic communities.” 195 Arundati Roy’s The Ministry of Utmost Happiness explores the clash, in India, between the terms of transgender theory—emanating from the United States and disseminated by NGOs, magazines, and other publications—and the terminology, self-understanding, and practices of hijras . 196

Stryker is particularly critical of the modern Western correlation of biological or bodily sex (particularly genital status) and gender identity, where gender is taken to be merely the “representation of an objectively knowable material sex.” 197 Stryker is adamant that “Sex . . . is not the foundation of gender.” 198 Nor is sex as self-evident as it appears to be, in that the different components of sex—chromosomal, anatomical, reproductive, and morphological—do not necessarily line up. (For example, one’s chromosomal status might not line up with their anatomical sex.) This supposedly “objective” correlation is based on the “assumed correlation of a particular” component of “biological sex with a particular,” normative “social gender,” with the result that transgender people (among others) are forever viewed as making “false representations of an underlying material truth.” 199 Many feminist strands have shed light on the correlation of biological sex and “gender normativity,” and Stryker promises that transgender theory will continue to analyze the “operations of systems and institutions that simultaneously produce various possibilities of viable personhood, and eliminate others.” 200 In recognizing diversity beyond “Eurocentric norms,” Stryker notes that “relationships between bodily sex, subjective gender identity, social gender roles, sexual behaviors, and kinship status” have varied greatly. 201 Of central importance to transgender theory is subjective gender identity, which Stryker understands within the tradition of feminist phenomenology.

It is important to distinguish between gender as a social category within social classifications and hierarchies and gender as one’s self-identification and sense of self. Stryker focuses on the latter and connects it to the body, as the “contingent ground of all our knowledge.” 202 The antidote to fake objectivity is the recognition of “embodiment,” “embodied experience,” and “experiential knowledge”; one’s “gendered sense of self” and “lived complexity” of gender are “inalienable.” 203 All voices are embodied and no voice should be allowed to “mask” its “particularities and specificities” under the cloak of “false universality.” 204 It is therefore imperative to either speak from “direct experience” or to represent others “in an ethical fashion.” 205 It is equally vital to include forms of knowledge previously “disqualified as nonconceptual[,] . . . naïve” and “hierarchically inferior.” 206 Once again, Stryker here joins several strands of feminist theory that have practiced formal innovation—for example, in mixing theory, literature, and life-writing—not for its own sake but in the pursuit of truth and justice.

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Julie Rak and Jean Wyatt for their suggestions for revision, John Frow for his comments, and Ian Richards-Karamarkovich for his in-house editorial support.

Further Reading

• Ahmed, Sara . Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others . Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.
• Al-Saji, Alia . “A Phenomenology of Hesitation: Interrupting Racialized Habits of Seeing.” In Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment . Edited by Emily S. Lee , 133–172. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014.
• Anderson, Pamela Sue . “Silencing and Speaker Vulnerability: Undoing an Oppressive Form of (Wilful) Ignorance.” In “Love and Vulnerability: Thinking with Pamela Sue Anderson.” Edited by Pelagia Goulimari . Special issue, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 25, no. 1–2 (February–April 2020): 36–45.
• Beauvoir, Simone de . The Second Sex . Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier . London: Vintage, 2011.
• Butler, Judith . Gender Trouble . London: Routledge, 1990.
• Cixous, Hélène . “The Laugh of the Medusa.” Translated by Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen . Signs 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976): 875–893.
• Collins, Patricia Hill . Black Feminist Thought . Rev. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2000.
• Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams . “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1241–1299.
• Djebar, Assia . Women of Algiers in Their Apartment . Translated by Marjolijn De Jager . Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992.
• Fricker, Miranda . Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
• Gilbert, Sandra , and Susan Gubar . The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination . 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
• Halberstam, Jack . Female Masculinity . 20th anniversary ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018.
• Hartman, Saidiya V. Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
• Irigaray, Luce . This Sex Which Is Not One . Translated by Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.
• Lorde, Audre . Your Silence Will Not Protect You . Preface by Reni Eddo-Lodge , introduction by Sara Ahmed . London: Silver Press, 2017.
• Mahmood, Saba . “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival.” Cultural Anthropology 16, no. 2 (May 2001): 202–236.
• Mohanty, Chandra Talpade . “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” boundary 2 12–13 (Spring–Autumn 1984): 333–358.
• Moi, Toril . “‘ I Am Not a Woman Writer’: About Women, Literature and Feminist Theory Today .” Eurozine , June 2009.
• Morrison, Toni . The Bluest Eye . London: Picador, 1990.
• Puar, Jasbir K. “Queer Times, Queer Assemblages.” Social Text 23, no. 3–4 (2005): 121–139.
• Spillers, Hortense J. “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s May Be: An American Grammar Book.” Diacritics 17, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 64–81.
• Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty . “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present , by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak , 198–311. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
• Stratton, Florence . “Periodic Embodiments: A Ubiquitous Trope in African Men’s Writing.” Research in African Literatures 21, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 111–126.
• Stryker, Susan . “My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix.” GLQ 1, no. 3 (1994): 237–254.
• Walker, Alice . In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose . Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004.
• Young, Iris Marion . “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality.” In On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays , by Iris Marion Young , 27–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

1. See also the companion, complementary piece by Pelagia Goulimari, “Genders,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Literature (March 2020).

2. Sylvia Tamale, ed., African Sexualities: A Reader (Oxford: Pambazuka, 2011).

3. Alison Bechdel, Fun Home: A Family Tragicomic (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006); Alison Bechdel, Are You My Mother? A Comic Drama (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012); Anne Carson, Antigonick , ill. Bianca Stone (Tarset: Bloodaxe, 2012); Maggie Nelson, Jane: A Murder (London: Zed Books, 2019); Maggie Nelson, The Argonauts (London: Melville House, 2016); and Paul B. Preciado, Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era , trans. Bruce Benderson (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2013).

4. Elizabeth Barrett-Browning, Aurora Leigh , new ed., ed. Kerry McSweeney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (London: Penguin, 2004); Julia Kristeva, “Stabat Mater,” trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Poetics Today 6.1–2 (January 1985): 133–152; Marge Piercy, Woman on the Edge of Time (London: Women’s Press, 2000); Audre Lorde, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name; A Biomythography (London: Penguin, 2018); Leslie Feinberg, Stone Butch Blues: A Novel (Ithaca, NY: Firebrand Books, 1993); Chris Kraus, I Love Dick (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2016); and Qurratulain Hyder, Fireflies in the Mist (New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2008).

5. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex , trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (London: Vintage, 2011), 293 .

6. For example, the situation of women is a form of “slavery of half of humanity” and Beauvoir calls for its abolition; Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 782.

7. For example, “every existent [human being] is at once immanence and transcendence,” Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 276; if woman is flesh for man, “man is also flesh for woman; and woman is other than a carnal object” (277); “The same drama of flesh and spirit, and of finitude and transcendence, plays itself out in both sexes,” and both sexes should assume the “ambiguity” of their situation (779–780). See also Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity , trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 2015).

8. See further Pelagia Goulimari, Literary Criticism and Theory: From Plato to Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 2015), ch. 10.

9. See Michèle Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc ., trans. Trista Selous (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 60.

10. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 672, 654, 663, 672. This description by Beauvoir is the starting point for Iris Marion Young’s work. Beauvoir adds that, lacking the means to grasp the world, a woman might offer herself as a “gift” (679). Hélène Cixous will return to this offering and reappraise it more positively in “The Laugh of the Medusa,” trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, Signs 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976): 875–893.

11. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 4, 12, 15, 654.

12. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 8.

13. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 9.

14. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 680.

15. Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice , 57.

16. See, for example, the section on D. H. Lawrence in Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 236–244.

17. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 767.

18. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 762, 765, 762, 766.

19. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 767. For example, Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément echo Beauvoir in their book, The Newly Born Woman , trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

20. “[T]ruth itself is ambiguity,” Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 763.

21. Iris Marion Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” in On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays , by Iris Marion Young (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27–45, 30.

22. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 35.

23. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 29, 35, 30.

24. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 35–36 (emphasis added).

25. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 37. Alia Al-Saji will adopt Young’s discussion of hesitation to build her own phenomenology of hesitation.

26. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 39 (emphasis added).

27. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 40.

28. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 40–41.

29. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 44.

30. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 45.

31. Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 43.

32. For example, Dianne Chisholm claims that Young’s phenomenological description is out of date and no longer relevant. Dianne Chisholm, “Climbing Like a Girl: An Exemplary Adventure in Feminist Phenomenology,” Hypatia 23, no. 1 (January–March 2008): 9–40.

33. Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman , trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Luce Irigaray, “This Sex Which Is Not One,” in This Sex Which Is Not One , trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke, by Luce Irigaray (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 23–33; Luce Irigaray, “The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine,” in This Sex Which Is Not One , trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke, by Luce Irigaray (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 68–85; and Cixous, “Laugh of the Medusa.”

34. Luce Irigaray, “Equal or Different?,” trans. David Macey, in The Irigaray Reader , ed. Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 30–33, 32.

35. Irigaray, “Equal or Different?,” 32–33.

36. Toril Moi, “‘Independent Women’ and Narratives of Liberation,” in Simone de Beauvoir: A Critical Reader , ed. Elizabeth Fallaize (London: Routledge, 1998), 72–92, 86.

37. Moi, “Independent Women,” 87–88.

38. Toril Moi, “‘ I Am Not a Woman Writer’: About Women, Literature and Feminist Theory Today ,” Eurozine (June 2009), 8 (emphasis added).

39. Moi, “I Am Not a Woman Writer,” 6, quoting Beauvoir, translation amended by Moi.

40. Moi, “I Am Not a Woman Writer,” 7.

41. Moi, “I Am Not a Woman Writer,” 7 (emphasis added).

42. Michèle Le Doeuff, “Engaging with Simone de Beauvoir,” in The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir , ed. Margaret A. Simons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 11–19, 12.

43. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life , trans. Peter Green (London: Penguin, 2001).

44. Beauvoir quoted in Miranda Fricker, “Life-Story in Beauvoir’s Memoirs,” in The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir , ed. Claudia Card (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208–227, 219, 225.

45. Beauvoir quoted in Fricker, “Life-Story,” 223.

46. Fricker, “Life-Story,” 226.

47. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 50–51.

48. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice , 50.

49. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice , 51.

50. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice , 150–152; see also 158–159.

51. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice , 169–175.

52. George Eliot, Mill on the Floss , ed. Gordon Sherman Haight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). See Dorota Filipczak, “The Disavowal of the Female ‘Knower’: Reading Literature in the Light of Pamela Sue Anderson’s Project on Vulnerability,” in “Love and Vulnerability: Thinking with Pamela Sue Anderson,” ed. Pelagia Goulimari, special issue, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 25, no. 1–2 (February–April 2020): 156–164.

53. Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 90–91, 23.

54. Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology , 66.

55. Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology , 87.

56. Ahmed’s work is also informed by Michel Foucault on disciplinary practices producing capable but docile bodies and Pierre Bourdieu on the “habitus” (naturalized socio-cultural habits).

57. Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology , 101–102, 105 (emphasis added).

58. Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology , 106.

59. Sara Ahmed, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness,” Feminist Theory 8, no. 2 (August 2007): 149–168, 161.

60. Ahmed, “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 161.

61. Ahmed, “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 161.

62. Ahmed, “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 163.

63. Ahmed, “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 163.

64. See Sara Ahmed, What’s the Use? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019).

65. Alia Al-Saji, “A Phenomenology of Hesitation: Interrupting Racialized Habits of Seeing,” in Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment , ed. Emily S. Lee (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014), 133–172, 138 .

66. Al-Saji, “Phenomenology of Hesitation,” 136.

67. Al-Saji, “Phenomenology of Hesitation,” 142.

68. Al-Saji, “Phenomenology of Hesitation,” 155.

69. Al-Saji, “Phenomenology of Hesitation,” 153 (emphasis added).

70. Al-Saji, “Phenomenology of Hesitation,” 154 (emphasis added).

71. Pamela Sue Anderson, “Creating a New Imaginary for Love in Religion,” in “Love and Vulnerability: Thinking with Pamela Sue Anderson,” ed. Pelagia Goulimari, special issue, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 25, no. 1–2 (February–April 2020): 46–53, 49 .

72. Pamela Sue Anderson, “Silencing and Speaker Vulnerability: Undoing an Oppressive Form of (Wilful) Ignorance,” in “Love and Vulnerability: Thinking with Pamela Sue Anderson,” ed. Pelagia Goulimari, special issue, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 25, no. 1–2 (February–April 2020): 36–45 .

73. See Akasha Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott, and Barbara Smith, eds., All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies , 2nd ed. (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2015). See also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present , by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 284 .

74. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1241–1299 ; and Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought , rev. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000) .

75. See Sojourner Truth, “Ain’t I a Woman?,” in Women in Culture: An Intersectional Anthology for Gender and Women’s Studies , ed. Bonnie Kime Scott et al., 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2017); Harriet Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: Authoritative Text, Contexts, Criticism , ed. Frances Smith Foster and Richard Yarborough, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2019); Zora Neale Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God , introd. Zadie Smith, afterword by Sherley Anne Williams (London: Virago, 2018); and Nella Larsen, Passing , ed. Thadious M. Davis (New York: Penguin, 2003).

76. Elaine Showalter, A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Brontë to Lessing , new ed. (London: Virago, 1999). See further Goulimari, Literary Criticism and Theory , ch. 9.

77. Indeed Barbara Christian argues that black women writers have had to include self-theorizing in their texts, becoming their own critics. Barbara Christian, “The Race for Theory,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 1 (April 1988): 67–79.

78. Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye (London: Picador, 1990) .

79. Toni Morrison, “What the Black Woman Thinks about Women’s Lib,” in What Moves at the Margin: Selected Nonfiction , ed. Carolyn C. Denard (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008), 18–30, 24.

80. Morrison, “What the Black Woman Thinks,” 18, 19.

81. Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (New York: Ten Speed Press, 2007). Also included in Audre Lorde, Your Silence Will Not Protect You , preface by Reni Eddo-Lodge, introd. Sara Ahmed (London: Silver Press, 2017) .

82. Lorde, Your Silence , 96.

83. Lorde, Your Silence , 113.

84. Lorde, Your Silence , 12.

85. Lorde, Your Silence , 29, and see the chapter “Eye to Eye: Black Women, Hatred and Anger.”

86. See “The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism” in Lorde, Your Silence .

87. Lorde, Your Silence , 78.

88. See “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power” in Lorde, Your Silence .

89. See “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference” in Lorde, Your Silence .

90. Alice Walker, Color Purple (London: Women’s Press, 1983).

91. Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004) , xi (emphasis added).

92. Walker, In Search , xi (emphasis added).

93. Alice Walker, “Looking for Zora,” in In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose , by Alice Walker (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004), 93–118 .

94. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination , 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000) .

95. Hortense J. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s May Be: An American Grammar Book,” Diacritics 17, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 64–81 .

96. Hurston, Their Eyes , 29.

97. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Toni Morrison, Beloved (London: Picador, 1988); Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) .

98. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection , 23, 36.

99. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection , 10 (emphasis added).

100. Saidiya V. Hartman, Lose Your Mother: A Journey along the Atlantic Slave Route (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 6.

101. Saidiya V. Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism 12, no. 2 (June 2008): 1–14, 12.

102. Hartman, “Venus,” 11–12.

103. Saidiya V. Hartman, “The Anarchy of Colored Girls Assembled in a Riotous Manner,” South Atlantic Quarterly 117, no. 3 (July 2018): 465–490, 470, 486.

104. Hartman, “Anarchy,” 471, 473.

105. Hartman, “Anarchy,” 474, 486 (emphasis added).

106. Hartman, “Anarchy,” 471, 470 (emphasis added).

107. Hartman, “Anarchy,” 469, 466, 471.

108. Hartman, “Anarchy,” 471. See further Saidiya V. Hartman, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval (New York: W. W. Norton, 2019).

109. Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather (London: Routledge, 1995), 6.

110. H. Rider Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines , ed. Robert Hampson (London: Penguin, 2007), 24.

111. Assia Djebar, Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade , trans. Dorothy S. Blair (London: Quartet, 1989).

112. Djebar, Fantasia , 6, 8.

113. McClintock, Imperial Leather , 45.

114. Assia Djebar, Women of Algiers in Their Apartment , trans. Marjolijn De Jager (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992) .

115. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 309. Delivered as a lecture in 1983, it was published in different versions of varying length. This article discusses the version in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) .

116. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 271.

117. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 270.

118. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 267.

119. See Goulimari, Literary Criticism and Theory , ch. 11. See also Hartman on singularity, as discussed in the section “ African American Feminisms (Morrison, Lorde, Walker, Spillers, Hartman): Race, Intersectionality, Differences among Women and among Black Women ” in this article.

120. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 307, 273.

121. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 309.

122. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 310.

123. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 283, 284.

124. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism,” Critical Inquiry 12, no. 1 (October 1985): 243–261, 243; and Charlotte Brontë, Jane Eyre , 3rd ed., ed. Jane Jack and Margaret Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

125. Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts,” 251.

126. Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts,” 248.

127. Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea , ed. Angela Smith (London: Penguin, 1997).

128. Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts,” 249.

129. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” boundary 2 12–13 (Spring–Autumn 1984): 333–358 .

130. Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” 333.

131. Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” 344.

132. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 39 (emphasis added).

133. Saba Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” Cultural Anthropology 16, no. 2 (May 2001): 202–236 .

134. Mahmood, “Feminist Theory,” 202.

135. Mahmood, “Feminist Theory,” 217.

136. Mahmood, “Feminist Theory,” 205.

137. Mahmood, “Feminist Theory,” 224.

138. Florence Stratton, Contemporary African Literature and the Politics of Gender (London: Routledge, 1994), 1.

139. Stratton, Contemporary African Literature , 10.

140. Stratton, Contemporary African Literature , 18.

141. Florence Stratton, “Periodic Embodiments: A Ubiquitous Trope in African Men’s Writing,” Research in African Literatures 21, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 111–126, 112 .

142. Stratton, Contemporary African Literature , 11.

143. Stratton, Contemporary African Literature , 11.

144. Jasbir K. Puar, “Queer Times, Queer Assemblages,” Social Text 23.3–4 (2005): 121–139, 122 (emphasis added).

145. Puar, “Queer Times,” 131.

146. Puar, “Queer Times,” 122, 121.

147. Puar, “Queer Times,” 126.

148. Puar, “Queer Times,” 126.

149. See, for example, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire , 30th anniversary ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

150. See Eileen Myles, “ The Lady Who Appears to Be a Gentleman ,” Harper’s Magazine , June 2019.

151. Beauvoir, The Second Sex , 293.

152. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990), 140, 139–140.

153. Butler, Gender Trouble , 137 (emphasis added).

154. Butler, Gender Trouble , 138, 141.

155. Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism,’” in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange , by Seyla Benhabib, et al. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 35–58, 50–51.

156. Butler, “Contingent Foundations,” 49.

157. Butler, “Contingent Foundations,” 50.

158. Butler, “Contingent Foundations,” 39.

159. Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (London: Routledge, 1993), 38; and Luce Irigaray, “When Our Lips Speak Together,” in This Sex Which Is Not One , trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke, by Luce Irigaray (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 205–218 .

160. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 46 (emphasis added).

161. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 37 (emphasis added).

162. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 39, 41 (emphasis added).

163. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 46.

164. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 37, 42.

165. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 49.

166. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 167 (emphasis added).

167. Nella Larsen, Passing , ed. Thadious M. Davis (New York: Penguin, 2003); and Butler, Bodies That Matter , 182 (emphasis added).

168. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 178.

169. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 183; and Toni Morrison, Sula (London: Picador, 1991).

170. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 181–182.

171. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 182.

172. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 169.

173. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 175.

174. Butler, Bodies That Matter , 176.

175. See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004); and Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2016).

176. Susan Stryker, “My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix,” GLQ 1, no. 3 (1994): 237–254 , 241. See also 251n2: “transgender” as “an umbrella term that refers to all identities or practices that cross over, cut across, move between, or otherwise queer socially constructed sex/gender boundaries.”

177. Mary Shelley, Frankenstein , 2nd ed., ed. J. Paul Hunter (London: W. W. Norton, 2012).

178. Stryker, “My Words,” 242.

179. Stryker, “My Words,” 244.

180. Jack Halberstam, Female Masculinity , 20th anniversary ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 171 .

181. Halberstam, Female Masculinity , 170.

182. Halberstam, Female Masculinity , 173.

183. Halberstam, Female Masculinity , xii.

184. Halberstam, Female Masculinity , xx, xxi.

185. Halberstam, Female Masculinity , xx.

186. Jack Halberstam, Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 95, 52–53, 4.

187. Jack Halberstam and Tavia Nyong’o, “Introduction: Theory in the Wild,” in “Wildness,” ed. Jack Halberstam and Tavia Nyong’o, special issue, South Atlantic Quarterly 117, no. 3 (July 2018): 453–464, 462.

188. Susan Stryker, “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil Twin,” GLQ 10, no. 2 (2004): 212–215, 214.

189. Stryker, “Transgender Studies,” 212.

190. Stryker, “Transgender Studies,” 214–215.

191. Susan Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies,” in The Transgender Studies Reader , ed. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (London: Routledge, 2006), 1–18, 1.

192. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 3.

193. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 7.

194. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 7.

195. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 14–15.

196. Arundati Roy, The Ministry of Utmost Happiness (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2017). On the expression of third-gender and non-normative gender identities in non-Western cultures, see, for example, the Rae-rae (Tahitian trans women), Faʻafafine (Samoan third gender), and Māhū (Polynesian “middle” or third gender).

197. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 8.

198. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 9.

199. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 9.

200. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 13, 3.

201. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 14.

202. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 12.

203. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 12, 13, 10, 7.

204. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 12.

205. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 13.

206. Stryker, “(De)Subjectivated Knowledges,” 13.

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Mapping a global view of feminism

Search online for the terms “feminism” and “global feminism,” and you’ll discover that feminism today comes in a variety of flavors, largely dictated by differences in the causes, concerns and condition of women around the world. Yet, while culture, politics, education and society may differ from one country to another, the commitment to obtain equal rights and freedom of choice for women remains constant among feminists no matter where they are.

In an interview with “Gender News,” noted research scholar Dr. Zilka Spahić-Šiljak discusses her views on global feminism and why “we need to bring the discussion about feminism back to the issue of social justice for women and all other marginalized groups.” Šiljak, who was born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has dedicated the past two decades of her career to advocating for women’s rights as a research scholar and human rights activist in non-governmental organizations. Her most recent research at Stanford University focuses on the intersection of leadership, gender and building peace.

GN: Is global feminism really moving forward? Does it mean the same thing in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it does in the U.S.?

ZS: Global feminism is not a special type of feminism, separate from others. It’s the result of the world’s global economy, and enables women from different contexts to be connected and networked, and to learn from one another’s experience. As such, it should not focus exclusively on the predominantly liberal discourse on politics and economy of the West. It needs to be open and sensitive to the problems of women from third-world countries.

Feminism is obviously affected by the social and political realities of our respective societies and cultures. Feminism in the U.S., for example, differs greatly from feminism in a post-war, impoverished and ethically divided region like Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans, which suffer from injustice, oppression, exclusion and ethno-nationalist exploitation. It’s important to distinguish between the concepts of global feminism and what I would call liberal feminism.

While global feminism has improved women’s lives in terms of their rights to education, economic and reproductive rights, and freedom of movement, women outside of liberal societies continue to suffer other forms of oppression like racial, class and religious persecution. Liberal feminism might work for developed, stable Western societies and for women who enjoy economic independence and comfort, but it does not take into account the oppression of marginal groups.

I would say that the main ideas of feminism--a project of social justice and equality--are being betrayed. Some women built careers that benefitted from globalization and the corporate world. They became proponents of the meritocracy in patriarchal neoliberal political and business structures that made women preoccupied with competing in the existing neoliberal political and economic frameworks. Today in the Western world, feminist studies are focused on the themes of identity, sexuality and our bodies, while the key social justice questions remain outside of their horizons.

GN: What makes you optimistic about feminism in your country?

ZS: It’s hard to be an optimist in a country where everything is falling apart due to the ethno-national divisions that resulted from the war between 1992 and 1995. In that context, the women’s movement is fragmented and divided across ethno-national lines. 

The good news is that feminism is still alive and vibrant in various forms and resists ethno-national divisions. I think that feminists in Bosnia have done a great job: they provided a “safe space” to survivors of war traumas and torture in shelters and therapy centers; they did an incredible job building peace and reconciliation and re-building communities and relationships. They struggled hard to lay legal foundations for gender equality, anti-discrimination and protection from domestic violence. Women’s groups and organizations became a reference point on the civil scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the strongest voice for equality and justice.

Gender equality can no longer be avoided in any discussion regarding politics, business and even constitutional reforms.

GN: For you, what has been an important turning point for feminism in the last three years?

ZS: Particularly in 2014, feminism became part of the discussion in art, sports, business, politics, fashion, music and world media. Newspapers and broadcast companies brought us stories about celebrities and successful businesswomen and men who supported gender equality and feminism. 

It is important to see celebrities like Emma Watson, Daniel Radcliffe and Benedict Cumberbatch support feminism, to learn that a woman became chairperson of the United States Federal Reserve for the first time in history, or to celebrate Malala Yousafzai as a Nobel Prize winner. But we have not seen profound changes. 

These stories did not help women in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Ukraine or Bosnia, or women in Chile or Sudan to get more political and economic stability and prosperity. However, they certainly initiated a discussion about these issues, and reminded all of us that women still face discrimination, gender-based violence, human trafficking and glass ceilings in politics and business.

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Discussion of Feminist Movements Essay

The position and privileges offered to women in society have been the basis of the controversial movements to fight for women’s rights rather known as feminist movements. The feminist movements have been behind a sequence of political and social movements that champion the equal rights of women in all aspects of life. The aspect of feminist movements can be dated as early as the 1400s whereby famous authors such as Christine de Pizan championed equal economic, political, and social rights for women in the society through her writings (Andersen and Witham, 2011). The growth of the feminist movements has seen a sequence of waves that have been held more in institutions such as universities and political spaces. The grievances staged by the feminist movements have resulted in more women being enrolled in schools, the political arena, and even in male-dominated workspaces.

The feminist movements have presented an array of inequality and discrimination grievances against women in society since time immemorial. Among the issues that have been presented by the feminist movements include domestic violence, sexual harassment, economic inequality, body shaming, and female genital mutilation. Gender inequality in religious and political systems also are issues that have been presented by feminist movements.

Another social movement that is related to gender equality and women’s rights is the gender-based violence against women movements (Council of Europe Portal, 2022). The ancient society had been built using the patriarchal frames resulting in the society reducing the role of a woman in the society as a housewife only. Women were taken to be objects and as a sign of prestige which led to gender-based violence against women. Currently, women are experiencing forms of gender-based violence from toxic partners in unstable relationships. Nevertheless, the gender-based violence movements play a major role in ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice and are charged accordingly by the law.

Andersen, M., & Witham, H. D. (2011). Thinking about females: Sociological perspectives on sex and gender.

Council of Europe Portal. (2022). Feminism and Women’s Rights Movements . Gender Matters. Web.

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IvyPanda. (2023, May 11). Discussion of Feminist Movements. https://ivypanda.com/essays/discussion-of-feminist-movements/

"Discussion of Feminist Movements." IvyPanda , 11 May 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/discussion-of-feminist-movements/.

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IvyPanda . 2023. "Discussion of Feminist Movements." May 11, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/discussion-of-feminist-movements/.

1. IvyPanda . "Discussion of Feminist Movements." May 11, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/discussion-of-feminist-movements/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Discussion of Feminist Movements." May 11, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/discussion-of-feminist-movements/.

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277 Feminism Topics & Women’s Rights Essay Topics

18 January 2024

last updated

Feminism topics encompass a comprehensive range of themes centered on advocating for gender equality. These themes critically address the social, political, and economic injustices primarily faced by females, aiming to dismantle patriarchal norms. Feminism topics may span from intersectional feminism, which underscores the diverse experiences of women across various intersections of race, class, and sexuality, to reproductive rights that advocate for women’s bodily autonomy and healthcare accessibility. They also involve the examination of workplace discrimination through concepts, such as the gender wage gap and the glass ceiling. Violence against women, including work and domestic abuse, sexual assault, and harassment, is a hot aspect, providing many discussions. In turn, one may explore the representation of women in media, politics, and STEM fields. Explorations of gender roles, gender identity, and the significance of male feminism are integral parts of these discussions. As society continues to evolve, feminism topics persistently adapt to confront and address emerging forms of gender inequality.

Best Feminism & Women’s Rights Topics

• Achievements of Women in Politics: A Global Perspective
• Emphasizing Gender Equality in the 21st-Century Workplace
• Evolving Representation of Women in Media
• Fight for Women’s Voting Rights: The Historical Analysis
• Intersectionality: Examining its Role in Feminism
• Unpacking Feminism in Third-World Countries
• Dissecting Misogyny in Classical Literature
• Influence of Religion on Women’s Rights Worldwide
• Unveiling Bias in STEM Fields: Female Experiences
• Gender Pay Gap: Global Comparisons and Solutions
• Probing the Historical Evolution of Feminism
• Reshaping Beauty Standards Through Feminist Discourse
• Importance of Reproductive Rights in Women’s Health
• Exploring Women’s Role in Environmental Activism
• Glass Ceiling Phenomenon: Women in Corporate Leadership
• Trans Women’s Struggles in Feminist Movements
• Empowering Girls: The Role of Education
• Intersection of Race, Class, and Feminism
• Effects of Feminism on Modern Art
• Impacts of Social Media on Women’s Rights Movements
• Deconstructing Patriarchy in Traditional Societies
• Single Mothers’ Challenges: A Feminist Perspective
• Dynamics of Feminism in Post-Colonial Societies
• Queer Women’s Struggles for Recognition and Rights
• Women’s Contributions to Scientific Discovery: An Underrated History
• Cybersecurity: Ensuring Women’s Safety in the Digital Age
• Exploring the Misrepresentation of Feminism in Popular Culture
• Repositioning Sexuality: The Role of Feminism in Health Discourse
• Women’s Economic Empowerment: The Impact of Microfinance
• Investigating Sexism in Video Gaming Industry
• Female Leadership During Global Crises: Case Studies

Easy Feminism & Women’s Rights Topics

• Power of Women’s Protest: A Historical Study
• Feminist Movements’ Role in Shaping Public Policy
• Body Autonomy: A Key Aspect of Feminist Ideology
• Cyber Feminism: Women’s Rights in Digital Spaces
• Violence Against Women: International Legal Measures
• Feminist Pedagogy: Its Impact on Education
• Depiction of Women in Graphic Novels: A Feminist Lens
• Comparing Western and Eastern Feminist Movements
• Men’s Roles in Supporting Feminist Movements
• Impacts of Feminism on Marriage Institutions
• Rural Women’s Rights: Challenges and Progress
• Understanding Feminist Waves: From First to Fourth
• Inclusion of Women in Peace Negotiation Processes
• Influence of Feminism on Modern Advertising
• Indigenous Women’s Movements and Rights
• Reclaiming Public Spaces: Women’s Safety Concerns
• Roles of Feminist Literature in Social Change
• Women in Sports: Overcoming Stereotypes and Bias
• Feminism in the Context of Refugee Rights
• Media’s Roles in Shaping Feminist Narratives
• Women’s Rights in Prisons: An Overlooked Issue
• Motherhood Myths: A Feminist Examination
• Subverting the Male Gaze in Film and Television
• Feminist Critique of Traditional Masculinity Norms
• Rise of Female Entrepreneurship: A Feminist View
• Young Feminists: Shaping the Future of Women’s Rights

Interesting Feminism & Women’s Rights Topics

• Roles of Feminism in Promoting Mental Health Awareness
• Aging and Women’s Rights: An Overlooked Dimension
• Feminist Perspectives on Climate Change Impacts
• Women’s Rights in Military Service: Progress and Challenges
• Achieving Gender Parity in Academic Publishing
• Feminist Jurisprudence: Its Impact on Legal Structures
• Masculinity in Crisis: Understanding the Feminist Perspective
• Fashion Industry’s Evolution through Feminist Ideals
• Unheard Stories: Women in the Global Space Race
• Effects of Migration on Women’s Rights and Opportunities
• Women’s Land Rights: A Global Issue
• Intersection of Feminism and Disability Rights
• Portrayal of Women in Science Fiction: A Feminist Review
• Analyzing Post-Feminism: Its Origins and Implications
• Cyberbullying and Its Impact on Women: Measures for Protection
• Unveiling Gender Bias in Artificial Intelligence
• Reimagining Domestic Work Through the Lens of Feminism
• Black Women’s Hair Politics: A Feminist Perspective
• Feminist Ethical Considerations in Biomedical Research
• Promoting Gender Sensitivity in Children’s Literature
• Understanding the Phenomenon of Toxic Femininity
• Reconsidering Women’s Rights in the Context of Climate Migration
• Advancing Women’s Participation in Political Activism

Feminism Argumentative Essay Topics

• Intersectionality’s Impact on Modern Feminism
• Evolution of Feminist Thought: From First-Wave to Fourth-Wave
• Gender Wage Gap: Myths and Realities
• Workplace Discrimination: Tackling Unconscious Bias
• Feminist Theory’s Influence on Contemporary Art
• Intersection of Feminism and Environmental Activism
• Men’s Roles in the Feminist Movement
• Objectification in Media: A Feminist Perspective
• Misconceptions about Feminism: Addressing Stereotypes
• Feminism in the Classroom: The Role of Education
• Feminist Analysis of Reproductive Rights Policies
• Transgender Rights: An Extension of Feminism
• Intersection of Feminism and Racial Justice
• Body Shaming Culture: A Feminist Viewpoint
• Feminism’s Influence on Modern Advertising
• Patriarchy and Religion: A Feminist Critique
• Domestic Labor: Feminist Perspectives on Unpaid Work
• Sexism in Sports: The Need for Feminist Intervention
• The MeToo Movement’s Influence on Modern Feminism
• Feminism and the Fight for Equal Representation in Politics
• Women’s Rights in the Digital Age: A Feminist Examination
• Feminist Critique of Traditional Beauty Standards
• Globalization and Its Effects on Women’s Rights
• The Role of Feminism in LGBTQ+ Rights Advocacy
• Popular Culture and Its Reflection on Feminist Values

Controversial Feminist Research Paper Topics

• Intersectionality in Modern Feminist Movements: An Analysis
• Representation of Women in High-Powered Political Roles
• Cultural Appropriation Within the Feminist Movement: An Inquiry
• The Role of Feminism in Defining Beauty Standards
• Women’s Reproductive Rights: A Debate of Autonomy
• Feminism and Religion: The Question of Compatibility
• Male Allies in the Feminist Movement: An Evaluation
• Shift in Traditional Gender Roles: Feminist Perspective
• Impacts of Media on Perceptions of Feminism
• Dissecting the Wage Gap: A Feminist Examination
• Menstrual Equity: A Battle for Feminist Activists
• Feminism in Popular Music: Power or Appropriation?
• Climate Change: The Unseen Feminist Issue
• Education’s Role in Shaping Feminist Beliefs
• Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A Feminist Scrutiny
• Cyber-Feminism: Harnessing Digital Spaces for Activism
• Healthcare Disparities Faced by Women: An Analysis
• Transgender Women in Feminist Discourse: An Exploration
• Feminist Perspectives on Monogamy and Polyamory
• Feminist Analysis of Modern Advertising Campaigns
• Exploring Sexism in the Film Industry through a Feminist Lens
• Debunking Myths Surrounding the Feminist Movement
• Childcare Responsibilities and Their Feminist Implications
• Women’s Sports: Evaluating Equity and Feminist Advocacy

Feminist Research Paper Topics in Feminism Studies

• Evaluating Feminist Theories: From Radical to Liberal
• Women’s Health Care: Policies and Disparities
• Maternal Mortality: A Global Women’s Rights Issue
• Uncovering Sexism in the Tech Industry
• Critique of Binary Gender Roles in Children’s Toys
• Body Positivity Movement’s Influence on Feminism
• Relevance of Feminism in the Fight Against Human Trafficking
• Women in Coding: Breaking Stereotypes
• The Role of Women in Sustainable Agriculture
• Feminism in the Cosmetics Industry: A Dual-Edged Sword
• The Influence of Feminism on Modern Architecture
• Bridging the Gap: Women in Higher Education Leadership
• The Role of Feminism in Advancing LGBTQ+ Rights
• Menstrual Equity: A Key Women’s Rights Issue
• Women in Classical Music: Breaking Barriers
• Analyzing Gendered Language: A Feminist Approach
• Women’s Rights and Humanitarian Aid: The Interconnection
• Exploring the Role of Women in Graphic Design
• Addressing the Lack of Women in Venture Capitalism
• Impact of Feminism on Urban Planning and Design
• Maternal Labor in the Informal Economy: A Feminist Analysis
• Feminism’s Influence on Modern Dance Forms
• Exploring the Role of Women in the Renewable Energy Sector
• Women in Esports: An Emerging Frontier
• Child Marriage: A Grave Violation of Women’s Rights

Feminist Topics for Discussion

• Feminist Criticism of the Fashion Modelling Industry
• Domestic Violence: Feminist Legal Responses
• Analyzing the Success of Women-Only Workspaces
• Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Human Rights Issue
• Women’s Role in the Evolution of Cryptocurrency
• Women and the Right to Water: A Feminist Perspective
• Gender Stereotypes in Comedy: A Feminist View
• Intersection of Animal Rights and Feminist Theory
• Roles of Feminism in the Fight Against Child Labor
• Representation of Women in Folklore and Mythology
• Women’s Rights in the Gig Economy: Issues and Solutions
• Revisiting Feminism in Post-Soviet Countries
• Women in the Space Industry: Present Status and Future Trends
• The Influence of Feminism on Culinary Arts
• Unraveling the Impact of Fast Fashion on Women Workers
• Feminist Perspectives on Genetic Engineering and Reproduction
• Assessing the Progress of Women’s Financial Literacy
• Sex Work and Feminism: A Controversial Discourse
• Women in Cybernetics: An Untapped Potential
• Uncovering the Women Behind Major Historical Events
• The Impact of the #MeToo Movement Globally
• Women’s Rights in the Cannabis Industry: Challenges and Progress
• Redefining Motherhood: The Intersection of Feminism and Adoption
• Roles of Feminist Movements in Combatting Child Abuse

Women’s Rights Essay Topics for Feminism

• Evolution of Women’s Rights in the 20th Century
• Roles of Women in World War II: Catalyst for Change
• Suffrage Movement: Driving Force Behind Women’s Empowerment
• Cultural Differences in Women’s Rights: A Comparative Study
• Feminist Movements and Their Global Impact
• Women’s Rights in Islamic Societies: Perceptions and Realities
• Glass Ceiling Phenomenon: Analysis and Impacts
• Pioneering Women in Science: Trailblazers for Equality
• Impacts of Media Portrayal on Women’s Rights
• Economic Autonomy for Women: Pathway to Empowerment
• Women’s Rights in Education: Global Perspective
• Gender Equality in Politics: Global Progress
• Intersectionality and Women’s Rights: Race, Class, and Gender
• Legal Milestones in Women’s Rights History
• Inequities in Healthcare: A Women’s Rights Issue
• Modern-Day Slavery: Women and Human Trafficking
• Climate Change: A Unique Threat to Women’s Rights
• Body Autonomy and Reproductive Rights: A Feminist Analysis
• Globalization’s Effect on Women’s Rights: Opportunities and Threats
• Gender Violence: An Erosion of Women’s Rights
• Indigenous Women’s Rights: Struggles and Triumphs
• Women’s Rights Activists: Unsung Heroes of History
• Empowerment Through Sports: Women’s Struggle and Success
• Balancing Act: Motherhood and Career in the 21st Century
• LGBTQ+ Women: Rights and Recognition in Different Societies

Women’s Rights Research Questions

• Evolution of Feminism: How Has the Movement Shifted Over Time?
• The Workplace and Gender Equality: How Effective Are Current Measures?
• Intersectionality’s Influence: How Does It Shape Women’s Rights Advocacy?
• Reproductive Rights: What Is the Global Impact on Women’s Health?
• Media Representation: Does It Affect Women’s Rights Perception?
• Gender Stereotypes: How Do They Impede Women’s Empowerment?
• Global Disparities: Why Do Women’s Rights Vary So Widely?
• Maternal Mortality: How Does It Reflect on Women’s Healthcare Rights?
• Education for Girls: How Does It Contribute to Gender Equality?
• Cultural Norms: How Do They Influence Women’s Rights?
• Leadership Roles: Are Women Adequately Represented in Positions of Power?
• Domestic Violence Laws: Are They Sufficient to Protect Women’s Rights?
• Roles of Technology: How Does It Impact Women’s Rights?
• Sexual Harassment Policies: How Effective Are They in Protecting Women?
• Pay Equity: How Can It Be Ensured for Women Globally?
• Politics and Gender: How Does Women’s Representation Shape Policy-Making?
• Child Marriage: How Does It Violate Girls’ Rights?
• Climate Change: How Does It Disproportionately Affect Women?
• Trafficking Scourge: How Can Women’s Rights Combat This Issue?
• Female Genital Mutilation: How Does It Contradict Women’s Rights?
• Armed Conflicts: How Do They Impact Women’s Rights?
• Body Autonomy: How Can It Be Safeguarded for Women?
• Women’s Suffrage: How Did It Pave the Way for Modern Women’s Rights?
• Men’s Role: How Can They Contribute to Women’s Rights Advocacy?
• Legal Frameworks: How Do They Support or Hinder Women’s Rights?

History of Women’s Rights Topics

• Emergence of Feminism in the 19th Century
• Roles of Women in the Abolitionist Movement
• Suffragette Movements: Triumphs and Challenges
• Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Advocacy for Women’s Rights
• Impacts of World War II on Women’s Liberation
• Radical Feminism in the 1960s and 1970s
• Pioneering Women in Politics: The First Female Senators
• Inception of the Equal Rights Amendment
• Revolutionary Women’s Health Activism
• Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Roe vs. Wade
• Birth of the Women’s Liberation Movement
• Challenges Women Faced in the Civil Rights Movement
• Women’s Roles in the Trade Union Movement
• Intersectionality and Feminism: Examining the Role of Women of Color
• How Did the Women’s Rights Movement Impact Education?
• Sexuality, Identity, and Feminism: Stonewall Riots’ Impact
• Influence of Religion on Women’s Rights Activism
• Women’s Empowerment: The UN Conferences
• Impact of Globalization on Women’s Rights
• Women’s Movements in Non-Western Countries
• Women in Space: The Fight for Equality in NASA
• Achievements of Feminist Literature and Arts
• Evolution of the Women’s Sports Movement
• Advancement of Women’s Rights in the Digital Age
• Cultural Shifts: The Media’s Role in Promoting Women’s Rights

Feminism Essay Topics on Women’s Issues

• Career Challenges: The Gender Wage Gap in Contemporary Society
• Examining Microfinance: An Empowering Tool for Women in Developing Countries
• Pioneers of Change: The Role of Women in the Space Industry
• Exploring Beauty Standards: An Analysis of Global Perspectives
• Impacts of Legislation: Progress in Women’s Health Policies
• Maternity Leave Policies: A Comparative Study of Different Countries
• Resilience Through Struggles: The Plight of Female Refugees
• Technology’s Influence: Addressing the Digital Gender Divide
• Dissecting Stereotypes: Gender Roles in Children’s Media
• Influence of Female Leaders: A Look at Political Empowerment
• Social Media and Women: Effects on Mental Health
• Understanding Intersectionality: The Complexity of Women’s Rights
• Single Mothers: Balancing Parenthood and Economic Challenges
• Gaining Ground in Sports: A Look at Female Athletes’ Struggles
• Maternal Mortality: The Hidden Health Crisis
• Reproductive Rights: Women’s Control Over Their Bodies
• Feminism in Literature: Portrayal of Women in Classic Novels
• Deconstructing Patriarchy: The Impact of Gender Inequality
• Body Autonomy: The Battle for Abortion Rights
• Women in STEM: Barriers and Breakthroughs
• Female Soldiers: Their Role in Military Conflicts
• Human Trafficking: The Disproportionate Impact on Women
• Silent Victims: Domestic Violence and Women’s Health

To Learn More, Read Relevant Articles

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✍️Essay on Feminism for Students: Samples 150, 250 Words

• Updated on  
• Nov 2, 2023

In a society, men and women should be considered equal in every aspect. This thought is advocated by a social and political movement i.e. feminism . The word feminism was coined by the French Philosopher Charles Fourier in 1837. He was known for his strong belief in equal rights for women as men in every sector, be it the right to vote, right to work, right to decide, right to participate in public life, right to own property, etc. Feminism advocates the rights of women with respect to the equality of gender . There are different types of feminism i.e. liberal, radical, Marxist, cultural, and eco-feminism. Stay tuned and have a look at the following sample essay on feminism!

Also Read: Popular Struggles and Movements

Essay on Feminism 150 Words

India is a land of diversity of which 52.2% are women as per an estimate for the year 2023. This doesn’t mean that every woman is getting basic fundamental rights in society. We should not neglect the rights of women and treat them as a weaker sex. Women are equally strong and capable as men. To advocate this thought a movement called Feminism came into existence in 1837. Feminism is a movement that advocates the equality of women in social, political, and economic areas. 

India is up eight notches in #WorldEconomicForum ’s annual gender ranking. And Iceland is #1 for women, again, for the 14th year in a row. @namitabhandare ’s newsletter, #HTMindtheGap looks at why. Plus the week’s other gender stories https://t.co/9Fen6TaEnb Subscribe here… pic.twitter.com/r6XfFMINO0 — Hindustan Times (@htTweets) June 25, 2023

Traditionally, women were believed to stay at home and there were severe restrictions imposed on them. They were not allowed to go out, study, work, vote, own property, etc. However, with the passage of time, people are becoming aware of the objective of feminism. Any person who supports feminism and is a proponent of equal human rights for women is considered a feminist. 

Feminism is a challenge to the patriarchal systems existing in society. Despite this strong movement burning in high flames to burn the orthodox and dominant culture, there are still some parts of the world that are facing gender inequality. So, it is our duty to make a world free of any discrimination. 

Essay on Feminism 250 Words

Talking about feminism in a broader sense, then, it is not restricted only to women. It refers to the equality of every sex or gender. Some people feel offended by the concept of feminism as they take it in the wrong way. There is a misconception that only women are feminists. But this is not the case. Feminists can be anyone who supports the noble cause of supporting the concept of providing equal rights to women.

Feminism is not restricted to single-sex i.e. women, but it advocates for every person irrespective of caste, creed, colour, sex, or gender. As an individual, it is our duty to help every person achieve equal status in society and eradicate any kind of gender discrimination . 

Equality helps people to live freely without any traditional restrictions. At present, the Government of India is also contributing to providing equal rights to the female sector through various Government schemes like Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Pradhan Mantri Mahila Shakti Kendra, One Stop Center, and many more. 

Apart from these Government policies, campaigns like reproductive rights or abortion of unwanted pregnancy also give women the right to choose and lead their life without any external authority of a male. 

Feminism has also supported the LGBTIQA+ community so that people belonging to this community could come out and reveal their identity without any shame. The concept of feminism also helped them to ask for equal rights as men and women. Thus, it could be concluded that feminism is for all genders and a true feminist will support every person to achieve equal rights and hold a respectable position in society.

Check Out: Women Equality Day

Also Read: National Safe Motherhood Day

Relevant Blogs

Feminism is a movement which has gained momentum to advocate against gender discrimination. It supports the thought that women should get equal rights as men in society.

The five main principles of feminism are gender equality, elimination of sex discrimination, speaking against sexual violence against women, increasing human choice and promoting sexual freedom.

The main point of feminism is that there should be collective efforts to end sexism and raise our voices against female sex exploitation. It is crucial to attain complete gender equality and remove any restrictions on the female sex.

For more information on such interesting topics, visit our essay writing page and follow Leverage Edu .

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380 Powerful Women’s Rights & Feminism Topics [2024]

Are you looking for perfect feminist topics? Then you’ve come to the right place. With our help, you can be sure to craft a great essay. Here, you can find feminist topics for discussion, feminism research topics and other ideas and questions for students.

Our specialists will write a custom essay specially for you!

Some people think all feminists hate men. It couldn’t be further from the truth! Feminists are people of all genders who believe that they are socially and politically equal. Thanks to their achievements, women’s rights around the world are progressing.

If you want to contribute to the discussion, this article has what you need. Here, our custom writing experts compiled:

• Creative feminism topics for your paper,
• Tips to help you pick the perfect topic.

Let’s dive right in!

🔝 Top 10 Feminism Essay Topics

• ✅ How to Choose a Topic

⚖️ Top 10 Women’s Rights Essay Topics

🔬 top 10 feminism research topics.

• 📜 Women’s Rights History Topics
• 💪👩 Feminism Topics
• 📚 Feminist Theory
• 👩‍💻 Women Empowerment
• 👩‍🎓 Women’s Studies
• 🏥 Abortion Topics
• 🙅‍♀️ Domestic Violence

🔍 References

• The 4 waves of feminism
• Liberal vs. radical feminism
• What is feminist psychology?
• Feminist views on trans rights
• Why ecofeminism is important
• How has feminism changed culture?
• Feminism interactions with socialism
• The effects of liberal feminism on the society
• Civil rights movement’s influence on feminism
• The main proponents of feminist standpoint theory

✅ How to Choose a Feminism Topic

Picking the right topic is a crucial first step for any assignment. Check out these tips for a little starting help:

• Formulate your topic as a question , such as “What makes Alice Schwarzer a controversial feminist figure?” This trick will help you clearly determine what your essay will be about.
• Compile a keyword list . Once you have a general idea of what you want to work on, think of related words and phrases. For example, if our area of interest is “ Feminism in America , ” some of our keywords might be women’s suffrage movement , Fifteenth Amendment, birth control . You can use them to outline your research.
• A concept map can be a helpful brainstorming tool to organize your ideas. Put your area of interest (for instance, women empowerment ) in a circle in the middle. Write all related concepts around it, and connect them with lines.
• Stay clear from overused themes . Writing on popular subjects might be tempting. But can you offer a unique perspective on the issue? Choose such topics only if your answer is “yes.”
• Make sure there is enough information available . Sure, an essay on the role of women in 17th century Tongan culture sounds exciting. Unfortunately, finding good sources on this topic might prove difficult. You can refer to subjects of this kind if you’re researching a thesis or a dissertation.

Now you’re ready to find your perfect topic. Keep reading and let one of our exciting suggestions inspire you.

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• Gender bias in driving
• Girls’ education in Afghanistan
• Women’s political rights in Syria
• Women’s land ownership rights
• Overincarceration of women in the US
• Resettlement of women refugees: risks
• Abortion rights in conservative countries
• Reproductive rights and HIV among women
• Honor killings as women’s rights violation
• Access to cervical cancer prevention for women of color
• Gender equity vs. gender equality
• Adverse effects of child marriage
• #Metoo movement’s impact on society
• Environmental crisis as a feminist issue
• The importance of women’s education
• Is gender equality a social justice issue?
• Why is teen pregnancy dangerous?
• How can gender biases be lessened?
• Ethics of artificial reproductive technologies
• Legacy of women’s suffrage movement

📜 History of Women’s Rights Topics

The history of women’s rights in America is long and full of struggles. The US is still far from having achieved complete equality. And in many developing countries, the situation is even worse. If you’re interested in the feminist movements and activists who paved the way thus far, this section is for you.

• The role of women in the first American settlements.
• Why weren’t women allowed to serve in combat positions in the US army until 2013?
• What happened at the Seneca Falls Convention?
• Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Women’s Suffrage in America.
• Discuss the impact of Sojourner Truth’s Ain’t I a Woman? speech.
• Explore gender equality in 20th century Britain.
• Trace the timeline of events that led to the 19th amendment.
• Why was the invention of the pill a milestone in the fight for equal rights ?
• The legacy of Amelia Earhart.
• What was The Bitch Manifesto ?
• Outline the history of women in American politics .
• The role of women in the Civil Rights Movement.
• How did the Comstock Laws affect the struggle for women’s rights?
• How did Ruth Bader Ginsburg fight against gender discrimination in the US?
• In what ways did the introduction of Islamic law improve women’s rights in Arabia?
• Artemisia Gentileschi: forerunner of feminism.
• In 2016, the first female president was nominated by a major US party. Why did it take so long?
• Explore the origins of witch trials in Europe.
• What did Molly Dewson achieve?
• The history of women’s rights in Russia vs. England.
• How did WWI influence the fight for equal rights ?
• What were the goals of the Women’s Trade Union League?
• The effects of the Equal Pay Act.

• Study the connection between women’s health and rights throughout history. 
• When did women receive the right to own property in America? Why was it important? 
• Debate the role of women in history of theater.  
• In the past, Russia was one of the first European countries to introduce women’s suffrage . In 2016, it decriminalized domestic violence. What led to this change? 
• Women in the workforce: the long road towards workplace equality . 
• Minna Canth: the history of women’s rights activism in Finland. 
• Who were “The Famous Five”? 
• Why was Japan quicker to enact equality laws than its European counterparts? 
• The role and visibility of women writers in the 19th century. 
• What problems did the National Organization for Women face? 
• Discuss the foundation and impact of the Redstockings. Did they reflect the general attitude of women towards liberation at the time? 
• Who or what was responsible for the failure of the ERA ? 
• The role of women in Ancient Greek communities.  
• Alice Paul and the Silent Sentinels: how did they contribute to establishing the right to vote for women? 
• Why was Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique critical to the progress of feminism in the 20th century? 
• The presidential candidacy of Victoria Woodhull. 
• What was the purpose of the Hull House? How did it advance women’s rights? 
• Why did Elizabeth Cady Stanton oppose the Fifteenth Amendment? 
• Lucy Stone’s influence on the abolitionist and women’s rights movements . 
• Discuss the significance of literature for the success of the suffragist movement in America. 
• Slavery: compare women’s and men’s narratives.  
• How Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s speeches and poetry changed the world. 
• Emmeline Pankhurst as the central figure of the UK’s suffragette movement. 
• Why did it take so long for suffragette movements around the globe to gain traction? 
• From a historical perspective, why weren’t women’s rights the same as human rights? 
• Trace the development of women liberation in Morocco. 
• Investigate the founding of women’s day. 

👩👍 Feminism Topics to Research

Feminism is a global phenomenon. That’s why it’s not surprising that the term has many definitions. What to consider sexism? What can we do about it? How important is the concept of gender? Those are central questions feminists around the world seek to answer. Feminism’s areas of study include politics, sociology, and economics.

• Compare feminist issues on a global scale.
• What distinguishes radical feminists from liberal ones?
• Black feminism: is it a separate movement?
• When does “being a gentleman” become sexist?
• Is feminism always anti-racist?
• What do we need gender concepts for?
• Feminism oppression in Islamic countries.
• How do gender stereotypes form in children?
• Why are societies around the globe still struggling to achieve full equality?
• The effects of gender-oriented politics.
• Can men be feminists? (Consider Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s We Should All Be Feminists )
• How did the patriarchy develop?
• Would a matriarchal society be more peaceful than a patriarchal one? Draw your conclusions from real-life examples.
• Compare and contrast Judith Butler and Alice Schwarzer.
• Effectiveness of provocative methods in feminism.
• What’s the problem with unisex bathrooms in restaurants and bars?
• Discuss the prejudice transgender people face. What should we do about it?
• Why are reproductive rights a crucial issue on the way to equality?
• Describe various types of feminism.
• How can hairstyle function as a political statement?
• Which feminist movements are most prevalent in Asia?
• Trace the history of feminist ethics.
• What’s the “pink tax,” and why should it be abolished?
• Discuss Audre Lorde’s feminism.
• How does feminist research methodology influence education?
• Sexism in advertising : why is it still a problem?
• What are the goals of Girls Who Code?
• The role of literacy politics in achieving gender equality .
• Stay at home moms: are they a step back on the feminist agenda?
• Explore the origins of color-coding pink and blue as girl and boy colors, respectively.
• Are beauty pageants harmful to women’s positive body image?
• The problem of ableism in intersectional feminist movements.
• What is identity politics , and why is it important?
• New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, recently introduced her new cabinet. Of the 20 people who serve in it, eight are women, five Maori, three belong to the minority Pasifika, and three are queer. Is it what all future cabinets should strive for?
• What makes racism a feminist issue?
• Describe how objectification works and why it is harmful.
• A history of women inventors who didn’t get credit for their innovations.
• Female circumcision as an example of women’s oppression disguised as a cultural tradition.
• The infantilization of women: origins and effects.

• Define how feminism influences science.
• How does one avoid gender bias when raising a child?
• What popular ideas about feminism are myths?
• Gender inequality in politics of India and Iran .
• What is the definition of ecofeminism? Describe its merits.
• How do men benefit from feminism?
• Why do we need gender equality in language?
• Problems of reconciling religion and the LGBTQ community.
• More and more fitness clubs introduce “women’s hours.” Some bars are only open for women. They claim to do this to create safe spaces. What’s your position on this development?
• Anti-feminism: is it a movement for the far-right?
• The impact of #metoo on work culture.

📚 Feminist Theory Topics to Look Into

Feminist theory criticizes how culture perpetuates misogyny. The best way to look at it is to divide feminism into three waves:

• First-wave feminism (the late 1700s – early 1900s). It includes the women’s suffrage movement.
• Second-wave feminism (the 1960s – ’70s.) Key points are equal working conditions and feminist political activism.
• Third-wave feminism (1990s – today). It encompasses not only women but all marginalized groups.

Take a look at culture from a feminist perspective with our topics:

• Discuss the concept of feminism in Barbie Doll by Marge Piercy.
• Explain the success of Gillian Armstrong’s Little Women.
• What inequalities between men and women does Mary Wollstonecraft mention in A Vindication of the Rights of Women ?
• Masculinity and femininity in William Somerset Maugham’s Of Human Bondage.
• An existentialist view: how Simone de Beauvoir influenced the feminist discourse.
• The role of women in Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Americanah.
• Discuss the power dynamics between men and women in the Terminator series.
• How does rap music perpetuate traditional concepts of masculinity ?
• Daisy’s character in The Great Gatsby through a feminist lens.
• Write about the depiction of women and the patriarchy in Mad Men.
• What distinguishes the third wave of feminism from the other two?
• Women’s history and media in Susan Douglas’ Where the Girls Are .
• What is the goal of gynocriticism?
• Possibilities of sisterhood in Hulu’s TV show A Handmaid’s Tale .
• Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar : where does Esther Greenwood see her place in society?
• Early feminist perspectives in Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own.
• Compare and contrast how the characters in Mulan react to the protagonist as a woman vs. a man.
• Life stages of women in Alfonso Cuarón’s Roma .
• Why were feminists unhappy about Prado’s exhibition Uninvited Guests ?
• Sexuality and society in Céline Sciamma’s Portrait of a Lady on Fire .
• Gender expectations in The Little Mermaid .
• Feminist concepts and issues in Netflix’s Thirteen Reasons Why .
• Challenging traditional femininity: independence and rebellion in Thelma and Louise.
• The target audience of Mad Max: Fury Road is stated as male. Yet, the central character of the film Furiosa is a strong rebel woman. Does this make it a feminist movie?
• Persepolis : what it means to grow up as a liberal woman in Iran.
• Blockbuster movies have an enormous reach. Does it obligate them to support feminist issues?
• Marjorie Liu’s Monstress : what does it tell us about feminism?
• The Berlin Film Festival announced that they would no longer crown the best actor and actress. Instead, they honor the best performance in either a leading or supporting role. What are the consequences of this?
• What does it mean to criticize an art piece from a feminist point of view?
• Compare and contrast the portrayal of female characters in horror genre throughout the years.
• Analyze Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto . Why does the author use the cyborg metaphor? What arguments does it help bring across?
• How do black women characters in Toni Morrison’s novels experience society?
• What makes various awards an important instrument of feminism?
• Analyze Katniss Everdeen archetype in Hunger Games.
• Many classic children’s stories include outdated depictions of women and people of color. Because of this, some people are demanding to ban or censor them. Do you think this is the right way to tackle the problem?
• What does the term “male gaze” mean, and why is it a problem?
• The role of the body in feminist aesthetics.
• Discuss the impact of women philosophers on renowned male scholars of their time.
• What distinguishes feminist art from other art forms?
• Debate the political dimension of using women in body art.
• Does the message in Lemonade make Beyoncé a feminist icon?
• Why are misogynist song lyrics still widely accepted?
• How did Aretha Franklin’s music impact the Civil Rights Movement in America?
• Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray from a queer theoretical perspective.
• Objectification in film: analyzing Rachel’s character in The Dark Knight.
• Investigate the Star Wars’ representation problem. How did the franchise develop into a battleground for diversity?
• Misogynist vs. psycho: feminist aspects of David Fincher’s Gone Girl.
• Was the diversity in Spider-Man: Into the Spider-Verse a good thing?
• The cultural significance of strong female characters.
• Examine the concept of femininity in William Golding’s Lord of the Flies.

👩‍💻 Women Empowerment Topics to Write About

Women were excluded from crucial work areas such as the military and politics for a long time. This situation is changing now. Empowerment programs encourage women to seek professions in typically male-dominated areas. Do you want to research ways of increasing women’s control over their choices? Check out the following topics:

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• Joan of Arc as a leadership idol.
• The role of She Should Run in encouraging women to run for political positions.
• What should we do about higher education barriers for African American women?
• Examine current trends in female empowerment .
• Importance of the women’s empowerment principles.

• How can businesses use the Gender Gap Analysis Tool to promote equality in their companies?
• Why is there such a big gap between committing to advancing equality and corporate efforts to implement women’s empowerment programs?
• What business practices need to change so that men and women benefit from work programs equally?
• Analyse the reasons behind poor body image among young women.
• How does the transition from cash to digital payrolls help empower women in developing countries?
• What challenges do large companies face when it comes to gender equality ?
• How does making fashion a circular economy impact women?
• Discuss what everyone can do to empower the women in their community.
• Why is it important to demand fair pay?
• The impact of Reese Witherspoon’s media company Hello Sunshine.
• What does it mean to be empowered?
• The influence of climate change on gender equality.
• Women in leadership positions: the rhetoric and the reality.
• Social stigma and family planning: the work of HER project in Kenya.
• CARE: why providing women with access to clean water is crucial for empowerment.
• How do you teach a girl that she can make a difference?
• Achievements of the global Women Deliver Conferences.
• How does Pro-Mujer help underprivileged women in Latin America?
• Why is workplace health a particular concern for women empowerment?
• What can businesses do to bridge the financial inclusion gender gap?
• Debate how strengthening women’s social position helps fight discrimination against all kinds of marginalized groups.
• Analyze the various benefits of women empowerment.
• Fighting gender stereotypes in the 21st century.
• The connection between a lack of women in politics and missing programs to support marginalized groups.
• What are patriarchal taboos that keep women from seeking power?
• How can a gender perspective on resilience activities assist businesses in finding ways to combat climate change?
• What methods does the #WithHer movement use to raise awareness of violence against women?
• The Spotlight Initiative: training sex workers to escape violence in Haiti.
• Define the gender digital divide.
• What’s the problem with the female gendering of AI assistants?
• Criticize the Gender Empowerment Measure.
• What role does the internet play in empowering girls?
• Compare the Gender Parity Index in the US and South Africa.
• How is Every Mother Counts working to decrease deaths related to pregnancies?
• Debate the reliability of the Gender Development Index.
• Child Marriage : the impact of Girls Not Brides.
• What are the political and social constraints that hamper women’s empowerment in Nigeria?
• How can you encourage women to give public speeches ?
• How does e-learning help women worldwide gain independence?
• Explore the influence of the women’s rights movement on anti-descrimination activities.
• Challenges of women business in Mauritius.
• Labibah Hashim as an inspirational figure for women empowerment in Lebanon.
• How did Malaka Saad’s magazine al-Jens al-Latif inspire women to educate themselves in the Arab world?
• The development of sexual harassment policies in East Africa.
• How does microfinance in South America help women to start businesses?

👩‍🎓 Interesting Women’s Studies Topics for an Essay

Women’s or gender studies is an interdisciplinary science. It combines research from many fields, such as economics, psychology, and the natural sciences. Key aspects are women’s experiences and cultural as well as social constructs surrounding gender.

• What is velvet rope discrimination?
• The IT sphere is comparatively modern. Why does it still have such a gender gap problem?
• Is paid maternity/ paternity leave a fundamental right for workers?
• How do we break the glass ceiling in today’s society?
• Discussing social taboos: postnatal depression.
• Women in religion: why shouldn’t women be priestesses?
• The queer of color critique: history and theory.
• Should feminists be against supporting care policies?
• Does foreign aid benefit women entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa?
• Gender bias in criminal justice.
• What does legalized prostitution mean for sex workers?
• Does “stealthing” make otherwise consensual sex nonconsensual? Should this practice have legal consequences?
• The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks : a gendered analysis.
• Rojava: give an overview of the egalitarian feminist society.
• The role of women in modern nation-building processes.
• How do we include transgender athletes into sex-segregated competitive sports?
• Discuss the significance of gender in the euthanasia debate .
• Chivalry and capital punishment : why are women who commit murders less likely to be sentenced to death?
• Why do men have less confidence in women’s abilities than in men’s?
• Are hijabs always a symbol of oppression?
• Write about the role of feminism in international relations.
• Universal basic income: changing perspectives for women.
• Gamergate: what does it tell us about some men’s view on the video game industry?
• Discuss the social construction of gender roles.
• What is benevolent sexism, and why is it a problem?
• The military seems to be especially notorious when it comes to discriminating against LGBT people. Where might this originate from?
• Many army officers don’t hide that they don’t want women to serve. Why do women still do it? Why should they?
• The Eurovision Song Contest gave drag queen Conchita Wurst an enormous audience. How did she use this opportunity?
• Why are men who wear typically female clothing stigmatized?
• How have The Guerilla Girls shaped the art world in the past 30 years?
• Healthcare: what challenges do transgender patients face?
• Femme invisibility: discrimination inside the LGBT community.
• How did the idea develop that gay men and lesbians have to act and look a certain way to be considered queer?
• The history of sodomy laws in the US.
• “The Squad” as an example of the current success of left-wing women in politics.
• Should women use their attractiveness to get what they want?
• Are the careers of women scientists more affected by turmoil than those of their male counterparts?

• Do children’s toys restrict gender criteria?
• Many drugs are only tested on male subjects. How does this affect women?
• Enumerate some qualities that are seen as positive in men and negative in women. Why do you think this happens?
• Discuss the significance of the “Transgender Tipping Point.”
• The meaning of “home” and home spaces for women over the centuries.
• How do gender issues influence lawmaking?
• Analyze queer narratives from post-soviet states. How do gender norms in these countries differ from those in your community?
• Transgender representation in media: views of Viviane Namaste and Julia Serano.
• Nuclear power between politics and culture: a feminist perspective.
• Women guards in national socialist concentration camps.
• What reasons do women have for sex tourism ?
• The problem of eurocentrism in European education.
• Explore the connection between citizenship and race.

🏥 Abortion Topics to Research

For some, abortion is a fundamental healthcare right. Others view it as a criminal act. Many conservative governments continue to restrict the access to this procedure. Because of this discrepancy, abortion remains a fiercely debated topic all around the globe. Consider one of these thought-provoking ideas:

• Why was Roe v. Wade such a landmark decision?
• Discuss why some CEOs step up against abortion bans .
• Abortion in transgender and intersex people.
• From a biological point of view, when does life begin?
• What signs should indicate that it is too late to terminate the pregnancy?
• Who influenced the abortion debate before Roe v. Wade?
• Is abortion morally wrong? If so, does that mean it’s always impermissible?
• Under what circumstances is terminating a life justified?
• Who or what defines if a being has the right to life or not?
• Analyse the access to abortion clinics as a policy issue.
• Reproductive rights and medical access in Sub-Saharan Africa.
• People terminate pregnancies, whether it’s illegal or not. Why would one still outlaw abortions?
• Investigate the occurrence of forced abortions during China’s one-child policy .
• Is the fetus’ right to life more important than the mother’s right to have control over her body?
• What rights are more essential than the right to life?
• Discuss women’s health as their integral right.
• Should there be restrictions on abortions?
• Can better access to contraceptives reduce the number of abortions?
• At what point does a fetus become a human being?
• Is selective abortion ethical?
• Germany’s paragraph 219a prohibits the display of information on abortion services. In 2019, the government decided to revise it, and now patients can consult a list provided by the department for health education. Is this compromise enough?
• What is the moral status of a human embryo?
• Should pregnancy terminations be free for low-income women?
• Is the criminalization of abortion discrimination?
• The social and psychological impact of pregnancy terminations on families.
• Should the man have a say in whether the woman has an abortion or not?
• What non-religious persuasive arguments against abortion are there?
• Are there good and bad reasons for ending a pregnancy?
• Should it be required for teenagers to have their parents’ consent for the abortion procedure?
• Examine the arguments of pro-life movement.
• Analyze how the public’s attitude towards abortion has changed over the past 50 years.
• Is withholding access to abortions a violation of human rights?
• After week-long strikes, the Polish government has delayed its proposed abortion ban. Is this a victory for the local feminist movement?
• Compare and contrast the various legal abortion methods.
• Analyze A Defense of Abortion by Judith Jarvis Thomson.
• How is abortion viewed in Eastern vs. Western countries?
• Describe potential health issues surrounding late-term pregnancy terminations.
• How can we prevent unsafe abortions ?
• What complications can occur during the abortion process?
• Debate the impact of the March for Life.
• Discuss whether women should have an abortion if diagnostics show fetal abnirmalities.
• What does Planned Parenthood do, and why is the organization important?
• Should Helms Amendment be repealed?
• How does the Hyde Amendment impact women of color in particular?
• Is forcing a woman to carry out an undesired pregnancy morally permissible?
• Mexican newspaper coverage on issues surrounding abortions.
• What are the possible health consequences of an abortion?
• Reproductive justice and women of color: the history of SisterSong.
• Compare organizations that offer information on abortions.
• How is the topic of abortion approached in Jason Reitman’s film Juno ?

🙅‍♀️ Domestic Violence Topics for a Paper

Domestic violence comes in many shapes, and it’s not always directed against women. It traumatizes not only the victim but the whole family. The long-term impacts on the victims are catastrophic, too. If you want to write a research paper on this topic, be sure to steel yourself before starting your reading.

• How did the COVID-19 lockdowns influence domestic violence cases?
• Domestic violence in closed religious communities.
• Does the type of abuse differ if the perpetrator is a man or a woman?
• Compare the problem of spousal abuse in the US, Asia, and Africa.
• Why do many victims choose not to report their cases of domestic violence?
• From a psychological perspective, why does domestic violence happen?
• Domestic violence prevention : the role of parental communication.
• Should a person with a history of abuse have custody over their child?
• Why are men more likely to resort to violence than women?
• Identify risk factors that can lead to elder abuse.
• Trace how the frequency of reports on domestic violence has changed in your community over the past 30 years.

• Why do some victims choose to stay with their abusive partners?
• What actions would you classify as domestic abuse?
• Domestic violence and feminism in Bell Hooks’ theory.
• Cultural perspectives on domestic violence : Saudi Arabia vs. Japan.
• What do different religions say about IPV ?
• If a victim kills its abuser to escape the violence, what legal consequences should they face?
• Examine the legislature of different states concerning marital rape .
• The social and legal concept of consent in marriage.
• Domestic violence and integrity among women of color.
• Abuse in teenage relationships.
• Common psychological characteristics of a person who commits parricide.
• Effects of emotional neglect on a child’s mental development .
• Discuss the effectiveness of art therapy for victims of domestic violence.
• The significance of Oregon v. Rideout.
• Explore the link between spousal and animal abuse.
• What is the Battered Woman Syndrome?
• Analyze different forms of domestic violence using case studies.
• Study the psychology behind victim blaming.
• How do mental illnesses and domestic violence affect each other?
• What are the signs of coercive control? How can one get out of it?
• The problem of control in gay relationships.
• How does one develop Stockholm Syndrome, and what does it entail?
• Analyze the discourse surrounding domestic violence in Hong Kong.
• The pseudo-family as a sociological concept.
• Compare cases of domestic violence in military and religious families.
• What is compassionate homicide, and how does the law deal with it?
• If a juvenile delinquent was abused as a child, should that lessen their sentence?
• Parental abduction: why do parents feel the need to kidnap their children?
• Domestic violence: new solutions.
• Is one sibling bullying the other a form of domestic abuse?
• How do communities typically respond to domestic violence ?
• Explore the link between women’s suicide and abuse.
• What can healthcare specialists do to identify victims of violence more effectively?
• What are the economic and social consequences of leaving an abusive relationship ?
• How does Netflix’s show You portray the relationship between a stalker and his victim?
• Treatment of perpetrators of domestic violence .
• Why do some people repeatedly end up in relationships with IPV ?
• What are the main motives for femicides ?
• Discuss the psychological aggression men and women suffer during separation processes.

With all these great ideas in mind, you’re ready to ace your assignment. Good luck!

Further reading:

Get an originally-written paper according to your instructions!

• 560 Unique Controversial Topics & Tips for a Great Essay
• 480 Sociology Questions & Topics with Bonus Tips
• 182 Free Ideas for Argumentative or Persuasive Essay Topics
• A List of 450 Powerful Social Issues Essay Topics
• 147 Social Studies Topics for Your Research Project
• 255 Unique Essay Topics for College Students [Update]
• 229 Good Dissertation Topics and Thesis Ideas for Ph.D. & Masters
• 150 Argumentative Research Paper Topics [Upd.]
• Feminism: Encyclopedia Britannica
• Picking a Topic: University of Michigan-Flint
• Women’s History Milestones: History.com
• Women Rising: Women’s Activism That Has Shaped the World as You Know It: UN Women
• Topics in Feminism: The University of Sydney
• Four Waves of Feminism: Pacific University
• Feminist Philosophy: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Women’s Empowerment: BSR
• Women Empowerment: United Nations Populations Fund
• Women’s & Gender Studies Research Network: SSRN
• Gender Studies: UCLA
• Key Facts on Abortion: Amnesty.org
• Abortion Ethics: NIH
• New Perspectives on Domestic Violence: Frontiers
• Domestic Violence against Women: Mayo Clinic
• What Is Domestic Abuse?: United Nations
• Feminist Research: SAGE Publications Inc
• Topic Guide: Feminism: Broward College
• Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment: UN Women
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487 Feminism Essay Topics

Women make up half of the world’s population. How did it happen they were oppressed?

We are living in the era of the third wave of feminism, when women fight for equal rights in their professional and personal life. Public figures say that objectification and sexualization of women are not ok. Moreover, governments adopt laws that protect equal rights and possibilities for people of all genders, races, and physical abilities. Yes, it is also about feminism.

In this article, you will find 400+ feminism essay topics for students. Some raise the problems of feminism; others approach its merits. In addition, we have added a brief nuts-and-bolts course on the history and principal aspects of this social movement.

❗ Top 15 Feminism Essay Topics

• 💻 Feminism Research Topics
• 📜 History of Feminism Topics
• 🙋‍♀️ Topics on Feminism Movements

🔥 Famous Feminists Essay Topics

• 👩‍🎓 Topics on Women’s Rights in the World
• 👸 Antifeminism Essay Topics

📚 Topics on Feminism in Literature

🔗 references.

• Compare and contrast liberal and radical feminism.
• The problem of political representation of feminism.
• Is Hillary Clinton the most prominent feminist?
• How can feministic ideas improve our world?
• What is the glass ceiling, and how does it hinder women from reaching top positions?
• What can we do to combat domestic violence?
• Unpaid domestic work: Voluntary slavery?
• Why do women traditionally do social work?
• What are the achievements of feminism?
• Why is there no unity among the currents of feminism?
• Pornographic content should be banned in a civilized society.
• Does feminism threaten men?
• What is intersectional feminism, and why is it the most comprehensive feminist movement?
• Those who are not feminists are sexists.
• Why are women the “second gender?”

💻 Feminism Research Topics & Areas

Feminism is the belief in the equality of the sexes in social, economic, and political spheres. This movement originated in the West, but it has become represented worldwide. Throughout human history, women have been confined to domestic labor. Meanwhile, public life has been men’s prerogative. Women were their husband’s property, like a house or a cow. Today this situation has vastly improved, but many problems remain unresolved.

A feminism research paper aims to analyze the existing problems of feminism through the example of famous personalities, literary works, historical events, and so on. Women’s rights essay topics dwell on one of the following issues:

Healthcare & Reproductive Rights of Women

Women should be able to decide whether they want to have children or not or whether they need an abortion or not. External pressure or disapprobation is unacceptable. In many countries, abortions are still illegal. It is a severe problem because the female population attempts abortions without medical assistance in unhygienic conditions.

Economic Rights of Women

Women’s job applications are often rejected because they are expected to become mothers and require maternity leave. Their work is underpaid on a gender basis. They are less likely to be promoted to managerial positions because of the so-called “ glass ceiling .” All these problems limit women’s economic rights.

Women’s Political Rights

Yes, women have voting rights in the majority of the world’s countries. Why isn’t that enough? Because they are still underrepresented in almost all the world’s governments. Only four countries have 50% of female parliamentarians. Laws are approved by men and for men.

Family & Parenting

The British Office for National Statistics has calculated that women spend 78% more time on childcare than men. They also perform most of the unpaid domestic work. Meanwhile, increasingly more mothers are employed or self-employed. It isn’t fair, is it?

Virginity is a myth. Still, women are encouraged to preserve it until a man decides to marry her. Any expression of female sexuality is criticized (or “ slut-shamed “). We live in the 21st century, but old fossilized prejudices persist.

📜 History of Feminism Essay Topics

First wave of feminism & earlier.

• Ancient and medieval promoters of feminist ideas.
• “Debate about women” in medieval literature and philosophy.
• The emergence of feminism as an organized movement.
• Enlightenment philosophers’ attitudes towards women.
• The legal status of women in Renaissance.
• Women’s Liberation Movement Evolution in the US.
• Mary Wollstonecraft’s views on women’s rights.
• Sociopolitical background of the suffrage movement.
• The most prominent suffrage activists.
• The Liberation Theme Concerning Women.
• “Declaration of sentiments”: key points and drawbacks.
• What was special about Sojourner Truth and her famous speech?
• The significance of the first feminist convention in Seneca Falls.
• The National Woman Suffrage Association: goals and tactics.
• The influence of abolitionism on feminism ideas.
• Why did some women prefer trade unions to feminism?
• Radical feminists’ criticism of the suffrage movement.
• The UK suffragists’ approach to gaining voting rights for women.
• Alice Paul and Emmeline Pankhurst’s role in the suffrage movement.
• The Nineteenth Amendment: the essence and significance.
• Infighting in the post-suffrage era.

Second Wave of Feminism Essay Titles

• How did second-wave feminism differ from the suffrage movement?
• The roots of the second wave of feminism.
• John Kennedy’s policies concerning women’s rights.
• Eleanor Roosevelt’s contribution to feminism.
• Debates on gender equality in the late 1960s.
• Feminism activists’ achievements in 1960-1970.
• What was the focus of second-wave feminist research?
• Why was there no comprehensive feminist ideology?
• Anarcho-, individualist, “Amazon,” and separatist feminism: key ideas.
• The nature of liberal feminism.
• How did liberal and radical feminism differ?
• Why was cultural feminism also called “difference” feminism?
• Liberal and Postmodernist Theories of Feminism.
• What is the difference between liberal and radical feminism?
• Black feminists’ challenges and input to the fight for equity.
• Sociocultural differences in views on female liberation.
• The globalization of feminism: positive and negative aspects.
• Taliban’s oppression of Afghani women.
• Women in the US Military: World War II.
• What were the main concerns of feminists from developing countries?
• Why did Third World women criticize Western feminists?
• Feminism achievements to the end of the 20th century.

Third Wave of Feminism Research Topics

• What was peculiar about the third wave of feminism?
• Why did third-wave feminists consider their predecessors’ work unfinished?
• Social, political, economic, and cultural premises of third-wave feminism.
• How did the information revolution impact feminism?
• Third Wave Foundation’s major goals.
• Women’s Rights and Changes Over the 20th Century.
• Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards’ views on feminism.
• The impact of second wavers success on third-wave feminism.
• New approaches in fighting discrimination, utilized by third-wave feminists.
• The influence of the postmodern movement on feminism.
• The concept of a gender continuum.
• How did sexist symbols turn into female empowerment tools?
• What was specific about third-wave feminist art?
• Third-wavers’ redefinition of women as powerful and assertive figures.
• “Girl power” in pop culture.
• How did the Internet impact third-wave feminism?
• Sexualized behavior: sexual liberation or oppression in disguise?
• Why was third-wave feminism criticized?
• The multifaceted nature of third-wave feminism.
• Is multivocality a strength or weakness of third-wave feminism?
• How did third wavers counter the criticism?

Fourth Wave of Feminism Essay Topics

• The premises of fourth-wave feminism.
• Feminism’s major goals after 2012.
• Peculiarities of fourth-wave feminism.
• What behavior is sexual harassment?
• Gender Equality at the Heart of Development.
• Sexual harassment: different gender-based perspectives.
• Social media: a feminist tool.
• Can social media deepen discrimination?
• Gender discrimination in video games.
• Musical Preferences: Race and Gender Influences.
• GamerGate’s alleged “men’s rights campaign.”
• Sexism in Donald Trump’s speech.
• Women’s March: reasons and significance.
• Main steps in MeToo’s development.
• Tarana Burke’s fight for justice.
• Gender Stereotypes of Superheroes.
• MeToo’s contribution to women’s rights.
• The most impactful MeToo stories.
• Harvey Weinstein’s case: outcome’s implications.
• Gender Roles in the Context of Religion.
• Sexual harassment awareness after MeToo.
• MeToo’s influence on Hollywood’s ethics.
• Reasons for criticism of MeToo.
• Social Change and the Environment.
• Are sexual violence discussions necessary?

🙋‍ Argumentative Essay Topics on Feminism Movements

Mainstream feminism topics.

• What is the focus of mainstream feminism?
• Mainstream feminism predispositions in the 19th century.
• The place of politics within mainstream feminism.
• What is males’ place in mainstream feminism?
• The correlation of mainstream feminism and social liberalism.
• The correlation between mainstream feminism and state feminism.
• Gender equality in the doctrine of mainstream feminism.
• Why sunflower is the symbol of mainstream feminism?
• Anthony Gidden’s ideas regarding liberal feminism.
• Liberal feminism, according to Catherine Rottenberg.
• Mary Wollstonecraft and her vision of liberal feminism.
• Liberal feminism through John Stuart Mill’s perspective.
• Interdependence of mainstream feminism and political liberalism.
• NOW’s activities and mainstream feminism.
• LWV’s activities and mainstream liberalism.
• LGBT’s place in mainstream liberalism’s doctrine.
• Discourse Analysis of the Me Too Movement’s Media Coverage.
• Frances Wright’s role in establishing mainstream feminism.
• Mainstream feminism and the civil rights movement in the 1960s.
• Constitutional Equity Amendment and mainstream feminism.
• International Woman Suffrage Alliance’s activities and mainstream feminism.
• Mainstream feminism and Gina Krog’s works.
• Betty Friedan’s understanding of mainstream feminism.
• Gloria Steinem’s theoretical contribution to mainstream feminism.
• Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas and the framework of mainstream feminism.
• Rebecca Walker and her vision within the scope of mainstream feminism.
• NWPC’s activities and mainstream feminism.
• WEAL’s activities and mainstream feminism.
• Catherine Mackinnon and mainstream feminism’s critique.
• “White woman’s burden” and mainstream feminism’s critique.
• The roots of mainstream feminism in Europe.

Radical Feminism Essay Titles

• Society’s order according to radical feminism.
• Sexual objectification and radical feminism.
• Gender roles according to radical feminism.
• Shulamith Firestone’s ideas regarding the feminist revolution.
• Ti-Grace Atkinson’s ideas in Radical feminism.
• The vision of radical feminism on patriarchy.
• Radical feminism’s impact on the women’s liberation movement.
• Radical feminism’s roots in the early 1960s.
• Kathie Sarachild’s role in radical feminism movements.
• Carol Hanisch’s contribution to radical feminism.
• Roxanne Dunbar and her radical feminism.
• Naomi Weisstein and her vision of radical feminism.
• Judith Brown’s activities in terms of radical feminism.
• UCLA Women’s Liberation Front role in radical feminism.
• Why have women come to be viewed as the “other?”
• Ellen Willis’s ideas regarding radical feminism.
• Redstockings’ role in radical feminism.
• The feminist’s role in radical feminism.
• Differences between The Feminists’ and Restokings’ positions.
• The protest against Miss America in 1968.
• 11-hour sit-in at the Ladies Home Journal headquarters.
• Forms of direct action in radical feminism.
• Protest of biased coverage of lesbians in 1972.
• Lisa Tuttle’s vision of radical feminism.
• Catharine MacKinnon’s position regarding pornography.
• Peculiarities of radical lesbian feminism.
• Recognition of trans women in radical feminism.
• Radical feminism in the New Left.
• Mary Daly’s vision of radical feminism.
• Robin Morgan’s vision of radical feminism.

Other Interesting Feminism Essay Topics

• Ecofeminism’s role in feminism’s popularization.
• Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen, and ecofeminism.
• Petra Kelly’s figure in ecofeminism.
• Capitalist reductionist paradigm and ecofeminism.
• Ecofeminism. How does the movement interpret modern science?
• Essentials of vegetarian ecofeminism.
• Peculiarities of materialist ecofeminism.
• Interconnection between spiritual ecofeminism and cultural ecofeminism.
• Henry David Thoreau’s influence on ecofeminism.
• Aldo Leopold’s influence on ecofeminism.
• Rachel Carson’s influence on ecofeminism.
• The social construction of gender in post-structural feminism.
• Luce Irigaray as a post-structuralist feminist.
• Julia Kristeva’s contribution to post-structuralist feminism.
• Hélène Cixous and her activities as a post-structuralist feminist.
• L’Écriture feminine in feminist theory.
• Monique Wittig’s influence on post-structuralist feminism.
• Kimberlé Crenshaw’s views on intersectionality.
• Marxist feminist critical theory.
• Representational intersectionality in feminist theory.
• Marxism and Feminism: Similarities and Differences.
• Interlocking matrix of oppression.
• Standpoint epistemology and the outsider within.
• Resisting oppression in feminist theory.
• Women’s institute of science and feminism.
• Peculiarities of the Black feminist movement.
• Equity and race and feminism.
• Pamela Abbott’s ideas regarding postmodern feminism.
• Trans-exclusionary radical feminism today.
• Lipstick feminism’s ideas in the political context.
• Stiletto feminism and fetish fashion.
• Adichie’s proof that we should all be feminists.
• Analysis of Maya Angelou’s “And still I rise.”.
• Susan Anthony – the abolitionist movement’s champion.
• Maria Eugenia Echenique’s Contribution to Women’s Emancipation.
• Patricia Arquette’s arguments on the gender pay gap topic.
• Simone de Beauvoir’s role in feminism.
• Madonna’s contribution to the female sexuality argument.
• How did Clinton rebuild US politics?
• Davis’s opinion on feminism and race.
• Dworkin’s vision of a future society.
• Friedan and feminism’s second wave.
• Gay’s description of bad feminists.
• Ruth Ginsburg – first woman champion in law.
• Hook’s answer to “Is feminism for everybody”?
• Dorothy Hughes – feminist leader of the civil rights movement.
• Themes in Lessing’s The Golden Notebook.
• Lorde’s explorations of women’s identity.
• Mock’s role in transgender women’s equality movement.
• Page’s championship in feminism.
• Pankhurst’s arguments for women’s voting rights.
• Rhimes’ strong women image in Grey’s Anatomy.
• Sandberg’s opinion about female careers.
• Sanger’s feminist ideas’ contribution to happy families.
• Walker and her fight for women of color’s rights.
• Oprah Winfrey’s role in promoting feminism.
• Eleanor Roosevelt: history of the first politician – a woman.
• Mary Wollstonecraft’s ideas about female education.
• Youngest-ever Nobel laureate – Malala.
• Emma Watson’s path from actress to feminist.
• Why is Steinem’s name feminism synonymous?
• Truth’s life from an enslaved person to activist.

🎯 Persuasive Women’s Rights Essay Topics

Healthcare and reproductive rights of women.

• Is abortion morally acceptable?
• Why is the fight for child care not over?
• Should government participate in birth control?
• Researching of Maternity Care in Haiti.
• Government’s moral right to cancel abortions.
• Should the government allow abortions?
• What are birth control and its meaning?
• Abortion rights recently disappeared in the US.
• Gender Disparity in Colorectal Cancer Screening.
• Why are women’s rights becoming less vital?
• Western world’s degradation in women’s rights issue.
• Canceling abortion endangers women’s human rights.
• Female access to healthcare in developing countries.
• Developed countries’ role in improving women’s healthcare.
• Media’s contribution to legalizing abortions.
• Middle-Aged Women’s Health and Lifestyle Choices.
• Female genital mutilation’s moral side.
• Feminism’s impact on LGBTQ healthcare rights.
• The reproductive rights of women are everyone’s problem.
• Abortion rights’ impact on country’s economy.
• Protection From Infringement and Discrimination.
• Women’s reproductive rights in developing countries.
• Abortion rights crisis and the UN’s failure in achieving SDG#4.
• UN’s contribution to achieving equal healthcare rights.
• IGO’s impact on women’s reproductive rights issue.
• Report on the Speech by Gianna Jessen.
• Is birth control already at risk?
• Why should abortions not be allowed?
• Meaning of reproductive justice.
• Reproductive rights movement’s role in the country’s development.
• Single Mothers, Poverty, and Mental Health Issues.
• The reproductive rights movement, as all social movements’ drivers.
• Abortion’s relation to healthcare rights.
• Healthcare rights’ impact on a country’s economic development.
• Political agenda behind abortion cancellation.
• Feminism’s role in national healthcare.

Economic Rights, Salaries, and Access to Education for Women

• Definition of women’s economic rights.
• Female economic rights’ impact on the economy.
• Female economic rights and education.
• Gender Prevalence in Medical Roles.
• Can women do “male jobs”?
• Gender inequality in the workplace.
• Women’s economic rights movements.
• How Wealth Inequality Affects Democracy in America.
• Barriers to gender-equal economic rights.
• Gender inequality by social classes.
• Female economic rights and poverty.
• Can equal economic rights solve SDG#1?
• Gender-Based Discrimination in the Workplace.
• Why is it important to have equal access to education?
• How did the gender pay gap appear?
• Why does the gender pay gap exist?
• Women’s economic rights and industrialization.
• Characteristics of Mayo Clinic.
• Female economic rights worldwide.
• Legal rights of women workers.
• Laws that protect women’s economic rights.
• Women as leaders in the workplace.
• The Future of Women at Work in the Age of Automation.
• Why are companies against women workers?
• Fertility’s impact on female economic rights.
• Quiet revolution’s impact female workforce.
• Reasons to monitor occupational dissimilarity index.
• Women’s Roles in Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism.
• Female economic rights in developing countries.
• Democracy and female economic rights.
• Gender pay gap as a global problem.
• ILO’s role in the fight for equal economic rights?
• Politics’ impact on female economic rights.
• Health Disparities: Solving the Problem.
• Female economic rights movement and the fight against racism.
• The best practices in achieving gender-equal economic rights.
• Democracy and gender pay gap.
• Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value.

Women’s Political Rights Essay Topics

• Women’s suffrage movement definition.
• Female suffrage movement’s significance.
• Causes of gender inequality in politics.
• Women’s suffrage movement’s role today.
• Female suffrage’s impact on democracy.
• Women’s suffrage and economy.
• Suffrage movement’s effect on politics in the US.
• Do women need the right to vote?
• Effects of gender inequality on politics.
• Suffrage movement and politics in Britain.
• Laws for gender-equal political rights.
• The correlation between gender inequality in politics and authoritarianism.
• The possible solutions to gender inequality in politics.
• The role of IGOs in solving gender inequality in politics.
• How has the UN participated in the women’s suffrage movement?
• What is women’s role in politics in developing countries?
• How can women improve politics in their countries?
• What can men do for women’s equal political rights?
• Why equal rights to vote are everyone’s problem?
• The impact of Antoinette Louisa Brown on women’s suffrage.
• The effect of equal rights to education on equal political rights.
• Are western policies for equal rights applicable in developing countries?
• The importance of equal rights to vote.
• How to eliminate the gender pay gap?
• Why had women not had equal rights in politics?
• Is politics a “male job”?
• Benefits of appearance of female leaders in politics.
• Who created the women’s suffrage movement?
• How does women’s suffrage impact racism?
• Women’s suffrage contribution to LGBTQ communities’ equal political rights.

Family and Parenting Research Titles

• Female and male roles in a family.
• Sexism in families.
• Eliminating sexism in families is the best solution to gender inequality.
• Why is feminism a pro-family movement?
• The Childbirth Process in Women’s Experiences.
• The benefits of feminist upbringing.
• The causes of sexism in families.
• How does feminism help LGBTQ parents?
• Why should sexism be legally banned?
• Healthcare Resources and Equity in Their Distribution.
• The effects of sexism in families.
• The influence of sexist customs on society.
• Why should every family be feminist?
• How can feminism help solve the domestic violence issue?
• Government’s role in creating feminist families.
• What is feminist family value?
• The relation of authoritarian parent-paradigm on politics.
• Can feminist families bring democracy?
• Teaching feminism at home vs. at school.
• Traditional vs. Feminist parenting.
• Why should women have the right to be child-free?
• The impact of bringing up feminist daughters.
• Can feminist parents bring up mentally healthy children?
• Does the government have a moral right to endorse feminist values?
• The role of media for feminist families.
• How does feminism transform parent-child relationships?
• Can feminism help families overcome poverty?
• The role of feminist families in the economy.
• The influence of hierarchal husband-wife relationships on children.
• Do IGOs have moral rights to intervene in feminist families?
• The movements endorsing feminism in families.
• The effect of different views on feminism in parents on children.

Sexuality Essay Ideas

• The views of radical feminists on women’s sexuality.
• Who are sex-positive feminists, and their values?
• Feminism’s impact on sexual orientation.
• The role of feminism in sexual identity matters.
• Gender-Based Violence Against Women and Girls.
• How does feminism help eliminate sexual violence?
• What is harassment, and why are feminists fighting it?
• The role of media in women’s sexuality.
• Traditional views on women’s sexuality.
• How is feminism transforming sexuality?
• Domestic Violence and COVID-19 Relation.
• What are feminist sex wars?
• Why are some feminists against pornography?
• What are pro-pornography feminist arguments?
• How is feminism protecting the rights of sex workers?
• Rights of sex workers in developed vs. developing countries.
• Media Promotion of Cosmetic Surgery in Women.
• Feminist critique of censorship.
• What is behind the issue of sex trafficking?
• Children’s rape problem and feminism.
• The role of feminism in solving the sex trafficking problem.
• The Influence of the Women Image in the Media.
• R v. Butler case discussion.
• How is pornography enhancing sexual objectification?
• How is poverty causing prostitution?
• Can feminism eliminate prostitution by solving poverty?
• Child Marriage in Egypt and Ways to Stop It.
• Pro-sex worker feminists and their beliefs.
• What are the perspectives of pro-sex workers?
• The consequences of violence against women.
• The role of feminism to LGBTQ sex workers.
• Why are feminists trying to decriminalize prostitution?
• Beauty Standards: “The Body Myth” by Rebecca Johnson.
• Prostitution in developed vs. developing countries.
• The effect of class and race differences on prostitution.
• Short- and long-term impacts on sex workers.

👩‍🎓 Essay Topics on Women’s Rights in the World

Essay topics on feminism in developing countries.

• Social taboos and abortion in Nigeria.
• Access to sexual healthcare in Asia.
• Human Papillomavirus Awareness in Saudi Women.
• Sexual health and access to contraception in developing countries.
• Coronavirus pandemic’s impact on gender inequalities.
• Health and education access for women in Afghanistan.
• Female Empowerment in the Islamic States.
• Does poverty result in increased sexual violence?
• Regulations on gender equality in developing countries.
• Unsafe abortion, contraceptive use, and women’s health.
• Female genital mutilation in the 21st century.
• Practicing female genital mutation in Africa.
• Gender Discrimination After the Reemergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
• Which countries have the highest gender gap?
• Forced and child marriages in humanitarian settings.
• The Taliban’s view: Is woman a property?
• Feminism in Latin America.
• Honor killing in Pakistan: 1000 women are killed annually.
• Women’s access to healthcare in Somalia.

Feminism Essay Topics in Developed Countries

• “Broken Rung” and the gender pay gap.
• What are the obstacles to reaching gender equality?
• Do gender stereotypes result in workplace discrimination?
• Increased educational attainment of young women.
• Culture: Women With Hijab in Western Countries.
• Ending sexual harassment and violence against women.
• Is sexual harassment a form of discrimination?
• Cracking the glass ceiling: What are the barriers and challenges?
• Domestic drama: The impact of sexual violence on women’s health.
• Socio-cultural Factors That Affected Sport in Australian Society.
• Feminism and the problem of misogyny.
• The challenges faced by women in developed counties.
• Female participation in the labor market.
• Discrimination Against Girls in Canada.
• Unequal pay for women in the workplace.
• How do developed countries improve women’s rights?
• Nations with strong women’s rights.
• Women’s employment: Obstacles and challenges.

👸 Antifeminist Essay Topics

• Antifeminism: The right to abortion.
• Gender differences in suicide.
• Manliness in American culture.
• Antifeminism view: Men are in crisis.
• The threats of society’s feminization.
• The meaning of antifeminism across time and cultures.
• Antifeminism attracts both men and women.
• Gender and Science: Origin, History, and Politics.
• Antifeminism: The opposition to women’s equality?
• How do religious and cultural norms formulate antifeminism?
• Saving masculinity or promoting gender equality?
• Traditional gender division of labor: Fair or not?
• Are feminist theories of patriarchy exaggerated?
• Oppression of men in the 21st century.
• Psychological sex differences and biological tendencies.
• Does feminism make it harder for men to succeed?
• The change of women’s roles: Impact on the family.
• How were traditional gender roles challenged in modern culture?
• History of antifeminism: The pro-family movement.
• Religion and contemporary antifeminism.
• Antifeminist on the rights of minorities.
• Heterosexual and patriarchal family: Facts behind antifeminism.
• Women against feminism in Western countries.
• Feminism versus humanism: What is the difference?
• Does feminism portray women as victims?
• Same-sex marriage: The dispute between feminists and antifeminists.
• Male-oriented values of religions and antifeminism.
• Does antifeminism threaten the independence of women?
• Men’s rights movement: Manosphere.
• Does antifeminism refer to extremism?
• The fear of being labeled as a feminist.
• A Vindication of the Right of Woman by Mary Wollstonecraft.
• Jane Austen: Criticism of inequitable social rules.
• Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley: Frankenstein and aborted creations.
• Undercutting female stereotypes in Jane Eyre.
• “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body” by Marion.
• Oppression of woman’s traditional roles in The Awakening.
• Virginia Woolf and her feminism.
• Orlando: A Biography. Evolving from man to woman.
• Harriet Jacobs’s Experiences as an Enslaved Black Woman.
• Feminist criticism: A Room of One’s Own.
• Social oppression in Three Guineas by Woolf.
• Rape, illegitimacy, and motherhood in The Judge by Rebecca West.
• Feminist utopias of Charlotte Perkins Gilman.
• Women’s rights and societal reform views of Charlotte Perkins Gilman.
• Feminist critics in a culture dominated by men.
• Black women’s aesthetic in Their Eyes Were Watching God.
• Alice Walker’s ideas on Feminist women of color.
• Female sexuality in Fear of Flying by Erica Jong.
• How do feminist novels address race and ethnicity?
• Social and emotional pressures in Love Medicine by Erdrich.
• Feminist Parenting: The Fight for Equality at Home – Psychology Today
• Feminist Parenting: An Introduction – Transformation Central Home
• Women’s suffrage – Britannica
• Only half of the women in the developing world are in charge of their own bodies – Reuters
• Gender Equality for Development – The World Bank
• How #MeToo revealed the central rift within feminism today – The Guardian
• Feminist Novels and Novelists – Literary Theory and Criticism
• Health Care & Reproductive Rights – National Women’s Law Center

A Poet on Taylor Swift’s Complicated Embrace of Tortured Poets

W ho was the first tortured poet? Maybe the ancient Egyptian who wrote, sometime in the 15th century BCE, "My beloved stirs my heart with his voice. He causes illness to seize me.... My heart is smitten." Maybe the poet Catullus, whose heartbreaks lit up ancient Rome: "I hate and love," he explained in Latin, "and it's excruciating," or (depending on the translator) "it crucifies me." Petrarch's sonnets, in 14th century Italy, complained that love both scorched and chilled. Mary Wroth, a contemporary of Shakespeare, agreed: love made her "burn and yet freeze: better in hell to be."

All those poets felt tortured by erotic love—and their strife sometimes hurt other people, too, if they came too close. The trope of the tortured poet whose gifts would destroy him (or, less often, her) came about later, when European writers began to see poets as especially sensitive, anguished, or fragile. "We poets in our youth begin in gladness," William Wordsworth mused in 1802, "But thereof in the end come despondency and madness." That second line lengthens as if unfolding hard truth. A genuine poet in France might be a "poète maudit" ("cursed poet"), like Charles Baudelaire or Arthur Rimbaud, marked by fate, mental illness, or alcohol addiction. By the 20th century the type (or stereotype, really) could fit all manner of wild and self-destructive creators, especially men, from Dylan Thomas to the Doors' Jim Morrison.

By calling her new album The Tortured Poets Department, Taylor Swift points back to this tradition. She also makes fun of it, comments on it, and rejects it, as the prose that accompanied the album implies. "There is nothing to avenge, no scores to settle once wounds have healed," Swift wrote in an Instagram post. "Our tears become holy in the form of ink on a page. Once we have spoken our saddest story, we can be free of it."

Seeing her work as ink on a page, not only as song in the air, Swift claims herself as a literary writer—the modern age’s most notorious poet. Fans first speculated that she appropriated the "tortured" mantle from the group chat co-run by her ex-boyfriend Joe Alwyn, which Alwyn called "The Tortured Man Club.” Could be—but it’s so much more than that, and it might also point to other recent relationships . Taylor creates some distance between herself and the stereotype she invokes. "You're not Dylan Thomas, I'm not Patti Smith," Swift's title track declares. "This ain't the Chelsea Hotel. We're modern idiots." He's not that gifted, and she's not that dramatic. Or rather she's dramatic in a different, far more deliberate way: one that fits her own, always thoughtful, but rarely raw, art.

Read More: All the References in Taylor Swift’s Title Track ‘The Tortured Poets Department’

Swift also takes back for herself—and for other women artists—the power that supposedly comes from chronic distress, from feeling like a tortured mess. "You wouldn't last an hour in the asylum where they raised me," Swift warns on "Who's Afraid of Little Old Me?" If she feels tortured and reacts with poetry, that's not endemic to poets; it's the logical consequence of a romance gone wrong and a live lived in public. "I was tame, I was gentle till the circus life made me mean,” she sings. “You caged me and then you called me crazy/ I am what I am 'cause you trained me.”

But if Swift has become the chair of the Tortured Poets Department, she didn't get there by being born this way: the rest of the department did it to her. Her barbed words, sharp hooks, and sarcastic replies are more like Wroth's burning and freezing than they are like Baudelaire's doom. They share, and make fun, of her own emotional extremes. "Whether I'm gonna be your wife or gonna smash up your bike I don't know yet," she explains on “imgunnagetyouback,” punningly. "But I'm gonna get you back”—either get you to come back to me, or get back at you. Her phrases present a feminist revenge, turning her pain into (what else?) song. "I cry a lot but I am so productive it's an art," she croons on one of the most upbeat new tracks “I Can Do It With a Broken Heart.” "You know you're good when you can even do it with a broken heart."

Like all Swift's albums, The Tortured Poet Department contains multitudes and multiple takes on the same situation, just as it contain several pop styles, from the 1980s-style synths in the album’s single “Fortnight,” composed with Post Malone, to the acoustic guitar and string sweeps of "The Albatross," created with reference to Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Wordsworth's ex-friend, a self-sabotaging poet for the ages). In "But Daddy I Love Him" Swift strikes back, with extra reverb, at fans who insist on telling her who to date and how. In "Down Bad" she encapsulates her toughest, most immature moments in elegant half-rhyme: "everything comes out teenage petulance. I might just die, it would make no difference." But Swift for most of the album, for all her passion and all her pain, knows better than to blow up her life for love. Like her character in "The Bolter," she knows how to save herself, even when love feels like drowning.

The tortured modern poet—the poète maudit—the trope that Swift's new album takes up and plays with and against, remains a powerful metaphor (she is no authority on literal torture, and never pretends to be one). Listeners who have been sorting through The Tortured Poets Department since both halves of it dropped, two hours apart, have already found our own favorites, mirrors for our own falls through thin ice.

Read More: Taylor Swift Is Embracing the 5 Stages of Grief. Should You?

It's surprising, even staggering, to see the range of her responses to love, to poetry, and to "torture." Sometimes she magnifies, even celebrates, her own and her characters' emotional turmoil. Other times (as in the title track) she makes fun of the way they, as would-be "tortured poets," cannot get out of their own heads. And sometimes—to quote another poet, William Butler Yeats—she mocks mockers after that, telling us to stop telling her what to do.

Always, though, she shows us the craft she shares with the great poets, and songwriters, of times past: the ability, as Yeats also put it, "to articulate sweet sounds together," and to "work harder than all these"—harder than anybody—at turning all those feelings into art.

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